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What accounted for the transformation of historic international orders such as that of 
Medieval Latin Christendom and the suzerain state system of nineteenth century East 
Asia? And what can the demise of both of these orders tell us about the modern state 
system’s present condition and long-term prospects? This dissertation engages these 
questions by undertaking a macro-historical investigation of the transformation of 
international orders from the Protestant Reformation through to the present era.  I 
argue that international orders consist of constellations of constitutional norms and 
fundamental institutions through which cooperation is cultivated and conflict 
contained between different political communities.  International orders rest on 
authoritative forms of power deriving from shared conceptions of the good, as well as 
coercive forms of power inhering in dominant forms of legitimate organized violence. 
These orders are transformed when pre-existing patterns of institutional decay 
intersect with systemic ideological schisms and dramatic material increases in the 
scale and scope for violence between political communities.  
 This argument is tested through a consideration of two epochal transitions in 
world history, specifically the emergence of the Westphalian state system from 
Christendom’s ashes in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the nineteenth 
century destruction of the East Asian Sinosphere and the region’s subsequent 
incorporation into a Western-dominated sovereign state system.  In both cases, I 
demonstrate that international orders were transformed as a result of coherent 
conjunctures of institutional decay, religiously inspired ideological challenges to the 
old order, and destabilizing increases in violence interdependence occasioned 
respectively by the European military revolution and the nineteenth century 
industrialization of war. I then identify analogous subversive processes now active 
within the contemporary state system, before identifying measures that must be taken 
if the state system is to avoid its predecessors’ sorry fate.  These findings carry 
important implications for our understanding of the nature of international order, the 
dynamics of international systems change, the trajectory of global political evolution 
from 1500 CE to the present, and the long-term viability of a universal system of 
sovereign states.   
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 1
INTRODUCTION 
 
International orders do not last forever.  Throughout history, rulers have sought to 
imbue relations between different political communities with a measure of peace and 
stability. From Rome’s dominion over the Mediterranean in late antiquity through to 
China’s maintenance of an East Asian suzerain state system as recently as the late 
nineteenth century, international order has most often been secured via the institution 
of empire. The Greek city-states, their Renaissance counterparts, and the protean form 
of state system that existed in China during the Period of Warring States stand as 
historical examples of alternative forms international order organized around the 
framework of sovereign state systems. The papal-imperial diarchy that prevailed in 
Latin Christendom from the eleventh century to the early sixteenth century provides 
yet a third form of international order, which was neither imperial nor sovereign but 
rather heteronomous in its ordering principles.  
 Their great differences notwithstanding, two features unite the international 
orders mentioned above. Firstly, in each instance, order was secured among political 
communities through the mobilization of both authoritative and coercive forms of 
power. Both practices of communicative action and authorized practices of organized 
violence have worked in uneasy combination to cultivate cooperation between polities 
while limiting conflicts between them within manageable bounds. Secondly, 
regardless of their level of ideological integration or institutional sophistication, each 
of the aforementioned orders eventually proved finite. Much like the polities that 
inhabit them, international orders are fragile and provisional creations, and are 
continuously susceptible to processes of decay culminating in the possibility of 
dissolution. The fall of Rome, the end of the Respublica Christiana, and the collapse 
of the late imperial Sinosphere all testify to the impermanence of international orders. 
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Equally, the sorry fate of orders past should remind us of the fragility of the 
contemporary world order, and caution against the belief that history has definitively 
ended with the emergence of a universal system of sovereign nation-states. 
 What are international orders, how are they transformed, and is the 
contemporary world order on the cusp of fundamental change? These are the three 
questions that drive this inquiry.  The problem of order has long preoccupied 
international relations theorists, who have acknowledged both the necessity and the 
frailty of ordering institutions in the formally anarchic realm of world politics.1  With 
the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing war on terror, the fragility of institutions first forged 
in the twentieth century to combat the horrors of the total state and total war has 
become painfully apparent, prompting renewed speculation about the state system’s 
future.2  In this study, I bring a new perspective to debates on international systems 
change by anchoring them firmly within a comparative historical account of the 
transformation of international orders. My concerns in undertaking this study are at 
once theoretical, practical and ethical in nature.  
 Theoretically, the discipline’s focus on the problem of achieving order in 
world politics inevitably invites two questions. Firstly, what is international order and 
how is it maintained? And secondly, how are international orders destabilized, 
contested, and ultimately transformed?  I engage with both of these questions in this 
study. In the last decade, several landmark constructivist studies have collectively 
enriched our understanding of international orders’ culturally and historically 
                                                 
1 The locus classicus on this subject remains Hedley Bull. The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in 
World Politics. London: MacMillan Press, 1995, but see also John A. Hall. International Orders. 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996; and Martin Wight. Systems of States. London: Leicester University 
Press, 1977. 
2See for example the collection of essays in Ken Booth, and Tim Dunne, eds. Worlds in Collision: 
Terror and the Future of Global Order. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002. See also Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, 
and Nicholas Rennger. "Apocalypse Now? Continuities or Disjunctions in World Politics after 9/11." 
International Affairs 82, no. 3 (2006): 539-52. 
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contingent character. 3 However, while these studies have undermined the sparse and 
asocial conceptions of the international realm that were previously dominant within 
the discipline, they nevertheless serve as both foils as well as inspirations in the 
following pages. For while I re-affirm constructivist insights regarding international 
orders’ socially constructed character, I also seek to correct what I regard as the 
excessive idealism (in both senses of the term) of constructivist accounts of 
international orders’ constitution and transformation.  Practices of communicative 
action and shared rules, norms, laws, and authoritative institutions are undoubtedly 
crucial in sustaining international order. But international order is equally sustained by 
corresponding practices of legitimate organized violence.  In placing disproportionate 
emphasis on the former to the neglect of the latter, I maintain that existing 
constructivist accounts have provided us with an artificially bloodless account of 
international orders’ constitution and operation. Conversely, in according equal 
significance to authoritative and coercive institutions, I aim to provide a more 
comprehensive conception of international orders that more accurately captures the 
paradoxical essence of international politics, as a realm in which the struggle for 
power and the pursuit of the good remain irreducibly important and unavoidably 
intertwined spheres of action. 
 On the question, ‘what are international orders?’, this study is thus intended as 
both a vindication as well as a qualification of existing constructivist accounts. My 
argument vindicates constructivist claims concerning the centrality of systemic 
                                                 
3See Mlada Bukovansky. Legitimacy and Power Politics - The American and French Revolutions in 
International Political Culture. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002; Rodney Bruce Hall. 
National Collective Identity: Social Constructs and International Systems. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1999; Daniel Philpott. Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern 
International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001; and Christian Reus-Smit. The 
Moral Purpose of the State - Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International 
Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999. 
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normative structures and authoritative institutions in constituting international orders. 
However, I also qualify these claims by illustrating the necessity of supplementing 
these institutions with authorized practices of organized violence. Far from being 
novel, the acknowledgment that international order is sustained through both 
authoritative and coercive institutions finds antecedents in both classical realism and 
also within the English School tradition.4 One of my core goals in this dissertation is 
to flesh out this insight by demonstrating the mutual indispensability of orders’ 
authoritative and coercive institutions, as well as identifying their common origins in 
shared identities and overarching beliefs about the underlying purpose of collective 
association.    
 In affirming international orders’ culturally and historically contingent 
character, my account necessarily emphasizes their distinctiveness from one another. 
Nevertheless, as I seek to account not merely for orders’ constitution but also for their 
transformation, I have also sought to identify the common dynamics operative across 
my cases that have precipitated international orders’ demise.  For international 
relations scholars, the ‘short’ twentieth century (1914-1991) continues to cast a long 
shadow, with the cataclysm of 1914-1945 providing the catalyst for the establishment 
of international relations as an academic discipline.  However, while it was singular in 
its destructive scale, the crisis that engulfed the world during this period was far from 
exceptional in its essential character. On the contrary, the conjuncture of ideological 
schism, institutional breakdown, and pervasive civil and international warfare that 
characterized the ‘thirty years crisis’ finds jarring historical parallels elsewhere. These 
                                                 
4To cite but one famous example, in Bull’s classic analysis of the modern state system, he explicitly 
identifies war as a key ordering institution in world politics, arguing thus: ‘From the perspective of 
international society, war retains its dual aspect: on the one hand, a threat to be limited and contained; 
on the other, an instrumentality to be harnessed to international society’s purposes.’  See Bull, The 
Anarchical Society, p. 191. Bull’s recognition of war’s paradoxical character – alternating at different 
times as a source of order and disorder – can be more generally applied to characterize the dominant 
coercive practices operative within the international orders considered in this dissertation.  
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parallels suggest the possibility of more systematically drawing out the common 
processes underpinning ostensibly disparate episodes of international systems change. 
In illuminating these commonalities, I seek to contribute our understanding of the 
structural drivers propelling the transformation of international orders. Additionally, I 
also hope to provide some insight into the strategies undertaken by agents that may 
either forestall or accelerate processes of systemic change. 
 Whereas my analysis of international orders’ constitution is intended as 
simultaneously a confirmation and corrective to established constructivist studies on 
international order, my points of reference on the question of orders’ transformation 
are more eclectic. For while constructivists have made convincing arguments 
regarding the centrality of ideational factors in driving great transformations in 
international politics, these insights have recently been complemented by the works of 
scholars who have alternatively stressed the materialist and institutional dimensions of 
international political change. In addition to the constructivist scholars cited above, my 
thinking on processes of systemic change has been heavily influenced by these more 
recent contributions, most particularly by the arguments of Daniel Deudney and 
Daniel Nexon.5  Given these eclectic influences, my task in conceptualizing the 
dynamics of international orders’ transformation has been one of synthesis and 
integration rather than either the outright ratification or refutation of existing 
frameworks. Accordingly, the explanation I advance accords equal primacy to the 
ideational, institutional and material drivers of international systems change, offering 
an account that remains sensitive to the particularities of each case, while nevertheless 
                                                 
5See Daniel Deudney. Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global 
Village. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007; and Daniel Nexon. Religion and the Fate of 
Empires in Early Modern Europe. Ph.D. thesis, New York, NY, Department of Political Science, 
Columbia University, 2004. 
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identifying a common causal constellation underpinning otherwise disparate episodes 
of international order transformation.     
 Beyond the theoretical questions of order constitution and transformation 
outlined above, important practical and ethical concerns also motivate this inquiry. At 
the practical level, this study is driven by the strategic necessity of better 
comprehending the present global security environment. This environment has been 
radically reshaped in recent decades by processes such as the growth of transnational 
terrorism, the rise of religious fundamentalism, widespread post-colonial state failure, 
and the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction to both state and non-state actors.  In 
the wake of 9/11, many commentators and some governments have invoked these 
security challenges to argue that ‘the world has changed’.6 These narratives of 
transformation have often been accompanied by claims that the new security 
challenges demand both fundamental revisions in the practice of sovereignty, as well 
as a relaxation of norms governing the use of force if international order is to be 
maintained.7 Conversely, the international community’s rapid post-9/11 counter-
mobilization against Al Qaeda provides suggestive evidence that the state system may 
be capable of responding to the new security challenges without fundamentally 
compromising its essentially liberal constitutional principles.8  The events of recent 
years have thus accorded far greater practical urgency to debates on international 
                                                 
6See for example Ludger Kuhnhardt. "Global Society and Its Enemies: 9/11 and the Future of Atlantic 
Civilisation." Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 4, no. 2 (2003): 157-72. The influential 
official transformationalist conception of the post 9/11 world remains that outlined in the United States’ 
2002 National Security Strategy. See generally The National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America, 2002 [cited October 30, 2007]. Available from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss.pdf   
7From a neoconservative perspective, see for example David Frum, and Richard Perle. An End to Evil - 
How to Win the War on Terror. New York: Random House, 2003; and more generally Charles 
Krauthammer. "The Unipolar Moment Revisited." The National Interest (2002/03): 5-17. From a liberal 
perspective, see for example Lee Feinstein, and Anne-Marie Slaughter. "A Duty to Prevent." Foreign 
Affairs 83, no. 1 (2004): 136-50; and Allen Buchanan, and Robert O. Keohane. "The Preventive Use of 
Force: A Cosmopolitan Institutional Proposal." Ethics and International Affairs 18, no. 1 (2004): 1-22. 
8On this point, see generally Barak Mendelsohn. Jihadism, International Society, and Interstate 
Cooperation. Ph.D. thesis, Ithaca, NY: Department of Government, Cornell University, 2006.  
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systems change than existed previously, with the perils of alarmism and complacency 
each presenting their own dangers for the would-be custodians of international order. 
Whether or not world leaders will effectively adapt to the new security environment 
depends largely on their ability to first comprehend the origins, nature, and magnitude 
of emerging threats. In situating contemporary developments within a larger historical 
frame, I hope to both more effectively highlight the extensive decay that has already 
beset the global state system, as well as delineate with greater precision the vectors of 
change with which the international community will need to contend if the present 
world order is to be preserved.  
 Finally, this project is framed by an ethical concern for the future of the global 
state system. As my historical cases demonstrate, the transformation of international 
orders has traditionally been associated with massive social dislocation, seismic shifts 
in cultural and intellectual landscapes, cataclysmic physical destruction, and loss of 
life on a mass scale.  In early modern Europe, the century of conflict inaugurated by 
the Reformation unleashed death and destruction on a scale that remained unsurpassed 
until the advent centuries later of industrialized total warfare.9  The nineteenth century 
collapse of the Sinosphere was similarly traumatic. Hastened by the millenarian 
Taiping rebellion, a catastrophe that by itself claimed approximately twenty million 
lives, the collapse of the Sinosphere plunged the region into over a century of 
violence, which arguably concluded only with the end of the Indochina wars and 
China’s post-Mao reintegration into global political and economic structures in the last 
decades of the twentieth century. 
 Unlike either sixteenth century Christendom or the nineteenth century 
Sinosphere, the global state system is not on the brink of transformation. Nevertheless, 
                                                 
9On the extremely high frequency and intensity of war in Europe in the sixteenth and particularly the 
seventeenth centuries, see Jack Levy. War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975. Lexington: 
The University Press of Kentucky, 1983, pp. 139-144. 
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it would be dangerous to take false comfort from this observation. For like its 
predecessors, the global state system has already demonstrated signs of decay that may 
herald the corrosion of its governing principles if left unchecked.  Like all 
international orders, the present world order is far from perfect, with its liberal 
legitimating values finding partial and uneven realisation in the actual practice of 
global politics.  Yet for all of its imperfections, the international order forged after 
World War II institutionalized a host of moral advances that are worthy of 
preservation. The global generalization of the sovereignty regime; the 
institutionalization of norms of non-aggression and non-intervention; the articulation 
of human rights covenants curbing the arbitrary exercise of state power – each of these 
are justly celebrated as having contributed to international stability in the post-war era.  
However, in the face of endemic state failure, an unprecedented spread of destructive 
capabilities to anti-systemic state and non-state actors, and the waxing of religious 
fundamentalist resistance to the present world order, the long-term durability of these 
principles is far from assured.  In emphasizing the impermanence of past orders and 
the fragility of the present one, I hope to lend added urgency to the search for solutions 
to contemporary threats that reconcile the timeless desire for order with the more 
historically contingent task of preserving the liberal principles upon which the present 
world order has been built. 
 
The Argument 
 
Conceptual Building Blocks 
 
 Already, I have introduced concepts into this discussion that demand 
definition. The most important of these is the concept of international orders.  
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International orders are defined here as the constellation of constitutional norms and 
fundamental institutions through which cooperation is cultivated and conflict 
contained between different political communities. This conception of international 
order, incorporating both ideational and institutional components, is consistent with 
that advanced by many constructivist scholars of international systems change.10 
Nevertheless, my conception of international orders differs from that of most 
constructivists in two ways.  Firstly, while the focus of my attention lies with the 
order-producing norms and institutions that define international orders, I also 
acknowledge that international orders depend at least partially on the continued 
existence of a permissive order-enabling material context.  This acknowledgement 
informs my argument that transformations of international order are propelled by a 
combination of ideational and material forces, rather than being driven by the force of 
revolutionary ideas alone.  
  Secondly, I argue that international orders are inherently dualistic in their 
constitution, incorporating both positive and negative (or alternatively, Aristotelian 
and Augustinian) dimensions into their animating purposes. On the one hand, 
international orders seek to advance a normatively thick and culturally and historically 
contingent conception of the good. The moral values that inform this conception of the 
good inevitably reflect the perspectives of the dominant actors within international 
orders. However, in stable orders these values and purposes generally secure wide 
assent among the order’s constituent polities. Simultaneously, however, I argue that 
international orders are also dedicated to the more basic objective of containing 
violent conflict between different polities within manageable bounds.  By necessity, 
these positive and negative dimensions of international order inform one another, an 
                                                 
10See for example Hall, National Collective Identity; Philpott. Revolutions in Sovereignty; and Reus-
Smit. The Moral Purpose of the State. 
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observation that is reflected in the fundamental institutions of international orders. 
International orders are sustained through a combination of authoritative institutions, 
which attract agents’ compliance through their concordance with shared standards of 
legitimacy, and coercive institutions, which compel agents’ compliance through the 
application of authorized practices of organized violence. In giving equal primacy to 
authoritative and coercive institutions in sustaining international orders, I hope to 
‘bring violence back in’ to accounts of international systems change, without 
abandoning constructivists’ emphasis on the centrality of shared legitimacy concepts 
in conditioning the purposes and institutional forms of international orders. 
 International orders can be distinguished from one another along the following 
axes: (a) principle of differentiation – the organizing principle (e.g. heteronomy, 
sovereignty, or suzerainty) that governs relations of authority between different 
political communities; (b) purposive orientation –the particular conception of the good 
that an international order seeks to advance; (c) institutional form – the precise 
combination of authoritative and coercive institutions that an international order relies 
upon to promote cooperation and contain enmity between its constituent communities; 
and (d) distribution of capabilities – the distribution of material capabilities 
(particularly capabilities for organized violence) among the different political actors 
inhabiting a given international order. These axes of comparison inform my 
conceptualization of different types of international systems change.  At the lowest 
level of magnitude, international orders may be buffeted by instances of positional 
change, whereby the relative distribution of power and prestige between different 
political units is altered (either by diplomatic re-alignments or by war), but in which 
an international order’s institutional forms, its purposive orientation, and its principle 
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of unit differentiation remain unchanged.11  France’s relative decline vis-à-vis Great 
Britain following the Seven Years’ War, which marked a dramatic shift in the global 
balance of power without witnessing any fundamental alteration in the international 
order of the ancien regime, stands as a clear example of positional change. At a higher 
level of magnitude, one finds instances of institutional change, entailing significant 
revisions to the fundamental authoritative and/or coercive institutions by which 
international order is maintained. In the twentieth century, an example of authoritative 
institutional change would be the establishment of permanent universal conferences of 
states, in both 1918 and 1945, as a key authoritative mechanism of order maintenance. 
Similarly, the rise of practices of forcible humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold 
War period stands as an embryonic example of shifts in the scope and purpose of war 
as a coercive institution dedicated to the purpose of order preservation.12  
 Higher up on the spectrum of international systems change, one finds instances 
of purposive change, whereby the principle of unit differentiation remains constant, 
but in which both the conception of the good informing international order and the 
institutional forms dedicated to its preservation undergo radical change.13 Within the 
history of the modern state system, purposive change is embodied most distinctly in 
                                                 
11My conception of positional change is roughly comparable to Robert Gilpin’s conception of systemic 
change, which he defines as entailing ‘…changes in the international distribution of power, the 
hierarchy of prestige, and the rights and rules embodied in the system…’; see Robert Gilpin. War and 
Change in World Politics. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 42. However, 
whereas Gilpin conflates changes in the international distribution of power and prestige with alterations 
in the rights and rules of the international system, thus assuming that changes in the distribution of 
power unproblematically translate into changes in rights and rules, I see the relationship between the 
two as being contingent rather than necessary, hence my distinction of positional from institutional 
change.  
12The expansion of practices of humanitarian intervention following the end of the Cold War and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union demonstrates that instances of institutional change may be enabled by 
permissive positional changes within an international order. They are not, however, logically dependent 
on positional changes, thus positional and institutional changes must be kept analytically separate from 
one another.   
13Both the distinction between purposive and configurative forms of systems change and the 
terminology distinguishing the two types are drawn from Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State, 
pp. 164-165.  
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the protracted transition from an Absolutist system of states grounded in monarchical 
sovereignty, to a modern system of states predicated on popular sovereignty.14 The 
magnitude of purposive changes in international order is clearly captured in the 
contrast between the radically different conceptions of the moral purpose of the state 
informing both sovereign state systems, as well as the different fundamental 
institutions developed in both systems to cultivate cooperation and contain enmity 
between their constituent polities. Finally, international orders may undergo episodes 
of configurative change, whereby an order’s principle of unit differentiation changes 
alongside its purposive orientation and ordering institutions. The transition from the 
heteronomous order of Latin Christendom to a Westphalian sovereign state system 
stands as the classic instance of configurative international systems change in modern 
European history. Beyond Europe, East Asia’s protracted transition from the suzerain 
state system of the Sinosphere towards incorporation into the global sovereign state 
system serves as an additional example of configurative change. Unless otherwise 
stated, when I refer to the transformation of international orders, this term refers to 
instances of configurative international systems change only.  
 Upon first glance, the three international orders considered in this study differ 
in profound ways. Latin Christendom, the Sinosphere, and the global state system are 
distinguishable most obviously on the basis of the distinct cultural and historical 
contexts out of which they emerged. Additionally, all three orders are notable for 
differences in their organizing principles – heteronomous in the case of Christendom, 
suzerain in the case of the Sinosphere, and sovereign in the case of the global state 
system. These differences notwithstanding, I argue that important commonalities unite 
my two historical cases, commonalities that are discernible also in a more muted form 
in the contemporary context. Specifically, I argue that both Christendom and the 
                                                 
14On this transition, see generally Ibid., chapter six.   
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Sinosphere were transformed by protracted crises driven by a combination of 
institutional decay and ideological schism, together with technological changes that 
radically increased the potential scale and scope for violent interactions within and 
between different political communities. While none of these factors by themselves 
accounted for transformations of international order, their combined influence in both 
of my historical cases worked to bring about configurative changes in the respective 
international orders governing Western Europe and East Asia. Equally, I maintain that 
this transformative triumvirate of forces is also observable within the global state 
system, suggesting that the present order’s indefinite survival cannot be guaranteed. 
Given the importance of these macro-processes to my argument, a brief definition of 
each is provided below.  
 In this study, the concept of institutional decay refers both to the declining 
effectiveness of an international order’s institutions in advancing its fundamental 
purposes, as well as to the diminishing legitimacy that the custodians of international 
order are able to attract as a result of this failure. Institutional decay thus refers to a 
decline in both the capacity and the legitimacy of the ordering institutions of a given 
international order. While the exact causes of institutional decay differ in each of my 
cases, the manifestations of decay are similar across each of them. These 
manifestations of institutional decay include rising ideological dissent, increasing 
popular dissatisfaction with existing governance structures, and a decrease in rulers’ 
ability to manage and contain violent conflicts within existing institutional forms.  
Institutional decay is generally protracted in character, and it provides the permissive 
context for the operation of the two macro-processes that then actively propel the 
order towards transformation. These processes are ideological schisms, and 
technologically driven increases in systemic violence interdependence.  
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 The term ideological schism refers here to the emergence of an anti-systemic 
ideology that emphatically repudiates the animating purposes and constitutional norms 
of the existing order. Anti-systemic ideologies subvert international order in two ways. 
Firstly, they destroy the normative consensus necessary to sustain the operation of 
ordering institutions, effectively paralysing collective capacities to manage and 
contain violent conflict. Secondly, the emergence of anti-systemic ideologies polarizes 
polities both internally and internationally between defenders and opponents of the 
existing order. The introduction of ideological antagonisms into social and geopolitical 
conflicts in turn radically intensifies these disputes, thus further accelerating the 
breakdown of the old order. In Latin Christendom, an ideological schism was 
precipitated with the outbreak of the Reformation, and culminated in the European 
Wars of Religion, which in turn catalysed the establishment of a modern sovereign 
state system. In East Asia, by contrast, the normative coherence of the Sinosphere was 
compromised by the intrusion of Western ‘standards of civilization’, before being 
challenged internally within the imperial core itself with the outbreak of the Taiping 
rebellion against China’s Confucian social order. In the contemporary state system, 
jihadist terrorism stands as the sharpest expression of religious fundamentalist hostility 
to the current world order, albeit one that has yet to acquire the broad social base 
necessary to seriously threaten the working of the state system’s ordering institutions 
in the near term.    
 The lethal interplay of institutional decay with ideological schism was 
compounded in each of my cases by technologically driven increases in the scale and 
scope for violent conflict both between and within an order’s constituent polities. For 
the sake of convenience, I refer to this phenomenon as an increase in violence 
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interdependence.
15   Increases in violence interdependence emerge in many instances 
as a byproduct of broader technological improvements, particularly in the areas of 
transportation and communication, which increase the scope for both peaceful and 
violent kinds of social interaction between polities. Nevertheless, central to the 
concept of violence interdependence is the parallel development of more destructive 
forms of war-making, together with their diffusion to a larger range of actors than 
existed previously. In Latin Christendom, increasing violence interdependence – in the 
form of the growth of large-scale commercial mercenarism and the introduction of 
gunpowder into European warfare – was already corroding the material foundations of 
the old order prior to the Reformation. Nevertheless, it was ultimately Christendom’s 
religious polarization combined with the advent of Europe’s first ‘military revolution’ 
that condemned Christendom to destruction.16  Similarly, in nineteenth century East 
Asia, international order had historically been predicated upon China’s uncontested 
hegemony as the most successful of the Old World ‘gunpowder empires’ to have 
emerged in the early modern period.17 The industrialization of warfare beginning in 
the mid to late nineteenth century finally permitted the Western Powers to force China 
open to foreign trade and cultural influences from the First Opium War onwards. This 
forced opening, and the social and economic destabilization that it wrought in southern 
China, in turn facilitated the Taiping millenarian challenge to imperial authority, a 
challenge that ultimately gutted the empire and thereby enabled East Asia’s forcible 
incorporation into a Western-dominated global state system. In the contemporary 
                                                 
15This concept of violence interdependence is borrowed directly from Daniel Deudney. Bounding 
Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2007, p. 18. The materialist dimension of my account of transformations of 
international order draws much of its inspiration from Deudney’s work in this area.  
16On the nature and consequences of Europe’s early modern military revolution, see generally Geoffrey 
Parker. The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West 1500-1800. 2nd ed. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
17The concept of ‘gunpowder empires’ is drawn from William H. McNeill. The Age of Gunpowder 
Empires 1450-1800. Washington DC: American Historical Association, 1989. 
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period, the processes of globalization, the information technology revolution, and the 
diffusion of dual-use technologies to state and non-state actors have already provided 
the permissive material context for jihadist terrorists to mount a low-level armed 
challenge to the existing world order. Should jihadists or other non-state actors 
succeed in acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction, I suggest that the resulting 
increase in violence interdependence could exert transformative effects on the global 
state system comparable to those witnessed in my historical cases of international 
systems change.  
 Transformations of international order are protracted episodes of historical 
change, with the movement from one order to another typically taking place over 
many decades. For example, the transition from Christendom to a Westphalian state 
system traced its beginnings to the late fifteenth century, but was really only complete 
with the onset of the Age of Absolutism after 1660. Similarly, the Sinosphere’s 
decline arguably began with the death of the Qian Long emperor and the onset of the 
White Lotus rebellion in the late eighteenth century, and concluded at the earliest with 
the re-establishment of a functioning central state in China in 1949. Given the nature 
of the subject matter, taking a ‘God’s eye view’ on transformations of international 
order and privileging structural variables over the agency of individual actors is 
potentially unavoidable. Nevertheless, while the following account places great 
emphasis on structural forces as catalysts for international systems change, I wish to 
stress from the outset the importance of actors’ agency in facilitating or inhibiting 
transformations of international order.  
 Institutional decay, ideological schisms, and increases in violence 
interdependence together place enormous stress on international orders. But these 
forces are together necessary rather than sufficient causes for international systems 
change. The example of the ‘thirty years crisis’ of 1914-1945, in which the global 
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state system was tested but not transformed by the breakdown of existing systems of 
collective security, the irruption of totalitarian challenges to liberalism, and the advent 
industrial total war, is illustrative of this broader point. Faced with the challenge of 
Nazi and Japanese imperialism, the Allied Powers succeeded not only in defeating 
Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan militarily, but also in reconstituting a post-war 
order that vigorously repudiated the moral visions of racist hierarchy underpinning 
Hitler and Tojo’s respective visions of world order. Similarly, the period 1789-1815, 
punctuated in Europe by ideological polarization, civil and international war, and the 
rise of the levee en masse, bore many of the hallmarks of a systemic crisis. But while 
the era of revolution did eventually yield a shift in the purposive foundations of the 
European state system, this transition was in many respects managed and moderated 
by Europe’s rulers over the course of several decades following the Congress of 
Vienna. The Concert of Europe and ‘old regime liberalism’ can be retrospectively read 
as the international and domestic faces of a grand strategy of ‘muddling through’, 
which was largely successful in containing the threats of systemic war and Jacobin 
republicanism for the course of the nineteenth century. Both the crushing of the Axis 
challenge and Europe’s managed transition from an Absolutist to a modern system of 
states demonstrate that repression and defensive adaptation offer pathways from 
systemic crisis that do not terminate in configurative international systems change.  It 
is with this appreciation that human agents retain a capacity to shape the evolution of 
international orders, even in circumstances where structural forces heavily militate 
towards their transformation, that I proceed.  
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Outline of the Argument 
 
 This study begins by outlining my conception of the nature of international 
order, before outlining the theoretical framework I employ to account for their 
transformation.  In chapter one, I argue that international orders are inherently 
dualistic in their constitution, both in the goals they seek to advance, and in the means 
that they employ to secure order. Specifically, I claim that international orders seek to 
promote both a historically and culturally specific conception of the good, while 
simultaneously pursuing the more generic goal of containing violent conflict between 
their constituent polities within manageable bounds. I further argue that these positive 
and negative dimensions of order are realised through recourse to authoritative and 
coercive forms of power. International orders are constituted by a normative complex, 
which prescribes an order’s animating purposes, and by a governing institutional 
framework, composed of the fundamental authoritative and coercive institutions 
employed by the custodians of international order to advance these purposes.  These 
order-producing normative complexes and their accompanying fundamental 
institutions are in turn embedded within an order-enabling material framework, which 
imposes hard physical constraints on the scale and scope for organized violence within 
and between political communities. 
 Practices of communicative action channelled through authoritative 
institutions, and practices of coercion channelled through authorized practices of 
organized violence, form the twin pillars of international order. In chapter two, I argue 
that international orders are transformed as a result of systemic crises that are 
inaugurated by processes of institutional decay, but are brought to fruition by a 
combination of ideological schisms and increases in violence interdependence. 
Ideological schisms undermine international order by destroying the consensus over 
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ultimate ends that undergirds all orders.  The emergence of challengers to the existing 
order both paralyses the operation of ordering institutions, while simultaneously 
polarizing populations and overlaying positional struggles for power and privilege 
with ideological struggles over competing conceptions of the good. Meanwhile, 
increases in violence interdependence corrode the efficient operation of ordering 
institutions that initially evolved in a different geopolitical context, while 
simultaneously increasing the scale and scope for violent conflict both between and 
within political communities. Ideological schisms and increases in violence 
interdependence transform international orders by respectively undermining the 
legitimacy and efficiency of existing ordering institutions. Having wrecked the old 
order, they then perpetuate disorder by providing actors with opportunities to pursue 
mutually antagonistic ultimate ends with the assistance of expanded destructive 
means. It is this intersection of fanaticism and firepower that drives the destruction of 
old international orders, while the ensuing period of chaos eventually prompts the 
development of intellectual and institutional innovations that permit the re-
establishment of international order, albeit on radically different normative and 
material foundations.  
 Having laid the foundations of my argument in chapters one and two, I seek to 
empirically illustrate my claims in chapters three through seven through reference to 
the transformation of two historical international orders, specifically Latin 
Christendom and the East Asian Sinosphere. Chapters three through five detail the 
origins, constitution, operation and decay of Latin Christendom, Christendom’s 
collapse, and the prolonged period of chaos that followed Christendom’s demise 
before ultimately bequeathing the Westphalian state system.  In keeping with my 
overall argument, I attribute Christendom’s collapse to the combined impact of the 
Protestant Reformation and the early modern military revolution. With the onset of the 
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Reformation and the breakdown of Christendom’s spiritual unity, I argue that 
Christendom’s already decaying system of canon law was fatally undermined, with 
confessional controversy additionally opening up poisonous sectarian rivalries within 
and between Europe’s polities at a time when technological innovations were already 
dramatically increasing the cost, scale, and destructiveness of warfare. In a world in 
which religion continued to be conceived as referring to an embodied community of 
believers rather than to an abstract body of beliefs, the rapid spread of Protestant 
heresies undercut Europe’s most basic governing principles and rites of social 
integration.  Once the abortive Habsburg attempt to reconstitute Christendom along 
imperial lines had been foreclosed, European rulers sought to re-establish order in 
their own kingdoms through the forcible imposition of confessional conformity, in so 
doing conflating religious heresy with political treachery and thereby condemning 
Europe to a century of violence.  The correspondence of this crisis with the emergence 
of a cluster of military innovations that initially empowered rebels and rulers alike 
radically raised the destructiveness of the ensuing conflicts. This destructiveness was 
further amplified by the absence of any systemic ordering institutions to prevent 
localized conflicts from rapidly metastasizing throughout the international system. 
Ultimately, it was only in the wake of a series of cultural and intellectual innovations 
forged in the maelstrom of Europe’s Wars of Religion that a new international order 
based on sovereign principles crystallized, a process that was begun but was by no 
means completed by 1648. 
 Whereas the transformative forces of Reformation and military revolution 
emerged within Latin Christendom itself, the Sinosphere was torn asunder by a 
concatenation of shocks that developed largely but not exclusively beyond its borders.  
Chapters six and seven describe the processes by which internal processes of dynastic 
decline interacted with millenarian peasant rebellions and the global industrialization 
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of warfare to destroy the Sinosphere and thereby propel East Asia’s entry into a 
Western-dominated global state system.  Given that the Sinosphere was a suzerain 
state system centred round the Qing dynasty, it is unsurprising that I argue that the 
Sinosphere’s demise was largely driven by the decline and disintegration of the 
imperial Chinese state. This process was hastened but not initiated by the forcible 
opening of China to Western commerce in the 1840s, a development that had been 
enabled by the unprecedented augmentation of European naval power yielded by early 
industrialization. The opening of China to Western commercial and cultural influences 
in turn provided the ideological inspiration for the Taiping rebellion, a puritanical 
millenarian movement that synthesized evangelical Christianity with Chinese folk 
religious traditions to create an insurgency of exceptional fanaticism and ferocity. 
While ultimately defeated, the Taiping rebellion ripped the heart out of the Qing 
imperial state, forcing expedients that radically accelerated the domestic devolution of 
fiscal and military power to regional warlords. This decentralization of dynastic power 
hollowed out the Chinese state, paving the way for the Sinosphere’s subsequent 
dissolution. The last days of the Sinosphere, punctuated by defeat in war, renewed 
religious qua nationalist rebellions, and ultimately the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty, 
are recounted in chapter seven.  
 Having traced the historical contours of configurative international systems 
change in Western Europe and East Asia, I turn my attention to the current challenges 
confronting the global state system in chapters eight and nine. Chapter eight describes 
the constitution of the global state system, before detailing the range of centrifugal 
forces that have been undermining it almost from its inception in the post-war era. I 
argue that while the present world order is dedicated to the promotion of popular 
eudemonism and national self-determination, its capacity to realize these substantive 
values has been hamstrung from the outset by the low institutional capacity and 
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popular legitimacy of many post-colonial states. From the late 1960s, the state 
system’s susceptibility to subversion has been amplified by two factors. The rise of 
religious fundamentalism, specifically the Islamist incarnation derived from the 
writings of Sayyid Qutb, has provided a powerful philosophical critique of the state 
system for many individuals who are disillusioned with the present order. At the same 
time, globalization has increased violence interdependence at a global level. 
Improvements in transportation and communication networks and the continued 
spread of dual-use knowledge and technologies have provided jihadist terrorists with 
the logistical and technical capabilities necessary to mount an armed challenge to the 
liberal world order. The background to the jihadist challenge is sketched in chapter 
eight, while its emergence, evolution and significance are considered in chapter nine. 
 Transformations of international order are infrequent, protracted, and 
profoundly traumatic episodes of historical change. My analysis suggests that the 
global state system will not be swept away any time soon. Nevertheless, the 
centrifugal forces now present are more likely to accelerate than they are to abate in 
the future. For this reason, the international community will increasingly struggle to 
reconcile the positive imperative of promoting human emancipation with the negative 
imperative of providing member polities with security from violence.  Harmonizing 
the positive and negative purposes of world order will be difficult for the present and 
future custodians of the state system, but it will not be impossible. My historical cases 
demonstrate that while the structural drivers of international systems change are 
irreducibly important in transforming international orders, they are not entirely 
determinative.  For this reason, I conclude this study by considering the range of 
future trajectories for the global state system, before identifying the steps that will 
need to be taken if the global state system is to be preserved, and liberty and order are 
to together endure in the twenty-first century. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
WHAT ARE INTERNATIONAL ORDERS? 
 
‘You must understand, therefore, that there are two ways of fighting: by law or by 
force.  The first way is natural to men, and the second to beasts. But as the first way 
often proves inadequate one must needs have recourse to the second. So a prince must 
understand how to make a nice use of the beast and the man. The ancient writers 
taught princes about this by an allegory, when they described how Achilles and many 
other princes of the ancient world were sent to be brought up by Chiron, the centaur, 
so that he might train them this way. All the allegory means, in making the teacher 
half beast and half man, is that a prince must know how to act according to the nature 
of both, and that he cannot survive otherwise…’  
– Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince.18 
 
Order Under the Centaur’s Shadow 
 
 In taking the centaur to personify the dualistic character of political power, 
Machiavelli captured an essential truth about the nature of order, one that obtains 
equally in the domestic and international spheres. Both the power of moral suasion 
and the force of material sanctions sustain political order. This elementary observation 
is worth emphasizing, precisely because it is so often overlooked in the study of 
international relations. Far from constituting mere decorative artifice, the rules, norms, 
principles and moral conventions that infuse political orders provide the essential 
media through which cooperation is realised and conflict mitigated between social 
agents. Similarly, recourse to organized violence – whether employed by rulers against 
                                                 
18 Niccolo Machiavelli. The Prince. Translated by George Bull. London: Penguin Books, 1999, p. 56. 
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subjects or by rulers against each other – frequently fortifies and perpetuates rather 
than weakening or undermining political orders. Rather than representing mutually 
opposed modes of action, communicative action and organized violence – the 
respective arts of man and beast – are equally central to the generation of political 
order. Political orders crystallize at the intersection of ethical and coercive modes of 
action. For the duration of their existence, they are sustained by these modes of action. 
And it is precisely when the tentative reconciliation between these factors fails that 
political orders are destroyed.  
 In the next two chapters, I will present the theoretical framework that informs 
this study.  I begin by exploring the nature of political order – what it is, why it is 
necessary, why it is difficult to realise, and why all political orders are unavoidably 
fragile and provisional.  I then narrow the discussion to consider the specific problems 
of realizing order within multi-actor international systems, before finally advancing 
my own conception of international order. Whereas chapter one is dedicated to an 
exploration of the nature of international orders, chapter two is devoted to a 
consideration of the processes by which international orders are transformed. I begin 
by critically evaluate existing cyclical, linear process and punctuated equilibria 
explanations for the transformation of international orders, before then articulating my 
own account of why and how international orders are transformed.   
 
1.1 The Nature of Political Order 
 
1.1.1 What is Political Order and Why is it Necessary? 
 
 The notion of order evokes multiple meanings that are relevant to this inquiry. 
Firstly, order can be understood as a purposive arrangement of a series of objects with 
 25
a view towards realising a functional goal. This conception of order is the starting 
point of Hedley Bull, who divines the rudiments of international order in states’ 
collective commitment to the maintenance of institutions designed to maximize 
realization of the bases of social order (security, promise-keeping, property) under 
conditions of anarchy.19 The notion of order also carries with it a sense of inter-
temporal stability, holding out the promise of predictability and thus susceptibility to 
rational control.  Finally, in being the antithesis of disorder, the concept of order has 
normative connotations, suggesting a condition of peace, harmony, and unity in 
pursuit of common ends.   
All of the aforementioned associations are relevant in conceiving of political 
order. Each, however, emphasize a different dimension of order that demands 
attention.  The conception of order as a functional arrangement highlights an 
understanding of order as structure. Seen through this lens, order denotes the panoply 
of norms, ideas, rules, institutions and material structures that together make the 
realization of agents’ functional ends possible. Conversely, a conception of order 
emphasizing stability over time illuminates a notion of order as process. Order from 
this perspective is manifest in agents’ routine subscription to regular patterns of 
practice that reliably recur over time.  Lastly, the notion of order as the antonym of 
disorder emphasizes a conception of order as ideal. This conceptualization of order 
encompasses the final condition of harmonious unity to which the structures of order 
and their accompanying processes are dedicated. These different conceptions of order 
– as structure, process and ideal – do not exhaust the full spectrum of meanings 
attached to the term, but together they constitute the interpretations that are most 
relevant to this discussion, and will be invoked both separately and together when 
necessary over the course of my analysis. 
                                                 
19Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 4. 
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 Political orders share the generic features of orders outlined above. At one 
level, they are holistic structures composed of ideological, institutional and material 
elements. Functioning political orders also demonstrate a strong degree of stability 
over time, and are also sustained through their sponsors’ commitment to idealized 
visions of community and shared moral purpose.  Beyond these generic 
characteristics, political orders are defined primarily by the social functions they are 
expected to perform.  Following Christian Reus-Smit, I argue that communities 
establish political orders to fulfil three elementary social needs for their members, 
specifically the provision of physical security, the provision of a minimum standard of 
material welfare, and the provision of a shared sense of collective identity and 
common purpose.20  Fear of violent death constitutes the primary catalyst for the 
creation of political order, and the success of any order must be judged firstly by the 
degree to which it protects its members from physical threats to life and property. 
Freedom from extremes of want provides an additional spur for the development of 
political orders, although both the means adopted to discharge this function and the 
benchmarks by which minimum standards of welfare are said to have been met varies 
considerably across orders.  The collective identity function of political orders is the 
least tangible of the three functions, but it is far from unimportant. In cultivating a 
sense of common identity amongst its members, political orders generate the sense of 
fellow-feeling necessary to secure members’ voluntary compliance with norms, rules 
and laws, thereby enhancing rulers’ capacity to guarantee members’ physical security 
and material welfare.21 Beyond its instrumental significance in fostering social 
                                                 
20 Christian Reus-Smit. "Changing Patterns of Global Governance: From Absolutism to Global 
Multilateralism." In Between Sovereignty and Global Governance: The United Nations, the State, and 
Civil Society, edited by Albert Paolini, Anthony P. Jarvis and C. Reus-Smit, 3-28. London: Macmillan, 
1998, p. 5. 
21 On the instrumental importance of ruler-sponsored ideologies as a means of reducing the enforcement 
costs of social norms and rules, see Douglass Cecil North. Structure and Change in Economic History. 
1st ed. New York: Norton, 1981, p. 47. 
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solidarity, fulfilment of the collective identity function is also crucially important for 
its own sake. The systems of meaning that help constitute political orders encompass 
the most basic moral, social and frequently even spiritual values and ideals of the 
societies over which they preside.22 Political orders play a vital role in embodying and 
perpetuating the values and ideals by which collectivities define themselves, fulfilling 
a role that cannot be conflated with the more prosaic security and welfare functions to 
which they are also dedicated.   
 In addition to being identifiable by their functions, political orders are also 
distinct inasmuch as they rely at least partially on institutionalized relations of 
command and obedience to realise these functions. Political orders imply by their 
nature the rule of some over others - they represent institutionalized forms of 
organized domination, wherein some are entitled to command and others are obliged 
to obey.23  Rulers’ powers may be limited by protective thicket of laws, customs and 
conventions, but the essential asymmetry of power between rulers and ruled remains a 
constant feature of political orders. This asymmetry in power relations between rulers 
and ruled requires the forebearance of the latter if it is to persist for any length of time, 
and the task of justifying this asymmetry constitutes one of the most enduring 
challenges for all custodians of political order.24 
 From the foregoing discussion, we can extract a definition of political orders as 
normative and institutional arrangements designed to fulfil the three elementary social 
functions (security, welfare, and collective identity functions), and that are 
                                                 
22On this point, see for example Reus-Smit, ‘Changing Patterns of Global Governance’, p. 6. 
23 This conception of political order as a form of institutionalized domination owes its inspiration to the 
work of Max Weber. Weber’s conception of the relationship between order, domination, organization 
and legitimacy is pithily summarized in Reinhard Bendix. Max Weber - an Intellectual Portrait. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977, pp. 290-297. 
24 In this regard, my argument again derives inspiration from Weber, who defines domination as the 
probability that commands will be obeyed by a given group of persons, and who further acknowledges 
that the very requirement of routine obedience implies a degree of voluntary compliance on the part of 
the dominated if relations of organized domination are to long endure. See Max Weber. Economy and 
Society - an Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, p. 212. 
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undergirded at least partially by relations of rule entailing the organized domination 
of some by others. The applicability of the latter part of this definition to international 
orders may initially seem questionable, for at least in international systems governed 
by the institution of sovereignty, ‘none is entitled to command; none is required to 
obey.’25 However, the scope of this objection is immediately limited when one 
considers that most international orders throughout history have assumed confederal, 
heteronomous or imperial forms, and have thus entailed routinized relations of 
command and obedience both between and within different political communities.26  
Sovereign international orders - which in any case rely on power asymmetries between 
rulers and ruled within but not between political communities - have been the historic 
exception rather than the rule, a status that as we will see endows them with very 
distinctive strengths and vulnerabilities. 
 In providing their members with essential collective goods, political orders 
secure the possibility of community among strangers, expanding the realm of 
sociability beyond the small circles of sympathy delimited by bonds of family and 
friendship. Additionally, political orders also offer a remedy for humankind’s unsocial 
sociability.27 Across different types of social formations, humans have consistently 
demonstrated an irrepressible capacity for sociability. The material and social needs of 
individuals compel them towards engagement with others, yielding webs of 
interdependence that require the protection of a political order if they are to persist and 
                                                 
25 Kenneth Waltz. Theory of International Politics. New York: Random House, 1979, p. 88. 
26On the historical prevalence of suzerain systems, and on the established tendency for most sovereign 
state systems to eventually evolve into suzerain state systems, see Martin Wight. Systems of States. 
London: Leicester University Press, 1977, pp. 43-44.  
27
On ‘unsocial sociability’ as a constitutive characteristic of humanity that renders the construction of a 
civil order both difficult and necessary, see Immanuel Kant. Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on 
Politics, History, and Morals. Translated by Ted Humphrey. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 
1983, pp. 31-38. 
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expand.28 For while the impulse towards sociability is strong, it is frequently in 
tension with humans’ equally strong desire to maximize their freedom to engage in 
autonomous action unfettered by external constraints. Political orders harmonize the 
imperatives of interdependence and autonomy by establishing a shared corpus of 
norms, conventions, rules and laws to govern actors’ behaviour in different spheres of 
social interaction.  The authoritative power vested in political institutions is necessary 
firstly to codify these norms, conventions, rules and laws, and secondly to organize the 
coercive power necessary to enforce them in cases of non-compliance. More 
generally, Thomas Hobbes’ observation that ‘Man is not fitted for society by nature 
but by discipline’29 pithily captures the pro-active role played by the custodians of 
political order in inculcating into their subjects shared standards of appropriateness 
and common habits of self-restraint, for in the absence of this socialization only 
constant surveillance and the costly threat of punishment would guarantee the 
maintenance of society among strangers.  Finally, political order is necessary to 
contain the problem of enmity in social life. Regardless of its underlying causes, the 
condition of enmity between contending parties is an ineradicable aspect of human 
existence, and the responsibility for containing enmity within manageable bounds falls 
to rulers.30   Of all the responsibilities falling to rulers, it is the containment of enmity 
that poses the greatest challenge to the maintenance of order. 
 
 
 
                                                 
28
On this point, see for example Norbert Elias. The Civilizing Process. Translated by Edmund Jephcott. 
Vol. II - State Formation and Civilization. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982, pp. 87-88. 
29Thomas Hobbes, De Cive, chapter I., p. i. Quoted in Gerhard Oestreich. Neostoicism and the Early 
Modern State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, p. 269. 
30 The problem of enmity in relation to the maintenance of international political orders is brilliantly 
eludicated in William Walker. Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Order, Adelphi Paper 
370. New York: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2004, chapter one passim. 
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1.1.2 Why is Political Order Difficult to Achieve? 
 
 Regardless of its necessity, political order remains difficult to secure and is 
always provisional in nature. This is so firstly because the character of political order 
as a form of organized domination raises the immediate problem of justification.  Hans 
Morgenthau observes of man that ‘“[He] is born a slave, but everywhere he wants to 
be the master…Out of this discord between man’s desire and his actual condition 
arises the moral issue of power, that is, the problem of justifying and limiting the 
power which man has over man.”31 While Morgenthau and other classical realists 
acknowledged domination as an inevitable aspect of political life, they also recognized 
that this domination is continuously subject to moral evaluation, and that it must at 
least partially meet its members’ ethical demands if it is to survive for any length of 
time.32  If domination – understood as the probability that commands will be routinely 
obeyed – is intrinsic to political order, it also presents problems if its exercise is 
perceived as illegitimate. The necessity that people submit to externally imposed 
restraints if they are to enjoy the benefits of political order clashes violently with their 
desire to maximize their autonomy. For this reason, the members of a political order 
must ideally perceive this order as legitimate, with its requirements of obedience seen 
as morally binding, if it is to survive.33 It is precisely because agents are continuously 
                                                 
31Hans Morgenthau. Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946, pp. 
168-169.
  
32 This point was expressed particularly well by E.H. Carr, who wrote: “Just as within the state every 
government, though it needs power as the basis of its authority, also needs the moral basis of the 
consent of the governed, so an international order cannot be based on power alone, for the simple 
reason that mankind will in the long run always revolt against naked power…The fatal dualism of 
politics will always keep considerations of morality entangled with considerations of power…” 
[emphasis added]; See Edward Hallett Carr. The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to 
the Study of International Relations. New York: Harper & Row, 1946, pp. 235-236.  
33 Certainly, it is possible for a political order to endure in the absence of legitimacy if its custodians 
choose instead to rely on coercion and repression as their primary mode of governance. However, 
political orders of this nature are likely to be rigid and brittle rather than truly strong, and are 
susceptible to rapid collapse in the face of exogenous shocks such as defeat in war or financial collapse. 
The pervasive propaganda characteristic of modern totalitarian governments is evidence enough of the 
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evaluating the legitimacy of political orders that they are so fragile, for evaluations of 
legitimacy are necessarily subjective and can be revised at any time.    
 Judgements about the legitimacy of political orders turn on questions of 
purpose, process and performance.34  Questions of purpose centre on the extent to 
which the declared functional and ethical purposes legitimizing a political order 
accord with agents’ deeply held moral frameworks. Questions of process relate to the 
degree to which agents believe that an order’s purposes are properly reflected in the 
design and operation of its fundamental institutions. Finally, questions of performance 
concern agents’ judgements about the effectiveness with which the existing political 
order fulfils the purposes to which it is dedicated. Inevitably, in any order, different 
agents’ judgements about questions of purpose, process and performance – and thus 
their assessments of a political order’s legitimacy – will vary considerably. 
Consequently, the durability of a given order is partially determined by its capacity to 
elicit positive evaluations of its legitimacy that will translate into loyalty to the present 
system and continued support for its perpetuation. Equally, its durability will also be 
determined by its capacity to manage sentiments of estrangement from the order 
deriving from negative assessments of its legitimacy. 
 Agents’ orientations towards a given political order can be classified into four 
categories that can in turn be located on a continuum ranging from radical alienation 
to full support. Agents that are radically alienated from a political order are those that 
perceive a profound dissonance between the declared purposes of that order and their 
own world-views and moral convictions. For the radically alienated, the ultimate ends 
                                                                                                                                            
importance that even the most brutal and terroristic rulers place on cultivating the appearance of popular 
legitimacy.  
34 This typology is my own, but has been inspired by and builds upon Fritz Scharpf’s discussion of the 
distinction between input-oriented and output-oriented (or in my terms, purposive and process-oriented 
versus performance-oriented) accounts of legitimacy. See Fritz Scharpf. “Economic Integration, 
Democracy, and the Welfare State.” Journal of European Public Policy 4, no. 1 (1997), p. 19. 
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to which the order is directed are anathema – the order is already seen as rotten to the 
core, making further reflection on questions of process or performance redundant 
when assessing its legitimacy. The sentiment of radical alienation can manifest itself 
in two ways. Actors may firstly choose to withdraw from the order and to minimize 
contact with the society over which it governs. In modern states, this mode of 
alienation is most conspicuously expressed in the activities of quietist religious sects, 
while internationally it finds expression in those rogue states that repudiate a Western-
dominated international society without actively seeking to subvert it. Alternatively, 
radical alienation can manifest itself in the absolute enmity of the revolutionary 
partisan, who dedicates himself to the annihilation of the existing order. Domestically, 
it is the clandestine revolutionary organization that expresses radical alienation in this 
mode, while internationally a transnational insurgency network such as Al Qaeda or a 
deeply revisionist state such as Nazi Germany fulfils this role.35  
 Radically alienated actors constitute a serious threat to political orders, and 
their subversive activities must be suppressed and preferably eliminated if the order is 
to survive. Conversely, greater scope for engagement exists with actors who, while 
estranged from the order because of its perceived failures of process and performance, 
are not radically alienated from the purposes that the order purports to advance. Actors 
who fall into this category are aggravated by the perception that existing institutional 
arrangements neither properly reflect nor adequately realise the order’s animating 
purposes. Without abandoning their commitment to these purposes, actors who are 
estranged from the existing order will seek revisions to established structures and 
                                                 
35On Al Qaeda as a radically alienated actor within the contemporary international system, see for 
example Khimbra L. Fishel. "Challenging the Hegemon: Al Qaeda's Elevation of Asymmetric Insurgent 
Warfare onto the Global Arena." Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement 2, no. 3 (2002): 285-98. 
On the notion of deeply revisionist states and their potentially system-subverting character, see 
Bukovansky. Legitimacy and Power Politics, p. 169. 
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procedures in the hope of narrowing the gap between an order’s purpose and its 
processes and performance. Naturally, the magnitude of actors’ estrangement will 
determine the extent of their revisionist activities. Thus for example, in the southern 
United States in the 1960s, the centrist core of the African-American civil rights 
movement could be classified as being only moderately estranged from the existing 
order. This is so because their activities were devoted to securing for their 
constituency the extension of rights (e.g. the right to vote) that the Constitution had 
already theoretically guaranteed to them. By contrast, the activities of the non-aligned 
states in trying to secure the creation of a New International Economic Order in the 
1970s can be interpreted as being more profoundly revisionist in character. For while 
advocates of the NIEO remained committed to the core principles and purposes of the 
United Nations system (e.g. the promotion of national self-determination and human 
rights), they nevertheless sought to significantly enhance the developing world’s 
collective bargaining power within the organization, as well as affording greater 
emphasis to the social and economic dimensions of the UN’s rights agenda.36  
 While estranged actors are not yet committed to total confrontation with the 
existing order, mechanisms of accommodation must ideally be in place to meet their 
concerns, for estrangement can evolve into radical alienation if left unaddressed for a 
prolonged period. Further along the continuum of sentiment from estrangement, one 
finds actors who generally support the purposes and processes of the existing order, 
but who nevertheless find its performance wanting. In practice, it is difficult to 
disentangle judgements about performance from judgements about process, and 
dissatisfaction with an order’s performance is likely to eventually engender 
                                                 
36On this point, see generally Stephen D. Krasner. Structural Conflict: The Third World against Global 
Liberalism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. 
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dissatisfaction with its processes as well.37 Nevertheless, it is theoretically possible for 
an actor to be satisfied with the constitutional structure of a political order, while still 
being disappointed with its efficacy in realising its purposes. Actors may identify with 
the moral content of a constitutional order and believe that its essential principles are 
faithfully reflected in its established rules, norms, and institutional structures while 
still judging it ineffective in realising its functions. The attitudes of many Western 
democracies to the League of Nations in the lead-up to World War II reflect this 
sentiment of dissatisfaction, which eventually resolves itself in either agitation for 
institutional renovation or disillusionment and disengagement. 
 Finally, we are left with political actors that are satisfied with the purposes, 
processes and performance of an existing political order, and who accord it a high 
level of legitimacy. These actors identify strongly with the existing order and have a 
strong interest in ensuring its perpetuation. Nevertheless, given that political orders are 
a collective good, and present all the problems of free riding characteristic of 
collective goods, the perception of legitimacy does not by itself ensure active support 
for the order in the face of efforts to subvert it.  Instead, the custodians of political 
order must directly enlist active support for the order if it is to endure. 
 From the foregoing discussion, we can extract several observations that 
account for the fragility of political orders.  Firstly, the maintenance of order requires 
the constant cultivation among its members of the perception that the order is 
                                                 
37 For example, the ambivalence towards the UN demonstrated by the George W. Bush administration 
reflects very strongly the mutually entwined character of judgements about performance and process. 
The administration’s preference for unilateralism (mitigated only partially by occasional recourse to ad 
hoc coalitions of the willing) and its penchant for the pre-emptive use of force as a means of dealing 
with threats to international peace and security derives from a negative assessment of the UN’s 
performance in dealing with these threats. But the administration’s posture arguably also reflects a 
broader scepticism regarding the effectiveness and desirability of operating through the established 
multilateral structures, rules and procedures (i.e. the fundamental processes) of the UN system of global 
governance.  
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legitimate, for political orders are predicated on relations of organized domination that 
depend on the voluntary compliance of the ruled to survive. Secondly, the attribution 
of legitimacy to political orders derives from agents’ beliefs that the purposes to which 
the order is dedicated are compatible with their most deeply held ethical convictions. 
Additionally, an order is most likely to enjoy legitimacy when its members regard its 
fundamental institutions as being also broadly effective in realising these purposes.  
Thirdly, as political orders evoke a broad spectrum of judgements regarding their 
legitimacy, the custodians of these orders must develop a range of responses to deal 
with the behaviours flowing from these judgements. As the radically alienated are 
most likely to attempt to subvert the existing order, the custodians of order must 
possess capacities for suppressing the threat that the alienated represent. Those that are 
estranged from the order must be reconciled with it and their demands at least partially 
accommodated, lest their estrangement evolve into alienation over time. Those that 
endorse the existing order but are dissatisfied with its performance must be actively 
engaged, if necessary through reforms that close the gap between the order’s purposes, 
processes, and performance. And those that accord the political order the greatest 
legitimacy must be actively mobilized for the order’s maintenance and defence.        
 Political orders depend for their survival on both the cultivation of legitimacy 
and also upon the maintenance of institutional capacities to suppress subversion, 
accommodate dissent, and mobilize loyalty and support. Given the centrality that I 
accord legitimacy in the maintenance of political orders, it logically follows that a key 
point of vulnerability for these orders lies in their susceptibility to legitimacy crises. I 
use the term legitimacy crises here to denote episodes in which political orders 
become debilitated as their members deem the existing order to be illegitimate and 
withdraw their support for its continued perpetuation. Crises of legitimacy may 
manifest themselves in either chronic or acute forms. Chronic crises of legitimacy are 
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characterised by the insidious leakage of support away from an existing order, and are 
punctuated by agents’ increasing unwillingness to comply with the rules, norms, laws 
and commands of established authorities. The increasing unwillingness of agents to 
accord legitimacy to established authorities, and their reticence to sustain the relations 
of organized domination that are constitutive of political orders, works to 
progressively corrode rulers’ capacities to govern. This corrosion of institutional 
capacity in turn feeds back into negative assessments of the order’s performance, 
further diminishing its perceived legitimacy and institutional capacity.38  
 While chronic crises of legitimacy are protracted and insidious, acute crises of 
legitimacy are both sudden and more immediately confronting. Acute legitimacy 
crises entail a more precipitate decline in an order’s institutional capacities, as well as 
involving a more direct challenge to its legitimacy than the slow leakage of support 
that is characteristic of more chronic crises. Whereas in protracted legitimacy crises, 
the political order’s deterioration is marked by a swelling in the ranks of those that are 
either estranged from the existing order or otherwise dissatisfied and disillusioned 
with it, in chronic crises one observes instead a polarized confrontation between 
radically alienated challengers and mobilized supporters of the status quo. Moreover, 
while a nominal commitment to a shared world-view may persist among the members 
of a political order mired in chronic crisis, acute crises are characterised by a violent 
confrontation between proponents of mutually antagonistic world-views.  
Analytically, it remains useful to distinguish between chronic and acute legitimacy 
crises, for chronic crises need not presage the collapse of a political order – prolonged 
stagnation or renovation and renewal both present as alternative possibilities to 
                                                 
38 On the reciprocal relationship between polities’ institutional capacities and their level of popular 
legitimacy, and the possibility of negative feedback between the two contributing to a downward spiral 
of institutional effectiveness and performance, see Francis Fukuyama. State-Building: Governance and 
World Order in the 21st Century. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004, p. 68. 
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collapse.39  In practice, however, chronic and acute legitimacy crises frequently 
constitute successive phases of a single overarching crisis encompassing the decay of 
an order and its subsequent dissolution.  
 Crises of legitimacy constitute a major threat to the survival of political orders, 
but they do not constitute the only threat to their perpetuation. Rather, actors engaged 
in struggles for relative power and influence can also indirectly undermine political 
orders. Positional struggles for relative power and influence are endemic to political 
life, but they are not necessarily subversive of order if conducted within that order’s 
existing normative and institutional parameters. Conversely, when positional struggles 
are conducted without heed for established restraints – that is, when actors resolve not 
merely to outmanoeuvre and defeat their opponents but to subjugate and annihilate 
them – then the constitutional foundations of a political order may be indirectly 
imperilled, even if this is not necessarily the intention of the protagonists.  
  In his Theory of the Partisan, Carl Schmitt introduces a useful typology to 
capture the different forms of enmity that characterise political life. Schmitt’s analysis 
begins with a discussion of the conventional enmity that characterised inter-state 
warfare in the nineteenth century Europe, during which time norms of jus ad bellum 
and jus in bello received systematic expression in international laws of war.40 For 
Schmitt, what defined European warfare during this period was its boundedness within 
clearly defined and routinely observed conventions, hence his characterisation of it as 
being suffused with the spirit of conventional enmity.41 European interstate warfare 
after the Congress of Vienna was undertaken between the regular armed forces of 
states. These forces operated at the behest of governments and their members were 
                                                 
39On the possibilities of taking remedial action to resolve international crises of legitimacy, see 
Christian Reus-Smit. "International Crises of Legitimacy." International Politics 44, no. 2/3 (2007), pp. 
169-173. 
40Schmitt, Theory of the Partisan, p. 6. 
41 Ibid. 
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clearly distinguished from non-combatants.42 Conventions of jus ad bellum and jus in 
bello were observed between protagonists, and state governments regarded their 
opponents as enemies to defeated and brought to terms rather than criminals to be 
eliminated. Schmitt contrasts this conventional enmity between state opponents to the 
real enmity that characterises the relationship between guerrilla partisans and state 
occupiers, arguing that the partisan is irregular by nature, and that the struggle 
between partisan and occupier is fought without mercy and without regard to the 
conventional restraints that traditionally corralled interstate conflicts within 
manageable bounds.43 The real enmity that defines the ‘tellurian’ (or terrestrial) 
partisan fighting to expel foreign occupiers contrasts again with the absolute enmity 
that characterises the nomadic revolutionary engaged in a global struggle to overthrow 
the existing political order.44 For Schmitt, it was the absolute enmity epitomized in the 
global revolutionary that accounted for the unprecedented violence and moral 
depravity of twentieth century total warfare.45 
 Schmitt’s distinction between different modes of enmity can be more generally 
applied to characterise the diverse forms of hostility that can obtain between actors 
struggling for relative power and influence within a given political order. Far from 
being the exclusive preserve of partisan guerrillas or global revolutionaries, the 
unrestrained hostility suffusing states of real and absolute enmity can express itself 
also in conflicts between nominally symmetrical opponents such as warring states and 
empires. The emergence of sentiments of absolute enmity can threaten the very 
survival of political orders. This is because the circumvention of established norms, 
                                                 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid., p. 14. 
44 Ibid., p. 39. 
45 For an outstandingly lucid distillation and discussion of Schmitt’s insights in Theory of the Partisan, 
see generally Gabriella Slomp. "The Theory of the Partisan: Carl Schmitt's Neglected Legacy." History 
of Political Thought XXVI, no. 3 (2005): 502-19. 
 
 39
conventions and institutional structures for mediating conflict can imperil their 
continuing validity and efficacy more broadly, even if competing protagonists seek 
only each others’ destruction and not the larger order that they jointly inhabit. As 
positional conflicts over relative power and influence are perennial in politics, and as 
such conflicts carry the potential for generating sentiments of absolute enmity that are 
corrosive of order more generally, the problem of containing enmity within 
conventional bounds remains a critically important challenge for custodians of 
political order.  
 Both legitimacy crises and the irruption of sentiments of absolute enmity 
constitute serious threats to the reproduction of political order. While it is analytically 
necessary to distinguish between the direct threat to political orders posed by 
legitimacy crises and the indirect threat posed by the breakout of absolute enmity 
between an order’s members, in practice these threats frequently coincide and 
intertwine. Indeed, in each of the cases considered in this study, legitimacy crises and 
power struggles suffused with sentiments of absolute enmity became intertwined to 
the point of partial fusion. This tendency for legitimacy crises and positional power 
struggles to become intertwined is further testament to the importance of the twin 
imperatives of cultivating legitimacy and containing enmity if political order is to be 
preserved.  
 
1.1.3 How is Political Order Generated and Maintained? 
 
 Having illustrated why political order is both necessary and difficult to 
achieve, it is now imperative to consider exactly how political order is produced.  To 
reiterate: political orders depend for their functioning on both authoritative and 
coercive forms of power – both moral suasion and material sanctions, the respective 
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arts of man and beast embodied in Machiavelli’s centaur, are equally essential for the 
maintenance of political order.  Authoritative and coercive forms of power are 
sometimes portrayed as residing at different ends of a continuum of forms of social 
power.46 Thus, whereas authoritative power is seen to attract subjects’ voluntary 
compliance with rules or commands deemed by them to be morally legitimate and 
therefore compulsorily binding, coercive power is conceived as extracting subjects’ 
otherwise unwilling compliance through the use or threatened use of force.47 While 
this ideal-typical distinction is not without value, I would suggest that both 
authoritative and coercive power typically work simultaneously and in conjunction 
with one another to produce order, and that the marshalling of both forms of power is 
necessary for societies to realise their elementary goals.   
 Political order involves the imposition of ethical and institutional restraints on 
agents’ freedom of action. While these restraints are necessary to cultivate cooperation 
between actors and limit enmity between them, their imposed character makes it vital 
that they be recognized as legitimate if they are to command compliance.  
Authoritative power relies upon the issuing of rules and commands, the obligatory 
force of which increases the more closely they are identified with agents’ 
subjectivities, their essential purposes and their most deeply held ethical convictions. 
Where agents inhabit what Habermas calls a common ‘life-world’, that is, where they 
share a ‘storehouse of unquestioned cultural givens’ that form the backdrop for 
practices of communicative action, authoritative power acquires a particularly strong 
purchase over agents’ actions.48 This is because the close identification between a 
ruler’s commands and a community’s shared moral values renders the obligation to 
                                                 
46See for example Reus-Smit, American Power and World Order, p.58. 
47 Ibid. 
48Jurgen Habermas. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Translated by Christian Lenhardt 
and Shierry Weber Nicholsen. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1990, p. 135. 
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obey a routine social expectation on the part of the dominated. This expectation in turn 
increases agents’ compliance with authority and thereby reduces the need for costly 
recourse to coercive power to maintain political authority.49 Where a close fit exists 
between a society’s constitutional values and the rules and commands of governing 
agencies, the legitimacy accorded to these agencies grows, the scope for the exercise 
of authoritative power expands, and the stability of the prevailing social and political 
order increases accordingly. 
 The ability of authoritative power to attract actors’ voluntary compliance 
makes it indispensible, but authoritative power alone is insufficient to maintain 
political order. This because even in the most well-integrated orders, where governing 
structures are sustained by very high levels of social legitimacy, the basic asymmetries 
of power and opportunity between rulers and ruled will inspire resentment and 
resistance in some quarters. This resistance may assume the form of a direct attack on 
the order by actors that deem it illegitimate, and who seek to overturn it in favour of a 
purportedly more just alternative. Alternatively, it manifest itself in a more indirect 
and unprincipled way, with actors ignoring or defying rules, norms, commands and 
laws for the sake of advancing their own interests at the expense of others. What 
unites both such instances of resistance is the imperviousness of the actors involved to 
the normative force upon which authoritative power relies. It is precisely because 
some will always be beyond the reach of authoritative power that coercive power 
becomes necessary.  
Coercive power, entailing the use or threatened use of material sanctions to 
compel actors’ compliance where authoritative power has failed to elicit it voluntarily, 
fulfils a variety of functions germane to the maintenance of order. Coercive power can 
punish transgressors and deter future violations of the existing order by providing 
                                                 
49On this point, see again North, Structure and Change in Economic History, p. 47. 
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actors with strong negative inducements to comply with existing constitutional 
arrangements.50 It can also be deployed to enforce established norms, rules, laws and 
commands and thereby preserve the existing order in the face of principled and 
unprincipled efforts to undermine it.51  Coercive power can also be deployed in a 
restorative sense to reverse or mitigate injuries sustained by the victims of 
transgressors, in so doing upholding communally shared conceptions of justice that the 
prevailing political order purports to embody.  Equally, coercive power can also serve 
a pedagogical purpose, re-affirming in the punishment of transgressors the key 
constitutional values of society, while simultaneously providing renewed opportunities 
to reflect, reiterate and communicate these values and identities back to the 
community. 
 In stable orders, authoritative and coercive power form complementary and 
mutually indispensible modes of action.  Exclusive reliance on authoritative power is 
unsustainable in the long-term, for the failure to effectively punish violators of norms, 
rules, laws and commands inhibits a political order’s capacity to provide elementary 
social goods, thus inviting negative assessments of its performance that corrode its 
legitimacy over time.  Equally, excessive reliance on coercion is suggestive of an 
order’s lack of legitimacy and its ineffectiveness in attracting voluntary compliance. 
Only by maintaining strong reserves of both authoritative and coercive power, 
deploying the former where possible and the latter where unavoidable, can a political 
order be successful in providing the social goods that are its raison d’etre. 
  The complementary character of authoritative and coercive power is most 
evident in the constitution of the modern nation-state. The classic nation-state weds 
the normative appeal of concepts of popular sovereignty and shared national identity 
                                                 
50On this point, see for example Bull’s discussion of war as a fundamental institution contributing to the 
maintenance of order in modern international society. See Bull, The Anarchical Society, pp. 180-183. 
51 Ibid., p. 182. 
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to the coercive capacities of a bureaucratic state endowed with systematic surveillance 
capabilities and a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence.52  Within functioning 
nation-states, a coherent sense of shared identity binds the citizenry to one another, 
while law acquires its moral force from its presumed concordance with the 
democratically expressed will of the people. An exo-social mass education system and 
state-regulated mass media institutions meanwhile provide institutional vehicles 
through which habits of compliance with the law and sentiments of mutual 
identification between citizens may be cultivated.53  The routine compliance of most 
citizens with the law is a testament to the considerable authoritative power disposed of 
by the modern nation-state.  
Nevertheless, the maintenance of order is secured equally by the 
comprehensive disarmament of the population and the arrogation of all capacities for 
legitimate organized violence to state institutions.54 The overwhelming disparity in 
coercive power separating state from citizens endows the former with a formidable 
capacity to suppress rebellion, punish law-breakers, and enforce the order needed for 
society to realise its elementary social goals.55 That the state’s awesome coercive 
powers are largely held in reserve should in no way detract from the pivotal 
importance of its monopolization of violence in promoting the physical security and 
material welfare of its citizens, at least in the developed world. For it is by 
dramatically reducing the possibilities for physical violence in everyday life, thereby 
dampening the security dilemma at the individual level, that the state provides the 
atmosphere of generalized trust between strangers that is necessary for all other social 
                                                 
52On this point, see for example Anthony Giddens. The Nation-State and Violence. Cambridge: Polity, 
1985, pp. 233-235. 
53 On the importance of an exo-social mass educational system and state media in promoting both 
cultural standardization and citizens’ compliance with the laws of the nation-state, see Ernest Gellner. 
Nations and Nationalism. London: Basil Blackwell, 1983, pp. 35-39. 
54 On this point, see generally Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence, pp. 181-192. 
55 Ibid. 
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goals to be realised.  It is precisely in the conjunction of authoritative power 
(democratic popular legitimacy) and coercive power (a Weberian monopoly on 
organized violence) embodied in the modern nation- state that Machiavelli’s fabled 
centaur finds its most powerful expression, and its most evocative demonstration of 
the dualistic foundations of political order.   
 
1.2 What is International Order and How is it Realised? 
 
1.2.1 Order and Diversity 
 
The provision of order is necessary not only within communities, but between 
them as well. This is so because rulers’ ability to provide their subjects with essential 
social goods is at least partially conditioned by the quality of their relations with other 
rulers. Thus, rulers that find themselves in a state of perpetual conflict with 
neighbouring polities will find it much more difficult to guarantee the physical 
security of their subjects’ lives and properties. Equally, the benefits of long-distance 
trade will be forfeited or severely curtailed in an international environment 
characterised by conflict and disorder, thus impinging on rulers’ ability to secure their 
subjects’ material welfare. Finally, a disturbed international environment can threaten 
even the maintenance of coherent collective identities within polities. For while the 
existence of external enemies can momentarily fortify feelings of solidarity, the 
myriad pressures produced by prolonged mobilization for war typically exacerbate 
internal strains, fraying and fragmenting political communities rather than unifying 
them in the long run.56 
                                                 
56On the centrifugal internal effects of prolonged war-time mobilization for the maintenance of coherent 
political orders, see for example Theda Skocpol. States and Social Revolutions - a Comparative 
Analysis of France, Russia, and China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. 
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 While the provision of order within polities is dependent upon the maintenance 
of order between them, the existence of a plurality of power centres in international 
systems makes international order more difficult to achieve. The reasons for this 
difficulty are not hard to discern, and are readily illuminated by contrasting 
international systems with the enclosed order of the nation-state. As the institutional 
equivalent of Machiavelli’s centaur writ large, the nation-state draws upon both a deep 
well of authoritative power deriving from its popular democratic constitution, as well 
as from vast reserves of coercive power deriving from its Weberian monopoly on 
legitimate organized violence. Concentration and monopolization of authoritative and 
coercive power respectively are key to the maintenance of political order within the 
nation-state. Conversely, international systems by definition are characterised by the 
diffuse distribution of authoritative and coercive powers among multiple actors – this 
is so even in imperial systems, where authoritative and coercive power are nominally 
(but rarely actually) monopolized by a single suzerain centre.57  
Given the pluralistic distribution of coercive and authoritative power 
internationally, two obstacles to the generation of order present themselves. Firstly, 
the dispersal of coercive power among multiple actors immediately introduces the 
security dilemma into social life, suffusing relations between rulers with suspicion and 
mistrust and thus corroding prospects for cooperation.58 With the spectre of violent 
conflict ever present, and with rulers painfully aware of the uneven distribution of 
capabilities and the varying possibilities for predation and victimization these power 
                                                 
57It is partially as a result of the disarticulated and pluralistic distribution of power that is frequently 
characteristic of empires that Alexander Motyl prefers to characterise empires as distinct international 
systems in and of themselves, even when embedded within a broader global political framework. See 
Alexander J. Motyl. Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1999, p. 124. 
58On this point, see generally Kenneth Waltz. Man, the State, and War. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1959, chapter six passim. 
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asymmetries present, the scope for securing institutionalized cooperation between 
rulers initially seems limited.59  
In reality, the dispersal of coercive power presents a less insurmountable 
challenge to the generation of order than may first be supposed. Hedley Bull’s 
paradoxical characterisation of the institution of war in international societies, which 
has historically threatened order while also working to sustain it, illustrates the fact 
that organized violence plays a vital role in the generation of order between political 
communities as well as within them.60 Neorealists have long emphasized the 
importance of concepts such as the balance of power and conventional and nuclear 
deterrence in underpinning international order, although they have sometimes cast 
these concepts in extremely materialist terms.61 What a closer consideration of 
practices of organized violence across different international orders reveals is that 
coercive power works to sustain rather than subvert order when it operates within the 
parameters of a commonly shared justificatory framework. When corralled within a 
framework prescribing the circumstances when violence is justified, the agents that 
may legitimately employ it, the purposes to which it may be directed, and the ways in 
which it may be deployed, coercive power fulfils a similar range of ordering purposes 
internationally as it does within the confines of the nation-state. The punishment of 
transgressors, the enforcement of laws, the rectification of injuries and the enactment 
of shared conceptions of justice each provide warrants for the legitimate use of 
coercive power internationally. To make such an observation is not to underestimate 
the intensity of the security anxieties actors confront in international orders. Nor is it 
                                                 
59On this point, see generally Joseph Grieco. "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist 
Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism." International Organization 42, no. 3 (1988): 485-507. 
60Bull, The Anarchical Society, chapter eight passim. 
61See for example Waltz, Theory of International Politics, chapter six passim; and also more generally 
John J. Mearsheimer. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2001. 
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do deny the fragility of these orders in the face of illegitimate applications of violence 
by powerful actors. But just as the state’s recourse to violence domestically may be 
construed as productive of order rather than subversive of it, so too does this situation 
frequently obtain internationally as well. 
 That coercive power may be legitimately employed to promote order 
internationally merely begs larger questions concerning the identity of those who are 
authorised to make such judgements, as well as the criteria by which applications of 
coercive power are appraised. More broadly, it opens up questions regarding the scope 
for the exercise of authoritative power within systems populated by a plurality of 
different power centres. Recalling comments made earlier, authoritative action 
operates through the medium of practices of communicative action.  These 
communicative practices in turn require as a prior condition of possibility the 
existence of a shared life-world that binds agents together and provides the backdrop 
of common cultural assumptions enabling effective communication to take place. In 
international systems comprised of different political communities, this then raises two 
questions: (1) to what extent do the constituent polities of an international order 
inhabit a common life-world? And (2) what scope exists in international systems for 
effective communicative action and the marshalling of authoritative power in the 
service of political order? 
 Despite their diversity, the cases I consider below suggest that the existence of 
a common life-world has been an antecedent condition for the generation of 
international order across a range of different contexts, and that the use of 
authoritative power been vital in producing order in each of these cases. Latin 
Christendom, the Sinosphere, and the contemporary global state system each varied 
dramatically in their normative and institutional composition, but each also shared the 
quality of being purposive rather than merely practical associations. As with all orders, 
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authoritative power in each of these cases acquired its persuasive force precisely 
because of agents’ prior subscription to a world-view incorporating a common 
collective identity, shared purposes, and an agreed moral framework. Certainly, 
authoritative power operated very differently in these different contexts, with the 
hierarchy of the Sinosphere contrasting with the looser papal-imperial diarchy of 
Christendom and the even more negotiated order of the contemporary global state 
system. Nevertheless, in each case, subscription to a common set of constitutional 
values was critical to the development of the fundamental institutions necessary to 
realise order between different political communities. Even more critically, in each 
case, it was the partial or total breakdown of consensus over these values – and thus 
the withering of agents’ capacities to deploy authoritative power in the service of 
common goals – that presaged the decay (and in two cases, the eventual 
transformation) of international orders. 
 
1.2.2 International Orders Defined 
 
How, then, is order generated internationally? More specifically, what are 
international orders?  International orders are understood here as coherent systemic 
structures comprised of an order-producing normative complex and an accompanying 
governing institutional framework, both of which rest in turn on a permissive order-
enabling material foundation.  The normative complex of an international order 
confers upon actors a shared collective identity, as well as providing ethical 
prescriptions to regulate actors’ behaviour and a justificatory rationale to stabilize and 
sustain existing relations of organized domination. The constitutional values expressed 
in the normative complex are practically realised through a governing framework. 
This framework is comprised of recognized loci of authoritative and decision-making 
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power, a legal or ritualistic framework through which relations of cooperation are 
fostered and conflicts mitigated, and authorized practices of violence through which 
order is enforced, transgressors punished, and the order’s values re-affirmed. Finally, 
the order-enabling foundation sets concrete material constraints on the scope and 
character of agents’ interactions. While not determining the character of an 
international order, the material foundation indirectly shapes it by providing the 
permissive context within which international orders are forged. 
 International orders are comprised firstly by a thick web of shared meanings 
that make the exercise of authoritative power possible between different political 
communities. This normative complex can be disaggregated into a composite of 
overlapping norms that perform identity-constitutive, ethical-prescriptive, and power 
legitimating functions.62  Identity-constitutive norms integrate the constituent 
communities of an order by conferring upon them a shared identity, and providing 
consensus on the ultimate purposes of collective association. They answer such basic 
questions as ‘who am I’ and ‘what do I want’, offering agents what Charles Taylor has 
referred to as the ‘inescapable frameworks’ operative in all societies that link concepts 
of the self with concepts of the good.63 Identity-constitutive norms provide societies 
with a sense of the ultimate sources of morality, be that the revealed Word of God, the 
divine mandate of the Imperial Son of Heaven, or universally valid ethical principles 
held to be readily discernible from the unfettered exercise of human reason.  They also 
help agents to locate themselves within the world, allowing them to orient themselves 
in relation to the higher purposes of collective association. This consensus over the 
                                                 
62 Once again, it is necessary to note that my conception of the component elements of international 
orders’ normative complexes derives strong inspiration from Chris-Reus-Smit’s interstitial conception 
of political rationality as articulated in Reus-Smit, ‘Politics of International Law’, pp. 25-30.  
63Charles Taylor. Sources of the Self - the Making of Modern Identity. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1989, p. 3. 
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ultimate purposes of community provides a critical counter-point to the seemingly 
interminable jostling for power and influence that is equally manifest in each of the 
cases I consider.  In both Christendom and the Sinosphere, this unity in overarching 
purposes derived from actors’ subscription to a common cosmology, with the 
Church’s salvation mission and the aspiration to bring society into conformity with 
Confucian ideals of peace and harmony (ping) providing the respective ideological 
foundations that held these orders together. While bereft of any cosmological 
foundation, the contemporary state system equally anchors its legitimacy in its 
members’ shared subscription to purposes (specifically popular eudemonism, human 
emancipation and individual and collective self-determination) that are of purportedly 
universal validity.  
 While identity-constitutive norms integrate international orders by providing 
consensus on the ultimate sources of moral obligation, ethical-prescriptive norms seek 
to regulate agents’ behaviour by conveying to them the precise nature and content of 
these obligations. Whereas identity-constitutive norms give actors a sense of what the 
good is, whereas ethical-prescriptive norms give them a sense of how to go about 
being good. As such, ethical-prescriptive norms perform a vital civilizing role in 
international orders, laying down shared standards of rightfulness against which the 
legitimacy of actors’ actions may be judged.  Again, the existence of such a shared 
moral vocabulary is absolutely critical if order is to endure, for authoritative power in 
all its forms can only operate in an environment in which actors share a common sense 
of what is right and wrong. Politics by its nature involves intense and often violent 
struggles over the ethical evaluation of actors’ motives and actions, but the mere 
existence of such interpretive contests in no way suggests the marginality of ethical-
prescriptive norms to the generation of international order. On the contrary, such 
contests rather testify to the practical political importance actors perceive in being 
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seen to be ‘good’, thereby indirectly affirming the power of ethical-prescriptive norms 
in conditioning actors’ political judgments and thus corralling conflict within shared 
moral parameters.  
Politics necessarily entails relations of organized domination, and this reality 
manifests itself in international orders in the existence of power-legitimating norms 
that work to stabilize the relations of domination upon which international order 
depends.  In a sense, power-legitimating norms constitute a sub-set of ethical-
prescriptive norms, inasmuch as their function is to convince agents that political 
obedience is both necessary and consistent with the demands of morality. At the same 
time, however, power-legitimating norms also work to fortify established structures of 
organized domination by situating them as necessary expressions of politically salient 
collective identities, whose continued operation is essential if the community’s shared 
purposes are to be realised. In this regard, power-legitimating norms harmonize the 
imperatives of morality and identity with the realities of power, legitimizing and 
securing the relations of organized domination that are characteristic of all political 
orders.   
Power-legitimating norms are most conspicuous internationally in orders 
predicated on explicitly hierarchical and inegalitarian world out-looks. Thus, in Latin 
Christendom, an Augustinian political theology and a social ideology of tri-
functionality jointly operated to naturalise a rigidly hieratic social order.64 Confucian 
ethics provided a similarly effective justification for the maintenance of Chinese 
suzerainty over its tributary states, with Confucianism’s ritualistic paternalism 
                                                 
64On the normative foundations of medieval Christendom, see generally Georges Duby. The Three 
Orders - Feudal Society Imagined. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978; and Walter 
Ullman. Law and Politics in the Middle Ages - an Introduction to the Sources of Medieval Political 
Ideas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. On the ideas informing medieval Europe’s 
Augustinian political theology, see generally Herbert Deane. The Political and Social Ideas of Saint 
Augustine. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963. 
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legitimating asymmetrical relations of benevolence and obedience between the Son of 
Heaven and his foreign dependents.65 The contemporary state system by contrast 
maintains a regime of strict formal equality between its constituent polities, an 
equality that sits awkwardly with the institutionalised accommodations that have been 
adopted to invest Great Powers with an interest in maintaining the present order. 
Nevertheless, even within the contemporary world order, norms of popular 
sovereignty paradoxically play a power-legitimating role, with popular submission to 
the state domestically being demanded precisely because of the presumed concordance 
between the commands of the state and the democratic will of the governed.  
The mutually entwined identity-constitutive, ethical-prescriptive, and power-
legitimating norms sketched above constitute nothing less than the ideological cement 
that holds international orders together, providing consensus on questions such as 
‘who are we’, ‘what do we want’, ‘how should we act’, and ‘how should we organize 
ourselves politically to get what we want.’66 Normative complexes pacify relations 
between polities by unifying them around a common moral ontology and shared 
purposes, creating the shared life-world within which communicative action becomes 
possible.  They effectively regulate agents’ behaviour through the codification of 
binding standards of rightfulness, and they legitimize and stabilize the relations of 
organized domination within and between polities that are necessary for the realisation 
of political order.  More fundamentally, normative complexes infuse the institutional 
infrastructures that are erected by rulers to facilitate cooperation and mitigate conflict. 
                                                 
65The best general overview of the normative content of the Sinosphere’s international order remains 
the series of essays contained within John King Fairbank, ed. The Chinese World Order - Traditional 
China's Foreign Relations. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968. See in 
particular John King Fairbank. "A Preliminary Framework", pp. 1-19; and also Mark Mancall. "The 
Ch'ing Tribute System: An Interpretive Essay", pp. 63-89. 
66Christian Reus-Smit. "Politics and International Legal Obligation." European Journal of International 
Relations 9, no. 4 (2003), pp. 607-608. 
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Normative complexes profoundly inform institutional design, thus shaping the 
governing frameworks within which authoritative and coercive power are jointly 
marshalled to the task of producing order between communities.  
The governing institutional frameworks of international orders are composed 
of the following: (i) authoritative institutions that wield supreme authority within a 
given issue area and/or territory; (ii) a legal or ritual framework that codifies agents’ 
rights and obligations and provides the medium through which relations of amity are 
fostered and relations of enmity contained, and (iii) authorized practices of legitimate 
violence through which order is enforced, violators are punished, and injuries are 
remedied. It is through this framework that the imperatives encoded in the normative 
complexes of international orders are practically realised. Inevitably, all international 
orders are compromised by a pronounced gap between promise and performance, with 
attempts to institutionalize visions of the good falling well short of stated ideals. But 
such imperfections do not detract from the necessary role these institutions play in 
mitigating conflict and promoting order. 
The diversity of the normative complexes informing different international 
orders is reflected in the distinctiveness of their accompanying governing frameworks. 
In Christendom, power was organized along heteronomous lines, with actors ensnared 
in elaborate webs of crosscutting, territorially non-exclusive and frequently mutually 
contradictory obligation.67 Social power crystallized overwhelmingly at the local level 
in medieval Europe, with the system’s coherence deriving from the operation of a 
loose diarchy composed of the Church and the Empire, serving as the respective 
pinnacles of sacred and secular power within Christendom.68 This framework contrasts 
                                                 
67On heteronomy as the organizing principle of medieval Christendom, see John Gerard Ruggie. 
Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization. London: Routledge, 1998, 
pp. 146-147.  
68Michael Mann. The Sources of Social Power. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, 
p. 394.   
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starkly with hierarchical order of the Sinosphere, in which the Chinese emperor laid 
claim to supreme spiritual and temporal power throughout the both the empire proper, 
as well as throughout a penumbra of adjacent tributary states.69 The Sinosphere differs 
in turn from the modern sovereign state system, in which political authority is 
concentrated primarily in territorially exclusive and formally equal sovereign states, 
and secondarily in multilateral institutions that derive their legitimacy from their 
perceived concordance with the collective will of their member states.70  
 The papal-imperial diarchy, the Sino-centric tributary state system, and the 
global sovereign state system each epitomize different ways of organizing 
authoritative power internationally. In each of these orders one finds not only different 
configurations of authoritative power, but also historically specific legal or ritual 
frameworks through which this power is deployed. These legal or ritual frameworks 
are accompanied also by authorized practices of violence through which coercive 
power is brought to bear in the service of order.  In Christendom, a combination of 
canon law and feudal law codified the essential matrix of social relations through 
which conflicts were mediated. As the supreme interpreter of canon law, the papacy 
was empowered to authoritatively adjudicate temporal as well as spiritual disputes, 
with its ability to credibly threaten excommunication to recalcitrant parties ensuring a 
notably high rate of compliance with the rulings of the papal courts.71 This system of 
papal mediation and adjudication functioned side by side with a system of violent self-
help, in which an armed aristocracy routinely resorted to violence as a means of 
                                                 
69 Fairbank, ‘A Preliminary Framework’, pp. 6-8. 
70 See generally John Meyer. "The World Polity and the Authority of the Nation-State." In Studies of 
the Modern World-System, edited by Albert Bergesen, 109-37. New York: Academic Press, 1980; and 
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71Randall Lesaffer. "Peace Treaties from Lodi to Westphalia." In Peace Treaties and International Law 
in European History, edited by Randall Lesaffer, 9-44. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
See specifically pp. 24-26. 
 55
seeking legal redress within the parameters of a shared corpus of feudal law.72 Rather 
than operating as alternative and antithetical systems of dispute resolution, papal 
adjudication and feudal self-help complemented one another in an environment in 
which spiritual and legal power was highly concentrated, but capacities for organized 
violence remained widely dispersed.73 
 A similar complementarity in the exercise of authoritative and coercive power 
can be observed also in the Sinosphere. In the Sinosphere, authoritative power was not 
deployed principally through the medium of a shared legal framework, but rather 
through the ritual affirmation of asymmetric bonds of benevolence and obedience 
linking the emperor to his domestic and foreign vassals. Li, understood as proper 
adherence to divinely sanctioned forms and ceremonies, was seen as vital to the 
transmission of ethical principles and the maintenance of moral, social, and even 
cosmic order within the Sinosphere.74  In China’s relations with her tributary states, li 
manifested itself most regularly in vassals’ highly ritualized tribute missions to the 
imperial court, and also in the less frequent but arguably more important investiture 
missions undertaken on behalf of the emperor to confirm the authority of newly 
appointed kings in vassal states.75  Conversely, where the proper enactment of ritual 
was insufficient to secure order within the Sinosphere, the imperial court resorted to 
fa, understood as the rectification of error through the punitive use of force against 
those unwilling to submit to the requirements of li.76  Internationally, fa was 
                                                 
72On the fundamentally litigious character of aristocratic legal feud, see generally Philip J. Geary. 
"Living with Conflicts in Stateless France - a Typology of Conflict Management Mechanisms, 1050-
1200." In Living with the Dead in the Middle Ages, edited by Philip J. Geary, 125-60. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1994. 
73Lesaffer, ‘Peace Treaties from Lodi to Westphalia’, p. 11. 
74Frederick Tse-shyang Chen. "The Confucian View of World Order." In Religion and International 
Law, edited by Mark W. Janis and Carolyn Evans, 27-49. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004, p. 
33. 
75 Key-Hiuk Kim. The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order - Korea, Japan, and the Chinese 
Empire, 1860-1882. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, pp. 7-9. 
76Bozeman, The Future of Law in a Multicultural World, pp. 152-153. 
 56
intermittently manifest in imperial interventions to punish outlaws (such as the 
Japanese wako pirates active in the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries), and to 
defend tributary states from external attack by ‘barbarians.’77  
 Within the global state system, the respective roles of law and force in 
maintaining international order are equally evident.  While the global state system 
lacks a judiciary with the same powers of universal and compulsory jurisdiction 
enjoyed by the medieval papal courts, it nevertheless possesses a richly articulated 
international legal framework through which international conflicts are routinely 
mediated and resolved. This framework is infused with the liberal values favoured by 
the dominant states, with the fundamental institutions of multilateralism and 
contractual international law faithfully reflecting a conception of law as reciprocal 
accord between formally equal parties.78 Unlike either the papal-imperial diarchy or 
the Chinese imperial hierarchy, authoritative power in the modern state system is not 
imposed downwards in the form of binding commands. Rather, it is negotiated 
between parties, with its obligatory character supposedly deriving from its basis in the 
consent of the signatory parties.79 
 Much like their counterparts in Latin Christendom and the Sinosphere, the 
custodians of order in the global state system aspire towards reducing members’ 
recourse to organized violence while also conceding the practical necessity of 
employing authorized violence to secure international order. In the global state system, 
coercive power manifests itself firstly at the unit level, with the maintenance of state 
monopolies on the domestic use organized violence forming a vital prerequisite for the 
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maintenance of international order.80 At the systemic level, the scope for the use of 
authorized violence is limited by the requirement that it first be endorsed by a majority 
vote from the United Nations Security Council, and that it be undertaken for the 
purpose of preserving international peace and security. As in all orders, such 
restrictions on the use of force reduce rather than eliminate agents’ propensity to act 
outside of these parameters. This observation aside, the broader point remains that the 
global state system, like each of its predecessors, depends upon a judicious mixture of 
authoritative and coercive power to sustain international order. 
 The normative complexes and governing frameworks of international orders 
provide them with the ideological unity and institutional capacity needed to produce 
order between diverse political communities. But these norms and institutions are 
themselves embedded within an order-enabling material context. This context 
profoundly conditions the order-producing norms and institutions of international 
orders, but it does not mechanically determine their composition. The three most 
salient features of this material context are (i) the aggregate social capacities for 
organized production and destruction extant within a given order; (ii) the configuration 
of mobilizational networks – organized around principles of kinship, patronage, 
contract or bureaucratic command - through which collective action may be 
channelled; and (iii) the volume and density of interactions (the systemic 
interdependence) operative between the order’s constituent communities.81  Each of 
these features is influential in determining both the social resources available to the 
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would-be architects of order, as well as the magnitude of governance problems that 
they are forced to confront. 
 Both the capacities to generate and appropriate liquid wealth and the capacities 
to organize and project armed force are central to the generation of political order.  
Across the cases examined in this study, variations in aggregate capacities for 
production and destruction left profound imprints on the resulting international orders 
crafted by elites. Thus, for example, we can only fully understand the order of Latin 
Christendom with a prior recognition of medieval Europe’s poverty, its technological 
backwardness, and the radical dispersion of capacities for violence among predatory 
aristocratic nobility. For it was only in such an environment, where economic and 
military power remained largely localized and the economy centred predominantly 
around subsistence agriculture, that the crazy-quilt of overlapping authority claims 
characteristic of a heteronomous system could effectively function as a viable 
governance structure.82  Conversely, the continuing viability of the hierarchical order 
of the Sinosphere over several centuries cannot be comprehended without an 
appreciation of the qualitatively higher levels of wealth and war-making capacity that 
the Ming and Qing dynasties were able to access vis-à-vis their medieval European 
counterparts.83  Equally, the ambitions of contemporary leaders to eradicate war and 
poverty from the world are only imaginable because of the unprecedented levels of 
liquid wealth and popular pacification that have been delivered by the advent of a 
global market economy and the universalization of the modern nation-state. 
 The raw levels of aggregate wealth and war-making capacity that rulers are 
able to tap clearly condition the shape of international orders, as do the mobilizational 
capacities available within a given social milieu. Social networks governed by 
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principles of kinship, patronage, contract, or bureaucratic command provide the 
essential media through which collective identities crystallize and raw resources are 
mobilized and channelled into concerted action.  In each of the orders considered 
below, rulers drew upon a combination of existing and newly constructed social 
networks to project power in distinctive ways. In Christendom, aristocratic kinship and 
patronage networks formed the vital media through which power was projected by 
both the emperor and the rulers of emerging dynastic kingdoms.84 Meanwhile, from 
the eleventh century onwards, the papacy crafted a system-encompassing Church 
governed firmly on principles of legal-bureaucratic command.85 Within the 
Sinosphere, a conspicuously modern bureaucratic apparatus and centralized patronage 
networks formed the twin bulwarks of imperial power within the empire, while 
rigorously administered commercial networks linked the Middle Kingdom to its 
tributary states.86  Finally, in the contemporary state system, political order is crafted 
from the operation of bureaucratically organized nation-states and multilateral 
organizations, with each depending on the wealth generated by formally depoliticized 
and world-straddling commercial networks for the perpetuation of order.87 
 Aggregate capacities for production and destruction and existing 
mobilizational networks form the raw materials out of which the custodians of 
international order attempt to craft governing institutions. The magnitude of the 
problems these institutions must manage is itself deeply influenced by the level of 
systemic interdependence evident within the international system. All other things 
                                                 
84Mann, The Sources of Social Power, p. 385. 
85
Ibid. On the Gregorian revolution and its import for the evolutionary trajectory of Christendom more 
generally, see Harold Berman. Law and Revolution - the Formation of the Western Legal Tradition. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983. 
86Fairbank, ‘A Preliminary Framework’, pp. 7-8.   
87On the relationship between the authoritative power of the nation-state and the wealth-generating 
capacities of transnational corporations, see generally Stephen Krasner. "Power Politics, Institutions, 
and Transnational Relations." In Bringing Transnational Relations Back In, edited by Thomas Risse-
Kappen, 257-79. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
 60
being equal, the scope for potential conflict between polities – and thus the need for 
ordering institutions – tends to rise as the volume and density of interactions between 
these polities rises. This observation holds true particularly when the focus is further 
limited to what Daniel Deudney has defined as the violence interdependence of 
international systems.88  Violence interdependence is understood here to refer to the 
material scope for violent confrontation between the constituent polities of an 
international order, as determined through the interplay of unchanging geography and 
changing technologies of communication, transportation, and production.89  Violence 
interdependence is thus strongly derivative of existing levels of technological 
development, and of existing aggregate capacities for production and destruction. 
 The level of violence interdependence decisively shapes the magnitude of 
governance challenges faced by the custodians of international order. By 
contemporary standards, social relations in Christendom were suffused with violence, 
given the aristocracy’s oligopolistic control over violence and the universal acceptance 
of feud as a means of legal redress.  However, Christendom’s poverty, its 
technological backwardness and the poor quality of its transportation infrastructure all 
conspired to keep violence interdependence relatively low. By contrast, the greater 
wealth and technological sophistication of the Sinosphere ensured significantly higher 
violence interdependence in this system, although the ordering challenges that this 
ultimately presented were strongly mitigated by the very high accumulation and 
concentration of coercive power within the Chinese imperial state.90 Within the 
contemporary state system, the unprecedentedly high concentration of Clausewitzian 
war-making capabilities enjoyed by the United States invites parallels between the 
Sinosphere’s imperial peace and the possibilities for ordering the global state system 
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under an informal American imperium. However, the countervailing diffusion of 
destructive capacities to non-state actors as a result of globalisation has raised the 
violence interdependence of the global state system beyond all prior experience, 
presenting ordering challenges of an intensity not witnessed in either of my historical 
cases.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 I have claimed that order is produced internationally through recourse to a 
combination of authoritative and coercive power, which are mediated through an 
ordering normative complex and its associated governing infrastructure. Normative 
complexes constitute the ideological glue holding international orders together. They 
make communicative action possible by providing actors with common purposes, a 
shared ethical code, and a justificatory rationale for existing structures of organized 
domination. The constitutional values of international orders are then practically 
realised through a systemic governing infrastructure. It is through this infrastructure 
that authoritative and coercive power are then marshalled to the task of producing 
order. Finally, both the normative complex and the governing infrastructure of 
international orders are embedded within an order-enabling material context. 
Aggregate capacities for production and destruction and available mobilizational 
networks set material parameters on the types of order that may be created. 
Meanwhile, the violence interdependence of the system determines the scope for 
conflict, and thus the magnitude of governance challenges that the custodians of 
international order must confront. 
 
 
  
TABLE 1.1 INTERNATIONAL ORDERS AT A GLANCE 
 
LATIN CHRISTENDOM THE SINOSPHERE THE GLOBAL STATE SYSTEM 
NORMATIVE COMPLEX 
• Salvation through Church as raison d’etre of 
collective association 
• Christian ethics 
• Augustinian political theology and social 
ideology of tri-functionality 
NORMATIVE COMPLEX 
• Achievement of temporal state of harmony 
(ping) in concordance with cosmic order 
• Confucian ethics 
• Sacerdotal conception of emperor and 
Confucian norms of benevolence and 
obedience 
NORMATIVE COMPLEX 
• Popular eudemonism and augmentation of 
individuals’ potentialities as moral purpose of 
the state 
• Globalised human rights system based on 
cosmopolitan liberal ethics 
• National self-determination and international 
regime of sovereign equality 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
• Heteronomous system nominally governed by 
papal-imperial diarchy 
• Canon law and feudal law 
• Feud as form of aristocratic legal redress; 
divine imperative of Crusade against infidels 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
• Imperial system nominally governed by 
Chinese emperor (Son of Heaven) 
• Ritual enactment of shared identities (li) 
through investiture missions and tribute trade 
• Imperial resort to judicial sanctions (fa) to 
rectify error and restore cosmic order 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
• Sovereign state system governed by universal 
concert of formally equal states 
• Global legal framework based on 
multilateralism and contractual international 
law 
• State monopolies on violence supplemented 
by collective maintenance of order through 
force authorized by UNSC 
ORDER-ENABLING MATERIAL CONTEXT 
• Feudal mode of production, aristocratic 
oligopoly over organized violence 
• Aristocratic kinship and patronage networks 
predominate alongside bureaucratic Church 
hierarchy 
• Low concentration and low accumulation of 
organized violence [low violence 
interdependence]  
ORDER-ENABLING MATERIAL CONTEXT 
• Proto-capitalist mode of production organized 
within framework of gunpowder empire 
• Dominance of imperial bureaucracy and 
centralized imperial patronage networks 
• High concentration and low accumulation of 
coercive means [moderate violence 
interdependence] 
ORDER-ENABLING MATERIAL CONTEXT 
• Global market system organized within 
framework of states possessing industrial (and 
in some cases nuclear) capacities for violence 
• Dominance of state and inter-governmental 
bureaucracies and formally depoliticized 
global commercial networks 
• High concentration and high accumulation of 
coercive means [high violence 
interdependence] 
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 A tabular representation of Christendom, the Sinosphere, and the global state 
system is presented above (table 1.1). The presentation is necessarily schematic, and is 
intended to serve as a reference point for the reader rather than as a comprehensive 
portrait of any of these orders. What table 1.1 cannot show is that international orders 
are rent with internal tensions and inconsistencies, and that they are capable only of 
mitigating and containing conflict between their members rather than eliminating it. 
International orders are susceptible to crises of legitimacy and are vulnerable to 
breakdown if they fail to contain sentiments of enmity between their constituent 
communities.  It is entirely possible for there to be an international system without an 
international society, in which antagonisms play out without the civilizing bridle of 
shared values and institutions to moderate hatred and mitigate human suffering. 
International orders are contingent constellations of norms and institutions that operate 
effectively only within a permissive ideational and material milieu. International 
orders are fragile. International orders are flawed. And international orders are finite. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
HOW ARE INTERNATIONAL ORDERS TRANSFORMED? 
 
2.1 Existing Accounts for the Transformation of International Orders 
 
How are international orders transformed? A range of suggestive but 
incomplete answers to this question may be drawn from the available literature on 
international systems change. Cyclical theories of order emphasize the dependence of 
international orders on the fate of great power sponsors, with orders’ transformation 
being determined by shifts in the balance of power away from conservative supporters 
of the status quo and towards more aggressive and dynamic revisionist powers. Linear 
process theories of international order conversely see international orders as the 
systemic residue of largely endogenous processes of polity formation. Seen through 
this lens, the nation-state’s contemporary ubiquity is a testament to a centuries-long 
process of Darwinian institutional selection, with the global state system representing 
nothing more than the most efficient available means of organizing political authority 
on a global scale. A third set of perspectives conceptualizes international systems 
change in terms of punctuated equilibria, affording causal primacy to either far-
reaching societal transformations (changes in the mode of production or destruction) 
or to the irruption of new and subversive forms of collective identity in explaining 
international orders’ transformation.  Each of these accounts provides valuable 
insights, but none by themselves are adequate as explanations for international orders’ 
transformation. 
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2.1.1 International Orders and the Rise and Fall of Great Powers 
  
 Martin Wight’s adage that international politics is and will forever be the realm 
of recurrence and repetition provides a useful entrée into a consideration of the merits 
and limits of cyclical power transition approaches to the study of international 
orders.91 The notion that the fate of international orders is tied to the fortunes of their 
great power sponsors superficially has much to commend it. Intuitively, it makes sense 
that international orders would reflect the interests of the powerful, and that they 
would tend towards disintegration as the relative power of their sponsors ebbed.92  In 
privileging the active role played by anti-systemic actors in overturning international 
orders, power transition theories also leave greater room for agency in their accounts 
than do many alternative explanations. I have already demonstrated that orders must 
be perceived as legitimate if they are to endure, and cyclical ‘rise and fall’ theories 
provide much scope for exploring the processes whereby radically alienated actors 
might mobilize to delegitimate and destroy existing orders.    
Beyond their intuitive appeal, the greatest strengths of ‘rise and fall’ theories 
lie in their parsimonious character, and in their familiarity and accessibility to 
international relations scholars. The idea that international orders hydraulically rise 
and fall in tandem with successive hegemons is attractive in its simplicity, a simplicity 
that carries with it the further advantage of rendering it potentially applicable across a 
broad range of cases. Paul Schroeder’s account of the post-Vienna Congress of 
Europe, a collective security system that was guaranteed by the dual hegemony of the 
                                                 
91Martin Wight. "Why Is There No International Theory?" In Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the 
Theory of International Politics, edited by Martin Wight and Herbert Butterfield, 17-34. London: Allen 
& Unwin, 1966, p. 26. 
 
92
For a sophisticated recent rendition of this argument, see Torbjorn L. Knutsen. The Rise and Fall of 
World Orders. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999. 
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United Kingdom and Imperial Russia as Europe’s respective sea and land-power 
giants, and which crumbled as these powers’ interests diverged, accords well with this 
approach.93 ‘Rise and fall’ theories also seem to find confirmation in the fate of the 
League of Nations, which failed through a combination of Allied abandonment or 
neglect and the active assaults of ascending totalitarian empires.94  The credibility of 
‘rise and fall’ theories is further fortified by their august intellectual lineage as the 
favoured default explanation of realists for the collapse of international orders.95  The 
very familiarity and prominence of such ‘rise and fall’ theories make it necessary that 
they be critically engaged before alternative accounts are considered. 
Cyclical power transition explanations for the transformation of international 
orders can be faulted firstly on conceptual grounds. The claim that shifts in the 
distribution of capabilities account for the collapse of discrete economic or collective 
security regimes has itself been subjected to rigorous criticism in recent decades.96 
However, power transition theories are of even more limited value when trying to 
comprehend the transformation of international orders as I have conceived of them in 
this study. For an international order such as Christendom or the Sinosphere did not 
                                                 
93
Paul Schroeder. "Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?" The American Historical 
Review 97, no. 3 (1992): 683-706. It must be acknowledged, however, that Schroeder’s broader account 
of the Vienna settlement accords great significance to the development of norms and processes of 
peaceful conflict mediation and resolution between the five great powers, and that his larger account of 
the era thus cannot be easily reduced to a realist position.  
94See for example Paul Kennedy. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers - Economic Change and 
Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. London: Fontana Press, 1980, chapter six passim. 
95
See generally Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis; Robert Gilpin. War and Change in World Politics. 
Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981; Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great 
Powers; and Jacek Kugler, and A.F.K. Organski. "The Power Transition: A Retrospective and 
Prospective Evaluation." In Handbook of War Studies, edited by Manus I. Midlarski, 171-94. Ann 
Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1996. 
96See for example non-realist arguments marshalled respectively in the 1980s to account for the 
persistence of a global free trade regime in the face of American hegemonic decline (e.g. Robert O. 
Keohane. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1984), as well as non-realist arguments articulated from the 1990s to 
account for NATO’s persistence following the collapse of bi-polarity (e.g. Celeste A. Wallander. 
"Institutional Assets and Adaptability: Nato after the Cold War." International Organization 54, no. 4 
(2000): 705-35). 
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merely reflect the interests of dominant actors such as the Church or the reigning 
imperial dynasty. Rather, these orders constituted the taken-for-granted normative and 
institutional matrix within which these actors crystallized. As such, the causal pathway 
assumed by cyclical theories must be reversed – far from reflecting the interests of 
dominant actors, international orders in each case worked to constitute these actors 
and their interests instead. 
In making the foregoing observation, I do not wish to imply that positional 
power struggles are irrelevant to the fate of international orders.  Positional power 
conflicts played out within decaying orders are undeniably important in both 
accelerating that decay and in exacerbating the chaos that immediately follows an 
order’s collapse. Additionally, the relative power and influence of different actors is of 
critical importance in shaping reconstituted orders that emerge from the ruins of their 
predecessors - the order that succeeded Christendom, for example, would have looked 
very different had the Habsburgs prevailed over France and her Protestant allies in the 
Thirty Years War. These qualifications aside, the fact remains that international orders 
only collapse following decades of decay, a process that is in turn driven by 
developments that are generally not the product of conscious, deliberate human action. 
Moreover, when international orders collapse, they do not simply sweep away the 
accumulated privileges of declining powers. Rather, they dissolve the most basic 
institutions of international societies, as well as representing the comprehensive failure 
of the world-views that sustained them. The dissolution of a unified Christendom and 
the disintegration of the Sinosphere respectively represented not just the humbling of 
the Church and the Qing dynasty, but the discrediting of entire cosmologies as well. 
Ruptures of this magnitude simply cannot be explained by the parsimonious power 
transition approaches advanced by realist international scholars. 
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 Cyclical power transition approaches to the transformation of international 
orders are also a poor empirical fit when applied to my case studies. In each of my 
cases, the most radically alienated anti-systemic forces were not revisionist states, but 
rather religious radicals whose material capabilities paled in comparison to those of 
the ostensible custodians of order. Neither Protestant confessional networks, the 
Taiping rebels, nor global jihadist terrorists compare favourably with their respective 
nemeses in raw power terms. But in both of my historical cases, these networks 
exercised a decisive influence in fatally undermining the old order, a trend that is 
manifesting itself also in the disproportionately destructive impact of global jihadism 
on the contemporary state system. By contrast, the most powerful custodians of order 
in each of my cases (Charles V’s Habsburg imperium, the Qing dynasty, and the 
contemporary United States) possessed enormous strengths measured in terms of raw 
material capabilities, again wrong-footing power transition explanations for the 
collapse of international order. 
 There can be no doubt that positional power struggles are endemic to 
international orders, and that these power struggles work to further enervate them by 
accelerating their decay and exacerbating the chaos that follows in their wake. But to 
claim that revisionist states intentionally overthrow international orders in Herculean 
acts of statesmanship designed to remake the world in their own image is to 
misunderstand the character of international orders as systemic social constructs. 
International orders constitute the shared mental and institutional framework within 
which social interaction takes place between polities, with their collapse punctuating 
the terminal crisis of an entire world outlook. They collapse only after a protracted 
period of decay, with their continued viability during this time being threatened by 
indifference and neglect rather than hostility or overt subversion. Moreover, when 
international orders finally do expire, their ideological coherence is often shattered not 
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by Goliath but by David, not by revisionist great powers but by inchoate insurgent 
networks operating at the interstices of the existing order. For all of their beguiling 
parsimony, ‘rise and fall’ power transition theories cannot account for the 
transformation of international orders. 
 
2.1.2 State Formation, Linear Process Theories, and the Collapse of International 
Orders 
 
Power transition theories perceive international orders as top-down constructs, 
imposed by Great Powers in their fleeting moments of dominance to lock in and 
perpetuate their interests at a system-wide level. Conversely, an alternative ‘bottom-
up’ perspective might imagine international orders as practical associations, 
collectively negotiated by rulers in parallel with domestic state-building projects to 
secure the realisation of essential social goods at systemic as well as unit levels. In 
place of recurrent cycles of Great Power turnover and the accompanying dramas of 
order collapse and reconstitution, a bottom-up perspective rather conceives of 
historical change in terms of a linear development from less to more efficient forms of 
domestic and international political organization. Seen through this optic, less efficient 
forms of international order do not collapse so much as fade away, with rulers 
collectively and incrementally sloughing off inefficient practices of international 
governance in the same manner that less efficient polity forms (e.g. city-states and 
city-leagues) were eventually sidelined in favour of the sovereign state.97 
                                                 
97
On the elimination of city-states and city leagues in favour of the more efficient polity form of the 
sovereign state, see generally Hendrik Spruyt. The Sovereign State and Its Competitors. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1994. For a sophisticated approach to the question of international systems 
change that emphasizes the predominance of accretive rather than revolutionary transformations over 
time, as well as tracing the secular tendency towards more complex modes of international governance, 
see generally K. J. Holsti. Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
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 There are undoubted insights to be found in approaches of this kind.  Both 
Christendom and the Sinosphere showed advanced signs of decay in the decades 
preceding their demise, with both systems increasingly failing to maintain order within 
environments convulsed by large-scale economic and geopolitical change. In 
acknowledging that international orders do not merely embody the interests of the 
powerful but rather work to safeguard the common interests of their members, it 
becomes possible to mount plausible arguments linking environmental changes (e.g. a 
technologically driven increase in violence interdependence) to a decline in the 
perceived effectiveness of international orders in securing their members’ common 
interests. The resulting legitimacy deficit in the prevailing order may then be cited as 
the catalyst for institutional innovations that subsequently evolved to restore a 
modicum order within international societies. 
 The world’s developmental trajectory since 1500 offers continuities that seem 
to support efficiency-driven linear process models. When considered over the broad 
arc of history, both Christendom and the Sinosphere present as archaic and decidedly 
inefficient international orders, swept away with the rise and spread of the modern 
sovereign state. Seen through this prism, processes of contracting and coercion in late 
medieval Europe forged a new form of polity in the sovereign state, which eventually 
proved itself more efficient in mobilizing capital and violence and more effective in 
commanding popular legitimacy than any of its contemporary rivals.98 Through 
processes of Darwinian selection, the sovereign state saw off its competitors, forcing 
through its ascendancy a reorganization of political authority within Europe from a 
heteronomous to a sovereign state system.99  From Westphalia onwards, the principles 
governing relations between rulers were then refined and perfected, enabling 
                                                 
98 On this process, see generally Tilly, Capital, Coercion and ad European States. 
99 Ibid. 
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sovereigns to consolidate their power domestically while containing international 
conflict within manageable bounds. The efficiency with which the European sovereign 
state system was then able to reconcile international pluralism with expansions in 
Europe’s productive and destructive capabilities laid the foundation for European 
international society’s triumphant global expansion. In so doing, it necessarily doomed 
irredeemably pre-modern non-European orders like the Sinosphere to inevitable 
destruction.100 
 While superficially plausible, linear process accounts are also unsustainable 
upon closer analysis. At the most fundamental level, one can contest the artificially 
thin conception of international order as a purely functional arrangement that sustains 
this line of argument.  The realisation of common interests such as the security of life 
and property is of undeniable importance in driving the construction of international 
orders, and the perception that a given order is failing to achieve these functions is 
certainly conducive to the onset of a legitimation crisis. But across the cases I 
consider, the more prosaic functions of international orders were joined with more 
historically and culturally contingent goals such as the pursuit of salvation through the 
Church, the maintenance of a Confucian cosmic and social order, or the promotion of 
popular eudemonism and human emancipation. Assessments of institutional 
efficiency, far from operating through the application of timeless and universal 
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The notion that Europe’s pluralistic and intensely competitive geopolitical environment fashioned a 
range of institutional and military innovations that laid the basis for Europe’s subsequent geopolitical 
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Cambridge University Press, 1973; and Geoffrey Parker. The Military Revolution: Military Innovation 
and the Rise of the West 1500-1800. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. I am 
however yet to read a treatment of the ‘rise of the West’ that gives sustained treatment to the role of 
sovereignty as an ordering institution in providing the political stability in Europe necessary to facilitate 
the colonial powers’ subsequent global expansion. 
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standards of rationality, were rather suffused with the substantive value orientations of 
agents operating within these historically and culturally specific environments. To take 
but one example, Christendom’s dependence on feud as an acceptable method of 
aristocratic legal redress seems by current standards to be not only morally perverse, 
but also highly inefficient as a means of enhancing the security of agents’ life and 
property.  Within the cultural context of Christendom, however, a system-wide 
ideology of tri-functionality that celebrated the armed vocation of the nobility 
provided ample justification for the feud as a normal and morally acceptable 
mechanism for resolving disputes.101  Endemic non-state violence did not by itself 
inspire late medieval rulers to consciously aspire for a more efficient international 
order. Rather, it was only after Christendom’s cultural unity had been decisively 
shattered, and then only in the wake of Europe’s devastating wars of religion, that 
Europe’s rulers were forced by necessity to reconstitute an international order on the 
basis of sovereign principles.  
 The loss of legitimacy is indeed critical to the collapse of international orders, 
and the hardships endured after an order has disintegrated provide a crucial catalyst 
for the construction of a new order. But hard-headed assessments that a given order is 
inefficient at realising common interests, and that it must be reformed if those interests 
are to be achieved, are conspicuously absent in the cases I consider. The empirical 
record suggests not an organic process of linear evolution towards more efficient 
forms of order, but rather the periodic collapse of old orders, followed by a bloody and 
prolonged inter-regnum out of which a qualitatively different order eventually 
emerges.  For this reason, claims that international orders are a systemic residue of 
processes of state formation, and that state formation may be nominated as the 
                                                 
101See again generally Geary, ‘Living with Conflicts in Stateless France.’ 
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locomotive force driving the genesis and global spread of Westphalian international 
society, must be discounted. 
 A final problem with linear process theories concerns the complacency with 
which they implicitly regard the future of the global state system. The notion that the 
Westphalian state system emerged and expanded because of its greater efficiency vis-
à-vis alternative orders is dangerous in that it encourages the view that the 
globalisation of the sovereign state system was foreordained, and that its future 
durability is assured.  Even if one were to accept that endogenous processes of state 
formation undermined Christendom from the bottom up and mechanically bequeathed 
a Westphalian sovereign state system in Europe, the logic of the system’s genesis was 
clearly different from that of its subsequent global expansion. The imposed character 
of the sovereign state in many parts of the developing world is evident today in the 
widespread prevalence of post-colonial state weakness and state failure. The acute 
institutional decay characteristic of many quasi-states, in conjunction with the 
ideological challenge posed by global jihadism and the material challenge posed by 
the widespread diffusion of destructive capacities to non-state actors, all speak to the 
fragility of the current world order. That instructive parallels can be drawn between 
the terminal crises of Christendom and the Sinosphere and the contemporary travails 
of the global state system seriously qualifies the deterministic triumphalism implicit 
linear process narratives. 
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2.1.3 Punctuated Equilibria Models of International Systems Change I: The Collapse 
of International Orders as the Product of Changes in Modes of Production or 
Destruction 
 
 In contrast to either cyclical power transition theories or linear process 
evolutionary theories, punctuated equilibria models of international systems change 
more accurately capture the dynamics of international order transformation as 
manifest in the cases explored in this inquiry. Given the holistic character of 
international orders and the protracted nature of the crises leading to their 
transformation, attempts to hitch the fate of international orders to tectonic 
transformations in underlying modes of production or destruction have definite appeal.  
In recent years, Marxist IR scholars have advanced a range of valuable new 
insights demonstrating the embededness of international orders within broader 
structures of production, cognition, and destruction.102 The value of Marxist 
approaches to the study of international orders is demonstrated clearly in Benno 
Teschke’s analysis of the constitutive role played by transformations in social property 
relations in reconfiguring both units of political authority and the geopolitical orders 
within which they are embedded.103 That the medieval, Absolutist and modern 
international systems in Europe displayed distinctive geopolitical logics is hard to 
contest.  Likewise, it is also evident from Teschke’s analysis that these different 
geopolitical logics were at least partially explicable through reference to changing 
logics of accumulation and concomitant shifts in dominant forms of social property 
relations.  
                                                 
102See for example Justin Rosenberg. The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of 
International Relations. London: Verso, 1994; and Benno Teschke. The Myth of 1648 - Class, 
Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International Relations. London: Verso, 2003. 
103 Teschke, Myth of 1648, passim. 
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 What Marxist analyses of systems change indicate is that the transformation of 
international orders is at least partially derivative of system-wide shifts in their 
material foundations. This insight is further confirmed through a consideration of 
theories that focus on transformations in the mode of destruction as an engine of 
systems change.  Both the Revolution in Military Affairs and the contemporary 
prominence of non-traditional security threats have spawned a growing literature on 
the changing nature of warfare.104 While some scholars have restricted their focus to 
technologically driven changes in war-fighting techniques, more historically informed 
accounts have analysed contemporary developments through the lens of tectonic 
transformations in the nature of war as a socio-cultural institution.  Thus, for example, 
Andrew Latham discerns distinctive feudal, modern and emerging post-modern forms 
of warfare, with organized violence being pursued for radically different purposes and 
being undertaken by historically distinctive collectivities in each of these epochs.105 
Permutations of this theme can be found also in the works of Kaldor, Cerny, and 
Martin van Creveld.106 While none of these scholars can be accused of subscribing to 
mono-causal narratives, they nevertheless share a common focus in identifying the 
transformative significance of changes in the mode of destruction for the legitimation 
of political authority and the organizational configuration of domestic and 
international orders. 
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 Macro-structural accounts of systems change have much to offer in aiding our 
understanding of the transformation of international orders. Nevertheless, once again, 
while they offer valuable insights, they are nevertheless by themselves inadequate. 
The first and most obvious weakness of macro-structural accounts is their materialist 
bias. Existing macro-structural accounts neglect the crucial significance of ideational 
factors in accounting for processes of systemic change. While war-centric narratives 
are more catholic in their theoretical foundations, and are thus willing to trace 
correlations between dominant modes of destruction, political organization, and 
collective identification, the independent causal significance of transformations in 
collective identity in effecting transformations in social order is generally neglected. 
This observation obtains even more strongly in the case of Marxist accounts of 
systems change. While Gramscian analyses of the contemporary international system 
accord at least some independent significance to ideology, culture, and other 
‘superstructural’ characteristics of the present world order, historically oriented 
accounts of the evolution of international systems more typically neglect the 
independent significance of ideational factors as drivers of change.107 Thus, for 
example, in Teschke’s analysis of the emergence of Absolutist and modern 
geopolitical orders, no mention is made of either the Reformation or the French 
revolution as catalysts for systemic change, despite the pivotal significance of both of 
in transforming European international society.  
At base, macro-social accounts remain heavily inflected with a materialist bias. 
This bias is problematic given that in my historical cases a critical catalyst for the 
destruction of international orders was the emergence of heretical religious 
movements that fatally undermined the normative complex of the old order. Certainly, 
                                                 
107On Gramscian approaches to the problem of world order, see for example Robert Cox. "Social 
Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory." Millennium 10, no. 2 
(1981): 126-55. 
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shifts in the material foundations of both Christendom and the Sinosphere weakened 
the effectiveness and legitimacy of these orders. But it was the shattering of 
ideological unity and the ensuing breakdown of existing ordering mechanisms that 
triggered the phase shift from a chronic to an acute legitimation crisis in both cases.  
Neither the Reformation nor the Taiping rebellion can be easily reduced to 
epiphenomenal expressions of changes in the underlying mode of production or 
destruction. Unfortunately, this observation merely illuminates an additional weakness 
of macro-structural accounts, namely their tendency towards structural determinism 
and their relative neglect of agency. Macro-social accounts leave limited room for 
considering the active role played by agents in shaping the normative composition of 
international orders. In so doing, they neglect the processes through which coercive 
and authoritative power are tentatively reconciled to produce international orders, thus 
eliding also the dynamics through which these tentative reconciliations are then 
subsequently torn apart.  Macro-structural accounts risk assuming a highly 
deterministic character, with successive international orders mechanistically reflecting 
and embodying the functional requirements of the larger social totalities of which they 
are a part. Seen through such an optic, the distinctive and pressing human dilemmas 
that are provisionally resolved through the construction of international orders – such 
as the reconciliation of force with legitimacy or the balancing of rulers’ autonomy 
with requirements of systemic stability – are in danger of being completely 
overlooked. 
 The Euro-centrism typical of macro-structural accounts of systems change 
further weakens their explanatory power, with the periodizations from which their 
categories are constructed most often drawing from the very particular experience of 
Western Europe.  In basing supposedly universal claims on the European experience, 
macro-social accounts can divine universal correspondences where contingent 
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constellations in fact exist, thereby effacing the particularity of the European 
experience while generating erroneous causal claims about the general dynamics of 
systems change. This danger is for example illustrated the emphasis placed by ‘mode 
of destruction’ accounts on the importance of Europe’s military revolution as the 
catalyst for the emergence of the modern state and an international society predicated 
on the organizing principle of sovereignty. The importance of the military revolution 
in triggering the rise of a sovereign state system in Europe is undeniable.  But the fact 
that a roughly synchronous military revolution merely strengthened the suzerain 
international order of the Sinosphere suggests that the causal linkages drawn between 
changing modes of destruction and changing international orders are contingent rather 
than universal.108 Consequently, attempts to reduce the transformation of orders to 
mere symptoms of deeper transformations in modes of production or destruction must 
be regarded with scepticism. 
 
2.1.4 Punctuated Equilibria Models of International Systems Change II: The Collapse 
of International Orders as the Product of Transformations in Collective Identity 
 
 The notion that transformations in collective identity are pivotal in catalysing 
international systems change has been persuasively advanced in a range of 
constructivist studies.  The empirical emphases and causal narratives advanced by 
authors such as Daniel Philpott, Rodney Bruce Hall and Mlada Bukovansky naturally 
vary. Philpott emphasizes the role played by heretical identities and ideas as 
mechanisms of contradiction producing ‘crises of pluralism’ that then catalyse the 
                                                 
108On this point, see for example Nicola di Cosimo. "Did Guns Matter? Firearms and the Qing 
Formation." In The Qing Formation in World Historical Time, edited by Lynn A Struve, 121-66. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2004. 
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development of new international constitutions.109 Conversely, Hall posits a causal 
pathway whereby transformations in co-constituted individual and collective identities 
produce a social dissonance between agents’ interpretive frameworks and existing 
social orders.110 This dissonance ultimately resolves itself in the formulation of new 
legitimating principles of global and domestic social order, yielding transformations in 
institutional forms of collective action and with them transformations in international 
order.111 This perspective contrasts again with Bukovansky, who emphasizes the 
pivotal significance of contradictions in hegemonic international political cultures in 
establishing the normative and strategic terrain within which legitimacy contests 
between the Old Regime and proponents of counter-hegemonic legitimacy principles 
are played out.112   
These differences in argument notwithstanding, the contributions of each of 
these scholars have definitively established the importance of ideational changes in 
explaining the constitution, operation and transformation of international orders. This 
ideational emphasis accords well with the conception of international orders advanced 
in this study, and the importance I ascribe to ideological shocks in precipitating the 
disintegration of these orders relies heavily on insights drawn from the constructivist 
tradition. Where my position differs from existing constructivist accounts lies in the 
more systematic links between material and ideational transformations that I stress in 
explaining the transformation of international orders. While constructivists have been 
careful not to argue for the complete sufficiency of ideational transformations in 
explaining systems change, their efforts to demonstrate the necessity of ideational 
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changes in accounting for this process have often led to a relative neglect of material 
forces as catalysts of systems change. In this respect, constructivists are guilty of an 
idealist bias comparable to the materialism of the macro-structural accounts 
considered above.   
That international orders founder with the irruption of subversive collective 
identities and the ensuing breakdown of their ideological unity is central to my 
argument. But ideological shocks such as the Reformation or the Taiping rebellion 
occur only following protracted processes of institutional decay, in which changes in 
the material environment render established governing frameworks less and less 
effective in maintaining order. Changes in collective identities are critical to the 
transformation of international orders, but ideational changes are of only secondary 
importance in bringing international orders to the edge of the precipice in the first 
instance. Material changes – and most especially increases in violence 
interdependence occasioned by technological change – are instrumental in corroding 
the effectiveness of the ordering institutions of international societies long before their 
collapse. It is only once these ordering institutions have been degraded, and the 
prevailing order has already suffered a pronounced loss of effectiveness and perceived 
legitimacy, that heretical movements can strip away the residual normative consensus 
underpinning international orders to such devastating effect. 
 Force and law, coercive and authoritative power, form the twin foundations of 
political order. As such, constructivists are correct to emphasize the importance of 
transformations in collective identity in explaining the breakdown of international 
orders. For without a basic consensus on the sources and content of morality and the 
character of legitimate political domination, agents lack a shared life-world, and 
effective communicative action – and thus the deployment of authoritative power 
internationally in the service of order – becomes impossible. But authoritative power 
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by itself is insufficient to maintain order. Coercive power, in the form of authorized 
practices of organized violence, is equally necessary if order is to endure. And changes 
in the material context within which coercive power is deployed can exert profoundly 
destabilizing consequences, rendering old methods of order enforcement ineffectual 
while empowering actors with new and unprecedented levels of disruptive and 
destructive power. Heresies in isolation can be suppressed, while ordering institutions 
can adapt to expansions in coercive capacities if given sufficient time to do so.  
However, it is when heresy and military innovation explosively intersect that 
international orders fail.  
 
2.2 Explaining the Collapse of International Orders 
 
2.2.1 The Argument in Brief 
 
 International orders collapse as a result of legitimacy crises occasioned by a 
combination of institutional decay, rising violence interdependence, and ideological 
shocks that shatter the normative consensus upon which international orders depend. 
The underlying causes of institutional decay vary with each case, and will be treated 
individually in my separate case studies.  Conversely, ideological shocks and increases 
in violence interdependence play analogous roles across each of my cases in 
catalysing the transformation of international orders. 
 Ideological shocks subvert international orders by breaching the integrity of 
the normative complexes that help constitute these orders. Recall that international 
orders are partly composed of normative complexes consisting of identity-constitutive, 
ethical-prescriptive, and power legitimating norms. These norms integrate actors 
around shared identities and purposes, regulate behaviour through the articulation of 
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binding standards of rightful conduct, and justify and stabilize the relations of 
organized domination upon which international order rests.  Ideological shocks 
destabilize orders by destroying the consensus embodied in these normative 
complexes. In place of shared identities and common purposes, ideological shocks 
polarize international societies between radically alienated opponents of the old order 
and mobilized supporters of the status quo. Where ethical-prescriptive norms 
previously worked to restrain violence between adversaries within manageable 
bounds, ideological polarization robs these norms of their constraining power. 
Opponents that might previously have been fought so that they could be brought to 
terms become absolute enemies falling outside the circle of moral obligation, who 
must be annihilated if order is to be restored. Finally, ideological shocks subvert 
power-legitimating norms, with defenders of the old order confronting actors who 
repudiate the principled bases of organized domination in international societies. 
 In challenging the normative bases of international order, ideological shocks 
rob actors of the shared life-world needed to make communicative action possible and 
the deployment of authoritative power in the service of order practically effective.  At 
base, the effectiveness of authoritative institutions depends upon the maintenance of 
consensus on the constitutional values that inform these institutions. This is because 
without this consensus, the capacity of authoritative institutions to attract agents’ 
voluntary compliance with existing rules, norms, commands and laws is fatally 
diminished. In destabilizing the normative bases of international orders, ideological 
shocks paralyse authoritative institutions, thus fatally compromising agents’ ability to 
contain conflict within manageable bounds. 
 Ideological shocks signal the shift from the chronic to acute phases of a 
legitimacy crisis, precipitating the collapse of order after a period of prolonged decay. 
Conversely, increases in violence interdependence are more incremental in nature, 
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accumulating in the decades prior to an order’s collapse and steadily undercutting its 
capacity to contain conflict within manageable bounds. The ordering institutions of 
international societies emerge in the context of historically finite material conditions, 
and the efficacy of these institutions in maintaining order is dependent upon a 
perpetuation of these initial conditions.  Paradoxically, however, the very increases in 
wealth accumulation and technological development that are made possible by the 
maintenance of order eventually yield material innovations that undercut its continued 
operation. As actors acquire novel and unprecedented capacities for disruption and 
destruction, existing ordering arrangements are strained, the efficacy and legitimacy of 
these arrangements is called into question, and international order is imperilled. 
 Increases in violence interdependence simultaneously expand and tighten the 
webs of coercive interaction between the constituent polities of international orders, 
thereby straining the capacity of ordering institutions to manage conflict. The 
development and diffusion of new means of destruction heightens agents’ security 
anxieties, while the observed ineffectiveness of existing ordering arrangements 
corrodes their legitimacy and thereby diminishes their ability to maintain order. 
Although existing ordering institutions endure, their perceived disconnectedness from 
a radically altered geopolitical context makes support for their continued operation 
increasingly nominal. Increases in violence interdependence accelerate processes of 
geopolitical consolidation, in so doing paradoxically integrating international systems 
within tighter webs of coercive interaction, while simultaneously exposing the 
inadequacy of existing ordering institutions and thus paving the way for the 
disintegration of international societies. 
 Ideological shocks embody a purposive challenge by some actors to the 
legitimacy of the existing international order. Increases in violence interdependence 
conversely undermine the effectiveness of existing fundamental institutions, 
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prompting others to negatively assess the legitimacy of the old order on account of its 
weakening performance.  Meanwhile, processes of institutional decay provoke yet 
others to demand reform of the old order based on process-based critiques of its 
legitimacy. The combination of ideological shocks, institutional decay, and increases 
in violence interdependence conspire to produce legitimacy crises that trigger the 
transformation of international orders. Moreover, while ideological shocks and 
increases in violence interdependence originate independently of one another and play 
different roles in catalysing the breakdown of order, the two intertwine and amplify 
one another’s destructive effects once the order has collapsed. It is in the fatal 
confluence of expanded destructive means and unlimited ideological ends that 
conventional enmity gives way to absolute enmity and international order is destroyed. 
 
2.2.2 Religious Insurgency and Violence Interdependence as the Engines of 
International Systems Change – The Argument in Greater Detail 
 
In the preceding paragraphs, I have sketched the contours of my argument in broad 
terms, telegraphing the importance of both ideological shocks and technologically 
driven increases in violence interdependence as structural drivers for the collapse of 
international orders. With these preliminaries dispensed with, it is now possible to 
specify with greater precision the respective roles played by religious insurgencies and 
increases in violence interdependence as catalysts for international systems change. 
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Render Unto Caesar?  Religious Radicalism and the Transformation of International 
Orders 
 
 The three international orders surveyed below were each convulsed by 
insurgencies grounded in religious ideological frameworks. This raises a fundamental 
question: how important is religious insurgency per se as a catalyst for the 
transformation of international orders?  From the outset, I must clarify that the 
emphasis I accord to religious insurgencies should not be mistaken for a more general 
privileging of religious over secular ideological shocks as precipitants of change. 
Rather, all that I require is that international orders be shaken by ideological shocks 
that challenge their most basic constitutional norms. Certainly, there are characteristics 
of religious insurgencies that stand out as being particularly subversive. The 
programmatic emphasis on millenarian visions of redemption; the resort to a 
combative rhetoric and iconography suffused with images of violence; the recourse to 
repertoires of action in which purgative, annihilatory violence and themes of 
martyrdom and sacrifice are particularly conspicuous; even the capacity to inspire total 
commitment from insurgent actors – each have been suggested by scholars to account 
for the ferocity of religious insurgencies.113  None, however, are the exclusive preserve 
of religious insurgencies, but have rather been manifest also in a range of nationalist 
and revolutionary movements throughout history.114   
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 The above qualification aside, the religious character of the ideological shocks 
in each of my cases remains, and demands explanation. Recalling one of my core 
assumptions – that political order depends on legitimate relations of organized 
domination– we must acknowledge that the cultivation of political legitimacy always 
demands a satisfactory negotiation of the relationship between the sacred and the 
mundane. This observation is particularly evident in my historic cases, where 
international orders were undergirded by Christian and Confucian cosmologies 
respectively. However, it is also manifest in the global state system, which by reason 
of its cultural diversity lacks overt spiritual moorings, but which subscribes in practice 
to a pluralistic conception of religion (as a formalized body of privately held beliefs) 
that bear the distinct imprint of the West’s post-Reformation experience.115  Across all 
of my cases, the relationship between the sacred and the mundane has been the subject 
of continuous contestation, with agents resolving these tensions in culturally and 
historically distinctive ways. In Christendom from the eleventh century Papal 
Revolution onwards, the existence of separate but intertwined sacred and mundane 
realms was explicitly acknowledged, with the authoritative institutions of the former 
being privileged over those of the latter, but with the Church nevertheless providing 
the populace with elaborate religious justifications for submission to political 
authority.116 In the global state system, by contrast, the sacred and the mundane are 
internationally regarded as separate realms, with religion conceived as a privately held 
body of beliefs having no direct bearing on questions of political obedience.117  This 
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contrasts again with the Sinosphere, in which the distinction between sacred and 
mundane was least well defined, with the emperor serving as the essential pivot 
linking the celestial and terrestrial worlds.118  
 The requirement that a political order be seen as legitimate is unavoidably 
complicated by the need to formulate a satisfactory relationship between the sacred 
and the mundane, and between the respective agencies of religious and political 
power.119  All political orders are undergirded by ontological claims regarding the 
appropriate relationship between the spiritual and social worlds.  Consequently, all 
orders are vulnerable to challenges that are anchored in a perceived dissonance 
between the cosmic and the temporal orders.  The perception of a lack of harmony 
between the cosmic and the mundane provides agents with a principled rationale for 
subverting the existing order that is indefeasible in character and potentially 
apocalyptic in its implications.120 Additionally, the capacity for agents to reflexively 
appreciate potential inconsistencies between their religious and their political 
obligations tends to grow with time, as developments such as the spread of literacy 
empower them to critically consider existing political arrangements without the 
mediation of an orthodox priestly class.  
 Political orders, in being forced through legitimacy concerns to institutionalize 
a workable relationship between the sacred and secular realms, are thus vulnerable to 
religiously informed challenges from the outset.  Beyond this generic vulnerability, 
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however, organized religions possess inherent characteristics that qualify them as 
seedbeds of subversive energy.  In their writings on the nature of religious violence, 
both Mark Juergensmeyer and David Rapoport note a central paradox that is common 
to religions, specifically their systematic appropriation of violent imagery, motifs and 
language for the purposes of normative pacification.121 Juergensmeyer argues that 
central to religion is the notion of order conquering chaos, and that beneath the 
appearance of disorder in the temporal world lies the higher reality of a transcendent 
cosmic order.122 In seeking to communicate this core message to believers, religions 
rely heavily on violent language and imagery not only to symbolize the forces of 
disorder, but also to make real the cosmic struggle between good and evil that 
culminates in the triumph of order over chaos.123  
 The ubiquity of violent language and imagery within religions cannot be 
denied, and is evident for example in the prevalence of martial metaphors in the 
Abrahamic faiths, Christians’ veneration of the crucifix – a Roman execution device – 
as their central icon, and Sikhs’ recourse to the khanda, a double-edged sword, to 
symbolize their confrontations with spiritual and worldly foes.124 In his seminal work 
Violence and the Sacred, anthropologist René Girard attempts to further explain this 
phenomena by contextualizing it in relation to religion’s initial purpose, which was to 
mitigate violence among strangers in environments in which kin-based vendetta had 
ceased to be viable as a mechanism of order maintenance.125 Girard argues that 
sacrificial rituals – at first involving real victims and only later entailing simulated 
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bloodshed – served to deflect and displace violence beyond the community of the 
faithful, thereby contributing to social order.126 Regardless of whether or not one 
accepts this explanation in toto, the intimate connection between religion, order and 
symbolic violence is important to note, if only for the ease with which polarized 
notions of good and evil and their associated imagery can be interjected into worldly 
political and social struggles. 
 While religion most frequently serves to sustain existing political orders, the 
pervasiveness of violent imagery and the Manichean division between good and evil 
that are characteristic of religion also lend themselves to interpretations that are also 
profoundly corrosive of authority. Not only does the perceived dissonance between 
sacred and mundane orders provide a particularly powerful justification for rebellion, 
but the cultural ‘tool-kit’ of violent religious imagery and language that is available to 
actors also licenses recourse to purgative violence as a means of enacting personal 
piety and effecting collective spiritual renewal.127 The Manichean dichotomy between 
good and evil that is characteristic of religious visions lends itself to interpretations 
that closely approximate Schmitt’s notion of absolute enmity, a sentiment that is 
ultimately deeply corrosive of all forms of political order. Whereas the exercise of 
communicative action depends on the recognition of other agents as legitimate 
interlocutors, fundamentalist ideologies interject categories of absolute good and evil 
into social and political struggles, negating the possibility of negotiated solutions to 
these conflicts.  Equally, the exercise of authorized practices of coercion to enforce 
order presupposes the existence of adversaries to be chastised and punished rather than 
reprobate enemies to be physically annihilated. The irruption of religious insurgencies 
both challenges the constitutional values of international orders, as well as shearing 
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away the thin crust of ordering institutions upon which the maintenance of political 
order ultimately depends. 
 Let me reiterate that it is not necessary for ideological shocks to be religious in 
character, and that religious visions have historically served to fortify political orders 
more often than they have subverted them. This qualification does not detract from the 
characteristics of religious insurgencies that, if not unique to them, nevertheless help 
to account for their destructive power. Ideologically, the re-framing of social and 
political contests as part of a larger cosmic struggle allows insurgent leaders to 
leverage off the grievances that naturally accumulate towards structures of organized 
domination in even the most stable orders.128 Fundamentalist visions also carry the 
appeal of linking collective projects for spiritual renewal with the quest for individual 
salvation and self-actualization, thereby forging unusually tight linkages between 
personal identity and the larger spiritual and political objectives of the movement.129 
The challenges of popular mobilization are also mitigated by the egalitarian nature of 
most fundamentalist visions, which allow them to more easily transcend existing 
social and geographic cleavages and thus unify a heterogeneous following around 
categorical religious identities.130  Finally, this capacity for rapid diffusion across 
multiple social groupings in turn permits insurgent actors to creatively tap into a 
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diverse plethora of existing social networks, enabling the construction of hybrid 
clandestine infrastructures of considerable resilience.131  
 While a religious foundation is unnecessary for ideological shocks to 
precipitate the collapse of international orders, anti-systemic movements predicated on 
fundamentalist visions pose a particularly powerful threat to the maintenance of 
international orders. In Reformation Europe, the nineteenth century Sinosphere, and 
the contemporary state system, religious insurgencies began with the articulation of 
deep philosophical critiques of the old order that challenged its ontological 
foundations.  In the wake of this philosophical challenge, the radicalization of 
religious opposition was accelerated by the availability of a cultural ‘tool-kit’ – in the 
violent imagery and rhetoric of Scripture – that permitted the construction of 
ideologies of total resistance to the old order. Following the partial or total breakdown 
of ordering institutions, the egalitarian nature of fundamentalist visions ensured them 
rapid social diffusion, while the tight linkages drawn between collective renewal and 
personal salvation gave these visions a particularly strong purchase over popular 
loyalties, ensuring a prolonged and bloody struggle for the reconstitution of 
international order.  
 For all the emphasis I accord to religious insurgency as a catalyst for the 
transformation of international orders, it must be stressed that their significance for my 
explanatory framework is limited, with their immediate destructive impact on old 
orders contrasting dramatically with their limited effect on the construction of 
succeeding international orders. Thus, the Reformation destroyed Christendom’s 
spiritual unity and plunged Europe into a century of chaos, but neither the competing 
visions of Calvinist revolutionaries nor those of ultra-Catholic reactionaries found 
systemic expression on the sovereign state system that succeeded Christendom. 
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Similarly, the Taiping rebellion was comprehensively defeated, with its long-term 
effect being to hasten the decentralization of power from the emperor to regional 
elites, thereby hollowing out the empire, hastening the collapse of the tributary system, 
and thereby facilitating the further extension of a European-dominated sovereign state 
system into East Asia.  Equally, while the long-term consequences of the global 
jihadist insurgency cannot be easily anticipated, the triumphant emergence of a 
transnational Caliphate over the ashes of ‘apostate’ regimes in the Islamic world 
appears a remote prospect.  Paradoxically, the chief legacy of past religious 
insurgencies in both early modern Europe and nineteenth century East Asia has been 
the secularization of international orders.  Whether or not these historical experiences 
provide clues as to the long-term future of the secular global state system is a question 
I will revisit in the concluding chapter of this inquiry.  
 
Violence Interdependence and the Transformation of International Orders 
 
 In introducing my argument, I have already adverted to the significance of 
technologically driven increases in violence interdependence in degrading the conflict 
management capacity of international orders. In this limited capacity, it can be said 
that processes of technological driven geopolitical consolidation feed in to and 
exacerbate existing processes of institutional decay. If the significance of geopolitical 
consolidation was confined to its role as an accelerant of institutional decay, it would 
be sufficient to reduce it to but one of the multitude of changes that progressively 
unshackle international orders from their initial material moorings and thus pave the 
way for their eventual disintegration. As it stands, however, the effects of systemic 
increases in violence interdependence cumulatively ramify throughout the course of 
international orders’ disintegration, playing not only a corrosive and destructive role in 
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bringing old orders to an end but also a transformative and productive role in 
establishing the material context within which successor international orders cohere. 
 The significance of increase in violence interdependence as drivers of 
international systems change can be inferred from both the importance I ascribe to 
coercive power as a foundation of political order, as well as the embededness of all 
international orders within permissive order-enabling contexts that change over time. 
In his classic if premature eulogy for the Westphalian state system, John Herz 
observed that the very institution of sovereignty merely constituted the legal 
ratification of an underlying material reality, namely the existence from the early 
modern period of the ‘hard-shelled’ and impermeable territorial state.132  Herz argued 
that the material foundation of the state system, and the root cause of its durability 
down to the twentieth century, was the establishment in early modern Europe of 
internally pacified and ‘hard-shell rimmed’ defensible units.133 With the advent of 
weapons systems – pre-eminently thermonuclear weapons – that threatened the 
sovereign state’s permeability and thus diminished its viability as a security provider, 
Herz anticipated the waning of the Westphalian state system as the underlying 
material foundations that enabled its existence passed into history.134 
 It is not necessary to completely embrace Herz’s materialism to recognize the 
relevance of his insights for the transformation of international orders. Latin 
Christendom, the Sinosphere and the global state system all relied on the deployment 
of authorized practices of coercion to maintain order, practices that evolved in 
distinctive and ultimately transient material contexts. Similarly, the credibility of 
authoritative institutions and overarching organizing principles of political authority 
depended in all cases on their broad congruence with underlying geopolitical 
                                                 
132
John Herz. "Rise and Demise of the Territorial State." World Politics 9, no. 4 (1957), p. 475. 
133 Ibid., p. 483. 
134
Ibid., pp. 487-489. 
 94
conditions. Across all of my cases, increases in violence interdependence served to 
radically alter these underlying conditions, placing immense – and in two cases 
intolerable – demands on existing ordering institutions. 
  In early modern Europe, the early modern military revolution dramatically 
increased Christendom’s violence interdependence, testing to breaking point those 
ordering mechanisms that had evolved to mediate inter-polity conflict in the more 
relaxed geopolitical environment of the High Middle Ages.  Equally, the viability of 
the Sinosphere’s tributary state system was fatally corroded with the industrialization 
of warfare from the latter half of the nineteenth century. The incipient industrialization 
of warfare opened up a historically unprecedented power asymmetry between the 
empire and ‘barbarians’ beyond the emperor’s orbit, curtailing the emperor’s ability to 
project a stabilizing influence throughout the Sinosphere and thus crippling the 
efficacy and legitimacy of the authoritative and coercive institutions that maintained 
that order.135  Finally, in the contemporary state system, the unprecedented diffusion 
of destructive and disruptive capacities to non-state actors that has been facilitated by 
globalisation is already eating away at the material bases of the nation-state’s 
monopoly on legitimate violence. Admittedly, it would be misleading to draw too 
many parallels for the time being between emerging forms of transnational non-state 
violence and transformations of the magnitude inaugurated by either the military 
revolution or the nineteenth century industrialization of warfare. This caveat aside, the 
growth of transnational terrorism has already deeply unsettled the state system’s 
ordering institutions, and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future, particularly 
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as globalization and technological diffusion continue to increase the likelihood of 
terrorists acquiring and deploying Weapons of Mass Destruction.     
 The dislocative effects of increases in violence interdependence are pivotal to 
my analysis of the transformation of international orders. Increases in violence 
interdependence precipitate seismic shifts in the geopolitical foundations of 
international orders, rendering ordering institutions ineffective, anachronistic, and 
increasingly illegitimate over time. As positional struggles for power and influence are 
not held in abeyance during periods of order collapse but rather persist inflamed by 
intense ideological antagonisms, growing violence interdependence increases the 
destructive means available to opponents and thus magnifies the carnage that follows 
the collapse of ordering institutions. In short, increases in violence interdependence 
are implicated at all stages of the downward trajectory of international orders, warping 
their material foundations, corroding the efficacy and legitimacy of their ordering 
institutions, and expanding the destructiveness of the intertwined positional and 
ideological struggles that rage in the aftermath of their collapse.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In the previous two chapters, I have advanced some basic claims about the 
purposes of political order, its nature, and the causes of its dissolution.  I began by 
arguing that political order is necessary if agents are to realise certain elementary 
social goals, and that political orders are also predicated on relations of organized 
domination that must be broadly recognized as legitimate if they are to endure for any 
length of time.  Drawing from Machiavelli’s metaphor of the centaur, I argued that 
political order is ultimately realised through a combination of authoritative and 
coercive power. Authoritative power, which attracts voluntary compliance from 
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members’ recognition of the morally binding force of norms, rules, laws and 
commands, presupposes the existence of a shared ‘life world’ of unquestioned cultural 
givens, for it is precisely through processes of communicative action that authoritative 
power is deployed.  Coercive power by contrast is necessary to enforce order in 
instances where agents choose out of either principle or opportunistic self-interest to 
defy existing rules, norms, laws and commands. In functioning political orders, 
authoritative and coercive power complement and mutually reinforce one another, 
with authoritative institutions enjoying greater efficacy given the existence of coercive 
institutions to enforce their writ, and authorized practices of violence enjoying greater 
legitimacy owing to their consonance with the shared values embodied in authoritative 
institutions.  
 Within international systems, I argued that order is produced through the 
operation of an order-producing normative complex and governing institutional 
framework, which is grounded in turn within a permissive order-enabling material 
foundation. Order-producing complexes integrate actors around shared identities and 
collective purposes, provide a shared standard of rightfulness with which to regulate 
actors’ conduct, and articulate principled justifications for the structures of organized 
domination upon which international order relies. In keeping with my general 
argument, I emphasized the joint significance of authoritative institutions and 
authorized practices of violence as the key mechanisms for maintaining order 
internationally. The legitimacy of these fundamental institutions derives from their 
correspondence with the values encoded in order-producing normative complexes, 
while their effectiveness is strongly conditioned by their degree of congruence with 
their underlying material context. 
 Finally, I argued that international orders are transformed as a result of 
concatenating processes of ideational schism and increases in violence 
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interdependence playing out within environments already characterised by pronounced 
institutional decay. Ideological schisms subvert order by destroying the consensus on 
constitutional values upon which the exercise of authoritative power relies. 
Meanwhile, increases in violence interdependence corrode the efficacy of existing 
ordering institutions by broadening the chasm between these institutions and a rapidly 
mutating geopolitical environment. The combined operation of these two forces 
undermines the authoritative and coercive bases of the old order, thrusting 
international systems into periods of chaos made worse by actors’ pursuit of unlimited 
ideological ends with the assistance of radically enhanced destructive means. Such 
chaos persists until such time as a new reconciliation between authoritative and 
coercive power can be forged, and a new international order that is consonant with a 
radically transformed normative and material milieu can be constructed. 
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CHAPTER THREE – THE ORIGINS, CONSTITUTION, AND 
DECAY OF LATIN CHRISTENDOM 
 
Religio vincula societatis [Religion is the bond which holds society together] 
 
‘And ye shall overthrow their altars, and break their pillars and burn their groves with 
fire; and ye shall hew down the graven images of their gods, and destroy the names of 
them out of that place…’ – Deuteronomy 12:3 
 
 
In 1577, six years after Philip II’s defeat of the Turks at the Battle of Lepanto, 
Pope Gregory XIII called Europe’s final crusade in an attempt to press home 
Christendom’s recent triumph over its Islamic nemesis.136  From the 11th century, the 
institution of the Crusade had embodied Latin Christendom’s spiritual unity, as well as 
demonstrating the Church’s power to mobilize the military resources of the European 
nobility in the service of Holy War. While Jerusalem had long since been lost, the 
crusading spirit was far from dead as Europe entered the modern age. The Turkish 
conquest of Constantinople in 1453 had signalled the emergence of a powerful new 
threat to Christendom on her eastern doorstep, while the completion of the Spanish 
Reconquista in 1492 marked a parallel resurgence of Christendom in the western 
Mediterranean. By the latter half of the sixteenth century, the continuing proximity of 
the Turkish threat, combined with the religious fervour of the Counter-Reformation 
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and the waxing of Spanish power all suggested scope for a renewed Holy War against 
the Ottomans. 
 That the pope ultimately failed to rally Christendom for a new crusade is 
illustrative of the final collapse of Christian unity and of Latin Christendom’s 
disintegration as a viable international order by the late sixteenth century. Far from 
pressing home his advantage against the Ottomans after Lepanto, Philip instead made 
peace with the sultan in 1578 so as to pursue the more urgent task of crushing 
Calvinist rebels in the Spanish Netherlands. Similarly, France proved equally reluctant 
to answer the call of crusade while the monarchy’s very survival was being threatened 
at home by sectarian rebellion. If faith remained the primary focus of collective 
identity in sixteenth century Europe, it was a faith that had become bitterly divided 
along confessional lines, with the duty to eradicate heresy taking absolute priority over 
obligations to wage Holy War against infidels. In Gregory’s call to arms, one finds the 
last dying echo of Europe’s medieval unity, and with the failure of his crusade, a final 
confirmation of the collapse of Latin Christendom. 
In this chapter, I begin my inquiry into the collapse of international orders by 
reviewing Latin Christendom’s genesis and consolidation in the High Middle Ages, 
before then examining the distinctive ordering mechanisms that helped constitute it as 
an international order.  Having sketched Christendom’s contours, I then proceed to an 
analysis of the processes of decay that were apparent within this order from the late 
fourteenth century. The Great Schism within the Church, the introduction of 
gunpowder into European warfare and the related commercialization of military 
power, the spread of printing and the subsequent growth of popular heretical 
movements such as Lollardy and the Hussite heresy – these were but some of the 
forces that steadily corroded Christendom’s institutional and normative foundations 
down to 1500. 
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 Whereas the genesis, constitution, operation and decay of Christendom form 
the focus of chapter three, Christendom’s collapse and Europe’s subsequent descent 
into chaos form the subjects of chapters four and five respectively. If at 1500 Latin 
Christendom was in an advanced state of decay, it was far from inevitable at this point 
that it would be succeeded by a sovereign state system. That Europe failed to replicate 
the pattern of early modern political development towards empire that was then 
dominant elsewhere in Eurasia demands explanation, thus it is to a consideration of 
Europe’s prolonged crisis that I turn in chapter four.  As anticipated in earlier chapters, 
my argument privileges military revolutions and ideological shocks – in this case the 
Reformation – as the primary catalysts for Christendom’s collapse.  Briefly stated, the 
introduction of gunpowder and the subsequent military revolution dramatically 
increased the violence interdependence of the European international system, thereby 
undermining the effectiveness of existing conflict management mechanisms at a time 
when the Reformation was irrevocably shattering Christendom’s religious cum 
ideological unity. The combined impact of increased violence interdependence and 
ideological polarization precipitated in turn a chain of conflicts that ultimately 
destroyed the last vestiges of medieval heteronomy while also arresting the 
consolidation of an alternative suzerain international order organized under the sceptre 
of Habsburg power. It was only after Christendom had become irretrievably broken 
and the suzerain alternative of Habsburg empire had been foreclosed that a European 
international order organized around sovereign states became possible.  
Chapter four details both the structural drivers of Christendom’s disintegration, 
while also exploring the role played by the Habsburgs’ multiple enemies in thwarting 
Christendom’s potential reconstitution along imperial lines. In chapter five, the French 
Wars of Religion and the Thirty Years War are examined, both as conflicts that are 
representative of the ideological polarization and intensified military interaction that 
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followed the fall of Christendom, but also for their formative role in generating the 
normative and institutional innovations that eventually facilitated the construction of a 
new international order predicated on the organizing principle of state sovereignty. My 
analysis concludes with a reinterpretation of the significance of the Peace of 
Westphalia, understood here as a modus vivendi between rulers that restored to Europe 
the stability required for the subsequent decades-long reconstruction of a new 
international order along broadly Absolutist sovereign-territorial lines.   
 
3.1 The Origins, Consolidation, and Ordering Mechanisms of Latin Christendom 
 
3.1.1 Origins 
 
The story of Latin Christendom’s origins is one of failure, specifically the 
failure of Rome’s heirs to reconstitute a viable supra-polity governance structure to 
succeed the Western Roman Empire. The collapse of empires in the third-fifth 
centuries CE was far from unique to Rome, and indeed from a Eurasian perspective, 
Byzantium’s survival during this period is the exception rather than the rule.  But 
whereas imperial structures were eventually re-established in the Indian sub-continent 
and in East Asia, Western Europe descended after the fall of Rome into a prolonged 
period of political anarchy, economic contraction, and cultural regression (marked by 
rapid de-urbanization and dramatic declines in literacy) from which it would not truly 
recover until the eleventh century.137 Certainly, attempts to construct supra-local 
governance structures during the early medieval period were not entirely without 
success. The Carolingian emperors’ fleeting attempts to revive the imperial dignity 
                                                 
137On the differing trajectories of Western Europe and East Asia following the collapse of the Western 
Roman and Han empires in the ancient period, see Dominic Lieven. Empire - the Russian Empire and 
Its Rivals. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001, pp. 33-40. 
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kept the idea if not the actuality of empire alive in Western Europe, while under the 
aegis of the papacy the skein of a common Christian high culture was extended to 
Europe’s northern and eastern peripheries.138 Nevertheless, if the precursors to the 
papal-imperial diarchy of the High Middle Ages can be dimly discerned during this 
period, neither of these institutions were sufficiently robust as to sustain a viable order 
in the centuries following Rome’s demise. Without the protection of an overarching 
imperial order, the long-distance trading networks that had flourished under Roman 
suzerainty withered, accelerating de-urbanization and attenuating Western Europe’s 
cultural and commercial contacts with other civilizational centres.139 Under the impact 
of sustained waves of barbarian invasions from the north, east and south, 
responsibilities for collective defence rapidly devolved to the local level. This process 
was accelerated in the tenth century with the collapse of royal and comital authority, 
and the cascading downwards of military and political power to the level of the 
castellany, or in some instances even down to the individual knight.140 Across Western 
and Central Europe, an overwhelmingly illiterate peasantry eked out a subsistence 
existence within the parameters of localized, non-monetized economies, while control 
over organized violence remained radically dispersed among a predatory aristocratic 
nobility.141 With the Carolingian empire dissolved and the papacy yet to assert its 
post-Hildebrand centralized authority over the Church, all forms of social power – 
ideological, political, military and economic – crystallized at the local level. As 
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Europe approached the millennium, centrifugal forces seemed to be inexorably in the 
ascendancy. 
  
3.1.2 The Consolidation of Latin Christendom 
 
Europe’s fragmented social landscape in 1000 CE initially presents as an 
unlikely seedbed for the formation of any stable governance structure. However, from 
the 11th century onwards a cluster of social processes conspired to generate a 
distinctive international order based upon the organizing principle of heteronomy and 
undergirded by the unifying religious and cultural identity of Latin Christendom.  
Between the 11th and 13th centuries, a range of transformative processes yielded 
Europe’s elites access to a greater portfolio of power resources than had previously 
been available to them at any time since the fall of Rome. The years 1000-1250 
witnessed a trebling of Europe’s population, a demographic upswing made possible by 
a system-wide revival of economic activity that had begun from the late 11th 
century.142  The breakdown of centralized political power following the Carolingian 
empire’s demise facilitated both the growth of merchant towns in North-West Europe, 
as well as the establishment in the countryside of a system of banal lordship predicated 
on the intensified extraction of surplus from a newly enserfed peasantry.143 Academic 
opinion remains divided as to the relative causal priority that should be placed on the 
revival of urban-centred long-distance trade versus the feudal intensification of 
agricultural surplus extraction as engines of the economic revival.144  However, there 
                                                 
142R.I. Moore. "The Birth of Europe as a Eurasian Phenomenon." In Beyond Binary Histories - Re-
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is consensus that the interaction of these processes, in conjunction with the diffusion 
of technological and organizational innovations that raised the overall productivity of 
the European economy, provided European elites with access to a growing pool of 
labour and potentially taxable wealth over time.145  
This increase in the availability of material resources coincided with a process 
of elite consolidation and differentiation among Europe’s lay and clerical elites. Under 
pressure to preserve their patrimonies in an environment of growing population 
pressures, Europe’s nobility abandoned a system of partible inheritance in favour of 
one predicated on principles of agnatic (patrilineal) primogeniture.146  Previous 
conceptions of family as one of loose clans of collateral kindreds gave way in the 11th 
century to a much more exclusive conception of family as patrilineal dynasty.147 The 
widespread adoption of heraldic emblems and toponymic surnames by the nobility at 
this time reflected a growing aristocratic self-consciousness and sense of corporate 
distinctiveness from both the peasantry and the priestly class.148  Similarly, the 
corporate identity of the clerics dramatically increased following the Hildebrand 
reforms and the successful establishment of papal dominance over the Church. In 
successfully asserting the supremacy of canon law within the Church hierarchy and 
prohibiting both simony (the sale of church offices) and nicolaism (the marriage of 
priests), Pope Gregory VII and his successors extricated the priesthood from 
entanglement within family politics of the local aristocracy.149 In so doing, the Church 
                                                                                                                                            
whereas Hendrik Spruyt affords greater significance to the revival of long-distance trade in accounting 
for the economic revival, Benno Teschke conversely emphasizes that the economic revival was driven 
principally by developments endogenous to a feudal economy based upon intensified aristocratic 
exploitation of an enserfed peasantry.  On this controversy and its relevance for their approaches to 
international systems change, see Spruyt. The Sovereign State and Its Competitors, pp. 61-63; and 
Teschke, The Myth of 1648, pp. 95-96.  
145 On this point, see Spruyt, Sovereign State and its Competitors, pp. 62-64. 
146 Moore, ‘Birth of Europe’, p. 145. 
147 Teschke, ‘Myth of 1648’, p. 91. See also Georges Duby. The Chivalrous Society. London: Edward 
Arnold, 1977, pp. 147-148. 
148Teschke, The Myth of 1648, p. 91. 
149 Berman. Law and Revolution, p. 108. 
 105
prevented the creeping usurpation of its landed assets by priests connected by 
marriage to local dynasties, while also forging out of the old priesthood a new trans-
national cadre of celibate officials whose sense of personal identity was now tethered 
exclusively to advancing the Church’s salvation mission.150 
As Europe grew in wealth and population and its elites became more organized 
and functionally differentiated (asserting respective monopolies upon military and 
ideological power), the availability of the ‘social technologies’ required to administer 
large-scale collective associations also increased.151 The growth in trade and the 
operation of the Church hierarchy respectively required the routine coordination of 
market transactions and the conveyance of bureaucratic commands over long 
distances.152 Both processes necessitated the creation of a greatly expanded class of 
literate administrators, trained from the 12th century onwards at the newly established 
universities emerging in urban centres such as Oxford, Paris, and Bologna.153 In 
addition to generating a transnational class of clerical professionals capable of 
servicing the needs of merchants, the Church and the higher nobility alike, the growth 
of universities also permitted the systematization of knowledge in the fields of law, 
theology, and philosophy.154 This process of systematization enabled growing elite-
level cultural integration across Christendom, exemplified in the diffusion of the 
crucifix as the pre-eminent symbol of Christianity from the late 11th century.155 
However, just as importantly, the systematization of knowledge within European 
universities provided elites with a shared conceptual vocabulary through which to 
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articulate binding authority claims to critical audiences. Admittedly, conflicts such as 
the Investiture Contest demonstrated the inability of Church and emperor to peacefully 
resolve disputes over the scope of their respective authority claims.  But the very 
ability of these parties to engage in such a polemic was indicative of Christendom’s 
growing cultural and ideological cohesiveness in the late medieval period. 
 Demographic and economic expansion, elite consolidation and differentiation, 
and increases in the social technologies of administrative capacity and cultural 
integration each fed into a final albeit highly tentative process of political 
centralization in Christendom. This process was most precociously apparent in the 
Norman kingdoms of England and Sicily, before diffusing more gradually in France 
and Spain. If it is premature to speak of the emergence of the modern state by the 
fourteenth century, one can nevertheless argue for a much greater degree of systemic 
integration than had previously existed in the medieval period.  From 1000 CE 
onwards, Latin Christendom had witnessed a sustained increase in its territorial reach, 
material wealth, institutional sophistication, ideological and cultural integration, and 
political centralization. As with all orders, Latin Christendom would prove ultimately 
ephemeral, beginning a long process of decay from the mid-fourteenth century 
onwards. Nevertheless, before this process may be considered, a more thorough 
investigation of Christendom’s constitution and ordering mechanisms is in order. 
 
3.1.3 The Problem of Order In Latin Christendom 
 
At first glance, Latin Christendom appears endowed with structural 
characteristics that render the problem of realising order among its constituent polities 
particularly intractable. Turning firstly to the level of organizing principles, authority 
relations in Christendom were mediated by the organizing principle of heteronomy. 
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Authority in Christendom, far from being concentrated, singular and precisely 
circumscribed within a particular territorial jurisdiction, was rather fragmented, plural, 
and simultaneously operative within particular functional domains across multiple 
territories.156 The extreme political decentralization characteristic of feudalism yielded 
a bewildering array of organizational forms, ranging from the Church through to urban 
commercial guilds and corporations through to embryonic feudal kingdoms. Each of 
these organizations in turn operated within the context of their own distinctive legal 
codes and norms of conduct (e.g. canon law, feudal law) intended to authoritatively 
regulate activity within a specified realm of social activity.157  
 The presence of multiplex, overlapping, mutually entwined power networks 
permeating the same territorial spaces provided ample scope for jurisdictional 
conflicts between different actors, of which the Investiture Contest between papacy 
and empire is merely the most notorious. In the absence of a final arbiter of disputes 
either at a systemic level (as in imperial formations) or at a unit level (as in the 
sovereign state), the conflicting authority claims of different actors rendered 
ideological controversy and even armed confrontation a perennial possibility. The fact 
that capacities for organized violence were so widely dispersed in medieval 
Christendom further sharpened the possibilities for conflict.  The radically dispersed 
character of military power in medieval Europe was such as to warrant it as a system 
governed by the condition of ‘nullarchy’, referring to the absence of identifiable 
concentrations of coercive power of the kind found in either multi-polar or bi-polar 
sovereign state systems or in uni-polar imperial formations.158 Within such an 
environment, recourse to violent self-help was not confined to rulers, but was rather a 
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collective and routinely exercised prerogative of a warrior aristocratic class.  Far from 
being in any way exceptional or aberrant, aristocratic recourse to violence was 
endemic, accepted and routine, contrasting starkly with modern conceptions of order 
informed by the ideal-typical nation-state exercising a monopoly over legitimate 
violence.  
 Both the presence of overlapping jurisdictional claims and the widely 
dispersed character of military power primed Christendom for conflict.  This threat 
that was further compounded by the economy’s overwhelmingly agrarian character, 
and by the centrality of seigneurial violence as a mechanism for wealth extraction and 
accumulation.  Beyond the urban enclaves of commercial wealth derived from trade 
(located predominantly in the Low Countries and in northern Italy), wealth 
accumulation in Christendom relied primarily upon maximizing agricultural surplus, 
either through the introduction of more productive crops or cultivation techniques, or 
more typically through the intensified exploitation of the peasantry or the acquisition 
of additional territory through war.159 In a low-productivity, predominantly non-
monetized economy in which wealth inhered overwhelmingly in landed assets, a zero-
sum logic of geopolitical competition prevailed among the aristocracy. War for the 
European nobility was undeniably a matter of status and honour. But it was also driven 
by harsh economic necessity, with material drives towards conflict becoming even 
more pronounced with the introduction of primogeniture and the consequent need for 
younger sons to carve out their own patrimonies at their peers’ expense.160 
 A final contributor to disorder in Christendom was the presence of an elite 
culture of existential bellicosity, which valorised aristocratic martial valour for its own 
sake and provided a pervasive normative justification for noble violence. In addition to 
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material motivations, aristocratic violence also fulfilled expressive functions deriving 
from the martial corporate identity of the nobility. The defence of individual and 
familial honour, the pursuit of glory, the prosecution of feuds, the enactment of 
chivalric virtues, the propagation of the Christian faith through the conquest of foreign 
lands – each of these were perceived as legitimate motivations for aristocratic 
violence.161 This culture of aristocratic violence occupied an at times uneasy 
relationship with the religious foundations of Latin Christendom. But as ethically 
problematic as this culture might seem to modern sensibilities, it was far from 
marginal within Christendom. Instead, it stood as a central feature of the ideological 
landscape that legitimated, sustained, and promoted endemic armed conflict both 
within and beyond Christendom’s borders. 
 
3.1.4 The Constitution and Ordering Mechanisms of Christendom 
  
 A heteronomous organizing principle, the dispersed character of military 
power, the presence of zero-sum geopolitical competition among aristocratic 
households, the valorisation of violence as an expression of noble identity – each of 
these features conspired to produce endemic low-level conflict in medieval Europe. 
These observations aside, Christendom’s consolidation and expansion from the 11th 
century onwards nevertheless testifies to the existence of ordering mechanisms that 
contained conflict within tolerable bounds.  
Arguably the most important of these mechanisms was the presence of 
ideological unity amongst Europe’s elites, manifest in elites’ subscription to common 
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ideas about the purposes of collective association and the nature of social order.  As 
with all international orders, the ideological glue holding Christendom together was 
comprised of three inter-related components, specifically identity-constitutive, ethical-
prescriptive, and power legitimating normative structures.  At the identity-constitutive 
level, Christendom was united in its commitment to spiritual salvation through the 
Church as the raison d’etre of collective association. As the most sophisticated and 
ideologically self-conscious medieval authority structure, the Church succeeded in 
defining Europe’s common high culture, instilling in the medieval imagination a 
conception of earthly existence as mere preparation for the Day of Judgement.162 
Medieval Europe was first and foremost a community of faith, with religion being 
understood not in the post-Westphalian sense as referring to a privately held body of 
abstract doctrine and beliefs, but rather as referring above all to an embodied 
community of believers.163 The medieval mappeamundi, which depicted the world as 
the Body of Christ, with Christ’s head next to paradise, his arms gathering the 
temporal world, and Jerusalem – navel of the world – at the centre, metaphorically 
captured in a most arresting manner the conflation of the temporal with the spiritual 
that was emblematic of the belief system undergirding Christendom’s unity.164  At a 
more concrete level, throughout Christendom, the ritual of the mass routinely 
confirmed the centrality of faith to medieval European identity, as well as reinforcing 
the perception that membership of the community was synonymous with membership 
of the universal Church. The cosmology and moral ontology of the Church were 
systematically communicated to the populace through the mass’s re-enactment of 
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Christ’s expiatory sacrifice as penance for man’s sins, a sacrifice that made possible 
reconciliation between God and man and thus opened up the possibility of salvation.165 
Even more critically, the mass formed a vital social integrative function, with the 
individual’s participation in communion (common union) symbolizing not only 
wholeness of Christ and his Church, but also the social solidarity of those united in 
their faith in Christ.166  
The Church provided medieval Europeans with not only a shared collective 
identity and a shared understanding of the ultimate purposes of collective association, 
but also a common ethical framework as well. While there is no question but that the 
Church provided invaluable ideological support for the pervasive inequalities 
characteristic of the medieval world, the egalitarian and pacifist dimensions of the 
Christian message also found comprehensive expression in the Church’s teachings. 
The notion that all people are made in the image of God and are therefore capable of 
salvation extended the bonds of moral obligation beyond the limits of family and 
friends, while the claim that acts of violence and injustice directly contradict the will 
and the revealed Word of the Heavenly Father exercised similarly powerful pacifying 
effects. The normative force of these prescriptions was evident for example in the 
Church’s frequently successful efforts to mobilize moral and religious sanctions to 
restrain the worst excesses of seigneurial violence.167  Moreover, even where the 
Church saw the need to reconcile Christian ethics with the realities of princely 
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violence, it nevertheless exercised a powerful restraining influence through its 
development of a coherent and richly articulated doctrine of just war. 
Christian ethics, as drawn from the Decalogue and the Gospel teachings and 
elaborated in Church doctrine, provided the basis of the normative restraints on 
violence that held Christendom together. The universality and the efficacy of these 
normative restraints were admittedly circumscribed by several factors. Externally, the 
ethos of Holy War that emerged with the Crusades posited a stark moral dichotomy 
between Christians and others, rehearsing on Christendom’s bloody borders an ethic 
of religiously sanctioned annihilatory violence that would later punctuate the 
European Wars of Religion.  Internally, the reach of Christian ethics was limited by 
the accommodations struck between Europe’s lay and clerical elites, which found 
expression in the power-legitimating structures of a social ideology of tri-functionality 
and an Augustinian political theology. Turning firstly to tri-functionality, this concept 
legitimated and sacralized the notion of society as a divinely conceived organic 
totality, with the pervasive inequality of feudal society being justified on the basis of 
its concordance with God’s vision of a rigidly stratified world divided between clerics, 
warriors, and peasants (oratores, bellatores, and laboratores).168 The concept of tri-
functionality legitimized and perpetuated inequality by assigning to priest, knight and 
peasant the respective functional vocations of worship, combat in defence of the 
church, and cultivation of the land in support of priests and nobles.169 The popular 
passivity and social immobility this concept engendered was further reinforced by the 
Augustinian justification for secular authority articulated by the Church.  Juxtaposing 
the City of God with the City of Man, Augustine had conceived of the latter as a 
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repressive, remedial order, imposed on man as punishment for original sin.170 While 
Augustine conceded the necessity of a secular order, given Fallen Man’s inability to 
peacefully co-exist without its restraining influence, this endorsement clearly 
subordinated the imperfect order of man vis-à-vis the perfect order of God, a celestial 
order given earthly institutional expression in the Church.171  In embracing 
Augustine’s pessimistic justification of secular authority, the Church provided vital 
theological support for princely and aristocratic power, delegitimating rights of 
rebellion by rendering popular submission to secular rulers a divinely ordained 
imperative.172 However, at the same, the terms of this endorsement clearly affirmed 
the Church’s supreme moral authority, thereby confirming the undiminished centrality 
of the Church’s salvation mission as the animating purpose of all collective 
association.173 
 While Christendom was not immune from fissiparous tendencies, it was 
nevertheless endowed with a richly articulated normative complex that provided a 
coherent basis for the maintenance of order. The component ideals that made up this 
complex in turn found practical expression in a governing institutional infrastructure. 
At the apex of this framework stood the papal-imperial diarchy, with pope and 
emperor serving as the two pre-eminent custodians of order within Christendom. The 
papal-imperial diarchy constituted the highest expression of the awkward and at times 
extremely fractious modus vivendi between clerical and lay elites upon which order in 
medieval Europe relied. According to Church doctrine, both Church and Empire were 
divinely ordained institutions fulfilling distinct but complementary governance 
functions. The former was responsible for assuring humanity’s submission to Christ 
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and securing the salvation of souls, while the latter was charged with securing the 
temporal order necessary for the Church to realise its mission on earth.174 The emperor 
was thus accorded a special significance as the primus inter pares among secular 
rulers, although in keeping with its Augustinian political theology, the emperor’s 
function was derivative of the Church’s salvation mission, with the emperor held as 
being clearly subordinate to the pope.175 This interpretation was inevitably challenged 
by imperial propagandists, who sought with very limited success to invoke ancient 
Roman precedents to sustain a more capacious conception of the imperial office.176  
 The tensions between papacy and empire eventually exercised a profoundly 
corrosive effect on the capacity of each to sustain order. However, for the duration of 
its existence, the papal-imperial diarchy provided a loose ordering framework for 
Christendom that embodied the synthesis of authoritative and coercive power that is 
constitutive of political order. Moreover, while the centrality of Church and Empire as 
ordering institutions should not be understated, one must also acknowledge the limited 
character of their authority claims. While both pontiff and emperor claimed 
throughout Christendom the right of auctoritas (the power to judge the legitimacy of 
lower office-holders and the legality of their actions), neither consistently sought to 
translate this claim into one of potestas, understood as the right and ability to enforce 
compliance with one’s commands.177  Instead, the systemic and at times quite notional 
authority claims of pope and emperor helped integrate a heteronomous order in which 
reserves of material wealth remained low, capacities for organized remained radically 
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dispersed, loyalties were multiple and overlapping, and social power crystallized at an 
overwhelmingly local level. 
 Throughout Christendom, social power resided predominantly in the Church as 
a bureaucratically administered authoritative interaction network, and also within the 
kinship and patronage networks of the nobility.178 Unsurprisingly, the authoritative 
and coercive institutions through which order was maintained within Christendom 
bore strongly the imprint of these different power networks. The most important of 
Christendom’s authoritative institutions was the system of canon law administered by 
the papal courts to mediate and adjudicate violent disputes among the aristocracy. 
Down to the sixteenth century, confirmation by religious oath served as the main 
constitutive act in the process of ratifying treaties between disputants, with signed 
paper documents (where they existed at all) serving merely as accessory guarantees 
for such agreements.179 Christendom’s religious unity and the Church’s acknowledged 
supremacy in adjudicating spiritual matters provided a ready-made framework for 
mediating conflicts and safeguarding treaty commitments, thereby assuring the 
credibility of such commitments and maintaining a modicum of social order.180 As the 
breaching of a religious oath was perceived as a sin in violation of canon law, 
breaches of oaths necessarily fell under the jurisdiction of papal courts.181 By 
confirming the terms of a treaty through a religious oath, contracting parties agreed to 
submit to the jurisdiction of the papal courts, thereby exposing themselves to a range 
of spiritual penalties should they be found to be in breach of their commitments.182 
Given the very real political consequences that could flow from an adverse ruling - the 
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sanction of excommunication absolved vassals from allegiance to an excommunicated 
lord, thereby exposing them to the threat of dispossession, deposition, or even death – 
the threat of papal sanctions could restrain even those with little concern for their own 
spiritual welfare.183 
 Canon law and the accompanying system of papal jurisdiction worked in 
conjunction with a richly elaborated system of feudal law to maintain order within 
Christendom. Over the course of centuries of aristocratic inter-marriage, Europe’s 
polities had become enmeshed in extraordinarily dense and complex webs of criss-
crossing genealogical ties. Given the centrality of marriage and inheritance as 
mechanisms of property transference in medieval Europe, a common corpus of 
customary feudal law was necessary to mediate the disputes that inevitably arose 
within such a tightly integrated environment.184  Critically, while the existence of 
feudal law provided a common medium within which feuding aristocrats could 
articulate their competing claims, neither the existence of feudal or canon law could 
prevent Christendom from being riven by endemic aristocratic feuding. That feuding 
remained commonplace in spite of the existence of both canon and feudal law would 
appear to speak to the inadequacy – perhaps even of the irrelevance – of authoritative 
institutions in contributing to the creation of order within Christendom. Nevertheless, 
such an impression would be misplaced given the role played by the institution of the 
feud itself as an authorized practice of legitimate violence, one that was seen to 
complement rather than contradict the ordering influence of the aforementioned 
authoritative institutions.  In contrast to the modern opposition between private 
violence and public law, noble violence was often inseparable from litigation in an 
environment in which no centralized agency existed to promulgate and enforce a 
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uniform legal code.185  Feuding did not occur within a legal vacuum, but was rather 
informed by feudal laws pertaining to matters such as the rights and duties of vassals 
and the rules for the proper dispensation of landed property.  As medievalist Philip 
Geary notes, nobles’ purpose in engaging in feuds was rarely to achieve the total 
extermination of the opponent, but rather to seek legal redress, with the end goal being 
the renegotiation of a continuing social bond with the opposing party on more 
favourable terms.186 Contrary to the situation obtaining in a Weberian nation-state 
enjoying a coercive monopoly, inter-noble ‘self-help’ in the form of feuding was not 
antithetical to existing legal structures. Rather, the feud formed an integral part of the 
legal structures themselves, at least among the aristocracy.187 
 The final contributor to order within Christendom flowed directly from the 
material context within which conflicts occurred. Simply stated, the poverty, the 
technological backwardness, and the institutional frailty of governance structures in 
medieval Europe placed strict upper limits on the scale and destructiveness of conflicts 
within Christendom. For much of the Middle Ages, the subsistence nature of the 
European economy foreclosed the possibility of diverting large numbers of men from 
agricultural pursuits for participation in military campaigns.188 Moreover, even if 
economic constraints had permitted the temporary mobilization of large infantry hosts, 
the bureaucratic and logistical capacities necessary to train, arm, equip and deploy 
large-scale armies had withered with the fall of Rome.189 The dilapidated state of 
European roads further slowed the pace of armed confrontations and limited their 
operational range, while the dispersed character of military power curtailed the 
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ambitions of lords and vassals alike.190 Given the dominance of shock cavalry in 
medieval warfare and the largely non-monetized nature of the economy, rulers had 
long been compelled to provide grants of land in exchange for promises of military 
services from the nobility.191 The result was the formation of political systems in 
which rulers were not qualitatively much stronger than their most powerful subjects, 
and were consequently painfully dependent – for both fiscal and military aid - upon 
the fickle loyalties of their vassals when contemplating war. Admittedly, from the 
mid-fifteenth century, the violence interdependence of Latin Christendom began to 
rise markedly, signalling an imminent transcendence of the technological and physical 
limits on conflict that had previously prevailed.192  Nevertheless, for much of the life 
of Latin Christendom, physical limitations on the scale and scope of conflicts did 
much to reinforce the efficacy of ordering institutions and the pacifying effects of 
ideological unity already described.  
 Like all orders, the international order of Latin Christendom (table 3.1 below) 
was far from perfect. Religious unity provided the normative cement necessary to hold 
Latin Christendom together, but the Christian imperative of non-violence co-existed 
uneasily with other constructs that conceded a necessary role to aristocratic violence in 
the defence of the Church and the maintenance of temporal order. Moreover, in an 
environment in which the corporate self-image of the nobility was tied to the 
demonstration of martial prowess, Christianity’s pacifying effects could only be 
limited. Similarly, the ordering institutions centred round the Church and the feud 
were both inadequate and indispensible as structural dampeners of conflict.  Treaties 
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guaranteed by religious oath and enforced by the papal courts could be partially 
effective in securing the peace between disputants, but this peace was always likely to 
be provisional while such treaties were perceived as being neither binding upon a 
prince’s successors, nor even necessarily binding upon the vassals nominally under his 
control, a conditioned that prevailed in Europe well into the sixteenth century.193  
Equally, the institution of feud may have been inseparable from processes of 
aristocratic litigation, but the mere fact that recourse to violent self-help was 
recognized as an ordering mechanism is demonstrative of the fragile character of order 
within Christendom. Finally, as we will shortly see, the very success of Latin 
Christendom in generating a modicum of order ironically permitted the acceleration of 
processes that would ultimately corrode the material limitations on conflict that were 
operative in the medieval period.194 
 
 3.2 The Decay of Latin Christendom, 1350-1500 
 
3.2.1 The Crisis of the Papal-Imperial Diarchy and the Onset of Institutional Decay 
 
A consideration of Christendom’s decay must begin by surveying the decline of the 
two institutions within Christendom claiming universal authority in the Middle Ages. 
While ostensibly complementary as the secular and sacred legatees of Roman 
universalism, Empire and Papacy remained locked in conflict throughout the Middle 
Ages in a struggle encompassing ideological, infrastructural and eventually even  
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Table 3.1 The International Order of Latin Christendom, 1000-1350 
 
Normative Complex Governing Institutional 
Framework  
Order-Enabling Material 
Context 
Identity-Constitutive 
Norms 
Salvation through the 
Church as raison d’etre of 
collective association 
Ordering Framework 
Heteronomous system of 
overlapping jurisdictions 
loosely governed by papal-
imperial diarchy 
Aggregate Capacities for 
Production and 
Destruction 
Feudal mode of production 
and aristocratic oligopoly 
over organized violence 
Ethical-Prescriptive 
Norms 
Christian Ethics (including 
the just war tradition) as 
articulated by the Church 
Authoritative Institutions 
- Mediation and 
enforcement of treaties 
through canon law and the 
papal courts 
- Feudal Law 
Mobilizational Networks 
- Dominance of 
aristocratic patronage and 
kinship networks 
- Bureaucratic Church 
hierarchy 
Power-Legitimating 
Norms 
Social ideology of tri-
functionality and an 
Augustinian political 
theology 
Coercive Institutions 
Aristocratic feud as a 
legitimate means of legal 
redress (‘peace in the 
feud’) 
Violence 
Interdependence 
Low concentration and 
low accumulation of 
coercive means [Low 
violence interdependence] 
 
geopolitical dimensions. At the level of ideology, which found its most perfect 
expression in the Church’s thirteenth century theory of papal monarchy, the Church 
claimed both temporal and spiritual supremacy over Christendom. 195 While the 
Empire’s legitimacy was recognized, it was said to derive its importance from the 
emperor’s position as the Church’s defender on earth. This task was provisionally 
delegated to the emperor by the pope, and was deemed essential if the church was to 
successfully accomplish its more important objective of securing the salvation of 
souls.196  This perspective contrasted sharply with the alternative interpretation of 
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Church-Empire relations propounded by imperial propagandists, who stressed the 
Frankish and Roman origins of the institution of empire, and claimed that the emperor 
derived his authority directly from God rather than through the mediation of the 
Church.197 At the level of infrastructural conflict, the Church sought to assure its 
independence by confirming the right of the pope alone to control the appointment of 
bishops within imperial territories.  This objective brought the church into direct 
conflict with the emperor, for whom control over the appointment of bishops was 
crucial both as a source of elite patronage (ecclesiastical appointments could be used 
to bind local notables more closely to the Imperial court), and also by dint of the 
critical role played by the literate clergy as local administrators within the imperial 
bureaucracy.198   Finally, from the mid-12th to the mid-13th centuries, the conflict 
between papacy and empire assumed a geopolitical dimension, as the Church tried to 
stave off a bid by the Hohenstaufen emperors to unite the German, Burgundian, and 
Italian kingdoms under the imperial sceptre.  As such a project, if successful, might 
have threatened the Pope’s status as temporal ruler of the Papal States in central Italy, 
thereby undermining the Church’s autonomy from imperial authority, successive 
popes conspired successfully with the Hohenstaufens’ enemies to prevent the empire’s 
consolidation199.   
 With the death of Frederick II in 1250 and the subsequent neutralization of 
Frederick’s heirs, the Papacy succeeded in irreparably weakening the empire as a 
potential nucleus of a broader Western European confederation.  The structural 
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consequences of the Hohenstaufens’ defeat were of inestimable importance for 
Europe’s subsequent evolution. The early defeat of the Hohenstaufen project of 
imperial consolidation guaranteed the long-term persistence of a fragmented 
sovereignty regime along the great urban dorsal spine of Europe, opening up room for 
the emergence of a variety of institutional forms (e.g. city-states, city-state leagues) 
that would successfully resist incorporation into national states down to the nineteenth 
century.200 In combining with the German princes to sabotage processes of imperial 
consolidation, the papacy prevented a central polity from coalescing around the great 
trading city-belt stretching from Northern Italy to the Baltic Sea.  The long-term 
import of papal intervention in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was that subsequent 
German emperors were unable to effectively tap the massive surpluses locked up in 
capital containers such as the Italian city-states, thereby denying them the fiscal 
resources necessary to build up a hegemonic state capable of unifying the cultural and 
economic heartland of late medieval Europe.201  Instead, with the road to capital-
intensive empire building blocked,202 European processes of state formation 
subsequently advanced most rapidly in areas beyond the central city-belt (e.g. Britain, 
France, the Ottoman Empire and Muscovy), that is, in areas outside of Europe’s core 
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zone of taxable wealth.203 While not definitively assuring West-Central Europe’s 
subsequent transition from medieval heteronomy to a modern sovereign state system, 
the Papacy’s early defeat of Empire made such an eventual transition considerably 
more likely. 
 In the aftermath of the Empire’s defeat, the Papacy enjoyed a fleeting period of 
supremacy that can retrospectively be read as a sort of Indian summer for the 
international order of Latin Christendom. In comparison with the ordering institutions 
of the modern international system, the authority of the Papal court within 
Christendom seems particularly impressive. The Papal court contrasted starkly with 
the modern International Court of Justice inasmuch as its jurisdiction was compulsory, 
it authoritatively explained, interpreted, and developed the law through the issuing of 
papal decretals, and it could reasonably anticipate – by dint of the unquestioned 
spiritual authority it exerted over all believers – the reliable enforcement of its 
decisions.204 In an era in which Aristotelian concepts of the state as an autonomous 
corporate association had yet to be fully recovered, notions of territorial or state 
sovereignty remained unknown. To the extent the idea of sovereignty was 
apprehended at all, it attached to individual persons, whose membership within the 
universal Church necessarily left them subject to papal jurisdiction and hence 
vulnerable to papal sanctions.205 At the height of its power, the Church routinely 
struck down the laws and customs of lesser powers, ordered the revision or annulment 
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of treaties, and even deprived kings and emperors of their powers through deposition 
or excommunication.206 
 From its mid-thirteenth century apogee, the papacy nevertheless soon began a 
process of decline that accelerated rapidly from the early fourteenth century.  The 
Church’s involvement in power politics during the anti-imperial struggle and its 
exploitation of its spiritual powers in the furtherance of its political objectives 
substantially diminished its spiritual authority in the eyes of many. Additionally, the 
Church’s reliance on Western European kings – particularly the French King – to 
balance the emperor inaugurated a relationship of increasing dependence on secular 
powers that would reach its zenith during the Avignon papacies (the so-called period 
of Babylonian Captivity) from 1309-1378.207 To a certain extent, the papacy’s decline 
paralleled the ascendancy of late medieval kings, with the thirteenth century recovery 
of Aristotelian concepts of statehood providing the latter with invaluable ideological 
resources with which to justify their assertion of autonomy from papal authority.  As 
the fourteenth century progressed, and the papacy experienced first the Babylonian 
Captivity and then the Great Schism (1378-1417), the efficacy of papal jurisdiction 
over Christendom waned. Notwithstanding their public lamentations over the 
polarization of Christian loyalties between two (and later three) popes, Europe’s 
secular rulers exploited the Church’s weakness during this time to further encroach on 
its prerogatives within their own territories.208 The subsequent post-Schism division 
within the Church between defenders of papal supremacy and conciliarists (those 
insisting upon the pope’s ultimate accountability to a general council of the Church) 
provided further scope for monarchical aggrandizement against the Church.209 While 
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successive popes successfully quashed conciliarists’ calls for internal reform, the 
cultivation of the conciliarist faction by secular rulers left the Church internally 
divided, further diminishing its capacity to fulfil its ordering functions within 
Christendom.210 
 
3.2.2 The Growth of Dissent and the Weakening of Christian Unity 
 
 From the thirteenth through to the fifteenth centuries, Christendom witnessed 
the fracturing of the papal-imperial diarchy and with it, the enervation of two of 
Christendom’s overarching ordering institutions. The possibility of imperial 
consolidation was abruptly terminated in the mid-thirteenth century, brought down by 
a coalition of actors working within and beyond the empire and coordinated by an 
activist and self-confident papal monarchy. The erosion of papal authority by contrast 
can be more readily likened to the effects of a progressive stroke, with division and 
inertia within the Church combining with the opportunistic defiance of secular rulers 
to steadily corrode the efficacy of papal jurisdiction within Christendom. By 1500 
both papacy and empire were immeasurably weakened, a process that had been 
paralleled by a discernible loosening in the grip of Church orthodoxy over the 
medieval imagination. Recall that a major ordering mechanism within Christendom 
was elites’ subscription to a common world-view, comprised of commitment to 
salvation as the over-riding purpose of collective association, adherence to a Christian 
code of ethics as defined by the Church, and acceptance of a social ideology of tri-
functionality and an Augustinian political theology. This edifice was to remain intact 
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down to the Reformation, but by then serious cracks had begun to appear in its 
foundations. 
 The challenges to Christendom’s normative unity were both indirect and direct 
in nature. Indirectly, the recovery of classical knowledge – and specifically the 
recovery of Roman law and ancient conceptions of the political as a sphere of 
interaction potentially independent of religion – posed a potentially grave threat to the 
Church’s ideological hegemony. Initially, the near-monopoly on literacy enjoyed by 
the Church enabled popes such as Innocent III to marshal classical legacies such as 
Roman law and imperial conceptions of power (the plenitudo potestatis) to the cause 
of promoting universal papal monarchy.211 Over time, however, it was Europe’s ruling 
families who more effectively appropriated the classical heritage to justify their 
admittedly tentative and halting centralization of political power. The Church’s 
interpretation of political authority as a repressive, remedial order divinely ordained as 
punishment for man’s sinfulness explicitly subordinated the temporal to the sacred. In 
this formulation, kings derived their power from the top down – that is, their power 
was explicitly the product of divine sanction, and the pope as Christ’s vicar on earth 
could thus effectively adjudicate the legitimacy of its exercise.212 By contrast, 
Aristotelian conceptions of the polis as an autonomous community – one brought into 
being by man’s natural propensity towards sociability – suggested an alternative, 
‘bottom up’ justification for political authority not tied to the Church’s salvation 
mission.213 In providing an alternative, secular conceptualization of political authority, 
the recovered classical heritage provided Europe’s rulers with legitimating principles 
that reduced their ideological dependence on the Church, potentially undermining the 
ordering structure of Latin Christendom. 
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 As it transpired, the recovery of Europe’s classical heritage did not radically 
corrode Christendom’s foundations. Ideologically and intellectually, the Church 
initially demonstrated a robust capacity for adaptation, proving capable of reconciling 
the ancients’ stress on human reason with its own emphasis on divine revelation as 
early as the thirteenth century.  Additionally, if Roman law and ancient conceptions of 
political power ultimately proved fungible, being accessible to royalist propagandists 
as well as to proponents of papal monarchy, this did not prompt the former to entirely 
abandon religious legitimations of kingly power.  Rather, the classical revival 
increased the self-consciousness with which kings advanced their authority claims, 
providing them with the ideological resources necessary to re-negotiate rather than 
directly sever their ties to the Church.214 That Renaissance thinkers were able to even 
formulate secular theories of politics is indicative of the fact that a sovereign European 
international society was imaginable by the late fifteenth century. Conversely, the 
hostility these theories often evoked attests to the continuing centrality of sacral forms 
of collective identity in Europe, and also to the mutually entwined character of 
religious and political power structures in Christendom as it stood on the cusp of 
dissolution. 
 In emphasizing nature over divinity, human reason rather than human 
sinfulness, and the polis over the Church as a focal point of human association, the 
classical revival presented as a slow-acting, indirect threat to Christendom’s normative 
unity. A much more direct threat to this order was the growth of popular heretical 
movements in late medieval Europe. The forces driving the growth of popular heresy 
were manifold, but foremost among them was disillusionment with the Church owing 
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to its perceived worldliness, corruption, and neglect of its pastoral duties. The 
combination of monarchical centralization, intensified geopolitical competition, and 
the increasing financial demands of late medieval warfare had driven a creeping 
usurpation of the Church’s prerogatives and material assets in many parts of Western 
Europe.215  In response, the Church resorted to a range of expedients - from the sale of 
offices to the increased sale of indulgences – that momentarily relieved its financial 
situation while simultaneously eroding its moral authority over the longer term.216  
While the pressures that compelled the Church to adopt such self-subverting 
financial expedients were beyond its immediate control, the Church’s ability to 
manage challenges to its moral and spiritual authority was further weakened by its 
increasingly inflexible response to heterodox religious movements. Whereas earlier 
waves of lay religious fervour had been successfully canalized into monastic and 
mendicant orders under the Church’s control, the Church proved unwilling from the 
thirteenth century onwards to countenance further accommodations with lay pietist 
movements.217  Where previously the Church had demonstrated a capacity to 
assimilate potential challenges to its spiritual authority, the establishment of the papal 
inquisition at the height of the Church’s power in the 1230s marked a shift from 
conciliation and co-optation to coercion as a preferred method of dealing with 
religious dissent.218  Subsequently, the Church identified popular impulses for spiritual 
renewal with heresy even in instances where practitioners sought merely to enjoy a 
more immediate experience of the divine by emulating the austere lifestyle of Christ’s 
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early followers.219  The wisdom of such a strategy may always have been 
questionable, but as the Church’s capacities to maintain its ideological hegemony 
waned in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, it served only to radicalize religious 
dissenters and further heighten the likelihood of a systemic ideological challenge to 
the Church’s authority.   
The collision between the Church’s ideological rigidity and an upsurge in 
popular piety in the late medieval period exposed the former to the risk of direct 
challenges to its legitimacy. This threat manifested itself most acutely in the Lollard 
and Hussite heresies that blossomed during the period of the Great Schism.    
Given the localized character of these heresies and their limited scope for cross-
regional transmission in an era preceding the invention of the printing press, the 
immediate systemic consequences of these heresies were limited.  Nevertheless, they 
merit attention, and not merely for their genealogical significance as forerunners of the 
Reformation. Unlike earlier movements that had emerged when the papacy was in the 
ascendancy, fifteenth century heresy blossomed in an environment of institutional 
weakness on the part of the Church. Throughout its evolution, a common faith had 
provided the ideological cement holding Christendom together. But as the fifteenth 
century advanced, processes of institutional decay within the Church called forth 
movements that signalled the potential transience of this unity.  
 
3.2.3. The Money and the Gun – Material Transformations and the Decay of Latin 
Christendom 
 
The institutional decay and incipient religious fragmentation of the late 
medieval period substantially reduced the effectiveness of Christendom’s ordering 
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mechanisms. This breakdown of order was further exacerbated by changes in 
Christendom’s material foundations.  Ironically, the very stability provided by 
Christendom’s ordering institutions hastened material processes that would ultimately 
be implicated in its destruction. While initially restricted to long-distance trading 
circuits centred around urban enclaves and occasional trade fairs, the market economy 
increasingly permeated the Western European social fabric as the Middle Ages 
progressed, a development that was only temporarily arrested with the Black Death 
and the ensuing demographic catastrophe of the mid-fourteenth century.220 Medieval 
improvements in metallurgical techniques increased the yields of central Europe’s 
silver mines, raising the amount of specie money in circulation and thus further 
driving the commercialization of the economy.221 This increase in the supply of specie 
money paralleled the further growth in long-distance trade in the thirteenth-mid 
fourteenth centuries occasioned by the emergence of a Eurasia-wide Pax 
Mongolica.222  Both of these processes in turn stimulated the development of deeper 
credit markets (e.g. to finance naval construction and insurance), dramatically 
expanding the pool of liquid wealth in Western Europe available for borrowing, 
taxation, or outright confiscation.223  
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 Occurring roughly contemporaneously with these developments, Christendom 
witnessed a series of changes in war-fighting technologies and techniques that would 
culminate in the 14th century introduction of gunpowder and the ensuing ‘gunpowder 
revolution’ of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Anticipating the early modern 
military revolution, some scholars have gone so far as to argue for the existence of a 
late medieval military revolution, with increased recourse to projectile weapons and 
infantry pikemen heralding the decline of feudal shock cavalry well prior to the 
introduction of gunpowder into European warfare.224 It is not necessary to embrace the 
analogy between late medieval innovations and subsequent military revolutions to 
accept that European warfare was becoming progressively more decisive and more 
destructive as the Middle Ages waned. The introduction of gunpowder artillery 
dramatically – if only temporarily – shifted the advantage in warfare to the offence, 
enabling ambitious monarchs to rapidly reduce the fortresses of rebellious subjects.225  
Simultaneously, the growth of international credit markets enabled rulers to transcend 
the restraints of feudal warfare by recruiting mercenary armies, either with money 
drawn directly from loans or by drawing upon cash payments provided by vassals in 
exchange for the commutation of their military obligations.226  Unsurprisingly, the 
commercialization of military violence manifested itself most precociously and most 
prominently in the wealthy city-states of northern Italy, before spreading unevenly 
throughout Christendom.227 Its uneven geographical diffusion notwithstanding, the 
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systemic consequences of this process were both undeniable and inimical to Latin 
Christendom’s survival. 
 Commercialization and military-technological change were both derivatives of 
the stability afforded by the order of Latin Christendom. Nevertheless, these processes 
together contributed to that order’s dissolution through the increase in violence 
interdependence that they produced. What little order existed in medieval Europe 
owed to both religious unity and to authoritative institutions and authorized practices 
of legitimate violence, but it also stemmed from a material context that limited the 
destructive scale and destabilizing consequences of aristocratic violence. The poverty 
of medieval Europe, its technological backwardness, the localized level at which 
military, political and economic power crystallized – these constituted irreducibly 
material parametric constraints on violence that were essential to the preservation of 
order at a systemic level. Consequently, as the material foundations of Christendom 
shifted, as warfare became more decisive and more destructive, ordering mechanisms 
designed to function in a more benign material environment began to diminish in 
effectiveness. Simultaneously, the same conflict-producing elements that had earlier 
fuelled endemic feuding – an aristocratic culture of existential bellicosity, a wide 
dispersal of coercive resources throughout the social fabric, a noble preoccupation 
with territorial aggrandizement – continued to operate in a more combustible 
geopolitical context. Neither mammon nor the cannonball brought down Christendom. 
But the two working in combination did tighten and enlarge the web of coercive 
interactions the order was trying to contain. Alongside advanced institutional decay 
and growing ideological dissent, this increase in violence interdependence constituted 
the final degenerative macro-process eating away at the foundations of the Respublica 
Christiana.  
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3.3 The Decline of Christendom and Statements of Possibility at 1500 
 
By the early sixteenth century, it was evident that Christendom was in an 
advanced state of decay. The jurisdiction of the papal courts over international 
conflicts was appreciably weaker than it had ever been during the High Middle Ages. 
Additionally, the papacy had been compelled to conclude a range of concordats with 
Renaissance kings that effectively ceded to them supervisory control over the 
Church’s activities within their territories.228  Europe’s princes continued to recognize 
the empire’s nominal authority, as evidenced by the fiercely contested character of 
imperial elections. But the empire had long since ceased to function as a viable 
centralized political entity. The defeat of the Hohenstaufens in the mid thirteenth 
century, coupled with the long vacancy of the imperial office from this point down to 
the early fourteenth century, had irrevocably strengthened the position of the towns 
and petty princelings vis-à-vis the imperial centre. 229 In the future epicentre of the 
Reformation there thus lay an enfeebled imperial structure honey-combed by petty 
state-lets and trading entrepots, lacking anything more than the merest semblance of 
centralized political power.230 Meanwhile, beyond the empire, resurgent ‘new 
monarchies’ in England, France and Spain were exploiting gunpowder, the growth of 
international credit markets, and the commercialization of military violence to open up 
an insuperable distance between their own power and that of their vassals, anticipating 
the subsequent rise of sovereign states.231 
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 Superficially, the foregoing portrait appears to present a picture not of 
Christendom’s decay so much as its disintegration by 1500. The contrasting fortunes 
of papacy and empire on the one hand, and the Renaissance ‘new monarchies’ on the 
other, invite the view that by the sixteenth century centralizing monarchies were 
irrepressibly bursting through the rotten integuments of the old medieval order, 
signalling the de facto if not yet the de jure triumph of an embryonic European 
sovereign state system. Were such claims to be accepted at face value, the discussion 
of Latin Christendom’s collapse could end here. As it is, a number of considerations 
invalidate this reading, necessitating a more detailed exploration of the forces 
responsible for Christendom’s destruction. 
 The first observation that needs to be made is elementary, and concerns the 
distinction that must be drawn between decay and collapse. That Christendom’s 
institutions, normative unity, and material foundations were being corroded prior to its 
disintegration is undeniable, and recognition that collapse came only after a prolonged 
period of decay is essential to understanding Christendom’s eventual demise.  But to 
extrapolate from decay to collapse is perilous precisely because such a move obscures 
the continuing vitality of system-integrating forces that remained strong down to the 
Reformation. Certainly, the fifteenth century witnessed a growth in popular heresies, 
but these movements did not fundamentally detract from the remarkable religious cum 
ideological unity that characterised Christendom. The contemporary maxim religio 
vincula societatis – ‘religion is the bond of society’ - captures the universally held 
assumption that religious unity was central to the maintenance of political and social 
order, and also integral to the very identity of early modern Europeans.232 Far from 
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diminishing in importance with the blossoming of the Renaissance, this religiously 
centred conception of collective identity had if anything been sharpened by the 
contemporaneous growth of Turkish power on Christendom’s south-eastern flank. 
 Though greatly diminished in importance from the mid-thirteenth century, the 
institutions of canon law and the papal courts also continued to serve as essential 
adjudicatory structures within Christendom. Confirmation of treaties by religious oath 
remained the constitutive act in the process of treaty ratification down to the 1540s, 
and parties continued to agree to submit themselves to ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the 
event of an accused breach of treaty terms.233 More generally, the Church continued to 
exercise ecclesiastical jurisdiction throughout Christendom, thereby preserving a 
pervasive legal influence throughout Western and Central Europe. In its position as 
Christendom’s largest land-holder, the Church’s material assets and accompanying 
jurisdictional authority pockmarked each of Europe’s kingdoms and principalities.234 
However imperfectly it fulfilled its pastoral functions, the Church also continued to 
assume responsibility for moral education and policing at the village level, providing 
the only effective supra-local governing presence within most communities.235  
Finally, while monarchs steadily chipped away at the Church’s assets and 
prerogatives, the sacerdotal conceptions of kingship they relied upon to legitimate 
their power remained intimately tied to the cosmology and political theology 
propagated by the Church.   
 In addition to religious unity, Christendom also remained integrated by the 
existence of an exceptionally dense web of trans-polity aristocratic genealogical ties, 
along with an accompanying corpus of feudal laws for regulating dynastic succession 
and property disputes. The growing violence interdependence of late medieval 
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Christendom had increased the destructiveness of war without changing either its 
ultimate objects or the larger legal structures through which it was mediated. The 
existence of trans-polity aristocratic webs, the institution of proprietary dynasticism, 
and the persistence of dynastic strategies of territorial accumulation such as marriage, 
transfer and inheritance guaranteed a condition of perpetual low-level conflict within 
the European nobility.236 Nevertheless, this very same inter-connectedness worked 
with the aristocracy’s sense of a shared corporate identity to bind Christendom 
together.  
While demonstrating signs of advanced decay, Latin Christendom was far from 
dead by the sixteenth century. Quintessentially ‘medieval’ features of this order 
continued to form part of Christendom’s fundamental structure, belying narratives that 
project Christendom’s demise as far back as the fifteenth century.237 In addition to the 
significance of these medieval survivals, the archaic nature of the Renaissance 
monarchies must also be stressed.  When judged relative to the frailty of feudal 
kingdoms, the centralizing initiatives of the fifteenth century Renaissance monarchs 
appear impressive. Conversely, when evaluated against the Absolute monarchies of 
the seventeenth century, the infrastructural power of the Renaissance monarchies 
presents as positively anaemic. While France had pioneered the development of 
standing armies, becoming the first kingdom to deploy such a force from 1445, 
authority and control over organized violence remained dispersed amongst the nobility 
as Europe approached the Reformation.238 Throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth 
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centuries, the weakness of the crown was apparent from the fact that princes regularly 
concluded peace treaties with their powerful vassals that were in no way substantively 
different to those concluded with foreign princes.239 Sovereigns exercised neither a 
monopoly on violence, nor a monopoly on representing their territories or entering 
into peace treaties with other princes.240 The dependence of the crown upon the 
nobility to assist in governing the royal patrimony was reflected in their reliance on a 
plethora of practices – from tax farming to the sale of offices – that while temporarily 
expedient did little to enhance the crown’s long-term infrastructural power.  To the 
extent that the ‘new monarchies’ represented an advance over existing political forms, 
they did so inasmuch as the Renaissance kings were able to more effectively centralize 
patronage than had their predecessors. Conversely, the construction of robust 
sovereign states governed by a rational-legal bureaucracy was still far off in the 
sixteenth century. 
 The point I seek to convey in illuminating the limitations of the Renaissance 
monarchies is that it is misleading to read the existence of a European state system 
back into the sixteenth century, and to conclude that the collapse of Latin Christendom 
had occurred at some indefinite time prior to this point. The centralizing new 
monarchies of Western Europe certainly constituted a powerful subversive influence 
within Christendom, and both profited from and contributed to the further corrosion of 
both papacy and empire. But to conceive of late medieval and early modern state 
formation as the locomotive driving the shift from medieval heteronomy to modern 
sovereign anarchy is empirically unsustainable.241 While the latter half of the fifteenth 
century had seen a surge in state formation along Western Europe’s Atlantic fringe, 
these processes of state formation were if anything abating rather than accelerating by 
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1500.242   Furthermore, the new monarchies in the sixteenth century constituted merely 
one of a number of institutional forms – alongside city-states and city-leagues – extant 
at this time, and the unqualified triumph of the former as Europe’s modal political 
form was at this point far from guaranteed.243 Each of these forms also continued to 
dwell in an environment constituted by a combination of feudal and canon law, a 
factor that further retarded the evolution towards the dominance of the sovereign state 
and the crystallization of a European state system. 
 The final observation of Christendom at 1500 that needs to be made concerns 
the trajectory not taken. Specifically, the possibility of Christendom evolving from 
medieval heteronomy to modern empire must be mentioned, if only to underscore the 
fluidity and indeterminacy of the environment in Western Europe at the eve of the 
Reformation. Throughout Eurasia, the sixteenth century witnessed a tendency towards 
commercial expansion and imperial consolidation under the banner of newly 
ascendant ‘gunpowder empires.’244  In the Muslim world, the Ottomans, the Mughals, 
and the Safavids each exploited the power of gunpowder to subdue local potentates 
and construct sizeable empires across Eurasia’s Islamic crescent.245  Similarly, the 
century also witnessed the further consolidation of imperial forms in both Muscovy 
and Ming China.246 In Western Europe, the papacy had previously defeated a 
Hohenstaufen bid for imperial consolidation in the thirteenth century, consolidating a 
heteronomous international order that had persisted down to the modern era. In the 
sixteenth century, however, the vagaries of European dynastic diplomacy, the shock of 
renewed religious schism, and the looming Turkish threat again tantalizingly raised 
                                                 
242
Ibid. 
243On this point, see generally Spruyt, The Sovereign State and its Competitors, chapters four through 
seven. 
244McNeill, The Global Condition, p. 116. 
245
Ibid. See also more generally C.A. Bayly. Imperial Meridian - the British Empire and the World, 
1780-1830. London: Longman, 1989, chapter one. 
246McNeill, The Global Condition, p. 116. 
 139
the prospect of a Christendom united under the imperial banner of Charles V. That 
such a possibility was even conceivable is suggestive of the fluidity of Christendom in 
a period in which the old international order had seriously decayed, but in which the 
lineaments of a new order were not yet clearly in prospect. 
 History teaches us that Western Europe would eventually transition from the 
heteronomous world of Latin Christendom to an Absolutist society of sovereign states. 
But for such a transition to occur, medieval survivals would need to be dissolved, 
alternative imperial possibilities foreclosed, and at least rudimentary ordering 
mechanisms for the emerging sovereign order constructed. The steady decay of 
Christendom that I have chronicled in this chapter provided the context out of which 
this evolutionary sequence emerged. But the road to a sovereign state system was far 
from straight. Before a new international order can emerge, its predecessor must first 
have collapsed, a process that necessarily entails enormous violence followed by a 
period of prolonged, chaotic disorder as power-holders scramble to construct new 
ordering institutions to fit radically changed material and ideal conditions.  As the next 
chapter illustrates, Christendom would prove to be no exception to this rule.         
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE COLLAPSE OF LATIN CHRISTENDOM 
 
Introduction 
 
At the turn of the sixteenth century, Western and Central Europe remained 
integrated within the decaying but still discernible order of Latin Christendom. By the 
mid-seventeenth century, this order had been swept away, its place taken by an 
embryonic Absolutist system of sovereign states. The story of Christendom’s 
dissolution and its succession by a sovereign state system is chronicled in the next two 
chapters.  In this chapter, I limit my analysis to the period beginning with the 
Reformation’s onset in 1517 and concluding with the Peace of Augsburg in 1555.  My 
purposes in this chapter are twofold. Firstly, I aim to demonstrate how the ideological 
shock of the Reformation, working in conjunction with processes of geopolitical 
consolidation and institutional decay already evident from the late medieval period, 
served to fatally undermine Latin Christendom as an international order. Secondly, I 
seek to explain why Christendom’s rulers were unable to effectively collaborate either 
to save Christendom from destruction or to contrive a viable alternative once it 
became clear that the old order was beyond redemption. 
 Whereas chapter four focuses on the immediate causes of Christendom’s 
collapse, chapter five explores the systemic consequences of its collapse for Europe’s 
subsequent political evolution. I argue Europe in the century following Christendom’s 
demise reverted to a condition of ‘immature anarchy’ marked by poisonous sectarian 
division, pervasive civil and international war, and the partial or total breakdown of 
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centralized structures of political authority.247  Far from laying the foundations of a 
sovereign international order, the combined forces of confessionalization and military 
revolution initially exerted profoundly centrifugal effects upon early modern Europe, 
inspiring a series of maladaptive responses from rulers that compounded rather than 
alleviated systemic disorder. Ultimately, the return to order was made possible only by 
a series of intellectual and cultural innovations forged during this bloody inter-
regnum. Of these innovations, the articulation of notions of divine right sovereignty, 
the formulation of politique solutions to the problem of religious pluralism, and the 
generalization of norms of mutual recognition and non-intervention throughout Europe 
proved most critical in establishing the normative complex of a new order. It was only 
with the maturation of these constructs that Europe’s rulers were able to fully 
reconcile themselves to the transformed ideal and material context yielded by religious 
schism and military revolution, thus permitting the establishment of a new order and 
with it an end to the disorder that prevailed in the century after Christendom but before 
sovereignty.    
 
4.1 The Crisis Opens 
 
4.1.1 The Changing Strategic Landscape of Latin Christendom 
 
From the mid-fifteenth century down to the eve of the Reformation, a cluster 
of forces dramatically reconfigured Christendom’s geopolitical landscape. The most 
basic of these forces, specifically the increase in violence interdependence, has already 
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been mentioned. Recapitulating briefly, the introduction of modern artillery into 
European warfare signalled a transient but nevertheless critical shift towards offence 
dominance on the battlefield, corroding key parametric constraints on the scale and 
intensity of violence that had previously prevailed. Cannon batteries could now 
rapidly reduce fortifications that had previously appeared impregnable, a trend that 
generally enhanced the crown’s position vis-à-vis the nobility and thus accelerated the 
centralization of political power.248 The growth of professional foreign mercenary 
companies, disembedded from their original social context and often indifferent to the 
domestic political intrigues being played out within their host societies, served as the 
nuclei of embryonic standing armies that could be used for both domestic pacification 
as well as for external territorial aggrandizement.249  Finally, the growth of 
international credit increased monarchs’ capacity to field ever-larger armies, in so 
doing driving up the costs of war and thereby catalysing the further consolidation of 
power within a shrinking number of expanding political units.250 
 The transformative significance of the aforementioned trends should not be 
overstated. Technological changes in the fifteenth century did integrate Christendom’s 
power-holders within an ever tighter and more expansive web of coercive interactions.  
But the cluster of institutional, organizational, and doctrinal changes associated with 
the early modern military revolution had yet to properly manifest themselves.  Kings 
and nobles continued to enjoy an uneasy symbiotic relationship, with the nobility 
forming the leadership of hastily constructed, notoriously independent and often 
ramshackle and unreliable armed forces.251  Similarly, the impetus towards political 
consolidation provided by the gunpowder revolution was arrested with the 
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development of modern fortifications built in the trace italienne style, thereby 
preventing the emergence of a Western European ‘gunpowder empire’ and ensuring 
Europe’s return to a more indecisive mode of warfare as the sixteenth century 
advanced.252 These observations notwithstanding, the increase in violence 
interdependence in late fifteenth century Christendom is undeniable, as is the 
quickening pace of political consolidation during this period. 
 In 1453, the strategic stalemate of the Hundred Years War between England 
and France was finally broken, with French cannon destroying the castles of the 
English king’s French vassals bringing the war to a successful climax for the Valois 
monarchy.253 In the East, cannon operated and maintained by Christian mercenaries 
exerted a similarly powerful impact, enabling the Turkish sultan to conquer 
Constantinople in the same year.254  1477 witnessed the defeat of Charles the Bold of 
Burgundy and the partitioning of his patrimony between the Valois and Habsburg 
monarchies, further hastening the emergence of a bitter rivalry between the two 
dynasties.255  Most spectacularly of all, in the fifty years between 1477-1527, the 
successful conclusion of a series of highly speculative marital alliances propelled the 
Habsburg monarchy to near hegemony in Western and Central Europe.  At its furthest 
extent, the far-flung Habsburg matrimonial conglomeration would encompass 
approximately forty percent of Western and Central Europe’s population, 
incorporating all of the great financial centres of the West, as well as both the 
established silver mines of Central Europe and the vast silver and gold reserves of the 
New World.256 The very size of the sprawling Habsburg patrimony ensured a 
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significant increase in Europe’s strategic inter-connectedness, even if its far-flung 
nature would eventually work against its serving as the foundation of an imperial 
alternative to Latin Christendom. 
 The geopolitical consolidation of Christendom occurred against a backdrop of 
institutional decay already adverted to in the previous chapter. By 1500, the papacy 
had recovered from both the Great Schism as well as the conciliarists’ subsequent 
efforts to institute reform of the Church by enhancing the authority of church councils 
at the expense of the papal monarchy. Far from reviving the Church, however, the 
papacy’s suppression of internal calls for reform merely estranged it from the popular 
base of followers whose spiritual and pastoral needs the Church was increasingly 
failing to meet. By the early sixteenth century, aggrandizing monarchs were already 
undermining the Church’s traditional exemption from royal taxation (most notably in 
France), while the papacy was neglecting the reform of the Church in favour of the 
pursuit of the papal monarchy’s power-political interests in Italy.257 Similarly, while 
the meteoric growth of Habsburg power revived medieval fears and hopes of universal 
monarchy, the institutional power of the imperial office remained limited. Certainly, 
the emperor’s auctoritas – conceived as the right to judge the legitimacy of lower 
office-holders and the legality of their actions – continued to be widely recognized 
into the sixteenth century within the territorial confines of the empire. But the 
emperor’s potestas – conceived as the right and ability to issue commands and enforce 
decisions within the empire – remained almost entirely notional.258 
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Latin Christendom thus entered the sixteenth century in an exceptionally 
fragile state, its stability being undermined by the combined forces of geopolitical 
consolidation and institutional decay. In an environment in which gunpowder, credit, 
and mercenarism had made warfare more costly, more violent and (temporarily, at 
least) offence-dominant, the institution of aristocratic feud no longer supported order 
but instead subverted it, providing rulers with a familiar and accepted rationale for 
their bellicosity in an environment in which feuds qua wars had become qualitatively 
more destructive than before. Equally, the interminable late medieval struggle for 
primacy between Church and Empire had left both institutions weakened, thereby 
diminishing the capacities of either emperor or pope to mobilize authoritative power in 
the service of order maintenance. Both the authoritative and coercive institutions 
through which order had been maintained in late medieval Christendom were 
declining into desuetude as the new century opened. Simultaneously, the rise of the 
‘new monarchies’ on Christendom’s Atlantic fringe, the Habsburgs’ meteoric 
ascendancy, and the growth of Ottoman power on Europe’s south-eastern flank called 
forth powerful new entities that unsettled Christendom’s ordering framework in a 
multitude of different ways.  
To the extent that a modicum of order prevailed in Western and Central Europe 
at all in 1500, it derived from the continuing integrity of Christendom’s normative 
complex, a complex firmly anchored in Christendom’s religious unity. Even after the 
material context out of which it had arisen had changed, even as its ordering 
institutions successively succumbed to processes of internal decay abetted and 
accelerated by these material changes, Christendom’s ideological unity endured. It 
was only once this unity was shattered that Latin Christendom definitively collapsed.         
 
 
 146
4.1.2 Ideological Schism and the Onset of Latin Christendom’s Collapse 
 
At first glance, Martin Luther presents as an unlikely agent of systemic 
transformation. An Austin friar and professor of theology, Luther was stepped in the 
intellectual tradition of the Church, and his ninety-five theses critiquing clerical abuses 
were initially intended to catalyse reform within the Church rather than precipitating 
irreparable schism.259 Additionally, Luther neither challenged established claims that 
preparation for salvation constituted the raison d’etre of collective association, nor did 
he question the prescriptive force of Christian ethics as an indispensible guide for 
human behaviour. These qualifications notwithstanding, Lutheran theology 
nevertheless posed a holistic challenge to the normative complex of Christendom, 
particularly as Luther’s ideas matured in the face of official intransigence and attempts 
to persecute him as a heretic.  At the most basic level, Luther repudiated power-
legitimating norms privileging the Church as the essential mediator between man and 
the divine, thereby undermining the legitimacy of the one supra-local governance 
structure common to all of Christendom. More fundamentally even than this, however, 
Lutheran theology disputed established norms governing the appropriate relationship 
between sacred and secular power structures, as well as anticipating a holistic re-
conceptualization of the very nature of religious worship and its relationship to the 
mundane world. An enormous literature has been written on the import of Luther’s 
ideas for Europe’s subsequent evolution, but for present purposes, it is sufficient to 
note the theological, political, and ontological dimensions of the Lutheran challenge. 
 Central to Luther’s critique of the Church was his doctrine of justification by 
faith alone. Whereas the Church stressed the importance of good works, prayer, and 
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fasting as means of securing one’s salvation, Luther conversely argued that salvation 
was possible only by abandoning oneself to God’s mercy and to the messages of the 
gospel.  Having accepted the notion of God’s omnipotence, Luther argued that it was 
blasphemous for humans to assume that they could through their own actions compel 
justification in the eyes of God.260 Stressing Augustine’s conception of man’s essential 
sinfulness and his estrangement from the divine, Luther claimed that it was only 
through the gift of faith – a gift made possible by God’s sacrifice of Christ – that man 
could again be reconciled with God and achieve salvation. Faith, rather than works, 
was the key to salvation, and faith in turn could best be cultivated by devoted study of 
Christ’s message and His sacrifice as recorded in scripture.261  Lutheran theology thus 
constituted a full-frontal assault not only upon clerical abuses, but also upon the whole 
moral economy of penances and indulgences underpinning Church theology.  
 As a corollary of his conception of justification by faith alone, Luther also 
rejected the intercessionary relationship between God and man that the Church had 
reserved for itself, arguing instead for the existence of an invisible priesthood of all 
believers linked directly to God by their faith in Him.262 In attacking the idea that 
salvation was possible only through the Church, and with it the justification for the 
existence of a separate priestly caste to mediate between God and man, Luther 
assaulted the most basic power-legitimating norms underpinning Christendom.  
Lutheran theology directly attacked the legitimacy of the only effective supra-local 
governance structure common to Western and Central Europe, while Luther’s public 
burning of the canon law books in 1520 represented in the most symbolic way his 
denial of the Church’s ecclesiastical jurisdiction.263  In denying the authority of canon 
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law, Luther rejected a pivotal component of Christendom’s common legal 
infrastructure, one that governed not merely matters pertaining to religious observance 
or family life, but that also mediated vertical relations between subjects and rulers and 
horizontal relations between rulers. 
 Given the interlocking character of religious and political power in early 
modern Europe, Luther’s theological iconoclasm held weighty implications for the 
organization of political authority in Christendom. Official Church doctrine from 
Boniface VIII onwards centred on the organic unity of Christendom and emphasized 
the inseparability of the civil and ecclesiastical realms. The Church’s doctrine of the 
Two Swords held that the Church was supreme in both ecclesiastical and the civil 
spheres, but that responsibility for the exercise of civil jurisdiction had been 
provisionally delegated by the Church to earthly rulers.264 Opposing this vision of the 
civil and ecclesiastical as representing distinct but inter-locking realms, Luther 
articulated instead a doctrine of the Two Kingdoms.  In view of Luther’s conception of 
the church as a purely spiritual community, an invisible body of believers united in 
their faith in Christ rather than through their submission to a corporeal ‘worldly’ 
institution, a clearer distinction could be drawn between the celestial and the terrestrial 
than had existed previously.265  In reconceptualizing the church as an invisible body of 
believers and divesting Rome of law-making powers, Lutheranism invited an 
identification of the institution of law as an institutionalized expression of the will of 
the ruler.266  Equally, in denying the writ of canon law, Lutheranism struck at 
Christendom’s legal canopy, working as a decomposition enzyme upon the tottering 
foundations of Christendom’s heteronomous structure. 
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 Finally, the Reformation inaugurated by Luther contradicted the most basic 
ontological assumptions about the nature of spiritual and social life held by all 
Christians, rending a seam in Christendom’s social fabric that eventually percolated to 
the level of the individual parish. Specifically, Lutheranism and its offshoots opposed 
a traditional conception of religion as magical, ritual and communal with a 
reconceptualization of religion cast in an ethical, intellectual, and individualistic 
mould.267 In Church doctrine, the ritual of the Eucharist was held as the central 
constitutive experience of the Christian faith. The mass re-created and re-affirmed 
Christ’s sacrifice on behalf of man, a sacrifice deemed cosmically necessary to repay 
the debt man incurred to God with his initial disobedience at the Fall.268 With Christ’s 
sacrifice, a restitution for man’s disobedience was secured, making possible a 
reconciliation between man and God.269  The ritual of the mass reaffirmed the bond 
between God and man made possible by Christ’s sacrifice. In addition, it also 
performed a vital social and sacramental function. In entering into communion with 
other believers through participation in the Eucharist, Christians affirmed both their 
membership within the universal Church, and also the integrity and unity of the body 
social, encompassing both the living and the dead.270   
The Eucharist – as the Church’s central institution, was magical, in that it 
called for divine intervention into the social world through the priestly performance of 
a sacred rite; ritual, in that it centred around the formulaic performance of an 
established set of propitiatory acts; and communal, inasmuch as it centred around the 
collective remembrance and recreation of a sacrifice that secured salvation for both the 
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living and the dead.271 Official doctrine thus contrasted starkly with Luther’s focus on 
justification by faith alone, his denial of the doctrine of substantiation and with it of 
the need for priestly intercession in the performance of the Eucharist, and his emphasis 
on individual prayer and the study of scripture as preferred means of drawing closer to 
God. In challenging the accepted interpretation of the mass, Lutheran theology 
compromised its indispensable function as both a mechanism of social integration and 
a collective means of affirming the unity of the body social.  At a time when religion 
was popularly understood as referring not to a privately held body of beliefs but rather 
to a corporeally embodied community of believers, Protestant theology polarized 
Christendom around mutually exclusive and antagonistic confessional identities.  The 
Reformation shattered the symbolic wholeness of the community of the faithful, 
affecting a rupture with the past that would eventually ramify throughout Christendom 
as a whole. 
While beginning as a reformist critique of clerical abuses, the Reformation 
quickly mutated into a threat to Christendom’s overarching normative complex. In 
addition to the challenge it posed to Christendom’s constitutional values, however, the 
Reformation also carried with it profound and paradoxical institutional implications 
that further imperilled Christendom’s perpetuation. At the systemic level, the effects 
of the Reformation were almost entirely disintegrative, with the doctrine of the Two 
Kingdoms striking like a sledgehammer against the brittle framework of canon law 
that had previously served as Christendom’s mechanism for adjudicating international 
disputes.  The order-maintaining capacity of canon law depended on a recognition of 
its validity and of the Church’s unquestioned authority to interpret and apply it to 
individual cases. In providing actors with a principled justification for rejecting the 
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Church’s authority, Lutheranism fatally undercut the legitimacy and efficacy of canon 
law as a mechanism of conflict management.   
Even more ominously, at the same time that it weakened one of Christendom’s 
few remaining authoritative institutions, the Reformation also overlaid an already 
conflict-prone environment with intense religious cum ideological rivalries.  It is 
worth emphasizing that the Reformation did not destabilize a hitherto pacified 
international system. Aforementioned processes of geopolitical consolidation had 
already led to a marked increase in the scale and intensity of conflict within 
Christendom, as evidenced in the interminable Franco-Habsburg struggle for 
hegemony on the Italian peninsula from 1494 onwards.272 However, in polarizing 
Europe’s polities along confessional lines, the Reformation destabilized bonds of 
collective identity that had previously exercised a modest pacifying effect on relations 
between Christendom’s rulers. Certainly, the heightened dynastic competition for 
power and prestige that had punctuated Christendom’s dying decades invites 
scepticism as to the restraining influence of religious unity upon rulers’ conduct prior 
to the Reformation. Nevertheless, this scepticism is qualified once the radicalizing 
effects of confessional strife upon dynastic policies in the decades after the 
Reformation are taken into account. Christendom’s moral breakdown, evidenced in 
the interjection of an ethos of Holy War into Europe’s internecine conflicts, did not 
fully manifest itself until after the Habsburg bid to reconstitute Christendom along 
imperial lines had been thwarted. But this breakdown was prefigured and made 
possible by the prior splintering of Christendom into competing confessions, a process 
inaugurated with the coming of the Reformation.  
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 In conjunction with its disintegrative effects on Christendom itself, the 
Reformation also exerted complex and contradictory effects on Christendom’s 
constituent polities.  On the one hand, Luther’s doctrine of the Two Kingdoms 
provided a powerful legitimation for rulers’ monopolization of law-making powers, 
thus strengthening moves towards political centralization in polities that adopted 
Lutheranism. Paradoxically, the clear-cut conceptual distinction between the civil and 
religious spheres articulated by Luther practically lent itself to the institutional de-
differentiation of church and state.273  For with the Church’s ecclesiastical jurisdiction 
abolished, the prince assumed responsibility for exercising legislative, administrative, 
and judicial powers as they pertained to the temporal affairs of the church within his 
territory.274 Similarly, the abolition of canon law entailed the secularization of laws 
pertaining to a vast range of matters – marriage and divorce, wills, property, common 
and religious crimes (e.g. heresy and blasphemy) that had previously been subject to 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction.275 
 More generally, even within polities that remained loyal to the Roman Church, 
the Reformation precipitated a range of processes that superficially favoured the 
strengthening of monarchical authority.  While Europe’s rulers had long sought to 
identify their power with the maintenance of a divinely ordained social order, the 
religious schism provided them with further scope for religious legitimation by 
enabling them to present themselves as defenders of the ‘true’ faith, the indispensible 
earthly guardians of Christianity against the forces of heresy. The historian Heinz 
Schilling’s observation of the Reformation period that ‘…the state became more sacral 
before it became more secular…’ alludes to the tightening of the alliance between 
spiritual and sacred authorities that could be observed throughout Europe as the 
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century progressed.276  Processes of confessionalization, whereby religious and lay 
authorities collaborated in the intensified supervision, social disciplining, and spiritual 
indoctrination of subjects, held out the prospect of strengthening the affective and 
institutional bonds between rulers and ruled, thereby dramatically augmenting rulers’ 
infrastructural power over their subjects.277  Once again, these processes of 
confessionalization were initially slow to develop in the years immediately following 
Luther’s revelation, but their genesis is inevitably linked to the ideological shock 
introduced by the Lutheran heresy. 
 Offsetting these centripetal effects, the breakdown of Christendom’s unity 
threatened Europe’s polyglot composite monarchies with the centrifugal pressures of 
protracted confessional conflict. The centrality of religious uniformity to the integrity 
of Europe’s polities becomes readily apparent when one considers the pronounced 
heterogeneity that otherwise defined them.  Period specialists have described early 
modern kingdoms as composite monarchies in order to avoid the anachronistic 
assumptions of corporate unity would be evoked were they to be identified as 
sovereign states.278  Early modern composite monarchies were comprised of a 
congeries of dispersed territories, each with their distinctive laws, language and 
customs, and each relating to their nominal dynastic suzerain on the basis of their own 
distinctive terms of incorporation.279  Given this heterogeneity, subscription to a 
common faith provided one of the few mechanisms of integration within composite 
monarchies. Conversely, the crystallization of implacably opposed confessional 
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identities in different portions of rulers’ patrimonies posed a grave threat to the 
continued integrity of their empires.  Protracted religious conflict threatened to 
generate socially inclusive and territorially exclusive collective identities within each 
of the constituent territories of dynastic empires, favouring local power-holders over 
dynastic monarchs. With the outbreak of confessional controversy, monarchs faced the 
real risk of local power-holders in each of their territories adopting different and 
opposed confessional identities, making the prospect of achieving an empire-wide 
reconciliation between religious parties virtually impossible.280    
In an era in which religious unity was held as being a sine qua non for the 
maintenance of political and social stability, the Reformation posed the danger of 
dissolving the most basic constitutive bonds holding society together. Lutheran 
theology challenged Christendom’s most crucial power-legitimating norms, contested 
the validity of established boundaries between the sacred and mundane, and deranged 
the operation of the mass as Christendom’s central ritual of worship and social 
integration. The Reformation also denuded canon law of the legitimacy necessary for 
it to function as a mechanism of conflict mediation and adjudication, while overlaying 
existing dynastic conflicts with sectarian rivalry. Meanwhile, while processes of 
confessionalization would eventually provide rulers with a range of normative and 
institutional levers with which to consolidate they power, these centripetal effects 
were more than offset by the centrifugal effects of confessional polarization upon 
Christendom’s fragile composite monarchies. 
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With the coming of the ideological shock of the Reformation, the last of the 
struts supporting Latin Christendom was gravely compromised. The Reformation 
threatened the normative underpinnings of Christendom’s shared structures of conflict 
mediation and adjudication, and also imperilled the ideological cement holding 
Europe’s fragile composite monarchies together. With its normative unity unravelling, 
its ordering institutions already in decay, and its underlying material structure already 
substantially transformed through processes of geopolitical consolidation, the 
international order of Latin Christendom in 1517 stood on the cusp of what would 
prove to be a terminal crisis. 
 
4.2. The Collapse of Latin Christendom and the Failure of the Imperial 
Alternative, 1517-1555 
 
The transition from a medieval Respublica Christiana to the modern state 
system was a transformation of such significance, both for Europe and subsequently 
for the world, that it is easy to retrospectively assume its inevitability. Nevertheless, a 
closer consideration of the transformative forces convulsing Europe in the sixteenth 
century demonstrates that an alternative developmental trajectory, from heteronomy to 
imperium, was if not likely then at least distinctly possible in the early decades of the 
Reformation. The rupture of Europe’s spiritual unity precipitated by Luther in 1517 
proved ultimately incapable of repair, and was eventually decisive in polarizing 
Europe’s polities to such a degree that a return to order could only be realised through 
the establishment of sovereign state system. Nevertheless, at least down to the 1540s, 
a conviction existed among Europe’s governing elites that a permanent reconciliation 
between Protestants and the Church was both desirable and possible.  For while the 
Reformation constituted a direct assault upon the Church’s theology and upon the 
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power-legitimating norms that sustained it as the essential mediator between man and 
the divine, Protestants continued to accept both the ethical prescriptions of 
Christianity, as well as identity-constitutive norms prescribing preparation for 
salvation as the animating purpose of collective association. Protestantism originated 
as an internal critique of the Church that was reformist rather than revolutionary in its 
initial intent, even if it subsequently proved revolutionary in its implications. 
Additionally, Lutheranism in particular was politically conservative in character, 
owing to Luther’s continuing subscription to the Augustinian political theology 
originally articulated by the Church.   
 While Protestantism emerged as an expression of extreme discontent and 
disillusionment with the Church, many of its early converts were not so radically 
estranged from the existing order as to make an eventual return to Church impossible.   
Equally, while there can be no question but that the Reformation tapped into genuine 
and intense popular desires for a more immediate experience of the divine, the Church 
had in previous centuries demonstrated an admirable capacity to canalize these 
sentiments into institutional vehicles (e.g. monastic and mendicant orders) that 
supported rather than undermined its spiritual authority.281 This adaptive capacity in 
the face of popular discontent would receive renewed expression from the Council of 
Trent onwards. Once the Peace of Augsburg signalled the failure of Charles’ bid for 
imperium and confirmed Europe’s permanent religious division, the post-Tridentine 
Church proved eminently capable of reviving popular religious enthusiasm among 
Catholics, while also collaborating successfully with secular rulers to ‘roll back’ 
Protestantism across huge swathes of Europe in the seventeenth century.282  That the 
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post-Tridentine Church was capable of substantially rolling back Protestantism in the 
late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, at a time when confessional identities had 
become firmly entrenched in the popular consciousness, is at least suggestive of 
Christendom’s potential capacity to have contained Protestantism far earlier through a 
combination of popular mobilization, institutional adaptation, and ideological 
accommodation.   
 The point of the foregoing observations is to illustrate that the religious and 
ideological unity that had previously sustained Christendom as an international order 
was not immediately and irretrievably annihilated with the outbreak of the 
Reformation. Despite the vituperative character of the theological debate that followed 
Luther’s ninety-five theses, educated Europeans remained united in their subscription 
to a wide range of principles relating to the character of the spiritual and social world.  
In Habermasian terms, the common ‘life-world’ of shared values and cultural givens 
necessary to sustain authoritative institutions had yet to completely disintegrate. 
Additionally, while increases in violence interdependence had corroded the capacity of 
existing ordering institutions to effectively manage conflict, the dominant trend in 
early modern Eurasia was towards the reconstruction of regional orders through 
imperial consolidation. As we will shortly see, the underlying geopolitical 
circumstances of Christendom were such as to inhibit an easy replication of this 
Eurasian pattern.  But this material impediment was partially offset by the vagaries of 
European dynastic diplomacy, which had produced in the Habsburg matrimonial 
conglomeration an entity of sufficient size and power as to make the possibility of 
Christendom’s imperial reconstitution in the Reformation’s wake an eminently 
imaginable prospect.  
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 The prodigious material resources of the Habsburgs, the diffuse but 
nevertheless real ‘soft power’ accruing from their possession of the imperial title, and 
the dogged determination of Charles V to effect Europe’s political and religious 
reunification must all be acknowledged when charting Europe’s course from 
heteronomy to sovereign anarchy.  Considering the material foundations of the 
Habsburg imperium, it is worth recounting that the Habsburg patrimony constituted 
the largest single agglomeration of territories in Europe to have existed since the fall 
of Rome. At its peak, the Habsburgs’ European patrimony included the Low 
Countries, modern-day Spain, northern and southern Italy, the Habsburgs’ hereditary 
stem-lands in Austria and Switzerland, a swathe of territories in what it now Eastern 
France, and substantial holdings in Germany as well.283 The Habsburgs under Charles 
V governed lands accounting for forty percent of Europe’s population, while also 
accounting in the Low Countries, northern Italy and southern Germany for all of 
Europe’s major financial centres and the lion’s share of its major trading entrepots.284 
In addition to their European holdings, the Habsburg dynasty had also acquired 
substantial possessions in the New World, possessions that would in time yield 
massive infusions of bullion into the Habsburgs’ coffers. Militarily, the Habsburgs 
also possessed a precociously modern infantry-dominated army composed in the main 
of highly disciplined pikeman and harquebusiers; this army would ultimately 
constitute the renowned Spanish tercios, arguably the most formidable fighting force 
of the sixteenth century.285 
 In addition to their formidable material power, the Habsburgs also possessed 
the considerable ideological power and prestige associated with their possession of the 
imperial title.  While the Hohenstaufens’ defeat had arrested imperial consolidation in 
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the thirteenth century, the Gelatian doctrine of the Two Swords – in which the 
emperor was invested with the responsibility of wielding coercive power in defence of 
the Church – continued to resonate in the sixteenth century, providing the emperor 
with prestige and at least nominal deference beyond the empire’s bounds.286 Imperial 
institutions were admittedly weak, but the emperor’s auctoritas was widely recognized 
within the empire. Europe’s rulers grudgingly acknowledged the emperor’s status as 
primus inter pares, even if Roman law was increasingly invoked by rulers such as the 
kings of England and France to establish their untrammelled authority within their 
own patrimonies.287 The very size of the Habsburg patrimony and the inevitable 
comparisons it drew with its ancient Roman predecessor triggered also revived interest 
in imperial schemes for organizing Christendom, a prospect that evoked both 
considerable hope and fear among Europe’s rulers. 
 To the Habsburgs’ prodigious portfolio of power resources must be added the 
leadership of Charles V, a monarch who approached the task of defending 
Christendom with unwavering resolve. Personally devout, Charles divined the hand of 
God in the Habsburg dynasty’s recent good fortune.  The suddenness with which the 
Habsburgs had won their empire – in Europe through marriage, election, and 
inheritance, in the New World through discovery and conquest – suggested to Charles 
and his courtiers that their ascendancy was in some way providentially ordained.288  
That the dynasty’s rise occurred roughly contemporaneously with the breakdown of 
Christian unity and the waxing of Turkish power suggested a divine purpose in the 
Habsburgs’ blessings, namely to restore the unity of the Church and lead Christendom 
on a victorious crusade against the infidel.289 
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 In reality, the institutional frailty and disunity of the Habsburg imperium 
fatally compromised Charles’ efforts to reconstitute Christendom in an imperial 
mould.  This failure was to be further guaranteed by his rivals’ willingness to sacrifice 
Christian unity upon the altar of dynastic self-interest. But given the threat posed by 
the Reformation to the maintenance of peace within and between Europe’s polities; 
given further the Habsburgs’ extraordinary endowments in hard and soft power 
resources; and given finally the fervour with which Charles was willing to commit 
these resources to the task of restoring Christian unity, the failure of Christendom to 
successfully shift from a heteronomous to an imperial international order demands 
explanation. 
 
4.2.1 The Vulnerability of Empire 
 
Christendom’s failure to reconstitute itself along imperial lines can be 
attributed to three causes, specifically the weaknesses internal to the Habsburg 
imperium itself, the existence of a surfeit of Habsburg enemies who were willing and 
able to exploit these weaknesses to derail all attempts at imperial consolidation, and 
the inability of emperor and papacy to effectively collaborate to maintain Christian 
unity. Charles was unable to effectively mobilize his vast resources to restore 
Christian unity, and Charles’ enemies were unwilling to countenance Christendom’s 
preservation if doing so entailed acceptance of Habsburg domination. 
 Turning firstly to the frailties of the Habsburg behemoth, the striking absence 
of common institutions underwriting the imperium must first be acknowledged. At no 
time in its existence did Charles’ patrimony possess a common currency, a common 
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treasury, or a common governing bureaucracy.290 The constituent territories of the 
imperium were each acquired through marriage, election or inheritance on their own 
distinct terms, with local power-holders retaining extensive fiscal, legal and social 
prerogatives and privileges.291  Such privileges, often rooted in custom and 
institutionalized in representative bodies, severely restricted Charles’ access to the 
latent wealth of his vast patrimony.  Imperial attempts to encroach on these 
prerogatives typically met with hostility and organized resistance, up to and including 
violent rebellion.292 The existence of a thicket of jealously guarded privileges proved 
no more pronounced than in the shatter-belt of the approximately one thousand 
distinct cities, ecclesiastical territories, and princely states comprising the empire 
itself.  In the German-speaking portion of the Habsburg imperium, burghers and 
princes – including the seven Electors charged with electing the emperor – had long 
conspired to limit the authority of the imperial office so as to safeguard their own 
autonomy and consolidate power within their own possessions.  Consequently, the 
empire lacked a centralized system of government, depriving Charles of the 
institutional framework needed to effectively mobilize his resources in pursuit of 
imperial ends.293  
   In the absence of common institutions around which collective loyalties could 
cohere, the Habsburg imperium remained irredeemably diverse, with the crown 
providing the only point of commonality shared by all of Charles’ subjects. In this 
respect, the Habsburgs did not differ greatly from other composite monarchies in 
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Europe.  What did distinguish them from their rivals was the enormous and 
geographically dispersed character of their imperium. The sheer size of the Habsburg 
patrimony magnified the problems of disunity experienced by all early modern 
monarchies. As a result of this disunity, Charles consistently experienced difficulties 
in soliciting the political and financial support required to defend the monarchy 
against its adversaries. The lack of mutual identification between Charles’ subjects 
ensured that when emergencies broke out in discrete territories within his imperium, 
the resources needed to confront these threats were provided belatedly and grudgingly 
– if at all – by subjects not immediately affected by the crisis.294  
 Imperial vulnerabilities deriving from institutional weakness and regional 
particularism were further compounded by more prosaic problems stemming directly 
from the gargantuan size and far-flung character of the Habsburg holdings. The very 
vastness of the Habsburg imperium imposed considerable command and control 
challenges for a polity in which major decision-making power remained concentrated 
in the Imperial Chancellery and more specifically in the figure of Charles himself.295 
The already fragile bonds of fealty linking Charles to local elites required regular 
renewal through imperial visitations, forcing the emperor to adopt a perpetually 
itinerant lifestyle at a time when the communications and transportation infrastructure 
then available was rudimentary.296  The extent of the Habsburg domains and their 
geographic centrality also brought them into contact with a multitude of prospective 
regional enemies, enemies that feared the Habsburgs’ power and could be tempted into 
coordinating their actions to jointly weaken Habsburg hegemony. This collaboration – 
however uneven and ad hoc – proved ultimately sufficient to irreparably weaken and 
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wound the Habsburg imperium, in so doing destroying Christendom’s last hope of 
reunification. 
 
4.2.2 Positional Conflicts and Imperial Nemesis  
 
For all of its strengths, the Habsburg imperium was a sort of geopolitical 
Frankenstein, a hastily assembled giant composed of a hodgepodge of different 
territorial appendages sewn together (in Europe at least) with the fragile threads of 
marriage, election, and inheritance. The frailties and fragility of the Habsburg 
imperium made the possibility of reconstituting Christendom along imperial lines 
unlikely from the outset.  However, by the time of the Reformation, increases in 
violence interdependence had evolved in ways that further diminished this prospect.  
Within Christendom itself, the Habsburgs – unlike empire-builders elsewhere across 
Eurasia – had failed to command a monopoly on the gunpowder weaponry necessary 
to subdue regional potentates and enable the construction of enduring imperial 
formations.  Across Western Europe in the latter half of the fifteenth century, the 
technology and expertise necessary to deploy fortress-destroying artillery pieces had 
rapidly diffused, enabling the consolidation of rival dynastic empires that could not be 
easily subordinated to Habsburg imperial designs.297  Beyond Christendom, this 
technology had also diffused to the Ottomans, permitting the consolidation of a 
formidable, expansive and hostile Islamic gunpowder empire on the Habsburgs’ south-
eastern flank.298  Finally, by the 1520s, the window for successful imperial expansion 
was arguably closing in Christendom in any case, with the development of virtually 
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impregnable trace italienne-style artillery fortress returning European warfare to its 
former state of being costly, protracted, indecisive and typically defence-dominant.299    
Structural considerations thus strongly conditioned against the possibility of 
Christendom’s unity being preserved after its old heteronomous incarnation had 
decayed. But what guaranteed Christendom’s final dissolution was the unwillingness 
of Europe’s leaders to countenance a revived Christendom on Habsburg terms. The 
Reformation destabilized an environment that was already fraught by positional 
conflicts for power and prestige both within the empire proper and throughout Europe 
more generally. These rivalries were in no way suspended in the face of religious 
schism. Rather, the Habsburgs’ enemies collaborated in the decades following the 
Reformation to divide and disperse Habsburg resources until the possibility of 
Christendom’s political unification had become impossible. An unintended 
consequence of this manoeuvring was that the emperor was distracted and delayed 
from addressing the problems of religious dissent within the empire until such time 
that Protestantism had become so entrenched as to make Christendom’s religious 
reunification also impossible.  A comprehensive narrative of the Habsburgs’ defeat is 
beyond the scope of this inquiry. Consequently, the following discussion is limited to 
identifying the main lines of opposition to the Habsburg imperium and the broad 
dynamics by which Christendom’s enduring fragmentation was secured.  
 Of the opponents of Habsburg imperium, the most tenacious was the Valois 
monarchy of France. As Europe’s largest single kingdom, Valois France stood after 
the vast Habsburg conglomerate as the only conceivable contender for hegemony in 
Western Europe.300 Finding herself simultaneously encircled by Habsburg territories 
and desirous of expansion into Italy at the Habsburgs’ expense, France under Francis I 
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consistently pursued an anti-Habsburg policy for a combination of defensive and 
offensive reasons, but always with the Valois monarchy’s dynastic self-interest at the 
fore.301  In addition to this formidable opponent to the West, Charles was also forced 
to contend with the growth of Ottoman power in south-eastern Europe and in the 
Mediterranean, an expansion driven both by ambitions for territorial aggrandizement 
and also by a desire to establish control over the Mediterranean’s lucrative trading 
routes.302  The Ottoman empire’s great size, its military dynamism, its capacity in 
conjunction with the North African Barbary corsairs to simultaneously engage the 
Habsburgs on multiple fronts each made it a valuable prospective ally for the 
Habsburgs’ many enemies within Christendom, their religious differences 
notwithstanding. 
 The Valois and Ottoman power blocs constituted Charles’ most formidable 
opponents, but to their number must be added also the steadfast opposition of 
Germany’s princes – Catholic and Protestant alike – to the prospect of a renewed and 
strengthened empire, given that it was perceived that this could only occur at the 
expense of the princes’ autonomy. The Reformation and the demands for confessional 
pluralism it engendered provided a further principled justification for the preservation 
of princely autonomy in German states and principalities that had converted to 
Lutheranism. But even without this religiously inspired justification, Germany’s petty 
princelings perpetuated the centuries-long practice of exploiting the emperor’s 
external woes to extort further concessions in exchange for promises of financial and 
military support. In the context of the Reformation, the intramural struggle for power 
between empire and principalities would conspire with the waxing of external threats 
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to further hollow out imperial institutions, with the systemic side-effect of 
guaranteeing Europe’s permanent religious division.  
 In the struggle to preserve Christendom’s religious unity, the papacy occupied 
an unusual relationship vis-à-vis the Habsburgs, alternating in the roles of unreliable 
ally and opportunistic opponent. Given Charles’ steadfast commitment to the 
maintenance of Church unity, the papacy’s intermittent efforts to stymie Habsburg 
policy initially appear incongruous. Nevertheless, this sense of incongruity is partially 
mitigated once the long history of hostility that characterised papal-imperial relations 
from the High Middle Ages is acknowledged.  Within the Italian peninsula itself, the 
occasional willingness of the papacy to truck with Francis I and other local Habsburg 
opponents can be attributed to fears for the Papal States’ continuing autonomy should 
Charles secure unchallengeable hegemony within Italy.303  Following Francis I’s 
defeat at Pavia in 1525 and the imperial sacking of Rome in 1527, armed papal 
opposition to Habsburg power was largely forsaken.  But the papacy continued in the 
1520s and 1530s to resist Charles’s calls for the establishment of a general council of 
the Church to reform its institutions and heal Europe’s religious divisions, perceiving 
such initiatives as a latter-day manifestation of conciliarism and thus as a threat to the 
papacy’s position as the unchallengeable head of the Church.304  Despite sharing 
Charles’s hatred for heresy, the papacy’s Italian geopolitical interests and its hostility 
to outside calls for Church reform of the type advanced by Charles positioned it as an 
unlikely if intermittent opponent to the Habsburg cause. 
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 The foregoing survey of the Habsburgs’ opponents is far from exhaustive, 
omitting from consideration other important actors – most notably Henry VIII’s 
England – that oscillated between pro and anti-Habsburg positions as circumstances 
and the changing vagaries of dynastic self-interest directed. Nevertheless, the main 
lines of opposition to the Habsburg imperium have been made clear.  Within the 
empire itself, the emperor fought a losing battle against the attempts of local burghers 
and petty princelings, both Protestant and Catholic alike, to preserve and if possible 
expand their privileges at the expense of imperial authority. Across his western flank 
and above all on the Italian peninsula, Charles remained locked with the house of 
Valois in a fierce struggle for territorial aggrandizement and dynastic supremacy, a 
struggle in which the papacy’s Italian interests frequently saw it align with France in 
an effort to avoid Habsburg domination. And in both the Mediterranean and in the 
Balkans, the Habsburgs were forced to fend off the incursions of an ascending and 
expansive Ottoman empire at the peak of its power. Given the extent of its 
simultaneous involvement in multiple positional conflicts of power and prestige, 
Charles’ inability to achieve his political and religious goals is more easily understood.   
 In spite of sharing the Habsburgs’ hostility to heresy, Francis I and later Henry 
II were at the van of opposition to the Habsburg imperium, with the clashing dynastic 
interests of the Habsburg and Valois royal houses embroiling them intermittently in 
war from 1494-1559. While it would be both anachronistic and also giving them too 
much credit to claim that the Valois kings consciously constructed an elaborate 
alliance system to contain Habsburg power, the ad hoc agreements they engineered 
did have the effect of fatally dispersing and diluting the Habsburgs’ material strength 
at critical times. France’s cooperation with Turkey – first initiated following Francis 
I’s humiliating defeat and capture at Pavia in 1525 – appears to have originally been 
conceived as forming the south-eastern lynchpin of a broader strategy designed to 
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divert Habsburg attention and resources eastwards, in so doing enabling Francis I to 
re-take Milan and thereby strengthen his position in Italy.305 Ultimately, French 
designs in Italy were never realised, and direct Franco-Ottoman diplomatic and 
military cooperation was more fitful and less consequential than might have been 
hoped for by either party. This observation notwithstanding, the very threat of possible 
coordinated Franco-Turkish action compelled the Habsburgs to divide their resources 
across multiple theatres, thereby weakening the Habsburgs’ overall position by 
preventing them from bringing the imperium’s strength decisively to bear against any 
of their enemies.306  
In addition to dispersing and dividing the Habsburgs’ material power, the 
threat embodied in French and Ottoman geopolitical pressures also distracted and 
delayed Habsburg responses to the growth of Protestantism within the empire. In 1526 
and in the wake of the Turks’ triumph in Hungary at the Battle of Mohacs, Charles 
was forced to guarantee the security of the Lutheran faith within the empire in 
exchange for aid against the Ottomans.307 The Catholic German princes, distrustful of 
the papacy and keen for the moment to avoid the prospect of religious civil war within 
Germany, were equally able to demand a conciliar solution to the empire’s religious 
tensions as the price for their assistance against the Turk.308 In the short term, French 
and Ottoman pressures distracted the emperor from comprehensively dealing with the 
religious question in Germany, while simultaneously forcing him to grant concessions 
to the princes in exchange for their support against these threats. Such concessions 
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weakened the emperor vis-à-vis Lutheran and Catholic princes alike, diminishing the 
moral authority and institutional capacity of the imperial office further and making an 
imposed religious settlement ever less likely.   
Given the severity of the French and Ottoman threats, it was not until 1546 that 
the emperor was able to afford full attention to the settlement of religious differences 
within Germany, by which time Lutheranism had become ineradicably entrenched 
within the empire. Making matters worse, the French sought to further weaken the 
empire by providing diplomatic and financial assistance to the Schmalkaldic League, 
the collective defence union established by an assembly of Protestant cities and 
principalities in anticipation of a possible religious war within the empire.309 As with 
their alliance with the Ottomans, French attempts to exploit confessional divisions 
within Germany initially yielded less benefits than had been anticipated. Francis’s 
persecution of French Protestants inevitably aroused the suspicions of their German 
co-religionists, complicating attempts to establish an alliance. The growth of 
confessional rivalry within France from the Affair of the Placards onwards (1534) also 
resulted in serious divisions within the French court over the legitimacy of treating 
with heretics.  These divisions in turn produced indecision and led to a failure to 
support the Schmalkaldic League once war broke out within the empire in 1546-7, 
thus ensuring Charles’ victory over the League.310 Their religious differences with the 
Protestant princes notwithstanding, the French were subsequently able to exploit the 
princes’ political goals of maximizing princely liberty vis-à-vis the emperor to their 
mutual advantage.311 The French king Henry II’s invasion of Metz, Toul, and Verdun 
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in 1552, coordinated with an uprising of the Protestant princes led by Maurice of 
Saxony, ultimately compelled Charles to accept the permanence of religious division 
within the empire, paving the way for the conclusion of the Augsburg Peace in 1555. 
 
4.2.3 Failures of Leadership – Role Strains in the Papal-Imperial Diarchy and 
Christendom’s Collapse 
 
The intense geopolitical pressures imposed by Charles’ external enemies; the 
religious and political concessions extorted from the emperor by the German princes 
in exchange for their support; the willingness of these same princes to cooperate with 
the empire’s external enemies to maximize their own autonomy – each of these factors 
conspired to divide and disperse the empire’s resources and delay a resolution of 
religious controversies until the religious reunification of the empire was impossible.   
However, what further guaranteed Christendom’s dissolution was the absence 
of cooperation between emperor and pope as the secular and spiritual heads of 
Christianity.  As mentioned above, the papacy’s failure to support Charles’ bid to 
maintain Christian unity was motivated by a combination of geopolitical and 
institutional concerns. Geopolitically, the papacy’s conviction that Habsburg power 
threatened the security of the Papal States led the papacy to support Francis’ ambitions 
in Italy as a means of offsetting Charles.312 Following the failure of successive anti-
Habsburg coalitions in the 1520s and the 1527 sack of Rome by Habsburg forces, the 
papacy generally forsook armed opposition to the Habsburgs, deviating disastrously 
from this policy only briefly in 1555-8 under the pontificate of Paul IV.313 
Nevertheless, in keeping with both long-standing papal suspicions of imperial 
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ambitions and also the papacy’s hostility to any resurrection of conciliarism, the 
papacy proved reluctant to support Charles’ efforts to restore Christendom’s lost unity. 
Under the pontificate of Clement VII, the papacy proved intransigent in its resistance 
to imperial calls for a General Council to reform the Church.314 The papacy’s anti-
conciliar sentiment, reinforced by their early underestimation of the threat posed to the 
Church by the spread of Lutheranism in Germany, worked against an early resolution 
of religious controversy within the empire.315  Even following Clement’s death and the 
belated realisation that a General Council was necessary, the papacy continued to 
place its interests ahead of the Church, delaying the council and then stymieing its 
progress until the gap between Catholics and Protestants was unbridgeable.316 The 
papacy’ s withdrawal of its offer of troops to support the emperor in his struggle 
against the Schmalkaldic League, an action taken when the League possessed more 
troops and the outcome of the war was far from certain, constitutes a final example of 
the depth of distrust between pope and emperor, a distrust that further doomed 
Christendom’s prospects for survival.  
In the absence of the papacy’s political support and moral leadership as the 
universally recognized head of the Church, Charles’ bid to reconstitute Christendom 
under the Habsburg sceptre was bound to fail. Nevertheless, a consideration of the 
underlying reasons for this failure to collaborate gives us one final insight into the 
dynamics of Christendom’s collapse. Both papacy and empire remained vital 
institutions in the sixteenth century, invested with considerable power and legitimacy 
and both deeply threatened by the prospective break-up of Christendom’s spiritual 
unity. Both institutions nevertheless proved incapable of attracting the legitimacy 
necessary to effectively respond to the threat of systemic ideological schism when it 
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presented itself.  This failure can ultimately be sheeted home to the phenomenon of 
‘role strain’, referring simply to the inability of actors to effectively manage the 
tensions and inconsistencies arising from their possession of multiple roles within the 
same social system.317  In the instance of the papacy, the pope’s role as Christendom’s 
spiritual leader co-existed uneasily with his status as ruler of a second-tier power on 
the Italian peninsula, while in the case of the emperor, his role as the anointed secular 
Sword of the Church competed with his identity as the head of but one of many 
competing dynastic empires extant in early modern Europe.  
 In order to have discharged their responsibilities effectively, and thus secured 
the possibility of Christendom’s renewal after the shock of the Reformation, both pope 
and emperor would have needed to cooperate both with each other and with 
Christendom’s other powers. This challenge in turn would have required these actors 
to reconcile the perceived tensions in their different social roles as the respective 
spiritual and secular guardians of Christendom on the one hand, and self-interested 
worldly powers on the other.  As it was, the papacy’s successful efforts to preserve the 
Papal States’ independence by corroding the power of the empire from the thirteenth 
century onwards profoundly inhibited the emperor’s ability to fulfil his divinely 
ordained role as Christendom’s protector once the Reformation broke.  Equally, 
Charles’ self-interested insistence that religious reunification required Christendom’s 
political unification guaranteed the opposition of Christendom’s other rulers, 
generating a series of confrontations that both scotched Charles’ imperial plans and 
                                                 
317
On the notion of role strain, see Bruce Cronin. "The Paradox of Hegemony: America's Ambiguous 
Relationship with the United Nations." European Journal of International Relations 7, no. 1 (2001): 
103-30. See specifically pp.104-105. While Cronin developed the concept of role strain to capture the 
specific tension between the United States’ parochial interests as a great power and its international 
responsibilities as a hegemon, I would argue that his insights pertaining to role strain and the tensions it 
evokes are of more general application, and are evident also in the underlying reasons explaining the 
papal-imperial diarchy’s failure to preserve Latin Christendom in the face of the Reformation.   
 
 173
guaranteed Christendom’s enduring division. In this failure to manage their respective 
internal role strains or to collaborate with each other, one witnesses the last failure of 
the quintessentially medieval papal-imperial diarchy, and with it, the passage of the 
international order of Latin Christendom into oblivion.   
   
4.3 The Peace of Augsburg, the Failure of the Imperial Alternative, and the 
Collapse of Latin Christendom 
 
On September 25, 1555 the Peace of Augsburg was proclaimed within the empire, 
signifying an acceptance by emperor and estates of the principle cuius regio, eius 
religio, and with it an acceptance of the empire’s permanent religious division 
between Catholics and Lutherans. In the same year, Charles abdicated from his 
positions of responsibility, dividing his massive inheritance between his brother 
Ferdinand and his son Philip, and thus confirming both the permanent separation of 
the Spanish and Austrian Habsburg lines and the final end to his dreams of European 
imperium.318  A combination of geopolitical consolidation, institutional decay, and 
growing ideological dissent had already fatally weakened Christendom in its late 
medieval heteronomous guise. With the onset of the Reformation, the residual 
normative unity of Christendom was finally shattered, but for a brief period there lay 
open the possibility of a reconstitution of Christian unity around the Habsburg 
imperium. Nevertheless, in retrospect, the failure of this imperial alternative seems 
both inevitable and over-determined. While possessing a material resource base 
greater than anything seen since the days of the Roman empire, the Habsburg 
imperium was far-flung and lacked either the sense of unity or the shared institutions 
necessary to mobilize these resources for the cause of preserving Christendom’s unity. 
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Additionally, the enormity of the Habsburg possessions evoked fear and resentment 
among a multitude of enemies, whose combined efforts were sufficient to divide and 
disperse Habsburg energies and distract the emperor from the task of confronting the 
Lutheran heresy until the breach from Rome was irreparable. In an increasingly febrile 
atmosphere conditioned by dynastic rivalry and confessional division, the institutional 
weaknesses of the imperial office vis-à-vis the estates became further aggravated, 
while the centuries-long mistrust between pope and emperor prevented the emergence 
of an ideologically unified leadership capable of successfully reforming the Church 
and healing the religious schism. 
 The Peace of Augsburg marked the decisive collapse of West-Central 
European religious unity, and with it the redundancy of the legal framework of canon 
law that had previously mediated Europe’s conflicts.  This collapse was made possible 
by the actions of the Habsburgs and their enemies, but was undergirded by more 
fundamental structural changes relating to the growth in violence interdependence and 
the creeping breakdown of normative unity in Christendom, macro-processes that had 
long been evident and that would intensify further in the decades immediately 
following Latin Christendom’s collapse. For while the Augsburg Peace represents the 
tombstone of Latin Christendom, it in no way signifies the birth certificate of a 
modern European state system. Instead, with the final collapse of Europe’s religious 
unity, West-Central Europe was to be thrust into a brutal state of Hobbesian 
‘immature’ anarchy, with polities unshackled from the constraints of a heteronomous 
order but yet to be corralled by the ordering mechanisms of a fully formed sovereign 
state system. Within this disordered systemic context, the same processes of growing 
violence interdependence and ideological polarization that had destroyed Christendom 
would soon accelerate rather than abate, plunging Europe into another century of 
division and bloodshed. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ANARCHY WITHOUT SOCIETY – EUROPE AFTER 
CHRISTENDOM AND BEFORE SOVEREIGNTY 
 
A False Dawn 
 
With the conclusion of the Peace of Augsburg and the signing of the Peace of 
Cateau-Cambrésis four years later between the Valois and Habsburg crowns, the 
possibility of a return to some semblance of order in West-Central Europe 
momentarily presented itself. The Augsburg peace, in officially recognizing the 
empire’s permanent religious division between Lutherans and Catholics, constituted 
an explicit acknowledgement that Christendom’s spiritual unity was lost beyond 
recall.  Equally, while the terms of Cateau-Cambrésis naturally favoured the Habsburg 
victors, the division of the Habsburg patrimony between the dynasty’s Spanish and 
Austrian lines removed the immediate possibility of reconstituting international order 
in Western Europe in an imperial form.  With the struggle between Europe’s two 
mightiest crowns momentarily in abeyance, and with both dynasties united alongside a 
revived post-Tridentine Church in their determination to eradicate heresy, the 
prospects for stability seemed promising. 
 As it eventuated, the period between Cateau-Cambrésis and the Peace of 
Westphalia would prove one of exceptional violence and ideological ferment, with the 
prior breakdown of Christendom’s spiritual unity and its ordering institutions paving 
the way for a protracted descent into Hobbesian anarchy.  While the Augsburg Peace 
established an uneasy truce between Germany’s warring confessions, elsewhere the 
hardening of confessional allegiances triggered a wave of religiously inspired revolts 
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from the 1560s onwards. In that decade alone, the spread of militant Calvinism fuelled 
revolts against monarchical authority in France, Scotland and the Low Countries, with 
English and Spanish rulers also being compelled to suppress rebellions by their 
respective Catholic and Muslim minorities.319  Rulers throughout Europe struggled to 
balance the competing imperatives of enforcing religious conformity and maintaining 
civil peace, with this task made more difficult by the ease with which rebels could 
solicit support from opportunistic neighbouring rulers and internationally dispersed 
networks of co-religionists. The political and religious ambitions of the Habsburgs and 
the fears these ambitions evoked meanwhile sustained a resumption of international 
warfare made more destructive by the continuing unfolding of Europe’s first military 
revolution. The culmination of these tendencies in the Thirty Years War – Europe’s 
most bloody and devastating conflict prior to World War I – symbolized in the starkest 
possible manner the institutional and moral breakdown of order that afflicted Europe 
in the century after Christendom, but before the advent of a society of sovereign states.  
 Whereas the purpose of the previous chapter was to analyse the institutional 
disintegration of Christendom as a viable international order, this chapter is dedicated 
to an exploration of the moral breakdown of order that followed in Christendom’s 
wake.  An analysis of Europe’s century of disorder is warranted because the chief 
drivers of Christendom’s breakdown did not abate but rather dramatically intensified 
in the decades following Christendom’s collapse. The extreme violence and intense 
ideological antagonism that are characteristic of a breakdown of normative consensus 
expressed themselves most acutely only after Christendom had definitively 
disintegrated and Europe stood bereft of ordering institutions.  Consequently, a 
consideration of the century between Augsburg and Westphalia is valuable for two 
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reasons. Firstly, it illuminates the magnitude of the disorder unleashed by 
Christendom’s demise, and secondly it provides the context for understanding the 
intellectual and cultural innovations that made possible the eventual return to order 
under the umbrella of a sovereign international society. 
 The following analysis proceeds in three sections. Section one outlines the 
structural features of the European international system after 1560 that lent themselves 
towards protracted disorder, as well as the dislocative forces that actively fuelled this 
disorder.  Section two considers the French Wars of Religion and the Thirty Years 
War as pivotal conflicts that encapsulated in their causes and course the broader 
symptoms of disorder characteristic of the period, as well as generating innovations 
that provided the intellectual foundations upon which a new international order was 
eventually built. Section three concludes with a review of Westphalia’s significance as 
an embodiment of the larger series of compromises that reconciled Europe’s rulers to 
the transformed ideal and material context bequeathed by the forces of Reformation 
and military revolution, thereby permitting a return to order after Europe’s century of 
chaos.   
 
5.1 The Centre Cannot Hold – Europe in the Immediate Aftermath of 
Christendom’s Collapse 
 
5.1.1The Immediate Structural Context 
 
Any comprehension of Europe’s chaotic inter-regnum must begin with the 
recognition that Europe’s polities at the time dwelled within an international system 
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but not within an international society.320 Certainly, Europe’s elites continued to 
subscribe to a common Latin-speaking high culture, although as the era progressed the 
printing press strengthened the development of vernacular languages and cultures and 
accelerated Europe’s cultural fragmentation. Equally, Europe’s polities remained 
ensnared within the transnational kinship webs of the nobility, while continuing 
commercial expansion had yet to radically transform the rigidly hierarchical and 
inegalitarian social structures characteristic of these polities.321  Offsetting these 
structural continuities, the onset of the Valois-Habsburg wars had spurred the 
extension of the Italian institution of resident ambassadorial diplomacy to the trans-
Alpine powers, establishing a rudimentary institutional framework upon which a 
European sovereign state system could potentially be built.322 The sixteenth century 
had also seen monarchs’ continuing arrogation of power to themselves, with rulers 
invoking the language and Roman legal concepts of the imperial office to support their 
claims towards jurisdictional supremacy within their own realms.323 
 Despite the increasing authority with which rulers asserted their supremacy 
within their own realms, and despite also the embryonic spread of a Continental 
network of resident ambassadors, neither the modern concept of sovereignty nor its 
accompanying principles of mutual recognition or non-intervention had been properly 
articulated by mid-century.324  This under-articulation of the constitutive norms of a 
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sovereign state system might at first seem trivial. After all, it would superficially seem 
reasonable to suggest that the explicit articulation of such norms is secondary to state 
practice, and that for purposes of classification it is immaterial whether or not actors 
explicitly recognized such principles provided their conduct towards one another 
practically resembled what one would expect of actors dwelling in a sovereign state 
system.  Unfortunately, this disregard for dissonances between norms and practice 
does not stand up to empirical scrutiny. Regardless of their superficial resemblances 
with modern sovereign states, Europe’s composite monarchies did not interact with 
one another as sovereign states, but rather engaged in practices of systematic mutual 
intervention and reciprocal destabilization. In the decades following Christendom’s 
collapse and the foreclosure of the Habsburg imperial alternative, it was the very 
failure of Europe’s rulers to formulate coherent and mutually respected norms for co-
existence that fuelled the endemic instability that defined the era. While mid-sixteenth 
century Europe was thus endowed with the institutional forms of a sovereign state 
system – in the form of aggressively centralizing ‘state-like’ entities and an expanding 
network of resident ambassadors – these forms lacked the necessary normative content 
(e.g. norms of mutual recognition, territorial exclusion, and non-intervention) needed 
for a sovereign international order to crystallize. 
 Despite its superficial resemblances to a sovereign state system, the sixteenth 
century European international system thus operated without a recognition of the 
bedrock principles of co-existence upon which a genuine sovereign state system is 
based. In the absence of such principles, new ordering institutions that were congruent 
with a sovereign state system and that might conceivably have replaced the defunct 
institutions of Christendom were unable to coalesce. Consequently, Europe’s polities 
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found themselves suspended in a prolonged state of ‘immature anarchy’, wherein a 
structural condition of anarchy obtained but in which the European international 
system lacked even the most basic ordering institutions or principles of co-existence 
necessary to corral conflict within manageable bounds. This absence of ordering 
institutions and principles of co-existence would play an important facilitative role in 
enabling the endemic violence that bedevilled Europe during this period. 
 In addition to the absence of ordering institutions and codified principles to 
regulate co-existence at a systemic level, the fragility of Europe’s constituent polities 
also contributed to the highly conflict-prone character of international relations at this 
time. As their direct antecedents, it is unsurprising that Europe’s composite 
monarchies are often anachronistically characterised as modern sovereign states by 
international relations scholars.  Nevertheless, despite the terminological 
inconvenience, I use the more generic term of polities here to describe the composite 
monarchies of this period, in deference to the distinctive structural characteristics that 
distinguished them from sovereign states. Of these characteristics, one of the most 
significant was the degree of mutual inter-penetration of composite monarchies owing 
to their enmeshment within transnational aristocratic kinship webs. Throughout the 
sixteenth century, Europe’s dynasties continued to be entwined within a complex 
continental web of genealogical ties, their relations undergirded by a shared corpus of 
feudal laws regulating rights to marriage, inheritance and (to a lesser extent) dynastic 
succession. By the very nature of proprietary dynasticism, this interlocking lattice of 
kinship ties horizontally integrated Europe’s composite monarchies in ways that find 
no analogue in the era of the territorially enclosed modern sovereign state. The great 
advantage of such inter-connectedness, as demonstrated in the Habsburgs’ sudden rise 
to near-hegemony, was the opportunity it provided for rulers to engage in processes of 
rapid dynastic territorial accumulation through mechanisms of marriage and 
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inheritance. The chief disadvantage of such a system was that cross-polity aristocratic 
kinship ties provided actors also with in-built influence vectors for destabilizing 
neighbouring rivals, as well as supplying ready conduits for the speedy transition of 
political shocks and subversive ideological influences between polities.   
 Europe’s composite monarchies were also distinguishable in the relative 
weakness of governments’ direct infrastructural power, a weakness that owed strongly 
to their embededness within an intensely stratified and inegalitarian social milieu 
dominated by the institution of aristocratic patronage. Throughout Europe, patronage 
networks linked wealthier and more powerful patrons with poorer and less powerful 
clients in asymmetrical relations of benevolence and obedience.325 These networks – 
suffused with the rhetoric of friendship and kinship – formed primary loci of collective 
identification and mobilization for Europe’s warrior aristocrats, and were only 
partially and imperfectly subject to monarchical influence. Writing on the internal 
balance of power between monarchs and the aristocracy in early modern polities, 
David Kaiser goes as far as to argue that ‘aristocratic networks of influence and 
patronage were the basic units of early modern politics’.326  Any order that monarchs 
were able to contrive within their kingdoms was provisional and dependent upon their 
ability to integrate the various aristocratic factions into their own patronage networks 
and balance with and against competing factions as the need arose.327  Rather than 
governing above faction, monarchs governed through faction, relying on imperial 
strategies of divide and rule to maintain hegemony within their respective domains.328  
When these strategies failed, a possibility that was particularly likely whenever the 
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monarchy appeared to be weak, the risk of factional infighting and a rapid collapse of 
central authority loomed large.329   
Finally, and despite monarchs’ growing capacity to extract and mobilize the 
wealth of their kingdoms for use in war, the hastily constructed armies they deployed 
were typically assembled and commanded by notoriously autonomous nobles fighting 
chiefly to maximize their own power and prestige.330 Even in Valois France, which 
had in 1445 been the first entity since the fall of the Roman empire to construct the 
nucleus of a standing army, the monarchy came nowhere close to enjoying a 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force within its territory.  Instead, rulers were 
continuously forced to contend with over-mighty subjects and their attendant armed 
retinues, with monarchs pressed to alternatively employ either patronage or the 
countervailing power of other factions to rein in the higher nobility’s political and 
territorial ambitions.331 That the leadership of monarchs’ armies was largely drawn 
from the ranks of the higher nobility further constrained the utility of royal armies as 
instruments of internal repression, thus severely limiting rulers’ ability to coercively 
enforce their writ throughout their territories.332    
 The distinctive characteristics outlined above rendered early modern Europe’s 
polities exceptionally fragile creations that bear only superficial resemblances to the 
sovereign states that succeeded them. As with sovereign states, composite monarchies 
faced the dangers of external attack, dangers made all the more acute both by the 
incipient military revolution and also by the susceptibility of Europe’s distribution of 
territorial patrimonies to rapid and unpredictable change on account of the vagaries of 
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dynastic marital diplomacy. In addition to this external threat, however, rulers were 
simultaneously forced to engage in internal power-balancing to maintain their 
ascendancy over aristocratic patronage networks, networks that intermittently 
challenged royal power, but that also served as the indispensible media through which 
rulers exerted indirect rule over their territories. Further complicating rulers’ efforts to 
consolidate their power was the enmeshment of composite monarchies within 
transnational aristocratic webs described above, a characteristic that left these polities 
peculiarly exposed to subversive and destabilizing influences communicated through 
cross-polity kinship ties.333  
  Scholars have frequently favoured the billiard ball analogy in describing the 
allegedly self-enclosed and hard-shell rimmed character of the early modern sovereign 
state. Given its fragile composition, a more useful metaphor to describe the early 
modern composite monarchy might be to conceive of it as a ball of twine, a loose 
bundle of aristocratic social relationships held together by bonds of kinship, marriage 
and patronage. To further extend the metaphor, one can imagine cross-polity kinship 
ties as loose threads that if pulled by external enemies with sufficient force and 
dexterity could precipitate the catastrophic unravelling of targeted polities.  The ball of 
twine metaphor is admittedly clumsy, but it nevertheless captures the frailty of early 
modern composite monarchies and their vulnerability to subversion, as well as 
illustrating the formidable strategic challenges faced by rulers in preserving their 
patrimonies and consolidating their power.  
 The frailty of European polities and the absence of systemic ordering 
institutions and principles of co-existence contributed to an exceptionally volatile 
strategic environment in the aftermath of Christendom’s collapse.   While Europe was 
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neither heteronomous nor imperial in its organization, neither had it stabilized as a 
viable sovereign state system at mid-century. Certainly, the spread of networks of 
resident ambassadors enabled rulers to contrive ever more elaborate tactical alliances 
and grand strategies for realising their dynastic ambitions.334  But in the absence of 
agreed principles for co-existence, and in light also of the fragile nature of Europe’s 
constituent polities, the situation remained fundamentally unstable. In light of these 
considerations alone, it may have taken an indefinite time for Europe to evolve into a 
functioning sovereign state system. However, with the further sharpening of Europe’s 
religious divide and the progressive unfurling of a revolution in the Western way of 
warfare, the task of constructing a new international order became infinitely more 
complicated.  
 
5.1.2 Systemic Dislocative Pressures I - Confessionalization 
 
Far from abating in the years after Augbsurg, the normative breakdown of 
Christendom intensified in the century’s second half, plunging the continent into a 
prolonged ideological conflict.  The ideological uniformity that had once characterised 
Christendom had already broken down with the emergence of Lutheranism and later 
Calvinism, but the divisions between the confessions became more embittered, more 
intractable, and more institutionalized over time. Following its initially lackadaisical 
approach to reform, the Church at last embraced the need for action through a raft of 
doctrinal and institutional changes agreed at the Council of Trent. These reforms 
clarified the Church’s theology, distinguishing it definitively from both Protestant 
heresies and also from a plethora of popular religious practices deemed inconsistent 
                                                 
334
Ibid., p. 57. 
 185
with the Church’s teachings.335 Armed with this new orthodoxy and strengthened by 
both internal institutional reforms and the formation of new religious orders (most 
notably the Jesuits), the post-Tridentine Church constituted a far more formidable 
vehicle through which to ‘re-Christianize’ Europe than had previously existed.336  
Moreover, with the last sessions of the Council being conducted under the shadow of 
religious civil war in France, the Church became newly energized in its commitment 
to purging heresy from Christendom and advancing its salvation mission. 
 Following the victory of confessional pluralism in the empire and magisterial 
‘top down’ reformations in Scandinavia, Lutheranism tended towards political 
quiescence, even as it remained steadfast in its theological estrangement from the 
Church. Conversely, Calvinism emerged from the 1550s onwards as a dynamic, well-
organized and implacable enemy of Catholicism. To the established Protestant 
propositions disputing the theology and authority of the Roman Church, Calvin added 
the notion of predestination, arguing that only a very few souls were predestined for 
salvation, and that mortals had no way of knowing in advance whether they were 
among the saved or the reprobate.337 Irrespective of whether or not they were to be 
saved, Calvin further insisted that all mortals were compelled to obey God’s laws 
through their voluntary subjection to rigorous physical and spiritual discipline.338 At 
an organizational level, Reformed churches were to be ruled and spiritual discipline 
enforced through local consistories jointly governed by Geneva-trained clerics and 
elders drawn from the congregation.339 These consistories in turn would be linked to 
Geneva via an ascending hierarchy encompassing regional colloquys of pastors, 
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provincial synods, and national synods.340 The rigidity and intensity of Calvinist 
doctrine, the intense self-discipline demanded of its adherents, the cellular 
organization of Reformed churches, and the implacable hostility of Geneva towards 
the idolatrous practices imputed by it to Roman church – each of these elements 
together rendered Calvinism a formidable adversary to the Church and its allied rulers. 
 The domestic and international political struggles of the mid-sixteenth century 
thus occurred against the backdrop of a poisonous ideological polarization between 
Rome and Geneva, with both poles demonstrating intense hostility towards 
Lutheranism as well.  As noted earlier, the consolidation of confessional identities 
carried with it powerful and paradoxical consequences for Europe’s rulers. Heinz 
Schilling’s characterisation of the confessional age as the ‘warm up’ period for 
modernity emphasizes the nexus he perceives between confessionalization and state 
formation in the decades following the Peace of Augsburg.341 Through this reading, 
modernization of the Catholic, Calvinist and Lutheran Churches (encompassing 
doctrinal modernization and proselytisation as well as organizational reform) became 
intimately connected with rulers’ attempts to construct unified, disciplined societies of 
subjects.342  This connection between confessionalization and state formation was 
manifest in the dramatic growth of church/state collaboration in the indoctrination, 
education and moral supervision of rulers’ subjects during this period, a process that 
irrevocably tightened the affective and institutional bonds linking rulers and ruled.343  
The confessionalization thesis has been criticized for its association with the 
structural-functionalist assumptions of modernization theory. Some period specialists 
have also questioned the theory’s applicability for cases beyond the lands of the Holy 
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Roman Empire.344 These criticisms notwithstanding, the theory’s recognition of the 
increased de-differentiation of church and state during the confessional age is both 
generally recognized and deserving of special emphasis. This is because the 
institutional de-differentiation of church and state encouraged throughout Europe an 
increasing identification of religious heresy with political treachery. Thus, while the 
increasing sacralization of political authority superficially enhanced the power of 
rulers, attempts to coercively impose confessional conformity invited resistance 
justified in explicitly religious terms. Where previously rebellious subjects were 
content to invoke the authority of established custom in justifying their defiance of 
rulers, the period after 1560 witnessed the formulation of radically novel theories of 
resistance that justified rebellion and even the deposition of established rulers as a 
divinely mandated imperative.345 Even in cases where rulers favoured conciliation 
rather than coercion as the preferred means of dealing with religious dissenters, such 
policies frequently courted confrontation with the devout, thereby imperilling the 
social unity such policies had initially sought to preserve.  
In spite of – or perhaps because of – the religious divisions opened up by the 
Reformation, faith remained the essential foundation of social unity and the 
indispensable buttress of political authority in the confessional age. Augustinian 
notions regarding the divinely ordained character of the temporal authorities resonated 
throughout the sixteenth century, as did the equation of religious uniformity with 
political and social stability. Religion continued to be conceived in relation to an 
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embodied community of believers rather than referring to a privately held body of 
beliefs or doctrines. Consequently, religious dissent was perceived as an intolerable 
threat to both temporal peace and spiritual salvation.346 The continuing centrality of 
faith to the legitimacy of kings and the unity of the body social thus ensured a 
polarization of sympathies and a breakdown of domestic and international order as 
confessional divisions sharpened in the years following Augsburg and Cateau-
Cambrésis. 
Ideologically, confessional conflict thus polarized Europe around competing 
confessional blocs, situating even localized conflicts within a broader narrative of 
spiritual struggle that resonated throughout the European international system. The 
fissiparous tendencies called forth by confessional division threatened the unity of 
kingdoms, the health of the body social, and the strength of man’s relationship to God, 
disturbing temporal peace and imperilling both individual and collective spiritual 
salvation. Such was the magnitude of the perceived threat posed by heresy that the 
rhetoric of confessional conflict became rapidly suffused with the imagery and 
indefeasible religious imperatives of Holy War. Prior to the Reformation, Europeans 
had largely reserved the language and practices of total moral exclusion for infidels 
living beyond Christendom’s borders, and, less consistently, for Jews living within 
Christendom. Europe’s wars of religion by contrast were distinguished by the 
interjection of the Holy War tradition into relations across the sectarian divide.347 
Political and social conflicts between rulers and ruled and dynastic geopolitical 
competition continued to simmer during this period. But now the added overlay of 
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religious rivalries encouraged actors to conceive of these rivalries in absolute terms, 
imbuing them with a larger significance as the mundane expressions of a more 
profound cosmic struggle between the forces of God and Satan.  To an already volatile 
environment, confessionalization added the accelerant of sentiments of absolute 
enmity, qualitatively heightening actors’ security anxieties and further contributing to 
generalized disorder. 
 
5.1.3 Systemic Dislocative Pressures II -The European Military Revolution 
 
While processes of confessionalization introduced deep ideological 
antagonisms into the fabric of early modern international politics, the roughly 
coterminous unfurling of Europe’s first military revolution dramatically increased the 
destructive scale of the ensuing conflicts. The role played by increases in violence 
interdependence in destroying Christendom has already been discussed in chapter 
four. As the sixteenth century progressed, Europe’s geopolitical environment would be 
further transformed by a congeries of technological and organizational changes that 
built upon previous innovations, and that are collectively referred to by period 
specialists as the ‘military revolution’.  
 Within the context of this inquiry, the early modern military revolution 
(c.1550-1660) is taken to refer to the following inter-related phenomena. At the 
technological level, the military revolution was punctuated by the ascendancy of 
artillery fortresses, massed musket-wielding infantry, and broadside-firing battleships 
as the chief instruments of violence within the European international system.348 
Organizationally, the military revolution manifested itself in a dramatic growth in the 
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size of armies, as well as a pronounced shift in their character. With the military 
revolution, the ramshackle hosts of an earlier era gave way to permanent standing 
armies comprised of systematically drilled and disciplined soldiers trained and led by 
a professional officer class.349 The unprecedented costs involved in establishing and 
maintaining such forces in turn forced shifts in rulers’ strategies of resource 
mobilization, giving rise to the consolidation of permanent taxation and the 
development of sovereign debt as key features of government.350 The pressures of 
intensified resource mobilization cumulatively generated radical revisions in the 
institutional structures mediating relations between rulers and ruled. These revisions 
typically produced dramatic and lasting increases in governments’ extractive and 
administrative powers over subject societies.351  Finally, at its end point, the military 
revolution contributed to the development of new legitimating frameworks for 
governments, with the enhanced powers of government finding domestic justification 
through reference to notions of sovereignty, and international legitimacy though 
reference to the imperatives of raison d’etat.352 
 Considered over the long term, the military revolution contributed heavily to 
the centralization of political power in composite monarchies, the crystallization of 
identifiably modern states, and the birth of a European sovereign state system. 
Conversely, in the short to medium term the military revolution exerted immensely 
disruptive and decidedly ambiguous effects for Europe’s rulers. At the systemic level, 
the immediate effect of increases in the cost, scale and destructiveness of warfare was 
to intensify actors’ sense of vulnerability to external attack, thus elevating security 
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anxieties and further raising the likelihood of international war. Within polities, the 
mobilizational strains induced by the increased costs of war strained relations between 
rulers and ruled in an atmosphere already suffused with religious tensions.353  
Additionally, given the weak infrastructural power of early modern governments, the 
costs of warfare invariably exceeded rulers’ abilities to pay, forcing them to adopt 
short-term expedients that further magnified the socially dislocative effects of war.354 
Thus, for example, in the Thirty Years War, rulers’ tendency to field far larger armies 
than they could possibly support forced commanders to engage in the systematic 
plunder of occupied populations, thereby massively increasing the devastation 
wrought by the conflict.355 
 Finally, for all of their long-term centripetal consequences, the innovations 
wrought by the military revolution did not immediately favour rulers decisively over 
rebels.  Thus, the intractability of France’s Wars of Religion owed in part to the 
entrenched position of the Huguenot rebels, who were installed in a network of 
formidable rebel artillery fortresses concentrated in the country’s South and West.356  
Similarly, it was the Dutch rebels that first introduced systematic drilling and the 
inculcation of a battle culture of forebearance into the training of infantrymen, 
innovations that enabled them to perfect infantry musketry volleys far earlier than 
their more powerful Spanish opponents.357 Once it was consummated in the post-
Westphalian period, the military revolution favoured political centralization and 
geopolitical consolidation. But during Europe’s century of chaos, its effects were more 
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uneven, tending to diffuse unprecedented destructive capabilities to rulers and rebels 
alike. 
 
5.1.4 Europe’s Century of Chaos – A Reprise and a Preview 
 
 The foregoing survey of the forces that defined Europe’s century of chaos has 
been necessarily extensive. I have argued that Europe in the aftermath of 
Christendom’s demise possessed an international system – comprised of state-like 
entities and endowed with an expanding network of resident ambassadors – but not an 
international society. While Europe possessed many of the institutional precursors of 
what would later emerge as a modern state system, it lacked either the minimal 
ordering institutions or principles of co-existence necessary for a stable international 
order to emerge. Europe’s composite monarchies remained embedded within 
transnational genealogical webs and beholden to the vagaries of dynastic marital 
diplomacy. Additionally, rulers’ powers within their patrimonies were limited by the 
influence of aristocratic patronage networks only imperfectly subject to monarchical 
control. Within this unsettled environment, confessionalization and the military 
revolution added poisonous religious division and the diffusion of capacities for 
destruction on an unprecedented scale.  It was in the context of this fusion of 
fanaticism and firepower that Europe’s century of chaos unfolded.  The literature on 
this period is voluminous and a comprehensive analysis of the era cannot be 
undertaken here. Instead, the French Wars of Religion and the Thirty Years War will 
be briefly considered, both to illustrate the dynamics of disorder that characterised the 
period, and also to illuminate the intellectual and cultural innovations that these 
conflicts called forth, and that laid the foundations of the Westphalian state system. 
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5.2 Into the Dark Valley – Europe’s Century of Chaos, 1559-1648 
 
5.2.1 The French Wars of Religion, 1562-1598 - The Main Lines of the Conflict 
 
On 28 June, 1559 King Henri II of France was mortally wounded in a 
celebratory joust to mark the conclusion of the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis. His death 
twelve days later, and the effective transfer of power to his widow Catherine de 
Medici and a shifting constellation of aristocratic factions, paved the way for France’s 
descent into decades of civil war and religious violence.  Between 1562 and 1598, 
France was wracked by no less than eight civil wars fuelled by a mixture of 
aristocratic factional rivalry, religious fanaticism and international dynastic 
competition. Given the complex interplay of political and religious motives driving the 
protagonists, attempts to characterise the French Wars of Religion as being driven 
exclusively by matters of faith or faction are of limited value.  Rather, the nature of 
these wars as expressions of Europe’s broader crisis demands an appreciation of the 
multiple and entwined motives that made these conflicts both so intense and so 
intractable.  
 That noble factional rivalries were so central to France’s religious wars is 
unsurprising given the centrality of aristocratic patronage networks as loci of loyalty 
and vehicles for collective action during the sixteenth century. At one level, the wars 
constituted a tri-polar struggle between the houses of Guise, Bourbon and 
Montmorency for power and for influence over Catherine de Medici and her sons, the 
rightful heirs to the throne. Each of the three houses maintained extensive patronage 
networks and independently disposed of great power in the regions they respectively 
dominated – the Bourbons in the South and West, the Guise in the East and in 
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Normandy, and the Montmorency in central France.358 The monarchy’s lack of 
infrastructural power made it heavily reliant on the assistance of the great families in 
projecting its writ throughout the kingdom. Equally, however, the prosperity and 
prestige of the great noble houses was partially dependent upon their proximity to 
royal power, given the king’s status as primus inter pares and his position as the 
central dispenser of patronage.359 During the prolonged period of royal weakness 
following Henri II’s death, the three noble houses were thus locked in a bitter zero-
sum competition for influence over Catherine and her sons. Equally, for the Valois 
heirs, the age was marked by repeated and forlorn attempts to reassert the crown’s pre-
eminence over the factions as a requisite for restoring lasting peace to the kingdom.  
 The situation in France after 1559 would have been volatile even without 
religious controversy, given the intensity of factional rivalry, the weakness of the 
crown and the ease with which the competing factions could recruit large numbers of 
soldiers recently demobilized following the end of the Italian wars.  Nevertheless, the 
spread of Calvinism throughout France – and particularly among the higher nobility, 
forty percent of whom were at one point converts to the Huguenot cause – explosively 
intensified pre-existing factional divisions.360  Under the leadership of the house of 
Bourbon, the Huguenots demanded the right to worship freely and in accordance with 
Calvinist doctrine, arguing that their religious non-conformity was in no way 
inconsistent with their duties of obedience to the crown. After the Massacre of Saint 
Bartholomew and the extermination of much of the Huguenot leadership, a 
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reconciliation with the crown no longer seemed imaginable, and Huguenot 
propagandists henceforth forged a theory of resistance to monarchical authority 
comprising an amalgam of customary, constitutionalist and religious justifications.361 
Opposing the Bourbons, the Guise household, incidentally enjoying a near-monopoly 
on appointments within the Gallican Church, led the struggle to enforce conformity 
and relentlessly pressured the king to fulfil his coronation oath of extirpating heresy 
from the kingdom.362  From 1584, as it became obvious that Henri III would die 
without heir and that the crown would likely pass to the Huguenot Henri of Bourbon, 
ultra-Catholic Monarchomachs under Guise leadership themselves embraced the cause 
of resistance for the larger goal of keeping the kingdom free of heresy. 
 That sectarian hatreds overlapped with factional cleavages provides some 
insight into the nature of France’s religious wars, but it should not be inferred that 
religious questions were of purely instrumental importance to the protagonists. On the 
contrary, the de-differentiation of church and state characteristic of the confessional 
age made questions of religious conformity of supreme importance not only to 
France’s aristocratic warlords, but also to the broader populace as well. For while the 
formula cuius regio, eius religio had been officially imposed as a solution to the 
problem of religious pluralism only within the Holy Roman Empire, de facto 
recognition that spiritual uniformity was synonymous with political and social 
harmony obtained throughout Europe. For the Catholic majority, for whom faith 
constituted the essential glue holding society together, Huguenot non-conformity 
represented a spiritual pollutant that threatened the unity of the body social and 
                                                 
361On Calvinist resistance theory, see generally Skinner, Foundations of Modern Political Thought, pp. 
225-239. 
362On the Guise households near-monopoly on appointments to the Gallican church, see Kaiser, Politics 
and War, p. 50.   
 196
demanded eradication.363  Equally, sectarian hostility violently expressed itself also in 
localities where Huguenots managed to secure the ascendancy, their public advocacy 
of religious toleration notwithstanding. The religious passions that animated France’s 
civil wars were intense, heartfelt and rooted in popular assumptions about the 
relationship between the sacred and the social worlds, and found their expression not 
merely in aristocratic factional warfare, but also in repeated waves of confessional 
cleansing aimed at restoring religious uniformity through the annihilation of heretical 
beliefs and heretical believers. 
 International dynastic competition constituted the third driver of France’s civil 
wars.  The drawn-out eclipse of its erstwhile peer competitor naturally benefited 
Habsburg Spain, and Philip II’s sponsorship of the both the Guise faction and the 
militant Catholic League was motivated as much by a desire to perpetuate French 
weakness as it was to eradicate the Huguenot heresy.364  Similarly, the limited support 
Elizabethan England afforded the Huguenots from 1585 was the product of equally 
mixed motives. With the French crown prostrate and the danger looming of a Spanish-
influenced and League-dominated puppet regime establishing itself in northern 
France, support for the Huguenots was dictated as much by dynastic concerns to stave 
off Spanish hegemony as it was by sympathy for England’s co-religionists.365  The   
collapse of Valois France – hitherto one of Christendom’s two superpowers -radically 
altered the strategic environment confronting Europe’s rulers, opening up a power 
vacuum in the heart of Western Europe and amplifying Spain’s power vis-à-vis other 
polities in so doing. In the absence of principles of non-intervention, dynastic 
geopolitical ambitions and anxieties thus combined with sympathy for co-religionists 
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to draw external powers into a series of interventions that further prolonged France’s 
agonies and exacerbated the ensuing carnage.  
  
5.2.2 Herding Cats in a Tornado - The French Wars of Religion as an Expression of 
Systemic Disorder 
 
The multiple motives that drove the French Wars of Religion illuminate the 
broader complexities underpinning Europe’s century of chaos. Confessional conflict 
interwove with factional rivalries and international dynastic competition without either 
subsuming or being subsumed by these pre-existing conflict vectors. Considerations of 
factional advantage or dynastic aggrandizement were not banished from actors’ 
strategic calculations by Europe’s ideological polarization. But sectarian divisions did 
inject a level of venom into these conflicts that made attempts at mediation and 
reconciliation exceptionally difficult to effect. For the duration of the French wars, the 
Valois household sought unsuccessfully to manage these passions through oscillating 
strategies of coercion and conciliation directed towards the Huguenot minority. The 
failure of both of these strategies not only illustrates the weakness of central authority 
in France at the time, but also provides an insight into the nature of the larger 
environment within which Europe’s wars of religion played out.   
 Throughout France’s wars, the Huguenots pressed the king to grant them 
freedom to worship in selected Calvinist enclaves in exchange for their obedience, 
with these liberties to be underwritten by the maintenance of armed Huguenot 
strongholds within these safe havens.  Catholics by contrast held equally firmly to the 
maxim un roi, une foi, une loi, and identified any concession to the Huguenots as an 
invitation to disunity and a betrayal of the king’s sacred obligation to eradicate heresy. 
Given the irreconcilability of these positions, Catherine initially sought to transcend 
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sectarian positions by cultivating a bi-confessional basis of support for the crown 
based on the nobility’s common bonds of traditional fealty to the monarch.  However, 
from 1572 onwards, amidst continuing factional intrigue and in the shadow of growing 
Huguenot influence over the young king Charles IX, the Valois court lurched towards 
a strategy of repression that culminated in the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre. The 
massacre in Paris and accompanying pogroms throughout the country eliminated 
much of the Huguenot leadership, terrified thousands of converts into returning to the 
Catholic Church, and permanently arrested the spread of Calvinism throughout the 
higher nobility.366  Nevertheless, in spite of the crown’s short-term tactical successes, 
the strategic goal of restoring peace to the realm remained unmet, with the newly 
radicalized Huguenots fighting on to extort enduring religious and political 
concessions from the crown in the 1598 Edict of Nantes.   
 The Huguenots’ durability in the face of savage repression is explicable by 
reference to three factors that speak more broadly to the weakness of early modern 
polities and to the absence of international order in late sixteenth century Europe. 
Firstly, Huguenot resilience can be explained by reference to both the trans-polity 
character of their support base, as well as the mobilizational structures they were able 
to construct by synthesizing the strengths of aristocratic patronage networks with those 
of a bureaucratically organized and internationally oriented system of church 
government.  From the outset, the Huguenots enjoyed ideological and organizational 
ties to confessional allies beyond France.  Ideologically, the Huguenots drew their 
inspiration from the Godly Commonwealth established by Calvin in Geneva. A 
protestant French exile, Calvin’s life-long mission was the evangelization of his 
homeland, and in the precociously developed printing industries of Geneva and Berne 
he found an ideal vehicle through which to direct a steady stream of theology and 
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propaganda to prospective converts in France.  Throughout France’s wars of religion, 
Geneva served as the Calvinist movement’s spiritual and intellectual epicentre, a 
position that had been confirmed through the establishment there of an academy for 
training and despatching Calvinist missionaries as early as 1559.367 
 It was from missionaries trained at the Genevan Academy – many of them 
native Frenchmen - that the Huguenots derived much of their ecclesiastical and 
intellectual leadership. As part of a conscious strategy of proselytisation, the Academy 
had also successfully targeted for conversion members of the French high nobility, in 
the understanding that upon converting a noble would usually bring with him his 
networks of clients and dependents.368  In pursuing this strategy, the Huguenots were 
able to construct a highly effective apparatus of rebellion that synthesized the 
ideological and intellectual power of an internationally trained cadre of clerics with 
the military power and experience of converted noble families. This dualistic character 
of the Huguenot leadership found its expression also in the hybrid organizational form 
of French Calvinist networks.  The elaborate web of kinship ties and patron-client 
relationships within which Huguenot nobles were enmeshed provided a powerful 
source of political and military power that they routinely tapped throughout the Wars 
of Religion.369 Overlaying this informal structure lay a structure of church 
government, developed under Geneva’s guidance, that organized France’s scattered 
Calvinists under a governance structure comprising a national synod, provincial 
synods, regional colloquys of pastors, and local churches with accompanying 
consistories.370  This hybrid organizational structure - built upon a foundation of pre-
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existing kinship and patronage networks and fortified by an internationally sponsored 
modular form of Church organization – provided the Huguenots with a formidable 
mobilizational infrastructure throughout France’s religious wars. 
 To the inherent organizational advantages mentioned above, the Huguenot 
cause was aided further by the absence of norms of non-intervention, and France’s 
pervasive permeation by aristocratic ties linking it to other polities. Both the lack of a 
norm of non-intervention and the interconnectedness of France to other polities 
ensured foreign involvement in France’s religious wars, including the provision of 
sympathy and support for the Huguenot cause.  Thus, for example, from the 1570s, the 
Huguenots enjoyed a symbiotic relationship with Dutch Calvinist rebels revolting 
against Philip II in the Spanish Netherlands, with familial connections (by marriage 
rather than blood) between the Huguenot leader Coligny and the Dutch rebel leader 
William of Orange working to further fortify pre-existing religious sympathies 
between the two rebel movements.371  Equally, both Huguenot and Dutch rebels also 
received intermittent assistance from Elizabethan England and Palatinate.372 Such 
assistance was neither as comprehensive as devout Calvinists would have wished, nor 
was it provided purely in the spirit of confessional solidarity, with reasons of state 
playing at least as significant a role in Elizabeth’s assistance to the Huguenots as 
enthusiasm for the Protestant cause.373 This qualification notwithstanding, 
international assistance in the form of soldiers, subsidies, sanctuary for exiles, and 
occasionally even direct military support was far from insignificant, and further 
fortified Huguenot resolve in the face of royal power. 
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 Finally, the Huguenots also benefited from the opening stages of the military 
revolution, which in France initially favoured rebels over rulers. Despite the advances 
in political centralization realised by Europe’s renaissance monarchies, the aristocracy 
continued to exercise a collective monopoly on the use of violence in the sixteenth 
century, and great noble houses such as the Bourbons could summon significant 
coercive power by tapping in to their extensive networks of clients.374  However, by 
the onset of the French wars, the nobility were additionally able to recruit and field 
larger armies than before by exploiting the burgeoning market for mercenary armies 
then extant throughout Europe. The commercialization of military violence originated 
in northern Italy in the fourteenth century, but by the mid-sixteenth century the 
market’s epicentre had shifted to Switzerland and southern Germany.375 The chief 
consequence of this development was that France’s feuding private armies were no 
longer limited in size or destructive potential by the resources inhering in aristocratic 
kinship and patronage networks. Instead, resources indigenous to France could now be 
augmented by resources derived from an international mercenary market, thereby 
prolonging the conflict and magnifying its destructive consequences.  
 Not only did the ongoing commercialization of military violence 
indiscriminately aid rebels as well as rulers, but the Huguenots additionally benefited 
from the sixteenth century revolution in fortress design that had yielded the virtually 
impregnable trace italienne artillery fortress. Throughout the ‘Huguenot crescent’ of 
South-Western France, Calvinism endured after the St. Bartholomew’s massacre in so 
small part due to the formidable defensive advantages conferred by the rebels’ 
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possession of a string of fortified towns and artillery fortresses.376 The existence of 
this archipelago of fortified positions provided the Huguenots with critical territorial 
footholds, which in the most famous instance (La Rochelle) could be continuously 
supplied by sea with the help of an international network of sea-borne co-
religionists.377 Consequently, in spite of a string of indecisive battlefield victories, 
neither the monarchy nor the militant Guise faction could overcome the Huguenots 
entrenched positions, making outright military victory and the forcible imposition of 
confessional conformity throughout France impossible. 
  For the foregoing reasons, the strategy of repression failed to resolve France’s 
domestic turmoil. Conversely, however, for similar reasons, a strategy of conciliation 
with the Huguenots also proved difficult to implement. For the duration of the conflict, 
the Catholic majority opposed any concession to the Huguenots as a concession to 
heresy and a sin against God. In Catholic propaganda, Huguenots were characterised 
as ‘unclean’ spiritual pollutants, to be cleansed from the body social through sacredly 
mandated purgative violence. Thus, a Leaguer propagandist enjoined his co-
religionists to the indiscriminate slaughter of Huguenots, arguing that French unity 
could be restored only by ‘cutting off this rotten member whose stench has infected, 
infects, and will infect, if it is not completely separated from the others…’378  With the 
unity of the body social imperilled by heresy, Christianity’s preoccupation with the 
struggle between the forces of God and Satan was now recruited to the task of 
legitimizing violence against confessional enemies. The institution of Crusade, an 
institution that had formerly deflected violence outwards from Christendom, was now 
turned inwards to devastating effect.379 Previously, aristocratic violence within 
                                                 
376 Black, Kings, Nobles and Commoners, pp. 48-49. 
377
Ibid., p. 49. 
378Dalia M. Leonardo. ""Cut Off This Rotten Member": The Rhetoric of Sin, Heresy and Disease in the 
Ideology of the French Catholic League." Catholic Historical Review 88, no. 2 (2002), pp. 252-3. 
379On this point, see for example Housley, Religious Warfare in Europe, pp. 196-198. 
 203
Christendom had been corralled, however imperfectly, by the constraints of just war 
doctrine and by the broader religious injunctions against violence articulated by the 
Church.  But in the heat of confessional rivalry, these ethical constraints dissolved, to 
be substituted by an ethos of Holy War that mandated the use of unlimited violence 
against demonized and dehumanized confessional Others380.   
 The intractability of sectarian hostilities emboldened the Guise and their clients 
to implacably oppose all royal attempts to negotiate a politique compromise to the 
conflict. In effect, the divine imperative of opposing heresy provided an unassailable 
normative justification for noble defiance of royal authority. As with the Huguenots, 
ultra-Catholics additionally possessed independent capacities for mobilization that 
under-wrote their attempts firstly to thwart royal attempts at a politique compromise, 
and secondly to resist the prospective ascendancy of the Protestant Henry de Bourbon 
after the last Valois king died without heirs in 1589. In 1576, and again from 1584 
onwards, this opposition to Calvinism assumed the form of the Catholic League, 
which drew its leadership from the Guise, but in its second incarnation broadened its 
social base to include members of the middle and lower classes.381  Like the Huguenot 
networks, the League cohered around existing structures of collective action, 
specifically around aristocratic kinship and patronage networks but also around parish 
churches and the religious confraternities affiliated with artisans’ guilds.382  Unlike the 
Huguenots, however, the League’s radicalism ultimately expressed itself in the 
formation in Paris of a precociously modern party apparatus, one that in the last of 
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France’s religious wars briefly instituted a theocratic reign of terror in the capital 
under the authority of a revolutionary Committee of Public Safety.383 
 Ultra-Catholics enjoyed along with their Huguenot adversaries a surfeit of 
international connections that strengthened their will and capacity to resist royal 
attempts to placate the Huguenots with concessions. Throughout its existence, the 
League drew its spiritual inspiration from Rome and remained heavily dependent upon 
the Spanish Habsburgs for financial and military support, a dependence that merely 
increased with the parallel growth in foreign sponsorship of the Huguenots by 
England, Geneva, and Palatinate.384 The conclusion in December 1584 of the Treaty of 
Joinville between the League and Philip II, in which both parties resolved to assist one 
another in preserving the Catholic character of the French monarchy and in extirpating 
heresy from both France and the Spanish Netherlands, provides a particularly stark 
illustration of both the power of France’s internationally allied religious factions and 
their accompanying private armies, and the inability of the French crown to effectively 
discipline same.  With the death in 1589 of Henri III and the imminent succession of 
the Protestant Henri de Bourbon as his nearest legal heir, the alliance between French 
ultra-Catholics and foreign entities became only more pronounced, and manifested 
itself in sustained military interventions by Catholic powers to scotch Henri’s disputed 
succession.385 The facility with which local ultra-Catholics were so able to tap the 
resources of the international Counter-Reformation in prosecuting their conflicts 
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against both Huguenots and crown provides further insight into the obstacles impeding 
a politique solution to France’s conflicts.    
 Given the notorious independence of France’s well-armed and internationally 
allied aristocratic factions, and given also the chaotic international environment of 
confessional schism and dynastic intrigue within which France’s civil wars unfolded, 
the task of reining in the factions and restoring monarchical power and civil peace to 
France can be likened to trying to herd cats in a tornado. To the challenges of 
governing through rather than above aristocratic faction confronted by all Renaissance 
monarchs, the Reformation and the military revolution added the centrifugal 
influences of unbridgeable confessional division and the diffusion of enhanced 
destructive capabilities to rulers and rebels alike. Added to this, the absence of norms 
of non-intervention and the presence of ties of blood and belief linking factional 
warlords to foreign allies ensured the rapid escalation, internationalization, and 
prolongation France’s internal conflicts. With Christendom vanquished and the 
prospect of a Habsburg imperium also foreclosed, any successor order in Western 
Europe was always likely to take the form of a sovereign state system. Nevertheless, 
in order for this transition to occur, robust sovereign states would need to be built, a 
task that required the prior imagining of sovereignty as a social construct. The 
anarchic conditions confronting France’s monarchs in the late sixteenth century hardly 
provided a propitious context for state building. But these very same conditions 
provided an ideal context for the development of the conceptual foundations upon 
which the Absolutist state would subsequently be assembled.  
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5.2.3 The Birth of Sovereignty and the end of the French Wars of Religion 
 
With Henri of Bourbon’s politique conversion to Catholicism in 1594 and his 
subsequent granting of limited toleration to Huguenots with the 1598 Edict of Nantes, 
France’s seemingly interminable religious civil wars were brought to a close. While 
France did not remain free from internal religious violence in the seventeenth century, 
the French monarchy’s new found strength proved sufficient to prevent a recurrence of 
the anarchy that had punctuated the dying decades of the Valois dynasty.  Indeed, so 
comprehensively did France recover from the religious wars that within a century a 
concert of powers would only narrowly defeat Louis XIV’s bid to secure a hegemonic 
position within the European state system. At the heart of this transformation in 
French fortunes lay a revolution in the conceptualization of religious and political 
power, one that would undergird the formation of a new order firstly within France 
and then subsequently throughout Europe as a whole. 
 The ideological revolution was of course Jean Bodin’s formulation of a 
recognizably modern theory of state sovereignty.  While royal propagandists had long 
drawn from principles of Roman law to assert that the king acts as emperor within his 
own realm, it was in Bodin’s writings that modern notions of sovereignty first receive 
systematic expression.  Bodin’s notion that there can be no order without an orderer, 
and that that orderer must be absolute in their authority, was in hindsight an 
understandable response to the turmoil characteristic of the French wars. Nevertheless, 
the timeliness of Bodin’s theory should not detract from either its novelty nor from its 
enduring significance. In the context of this inquiry, the implications of Bodin’s theory 
for prevailing conceptions of the law, violence, and religion, and the relationships of 
each to monarchical authority deserve particular attention. Turning firstly to law, 
Bodin’s conception of sovereignty was distinguishable by its emphasis on the 
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centrality of legislative power as the constitutive act that defines the sovereign.386 
Whereas previous conceptions of monarchical power had placed great emphasis on the 
crown’s adjudicatory function, Bodin instead invested law-making as the defining 
prerogative of the sovereign.387 The sovereign in Bodin’s theory was said to replicate 
in his law-making powers God’s creative role in ordering the universe out of chaos by 
the exercise of divine command.388  
 Bodin’s conception of law as sovereign command was critical as a principled 
attack on theories of mixed government that had been exploited by Huguenots and 
Leaguers alike in justifying rebellion against the crown.  In investing sole legislative 
power in the Absolute sovereign, Bodin’s theory wrong-footed the justifications 
previously advanced by feuding aristocrats in subverting the monarchy and plunging 
France into civil strife.  While the sovereign was obliged to act within the confines of 
custom, divine natural law and the fundamental customs of the kingdom, the 
unprecedented arrogation of law-making powers to the crown under Bodin’s theory 
necessarily carried weighty implications also for the control of violence within and 
beyond the kingdom. Bodinian sovereignty did not directly call for the monarch’s 
monopolization of the means of violence, but the ordering function of the sovereign 
implied a harnessing of aristocratic violence towards the realisation of the sovereign’s 
will.  Given the crucial centripetal role assigned to the sovereign power by Bodin, 
neither feudal ‘self-help’ nor confessional ‘Holy War’ justifications for aristocratic 
violence could be admitted where such prerogatives clashed with the sovereign’s 
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objective of maintaining political and social order.389 In this regard, Bodinian 
sovereignty provided a crucial ideological justification for rulers’ rationalization and 
centralization of coercive power once Europe’s religious wars ended.  
 Finally, Bodin’s theory of sovereignty opened the way for a politique 
reformulation of the relationship between religion and political authority. Bodinian 
sovereignty drew upon existing sacerdotal conceptions of kingship, stressing the 
divinely ordained character of the monarch.390 However, in identifying the 
maintenance of social order as the sovereign’s raison d’etre, Bodinian sovereignty 
permitted a reassessment of the formerly automatic identification of religious dissent 
with political treason. Certainly, the politique thinkers who followed Bodin and who 
rationalized the crown’s accommodation of the Huguenots in no way embraced 
religious toleration as a positive ideal, preferring to regard it instead as a regrettable 
(and hopefully temporary) expedient necessitated by the overriding requirement of 
securing the civil peace.391  But in locating sovereignty in the will of the monarch and 
in identifying submission to the sovereign’s will as the subject’s primary moral 
obligation, Bodin at least admitted the possibility of the existence of the loyal and 
obedient heretical subject. In so doing, Bodin’s theory of sovereignty anticipated the 
reconceptualization of religion – from an embodied community of believers to a 
privately held body of beliefs – that would ultimately enable the genesis of a sovereign 
state system and with it a resolution to Europe’s century of crisis. 
 None of the foregoing is intended to imply that Bodin’s theory was by itself 
was sufficient to bring an end to France’s wars of religion. Still less do I seek to 
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suggest that Absolutist theory unproblematically begat corresponding practices and 
institutions.392  In reality, monarchical sovereignty was only finally consolidated in 
France with the crushing of the Fronde, and even then it was only in the decades 
following the Fronde’s suppression that the Bourbon kings were able to give 
Absolutist theory an imperfect institutional expression.  Nevertheless, Michael 
Walzer’s observation, that the state ‘…must be personified before it can be seen, 
symbolized before it can be loved, imagined before it can be conceived…’ remains 
apposite here.393  With the formulation in France of a modern theory of sovereignty – 
a development that arose as a direct response to the chaotic turmoil of the French 
religious wars – the first lineaments of a successor international order for Europe 
begin to be discernible. Tragically, it would require a catastrophe of even greater 
magnitude before the construct of sovereignty could be fully elaborated and 
redeployed as an ordering arrangement at a systemic level.  
 
5.2.4 The Thirty Years War, 1618-1648 
 
Much like the French Wars of Religion, the causes of the Thirty Years War 
have been the subject of considerable debate within the specialist literature. 
Traditional interpretations of the conflict stressed its German and religious character. 
The war was thus portrayed as essentially a contest between an aspiring Absolutist 
Counter-Reformation monarch (Ferdinand III) and a coalition of German princes 
fighting to preserve and if possible extend their religious and political liberties, with 
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opportunistic outsiders weighing in on either side to advance their own agendas.394  
More recent analyses have conversely emphasized the European character of the 
conflict and accorded greater primacy to dynastic over religious motives in animating 
the protagonists. N.M. Sutherland has thus disputed the ‘fictitious unity’ of the Thirty 
Years war, going so far as to portray it as merely the most violent manifestation of a 
centuries-long struggle between France and Spain for European hegemony.395 The 
literature on the ‘General Crisis’ of the seventeenth century provides yet a third 
interpretive lens for comprehending the conflict.  This perspective emphasizes the 
common causes of Eurasia’s crises of authority in this period, stressing the importance 
of adverse climatological changes, reduced crop yields and over-population in 
catalysing political revolt throughout the Eurasian ecumene.396  Although this last 
perspective is the most general in its application, it nevertheless serves as a useful 
reminder that the Thirty Years War constituted but one expression of a larger crisis 
that was hemispheric in its geographical scope.397 
 Fortunately, it is not necessary for the purposes of this analysis to adjudicate 
between these frameworks. In reality, the conflict was sufficiently complex that it can 
only be adequately understood by briefly canvassing all dimensions – German and 
religious, European and dynastic, Eurasian and climatological cum eco-demographic – 
that are emphasized in these contrasting narratives. Turning firstly to the German 
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dimension of the conflict, the clash between Ferdinand and the princes bears 
resemblances to the earlier struggle for power between Charles V and the princes 
waged almost a century earlier. This parallel is to be expected, given the continuing 
deterioration of imperial institutions in the decades following the Augsburg peace, 
together with the range of outstanding disputes flowing from that settlement.  For 
while the Augsburg peace bought Germany over six decades of peace, it failed to 
resolve many of the religious and constitutional issues dividing the empire. Although 
the emperor retained nominal suzerainty over the approximately 1000 territories 
constituting the ‘Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation’, effective territorial 
jurisdiction (landeshoheit) resided with the burghers, bishops and princes of 
Germany’s petty states and cities.398 Admittedly, these petty states existed under a 
penumbra of shared imperial institutions – the Circles, responsible for regional 
defence; the Supreme Court, charged with adjudicating disputes between rulers; and 
the Diet, responsible for approving taxation and legislation for the whole empire.399 
But the effectiveness of these weak institutions had been further enervated with the 
accumulation of religious tensions in the empire after Augsburg.  In recognizing the 
principle cuius regio, eius religio, the Augsburg peace had strengthened processes of 
confessionalization already extant in Germany’s petty states, with popular loyalties 
and social practices becoming increasingly governed by the dogma, rites, norms and 
laws formulated and policed by integrated state-church complexes.400 By the 
seventeenth century, categorical and mutually antagonistic Lutheran, Calvinist, and 
post-Tridentine Catholic identities had thus become deeply ingrained within 
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Germany’s social fabric, impeding the operation of imperial institutions and 
imperilling the prospects for continued peace. 
 The interlocking processes of petty state formation, intensified social 
disciplining, and confessionalization facilitated by the Augsburg peace enhanced 
political and cultural integration within Germany’s constituent territories, but at the 
expense of promoting further political and cultural disintegration within the empire as 
a whole. In this respect, the Augsburg peace contained the seeds of its own 
destruction, even without considering the emperor’s refusal to extend toleration to 
Calvinism within the empire. From the 1600s onwards, the Catholic states’ dominance 
of the Supreme Court and Diet – and their determination to use these instruments to 
protect the interests of Catholic subjects in Protestant territories – triggered further 
estrangement between the emperor and the Protestant princes.401 Without adequate 
constitutional means of venting their grievances, the Protestants (under the leadership 
of Frederick of the Palatine) established a collective self-defence league – the 
Evangelical Union – in 1608, a move mirrored in 1609 by the formation of a 
counterpart Catholic League under the leadership of Maximilian of Bavaria.402 From 
this point onwards, a renewal of religious war in Germany was already likely, an 
outcome that was further assured with the election of the Jesuit-trained Ferdinand III 
to the imperial dignity in August 1619.  By the time of Ferdinand’s election as 
emperor, the ‘defenestration of Prague’ – the initial catalyst for the war – had already 
occurred. With Ferdinand’s election to the throne, the familiar collision between a 
centralizing emperor and an intransigent coalition of princes anxious to preserve or 
extend their religious liberties played itself out again, only with far greater intensity 
and for far longer than had been the case in the time of Charles V. 
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 The intramural constitutional struggle between emperor and princes provided 
the immediate context for the war and its proximate trigger, but the conflict was 
entwined also within a larger international struggle between the Habsburg bloc and its 
rivals.  Geoffrey Parker observes that by the early 1600s, the European political 
landscape had become polarized between a Counter-Reformation axis – dominated by 
Habsburg Spain and encompassing Madrid, Brussels, Munich, Vienna and Rome – 
and a heterogeneous coalition united by little more than their opposition to Habsburg 
power.403  Once again in an echo of the past, France would ultimately emerge as the 
Habsburgs’ most formidable rival. Nevertheless, this would occur only after a period 
of equivocation during Louis XIII’s minority, and then only after the defeat of 
renewed Huguenot rebellions and Cardinal Richelieu’s assertion of foreign policy 
dominance over the ultra-Catholic devots faction at Louis’ court.404 Alarmed at 
Ferdinand’s initial triumphs over the German Protestants, first Denmark and then 
Sweden intervened in the German war both to defend Lutheranism and advance their 
own geopolitical interests in the Baltic basin and in Germany.405 Finally, the Thirty 
Years War was punctuated by a resumption of the war between Spain and Holland, 
with the Dutch successfully harrying Spain both in Europe and in the New World.406    
 The motives of the Habsburgs’ opponents during the war were manifold. For 
the French, dynastic power political interests clearly trumped any devotion to the 
cause of Catholicism, and the policies of Richelieu (and later, Mazarin) were firmly 
directed towards enhancing Bourbon power at the expense of their Habsburg rivals.407 
For the Scandinavian powers, the fear that Ferdinand might seek to roll back 
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Protestantism in Germany mixed with more prosaic geopolitical concerns in 
motivating their respective interventions into the German war.408 In the case of 
Sweden at least, initially defensive considerations gave way to more ambitious plans 
for extending Sweden’s political influence deep into Germany as the war 
progressed.409 For the Dutch, Protestant sympathies with their German co-religionists 
were far from negligible, but the Hague’s primary interest lay in weakening Spain and 
thus guaranteeing Holland’s continued independence.410  
On the Habsburg side, and in spite of their familial connections, the Spanish 
and Austrian Habsburg lines were by no means a united force. Ferdinand’s interests 
lay squarely in Germany, and both his disposition and his Jesuit upbringing 
predisposed him towards intransigence when dealing with Germany’s religious and 
constitutional problems.411  Conversely, while the Spanish Habsburgs under Philip IV 
were sympathetic to Ferdinand’s desire to advance the cause of the Counter-
Reformation, their interests in the larger conflict were largely geopolitical. Foremost 
among Spanish priorities was the realization of an adequate settlement in the Low 
Countries, something that required the maintenance of Spain’s lines of march and lines 
of communication between her north Italian possessions and the Spanish Netherlands 
(the so-called ‘Spanish Road’).412 Given the Spanish Road’s vulnerability to French 
interdiction and given also the road’s passage along the empire’s crumbling frontiers, 
the Spaniards possessed strong geopolitical motivations for securing Ferdinand’s 
power within the empire. For with Habsburg power restored within the empire, the 
Spanish expected to be then better placed to sustain the vital umbilical cord linking the 
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northern and Mediterranean portions of their patrimony, improving their chances of 
reclaiming Holland and thus preserving Spain’s reputation and power.413  
 The Thirty Years War thus constituted a German religious and constitutional 
conflict embedded within a larger and more enduring struggle for power between the 
Habsburg family conglomerate and its many rivals. These inter-twined conflicts were 
themselves anchored within a larger hemispheric crisis of political authority, driven by 
institutional frailties intersecting with the climatological cum eco-demographic factors 
alluded to previously.  Between 1450 and 1600, it is estimated that Europe’s 
population may have doubled.414  This demographic expansion reflected generally 
buoyant economic conditions throughout the Eurasian ecumene, and paralleled also 
processes of political consolidation manifest across the hemisphere during this 
period.415 Conversely, from the late 1620s onwards the European economy 
experienced a severe cyclical downturn. This downturn was disastrously exacerbated 
by climatological changes (the so-called ‘Little Ice Age’) that brought declining 
temperatures, reduced harvesting times, lower crop yields and ultimately a reduction 
in Europe’s food supply.416 Coming at a time of pervasive conflict, when rulers were 
already lifting taxes and debasing currencies in an effort to mobilize a greater 
percentage of resources from stagnant or shrinking economies, this exogenous shock 
precipitated a chain of crises throughout Eurasia. In Europe alone, the 1640s witnessed 
revolts or revolutions in Scotland, Ireland, England, France, Portugal, Spain, Sicily, 
Naples, Austria, the Polish Commonwealth and Muscovy.417 Further afield, the celali 
revolts in the Ottoman empire, the collapse of the Ming dynasty in China, the rebellion 
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against Mughal power in India and even the Kyushu rebellion in Japan betray through 
their very synchronicity the broader Eurasian dimension of the crisis that roiled 
Europe at the time of the Thirty Years War.418 
 The impact of the Eurasian ‘General Crisis’ on the course of the Thirty Years 
War should not be overstated – the war began prior to the onset of the crisis, and the 
main impacts of the crisis were to further destabilize an already volatile environment. 
Nevertheless, the compounding effects of the ‘General Crisis’ were far from 
negligible, and their inclusion provides a broader context in which to examine the 
turmoil afflicting both Germany and Europe at this time.  To summarize: the 
proximate catalysts for the Thirty Years War lay in constitutional and religious 
controversies within Germany, the origins of which lay in tensions between the 
imperial office and princely particularism left unresolved by the Augsburg settlement. 
This conflict in turn was located within a more protracted struggle between the 
Habsburgs and their adversaries for pre-eminence in Europe, a struggle made more 
bloody and more intractable by the absence of an international order in Europe for a 
century following Christendom’s collapse. The bloodshed and chaos generated by this 
conflict was itself amplified by roughly synchronous climatic cum eco-demographic 
changes of global scope, changes that interacted with existing institutional frailties and 
the pressures of war to trigger large-scale crises of authority across Eurasia.  
 The Thirty Years War can thus be characterised as a series of nested crises 
encompassing German, European, and Eurasian dimensions. A full comprehension of 
the conflict requires an acknowledgement of the forces operative at these micro, meso, 
and macro levels of analysis.  However, as the focus of this inquiry lies at the meso 
(i.e. European) level of analysis, the remainder of this discussion will concentrate on 
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the Thirty Years crisis as both an expression of the absence of international order and 
a catalyst for its eventual reconstruction. 
 
5.2.5 The Thirty Years War as a Symptom of Systemic Chaos 
 
This discussion is not the place for an extensive narrative of the course of the 
Thirty Years War, and the main contours of the crisis have already been sketched in 
their broad form.419 Generally, however, the conflict can be divided into two halves. In 
the first half, battlefield victories predominantly accrued to the imperial side. The 
Bohemian revolt was quickly crushed, Frederick of Palatinate was evicted from 
Bohemia and dispossessed of the Palatinate, and the Danish intervention in support of 
Germany’s Protestants was quickly vanquished.420 The high tide of imperial power 
was marked by Ferdinand’s 1629 Edict of Restitution, in which he demanded the 
restitution of all lands illegally taken from the Church since the Augsburg peace.421  
The indiscriminate enforcement of this edict against all Protestant states – regardless 
of whether or not they had remained loyal to Ferdinand throughout the preceding 
decade of violence – firmed the resolve of anti-Habsburg forces, encouraged foreign 
interventions in support of the Protestants, and thereby contributed to the Habsburgs’ 
eventual containment and defeat.422  
Under Gustavus Adolphus’s leadership, the Swedes carved deep into southern 
Germany, realising greater gains than their enemies had feared or their allies had 
desired.423  The Dutch meanwhile held the Spanish at bay and undercut their position 
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abroad, further squeezing Habsburg finances and thus curtailing their military 
power.424 Following a brief Habsburg resurgence at Nordlingen in 1634, the French 
directly entered into the conflict upon multiple fronts, further hastening the 
Habsburgs’ defeat.425 As German princes began to negotiate separate peaces with the 
occupying foreign powers, Ferdinand’s position became untenable. When it was 
finally concluded in 1648, the Peace of Westphalia ended the Eighty Years War 
between Holland and Spain by officially recognizing the former’s independence. It 
additionally ended the Thirty Years War in Germany, further institutionalizing 
religious pluralism within the empire, confirming the prince’s liberties, and 
indefinitely postponing the consolidation of an Absolutist state in Germany. Most 
importantly, while it failed to settle the struggle between Bourbon France and 
Habsburg Spain, the Westphalian peace did mark a definitive conclusion to Europe’s 
international wars of religion and the beginning of the Absolutist age.426  
 The Peace of Westphalia was of vital importance in creating the climate 
necessary for the reconstruction of an international order of sovereign states after a 
century of turmoil.  Nevertheless, in order to apprehend the true significance of the 
peace, it is first necessary to revisit the chaotic milieu out of which it emerged. Like 
the French religious wars that preceded it, the Thirty Years War reflected in 
microcosm the broader absence of international order afflicting Europe after 
Christendom’s collapse. The conflict, Europe’s bloodiest prior to the two world wars, 
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occurred during a half century (1600-1650) of war and revolution, one in which 
Europe knew not one year without international conflict.427 
 In the absence of a shared framework for mediating and containing conflicts, 
the Thirty Years War demonstrated the same tendencies towards internationalization 
as had the French religious wars, only for a longer period and with a greater number of 
actors involved. In the absence of norms of territorial exclusion, mutual recognition 
and non-intervention, the conflict within Germany was not able to burn itself out, but 
was rather continuously fuelled and prolonged through fresh injections of troops and 
subsidies by foreign powers.  Domestically, the institutional and social strains 
produced by war-time mobilization and eco-demographic crisis precipitated a chain of 
revolts and revolutions across Western Europe in the war’s final decade, with 
Europe’s governments buckling under the burden of sustaining ever larger armies 
engaged in continuous warfare. Meanwhile, within the empire itself, the collapse of 
viable governance structures is most starkly brought into relief by a consideration of 
the parasitism of the approximately 1500 private military entrepreneurs who sustained 
themselves through the systematic rapine and plunder of occupied populations.428    
Most crucially of all, the war represented a breakdown in moral order, with 
ingrained sectarian hatreds interacting with the surge in private military violence to 
produce a style of warfare dominated by scorched earth tactics and the calculated use 
of terror and atrocity to subdue civilians.  The 1631 sack of Magdeburg, in which three 
quarters of an estimated 30,000 inhabitants were slaughtered and most of its buildings 
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razed by marauding imperial armies, constitutes but one instance of the pervasive and 
largely indiscriminate violence that characterised the Thirty Years War.429 With 
chivalric norms long since fallen into desuetude, sectarian hatreds and the spirit of 
Holy War till live, and modern laws of war yet to be formulated, the violence that 
convulsed Europe during this period raged largely in the absence of effectively 
institutionalized ethical restraints. In the conflict’s later stages in particular, the war in 
Germany became progressively unmoored from its original religious and political 
rationales, with increasingly autonomous military entrepreneurs devoting themselves 
exclusively to a form of institutionalized banditry against occupied civilians 
committed on a mass scale.   
In the Thirty Years War, one thus finds the symptoms of Europe’s overarching 
crisis of order – a surge in war and revolutions, the breakdown of existing authority 
structures, ideological schism and the collapse of constraints on the exercise of 
violence – manifesting themselves on an unprecedentedly large scale. As with the 
French Wars of Religion, the underlying sources of this turmoil can be found in the 
intersection of ideological polarization and increased violence interdependence, 
occasioned respectively by religious schism and military revolution.  Similarly, the 
absence of an ordering framework to mediate and contain conflict between polities 
played an analogous role in the Thirty Years War as it did in the French Wars of 
Religion.  Nevertheless, for all their commonalities, it would be misleading to read the 
Thirty Years War as simply a replication of the French Wars of Religion on a larger 
scale. For while ideological polarization and increased violence interdependence were 
pivotal in framing both conflicts, the roles played by these pressures were distinct in 
both cases. Similarly, while the absence of an ordering framework played a permissive 
role in enabling the prolongation of both conflicts, the mere fact that the Thirty Years 
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War was a general European conflict ensured that its structural consequences would 
prove more profound. 
 Turning firstly to the role played by confessional enmities in the Thirty Years 
War, religious controversies obviously remained central to the war’s course and 
conduct. The war’s origins in the Bohemian revolt lay in the regency government’s 
encroachments on the religious and constitutional liberties of the Bohemian estates, 
and the estates’ rebellion against the emperor was explicitly justified in religious as 
well as constitutional terms.430 The combustible environment in Germany at the war’s 
outset and the war’s rapid spread can also be attributed to Germany’s polarization into 
opposing Evangelical and Catholic military alliances in the decade immediately 
preceding the conflict.431  International diplomatic alignments in the war’s first decade 
were also heavily influenced by confessional sympathies. In the north, England, 
Holland and the French Huguenots formed a potentially potent anti-Habsburg bloc, 
while in the east, the Palatinate, Bethlen Gabor (prince of Transylvania) and Protestant 
minorities in the Habsburgs’ hereditary lands formed an additional counter-weight to 
Habsburg power bound by confessional sympathies.432  Similarly, the Counter-
Reformation provided a powerful ideological bond reinforcing the kinship ties already 
linking the Austrian and Spanish Habsburg power-blocs. Finally, the persistence of 
intense religious antagonisms in Europe severely aggravated already acute security 
dilemmas between polities, contributing to the war’s escalation and expansion.  Thus, 
while Scandinavian fears of Ferdinand’s plans to roll back Protestantism in Germany 
were undoubtedly exaggerated, they were nevertheless instrumental in drawing first 
Denmark and then Sweden into the war.433  
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 However, while sectarian rivalries continued to resonate in the seventeenth 
century as they had in the sixteenth, one can nevertheless detect a diminution in both 
their intensity and their influence over early modern diplomacy in the latter period. 
Thus, for example, one does not find in the Thirty Years War the same synthesis of 
religious fanaticism, revolutionary terror, and proto-modern party organization that 
characterized either the Catholic League in France or the Water Beggars in Holland 
one generation previously.434 The dehumanizing rhetoric and practices of moral 
exclusion characteristic of the French Wars of Religion continued to obtain during the 
Thirty Years War, but religious violence was no longer being linked to the 
advancement of quasi-revolutionary agendas as it had briefly been under the 
leadership of the Parisian League.435  Equally, confessional sympathies continued to 
influence diplomatic alignments, as evidenced by the paralysis in French policy during 
the 1620s while the anti-Habsburg policies of the politiques were effectively stymied 
by the ultra-Catholic devots faction. Nevertheless, sectarian divisions had never 
deterministically shaped rulers’ diplomacy, and their influence continued to wane 
during the Thirty Years War. France’s embrace of raison d’etat under Richelieu from 
the 1630s onwards bears superficial similarities with Francis’ earlier dalliances with 
the Schmalkaldic League in the 1540s.  But the subordination of religious to political 
objectives under Richelieu was more consistent, more systematic and undergirded by a 
much more robust and articulated intellectual framework (the discourse of raison 
d’etat) than had previously been the case.436  Domestically also, the prospect of 
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granting toleration to religious minorities had now been grudgingly accepted in a 
range of kingdoms, most notably France. The maxim cuius regio, eius religio 
continued to undergird rulers’ legitimacy claims and call into question the loyalties of 
heretical minorities. But the idea of sacrificing religious unity for the sake of political 
unity was no longer unimaginable for Europe’s leaders, and merely gained in traction 
as the war progressed. 
 Europe continued to be saturated by religious hatreds during the Thirty Years 
War. However, the fruits of France’s religious wars – the ideological construct of 
Absolutist sovereignty and the demonstrated link between politique domestic and 
foreign policies and the strengthening of rulers’ power – profoundly conditioned the 
conflict’s course.  Indeed, by the last decade of the war, religious motives had been 
almost entirely eclipsed by political motives in driving dynastic diplomacy, 
anticipating the Absolutist sovereign state system to come.  Conversely, this mild 
tempering of Europe’s religious hatreds was offset by the continuing expansion in the 
scale and destructiveness of European warfare.  By the onset of the Thirty Years War, 
a plethora of transformations inaugurated by the military revolution were increasingly 
in evidence. Artillery fortresses, broadside-firing warships, and massed musket-
wielding infantry had by 1618 diffused throughout Europe to become definitive 
weapons platforms of the age.437  Equally, the size and costliness of armies had by 
then also dramatically increased. Thus, while the armies that had fought the Italian 
wars of the sixteenth century had rarely exceeded 30,000 men, armies of over 150,000 
soldiers were common in the Thirty Years War.438 
 Ostensibly, the far larger armies fielded by the opposing sides appear to affirm 
narratives linking military revolution with political centralization and the waxing of 
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sovereign power. However, a closer consideration of the conflict reveals that such 
increases in army size did not necessarily reflect increases in rulers’ capacity to 
finance and bureaucratically administer and control such forces. On the contrary, 
throughout the Thirty Years War, rulers routinely fielded far larger armies than they 
could possibly sustain, relying on private military entrepreneurs to recruit, administer, 
financially maintain and lead these armies in the field. Economies of scale dictated 
that it was far easier to garrison and systematically plunder occupied populations with 
larger rather than smaller armies, leading to the development of massive itinerant 
mercenary hosts led by quasi-autonomous aristocratic warlords.439  The recruitment of 
largely foreign mercenaries on little more than the promise of plunder ensured a rapid 
breakdown in military discipline as the war progressed, with soldiers routinely 
subjecting civilians to theft, arson, torture and murder to maintain themselves.440  
Already weakened by famine and epidemics, peasants occasionally stood and fought 
against predatory mercenary hosts, but more frequently fled to neighbouring 
territories, thereby further enlarging conflict’s radius of disruption.441  
In the French Wars of Religion, the diffusion of destructive capabilities 
inaugurated by the military revolution had tended to reinforce the pre-existing 
dominance of aristocratic factions at the expense of a weakened crown, momentarily 
reversing the gains in political centralization achieved under France’s Renaissance 
monarchies. Paradoxically, the immediate consequence of an incomplete military 
revolution in the French Wars of Religion was thus political regression, a return to an 
earlier era characterised by weak monarchy, over-mighty subjects and endemic 
aristocratic violence.  Conversely, in Germany, the military revolution redounded 
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primarily to the advantage of the 1500 small and large-scale military entrepreneurs 
fighting the war, yielding a qualitatively more radical fragmentation of political and 
military power for the course of the conflict. With a pan-European pool of commercial 
military talent from which to draw and in the absence of norms of non-intervention, 
Europe’s rulers were free to continuously inflame the conflict in Germany through the 
deployment of armies larger than they could possibly afford to finance or continuously 
maintain themselves.442 In an era in which rulers’ administrative and mobilizational 
powers had yet to fully catch up with advances in the technologies and techniques of 
European warfare, the burgeoning market for military violence offered them a means 
for pursuing their dynastic ambitions at the expense (both literally and figuratively) of 
local populations.  In reality, this expedient merely nurtured the development of a 
parasitic host of military entrepreneurs and economies of plunder, further accelerating 
the moral and institutional breakdown within Germany and compounding international 
disorder throughout Europe.  
 Despite their commonalities, The French Wars of Religion and the Thirty 
Years War stand as distinct expressions of systemic disorder. The absolute enmity 
borne of confessional schism featured heavily in both conflicts, but burned more 
intensely in the former than the latter. By contrast, the military revolution’s centrifugal 
consequences were more evident in the Thirty Years War than in the French Wars of 
Religion, although again these tendencies were evident in both conflicts. What unites 
both cases is the role played by the absence of an international ordering framework in 
internationalizing and prolonging the respective conflicts. In the inter-regnum between 
Christendom’s demise and the constitution of a sovereign state system, Europe’s rulers 
dwelled in a condition of ‘immature anarchy’, in which the most basic principles of 
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co-existence had yet to be formulated – Europe at this time was in effect an anarchical 
system, but not an anarchical society. The combination of ideological polarization and 
enhanced destructive capacities characteristic of the era would have strained even a 
robust international order. But in the absence of any agreed framework for 
cooperation, Europe was condemned to a prolonged era punctuated by division, war, 
revolution, atrocity and death. It was only after a peace borne of mutual exhaustion 
that Europe’s rulers could formulate the principles upon which a successor order to 
Latin Christendom could finally be built.  
 
5.3 Revulsion, Renovation and Reconstitution – The Peace of Westphalia and the 
Dawn of a New International Order 
 
International relations scholars have long regarded the Peace of Westphalia as 
the ‘majestic portal’ through which Europe made its transition from medieval 
universalism to the institutionalized particularism of the modern sovereign state.443  In 
recent years, a raft of revisionist literature has demonstrated the limitations of this 
view, for quintessentially archaic features of Europe’s international order persisted 
down into the nineteenth century.444  Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries continued to be dominated by ramshackle composite monarchies governed 
through inefficient systems of aristocratic patronage.445  Europe also remained 
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horizontally integrated by a web of aristocratic blood-ties after Westphalia, while 
proprietary dynasticism and their accompanying wars of succession persisted well into 
the eighteenth century.446 Even following the horrors of the Thirty Years War, private 
military violence also remained endemic, with mercenaries and privateers providing a 
critical war-making resource for Europe’s rulers in an age of limited warfare and even 
more limited state power.447 
These qualifications aside, the Westphalian peace nevertheless remains of 
pivotal importance. For while it may not have instantly inaugurated the shift to a new 
international order yoked around a sovereign state system, Westphalia did provide the 
stability required for this order to be gradually constructed out of materials forged 
during Europe’s century of chaos. The century following Christendom’s demise was 
marked by terrific violence and destruction, but it equally yielded innovations that 
eventually formed the foundations of a new international order.  Of these, the most 
readily recalled is the theory of Absolutism developed in the fires of France’s Wars of 
Religion.  Absolutist theory offered a new model of political obligation – sovereign 
command was to replace feudal contract as the essential mediating principle of 
government, with the imperative of obedience superseding older and more inchoate 
feudal and patronal ties of vassalage to the monarch.448 In addition to its implications 
for relations between rulers and ruled, Absolutist theory was replete also with 
implications for the management of relations between rulers. Absolutist sovereignty 
provided a principled justification for the monarchical arrogation of power at the 
expense of external as well as internal actors. This was because the monarch’s 
exercise of sovereignty presupposed immunity from external interference as much as it 
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required the obedience of domestic subjects.  In exercising his sovereign prerogatives 
internationally, the monarch was equally to be unconstrained by the passions of his 
subjects. Consequently, ostensibly universalist obligations (e.g. to the maintenance of 
Christian unity) could be implied to be logically subordinate to adherence to the 
dispassionate logic of raison d’etat.  While primarily addressed to the problem of 
securing order within polities, Absolutist theory logically presupposed shifts in the 
framework governing relations between rulers for it to be fully effective. During 
Europe’s century of chaos, the norms of territorial exclusion, mutual recognition and 
non-interference that would subsequently constitute the inside/outside dichotomy of 
the modern state system could not yet materialize. But the development of Absolutist 
theory provided the intellectual framework out of which these norms could 
subsequently develop.    
 In addition to the intellectual innovation of Absolutism, processes of 
confessionalization represented a further precondition for the development of a new 
order.  Religious schism destroyed the ordering framework of Christendom, but it also 
precipitated the consolidation of socially inclusive and territorially exclusive 
confessional identities within polities.  Across Europe, lay and clerical elites 
collaborated to enforce religious orthodoxy and popular conformity to new standards 
of moral and spiritual discipline. New forms of church government brought with them 
expanded capacities for communal surveillance and social disciplining, as well as 
providing governments with the institutional wherewithal to inscribe confessional 
identities into the hearts and minds of governed populations.449 Despite 
confessionalization’s destabilizing effects during Europe’s century of chaos, both the 
expanded institutional reach of rulers and the socially inclusive and territorially 
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exclusive collective identities that confessionalization spawned would provide a robust 
foundation for the consolidation of state power in the decades following Westphalia. 
 At the material and organizational level, the changes inaugurated under the 
military revolution also proved highly destructive in the medium term, but would also 
be implicated in the reconstruction of order following the Westphalian peace. The 
development of artillery fortresses, infantry musketry volleys, and broadside-firing 
warships qualitatively increased the destructiveness of European warfare following 
Christendom’s demise, as well as imposing fiscal and administrative burdens that were 
beyond the capabilities of most European polities to manage.  The changes wrought by 
the military revolution brought bankruptcy, bloodshed and rebellion in their immediate 
wake.  Equally, however, these changes also eventually provided the material 
foundation for the establishment a new international order founded upon the 
‘internally pacified and hard-shell rimmed’ sovereign states of Absolutist Europe.450  
The order-producing consequences of the military revolution required for their 
emergence a raft of institutional innovations (e.g. the establishment of more robust 
systems of taxation and public credit and the elaboration of bureaucratic structures of 
military command) that find isolated and incomplete expressions prior to Westphalia. 
However, it was really only in the decades after Westphalia, when rulers could embark 
on the project of state-building without fear of foreign intervention, that the 
institutional changes necessary to subordinate the military revolution to sovereign 
ends could at last be implemented.451   
 Finally, Europe’s chaotic inter-regnum also witnessed the beginnings of an 
ontological transformation in conceptions of religion and its relationship to the body 
social.  The absolute enmity that found expression in Europe’s sectarian violence 
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derived from a conception of religion that conceived of it as referring to an embodied 
community of believers to be defended at all costs against the disease of heresy. 
Processes of confessionalization initially fortified this conception of religion, 
begetting the rites of divinely ordained violence that helped define the age. However, 
while the association between religious dissent and political treason would resonate 
into the late seventeenth century and beyond, the revulsion evoked by Europe’s 
religious wars helped initiate an epistemic shift in conceptions of the sacred.  Modern 
conceptions of religion as a privately held body of doctrines and beliefs did not 
become institutionalized during Europe’s century of chaos. Principled arguments in 
support of religious toleration matured only in the seventeenth century’s more settled 
second half, and took far longer to be incorporated into the policies of governments.452 
Nevertheless, anticipations of this revolution can be found in the politiques’ 
concession that religious unity could in extremis be sacrificed for the greater good of 
securing political unity. This recognition marked the beginnings of a ‘privatization’ of 
religion that would prove pivotal in reconciling religious diversity with the demand for 
order within and between Europe’s polities. 453 
 The century of chaos thus bequeathed a range of innovations – intellectual, 
institutional, material and cultural – that once re-assembled into a coherent whole 
would form the foundation of a new international order based upon a system of 
sovereign states. Both confessionalization and the military revolution were 
instrumental in plunging Europe’s polities into over a century of violent turmoil. 
Equally, however, confessionalization bequeathed Europe’s rulers with greater 
capacities for communal surveillance and more effective resources for social 
disciplining than they had enjoyed previously. Confessionalization further yoked 
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subjects more closely to rulers through the inculcation of socially inclusive and 
territorially exclusive collective identities tied to integrated church-state complexes. In 
these ways, it thus smoothed the path for the intensified processes of state-building 
that followed the Westphalian peace. Similarly, despite its initially centrifugal 
consequences, the military revolution would eventually provide an enormous fillip to 
the centralization of political power. The standing armies, permanent navies and 
networks of frontier artillery fortresses that together constituted the ‘hard shell’ of the 
sovereign state matured in the Absolutist era, but found their origins in an earlier and 
more volatile age. 
 Both Absolutist notions of sovereignty and the development of a more 
‘privatized’ conception of religion traced their origins to revulsion against the chaos 
engendered by confessionalization and the military revolution. These intellectual and 
cultural developments would also be critical to the development of a new international 
order. Although Absolutism would be rejected in many polities as a template for 
governing relations between rulers and ruled, its systemic implications –(e.g. 
principles of mutual recognition and reciprocal commitments to non-intervention in 
one another’s internal affairs) would win general acceptance. Absolutism – and more 
specifically, the principles for regulating co-existence between rulers that it 
presupposed – would provide the framework necessary to mediate relations between a 
plurality of power centres once the ideological cement of Christendom had dissipated. 
Equally, the transformed conception of religion – from body of believer to body of 
beliefs – formed a cultural precondition for the reconstitution of international order. 
While religious diversity would continue to be tolerated grudgingly if at all in 
Europe’s polities after Westphalia, the requirement of mutual recognition between 
sovereign states necessitated pragmatic acceptance of the reality of religious diversity 
internationally. For international order to be restored to Europe, the absolute enmity of 
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a polarized respublica Christiana would need to be replaced by a more conventional 
and contained enmity between sovereign states dwelling in anarchy.  This would be 
truly possible only when undergirded by the transformed conception of religion first 
anticipated by the politique thinkers of the confessional age. 
  This brings us at last to the true significance of the Peace of Westphalia. The 
Westphalian peace was of crucial importance firstly because it provided a minimal set 
of principles for co-existence between polities dwelling in anarchy, thereby initiating a 
transition from the immature anarchy of the confessional era to the more mature 
anarchy of the Absolutist age. In the interim between Christendom’s collapse in 1555 
and the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, Europe’s rulers had dwelled in an international 
system. After Westphalia, they dwelled in an international society. The modernity of 
Westphalia should not be overstated, for the provisions of the peace related firstly to 
constitutional arrangements within the empire, and were only subsequently expanded 
to encompass Europe itself.454 This qualification notwithstanding, what the 
Westphalian peace did accomplish was to make explicit principles of international co-
existence that had been presupposed in the theory of Absolutism. The Peace of 
Westphalia did not expunge war from the European international system, nor did it 
vanquish dynastic rivalries or sectarian hatreds. But in initiating the process of 
entrenching norms of mutual recognition internationally, the Westphalian peace 
provided the foundation for the containment of conflict within tolerable bounds, 
heralding the development of a new international order. 
 More fundamentally even than this accomplishment, the Peace of Westphalia 
also provided the systemic ideological brace behind which successful state-building – 
and thus the bottom-up reconstruction of international order – could eventually take 
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place. Confessionalization and military revolution provided powerful stimuli to the 
process of state-building, but only once caged by the innovation of Absolutist 
sovereignty, and only once the excesses of confessionalization had been limited by the 
evolution towards a more politique privatized conception of religion. The Peace of 
Westphalia, in establishing principles of mutual recognition and non-intervention, 
provided a systemic carapace behind which rulers could draw together these legacies 
of the confessional age and yoke them together in the form of sovereign states. In 
comparison to modern peace settlements such as Vienna or Versailles, Westphalia 
remains a modest settlement, containing few prescriptions regarding the institutional 
form that polities should assume. Conversely, in comparison to the age of disorder that 
preceded it, Westphalia’s novelty is both profound and immediately apparent. In 
institutionalizing mutual recognition in place of absolute enmity, and in proscribing 
endemic interference in favour of non-intervention, Westphalia helped reconcile 
diversity and division with conventional enmity and co-existence. In so doing, it 
provided the anvil upon which the modern state – and with it – the modern sovereign 
state system – could subsequently be forged.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE ORIGINS, CONSTITUTION, AND DECAY OF THE 
SINOSPHERE 
 
‘You shall not deviate from our instructions, but you shall reverently obey and adhere 
to our imperial command. Heaven looks down on the earth below and the will and 
laws of Heaven are strict and severe.  Our imperial words and codes are brilliant and 
effective. Always revere Heaven and the throne…’455 
 
Introduction 
 
On July 19 1864, the city of Nanjing fell to Qing imperial forces, marking an 
end to the Taiping rebellion, history’s bloodiest ever civil war. From 1850 onwards, an 
army of holy warriors, numbering at times over a million strong, had fought to 
overthrow the imperial household and establish a theocratic Heavenly Kingdom in its 
place.  Inspired by a failed candidate for the imperial bureaucracy who saw himself as 
Christ’s younger brother, the Taiping faith fused elements of Chinese folk religion 
with evangelical Christianity to energize a millenarian movement of exceptional 
resilience and ferocity. For almost fifteen years, the Taiping rebels paralysed the Qing 
dynasty, spreading from their initial base in Guangxi province to seize control of the 
ancient imperial capital of Nanjing, from where they briefly ruled a territory as large 
as France and Germany combined. By the time leader Hong Xiuquang died and 
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imperial forces had massacred his remaining followers, the rebellion had cost the lives 
of at least twenty million imperial subjects. Additionally, in their desperation to crush 
the rebels, court officials had permitted a cascading downwards of military and fiscal 
powers to regional strongmen, which would ultimately prove fatal to the maintenance 
of central imperial authority. Coming at a time when the Qing dynasty was already 
weakened by fiscal crisis and accelerating Western colonial penetration, the Taiping 
rebellion effectively gutted the Chinese state. In so doing, it thereby fatally weakened 
the imperial core of the suzerain state system that had governed East Asia for the 
better part of the millennium, permitting the region’s subsequent absorption into a 
European-dominated international society of sovereign states. 
 In the next two chapters, I will recount the origins, constitution, decay and 
eventual dissolution of the Sino-centric suzerain state system of East Asia.  My 
analysis proceeds in six sections. In this chapter, I begin by sketching the origins, 
constitution and operation of the Sinosphere, focusing particularly on the form that it 
assumed following the establishment of the Manchu Qing dynasty in 1644.  Having 
outlined the contours of the Sinosphere, I then proceed to an examination of the 
processes of decay that were afflicting the imperial core of the system in the lead-up to 
the first Opium war (1839-1842) and the subsequent onset of full-scale European 
encroachment into North-East Asia.  
 Whereas chapter six reviews the Sinosphere’s decay, in chapter seven I 
concentrate instead on the concatenating crises that eventually destroyed it over the 
period 1842-1911. Section three considers the multi-faceted nature of the challenge 
that European expansion posed to the Sinosphere’s material and ideological 
foundations, a challenge that encompassed military, economic, cultural and even 
religious dimensions. Section four concentrates on the origins, nature and course of 
the Taiping challenge to imperial authority, while in section five I detail the systemic 
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consequences of the Qing dynasty’s Pyrrhic victory over the Taiping Heavenly 
Kingdom. The Taiping rebellion constitutes the pivotal hinge episode in my narrative, 
before which a reconstitution of Chinese imperial authority was unlikely but still 
possible, and after which the contraction and collapse of the Sinosphere became 
inevitable. As in the case of Latin Christendom, it was violent religious radicals who 
effectively challenged the fragile ideological foundation upon which international 
order was based in nineteenth century East Asia, fatally undermining the Sinosphere 
and thereby condemning the region to almost a century of chaotic instability 
thereafter.  Paradoxically, however, religious passion unintentionally also served as a 
conduit for the caging of political authority and popular loyalty within the confines of 
the sovereign state in fin-de-siecle East Asia, just as it had centuries previously in 
seventeenth century Europe. Consequently, in the concluding section of my 
discussion, I very briefly consider the role played by religious radicalism in serving as 
the mid-wife of modern nationalism in China and elsewhere in East Asia by century’s 
end, a process that led – albeit fitfully and with great violence – from the wreckage of 
the Sinosphere to the new order of a regional sovereign state system.   
 
6.1 The Origins, Constitution, and Operation of the Sinosphere 
 
Whereas division and fragmentation marked the history of Western Europe following 
the fall of the Roman Empire, the suzerain state system that developed in East Asia 
was forged upon the underlying unity of successive Chinese empires.456  Like Western 
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Europe, China’s experience in the middle centuries of the first millennium CE was one 
of political division following the collapse of the Han Dynasty in 220CE.457 Unlike 
Western Europe, however, which never regained the political unity it had enjoyed 
under the Romans, empire remained the dominant mode of governance in China from 
the Tang Dynasty (618-907) down to the Qing Dynasty’s final collapse in 1912.458 
From the early seventh century onwards, China’s political unity, its unmatched wealth 
and population, and its cultural sophistication enabled it to serve as the core of a far-
flung regional international order organized along suzerain lines.459  Inevitably, the 
robustness of this regional order co-varied with the vagaries of Chinese cycles of 
dynastic ascension and decline. But when considered from a global (and particularly a 
Western) vantage point, what was remarkable about the Sinosphere is its striking 
stability over time, and the high consistency apparent in the normative structures and 
institutional practices that sustained international order in East Asia over the course of 
successive dynasties. 
 
6.1.1 The Constitution of the Sinosphere – Introductory Remarks 
 
Before considering the Sinosphere’s structure in detail, I must first make two framing 
observations regarding its constitution. Firstly, of all the international orders 
considered in this study, the Sinosphere was by far the most hierarchical, both in its 
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constitutional principles and in its institutional forms. While Christendom was 
organized around a loose papal-imperial diarchy, in which Church and Empire 
checked each others’ pretensions towards universal authority, no such qualification of 
the emperor’s power existed in the Sinosphere. Instead, the emperor was conceived as 
the Son of Heaven, the apex of all spiritual and temporal power within the East Asian 
ecumene.460 This ideological elevation of the emperor to such a vaunted status was 
structurally reinforced by the massive gulf in material power between the Chinese 
empire and its neighbouring tributary states. The asymmetry between the wealth and 
power of China and those of its tributary polities finds no direct parallels in either 
Christendom or the global state system, and along with China’s cultural magnetism it 
helps strongly to account for the longevity and relative stability of the Sino-centric 
suzerain state system over which successive emperors governed. 
 Secondly, of the international orders considered in this study, the distinction 
between the sacred and mundane realms was least well articulated in the Sinosphere. 
In Christendom, while the sacred and mundane realms were of course intimately inter-
twined, the Gelatian doctrine of the Two Swords nevertheless ensured that they 
remained conceptually distinct, with supreme authority in each sphere being yoked 
under the complementary institutions of Church and Empire. In the global state system 
by contrast, the sacred and temporal realms are kept strictly separate – the system’s 
animating ideals of popular eudemonism and self-determination are self-consciously 
ecumenical, while dominant institutional forms such as contractual international law 
are not anchored in any specific cosmology. This contrasts yet again with the 
Sinosphere, in which the emperor was conceived as the essential pivot linking the 
sacred and mundane worlds, with the realization of temporal order being contingent 
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upon the emperor’s governing in strict accordance with the moral imperatives of an 
impersonal cosmic order.461 In their different ways, both Christendom and the global 
state system were dualistic in their composition, with the sacred and temporal realms 
being either structurally interwoven (Christendom) or alternatively structurally 
isolated from one another (the global state system).  The sacred and temporal worlds 
were in the Sinosphere conversely structurally conjoined, producing a monism that 
strengthened the Sinosphere for much of its existence, but that also left it intensely 
vulnerable to millenarian challenges during periods of dynastic decline. 
 
6.1.2 The Constitution of the Imperial Sinosphere 
 
 The normative complex that under-wrote the Sinosphere was infused by the 
values and ideals of Confucianism. Much like Saint Augustine, Confucius had written 
at a time of great political volatility, in which the early unity of the ancient Zhou 
dynasty had given way to a period of fractious conflict between China’s increasingly 
independent constituent kingdoms.462 Similarly, just as Augustine sought 
simultaneously to fortify and bridle the temporal powers of his day by tethering their 
legitimacy to the teachings of the Church, so too the teachings of Confucius were 
intended to strengthen temporal rulers by bringing their behaviour into closer 
conformity with the moral imperatives of the cosmos. These similarities in originating 
circumstances and political intentions notwithstanding, the philosophies articulated by 
Augustine and Confucius were nevertheless radically different. For Augustine, the 
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problem of legitimizing political authority was profoundly informed by his essentially 
pessimistic assessment of human nature, and also by his beliefs concerning the 
existence of a supreme law-giver in the form of an omnipotent God. The political 
theology he produced stressed the fact of man’s essentially corrupt nature following 
the Fall, and the concomitant necessity of restraining human wickedness through the 
imposition of a remedial and authoritarian political order.463 In Augustinian lights, 
temporal authority was an evil made necessary by man’s initial defiance of God.464  
The injustices of earthly rulers were moreover construed as both a reflection of man’s 
flawed nature, and also as a continuing earthly punishment for Original Sin.465 This 
justification for temporal rule simultaneously acknowledged its necessity while 
stressing both its moral imperfection and its subordinate status to the Church, which 
remained the agency responsible for interpreting God’s will and spreading His Word 
among the faithful. 
 In contrast to Augustine’s belief in the existence of a transcendent and 
omnipotent divine lawgiver, Confucianism was conversely informed by a belief in the 
existence of an immanent and impersonal cosmic order.466 Equally, whereas 
Augustine proceeded from a radically pessimistic assessment of a human nature 
forever tainted by Original Sin, Confucius and his followers instead stressed the 
perfectibility of human nature. For Confucians, humans were equally endowed with an 
innate moral sense, which it was the responsibility of rulers to cultivate through a 
combination of exemplary leadership and systematic moral indoctrination.467  Unlike 
Augustinian political theology, Confucianism placed great importance on the moral 
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qualities of the ruler himself, believing that his righteous conduct and proper 
adherence to prescribed ceremonies (li) could exercise a profoundly beneficial 
educative impact on the populace at large.468  More broadly, Confucians believed that 
the ruler’s righteous conduct and adherence to the proper ceremonies was necessary 
for the maintenance of cosmic as well as social order.469 In Christendom, salvation 
was possible only through the Church, and the divine could be experienced only 
through the intercession of a celibate priestly caste. Accordingly, a ruler’s moral 
failings were of little spiritual consequence for the faithful, however negatively they 
might impinge on believers’ earthly existence.  Conversely, for Confucians, the ruler’s 
moral qualities were of supreme spiritual as well as earthly significance, with a failure 
to live in harmony with the moral imperatives of the cosmos inviting catastrophe for 
all.  
 The normative complex underpinning the Sinosphere was thus informed by a 
world-view that conflated the spiritual and mundane worlds, and worked to sustain a 
hierarchical order with an omnicompetent universal emperor at its pinnacle. At an 
identity-constitutive level, the purpose of collective association was to achieve a 
temporal state of peace, fairness and harmony (ping) in accord with the rhythms of a 
larger cosmic order.470 For successive Chinese dynasties, the emperor was conceived 
as the Son of Heaven, and the ambit of his rule was tien-hsia, literally ‘all under 
heaven.’471 From this privileged position, the emperor presided over a social order 
conceived in organic and rigidly hierarchical terms, with actors embedded in fixed 
relationships of super- and subordination. Of these relationships, the most important 
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were the Three Bonds linking rulers and ruled, husbands and wives, and parents and 
children.472 These bonds entailed actors’ subscription to fixed roles involving specific 
duties that had to be assiduously fulfilled for social and cosmic order to be realised. 
The Confucian world-view was emphatically paternalistic and rigorously prescriptive 
in its constitution, and envisaged the ideal society as one in which ruler and ruled, 
husband and wife, and father and son were to be linked in vertical, mutually 
reinforcing asymmetric ties of benevolence and obedience.473  At an international 
level, as we shall see, this pattern was to be replicated in the relations between the 
Chinese empire and its tributary polities, with the latter being expected to show the 
same level of deference and filial piety to the emperor as one would expect from a 
dutiful son towards his father.474 
 Where earthly preparation for eternal salvation constituted the raison d’etre of 
collective association in Christendom, the Sinosphere was conversely organized for 
the purposes of realizing a state of peace, fairness and harmony in the social and 
cosmic spheres, which were deemed by Confucian scholars to be inextricably 
enmeshed. Similarly, whereas Christian ethics provided the primary means of 
normative pacification in medieval Christendom, in the Sinosphere it was the 
Confucian ethical code that fulfilled this function. In their distinctive ways, both 
Christianity and Confucianism were characterised by a series of tensions between the 
egalitarian and hierarchical threads running through their respective philosophies. 
Both ethical frameworks began from a position that stressed the moral worth of each 
individual, either by dint of their status as children of God or alternatively as creatures 
cosmically endowed with an intrinsic capacity to think and act as moral beings. In this 
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regard, at least, the ethical-prescriptive norms of Christendom and the Sinosphere 
were very similar, with variants of the Golden Rule conspicuously featuring in both 
systems.475 At the same time, however, both ethical systems functioned within highly 
rigid and inegalitarian social milieux, a fact that necessitated very distinctive cultural 
accommodations with the prevailing social order.  
 In Christendom, as we have seen, the Church’s ideological hegemony was 
exercised in a highly fragmented political environment, and one that was additionally 
characterised by high levels of corporate organization among merchant and 
aristocratic elites. As a result, the egalitarian message of Christianity was diluted by 
the accommodations it was forced to make, particularly with a bellicose noble class. 
Both the Augustinian political theology and the social ideology of tri-functionality that 
sustained Christendom reflected this uneasy compromise, as did the co-existence of 
Christian ethics with a plethora of legal codes (e.g. feudal custom and Roman law) 
that assigned particularized bundles of privileges to discrete social groups.476 
Conversely, in the Sinosphere, ethical obligations were framed far more 
comprehensively in the language of duties rather than reciprocal rights and 
responsibilities, reflecting the paternalism inherent in Confucian philosophy.477 
Additionally, rather than cohering within a social order marked by autonomously 
organized and functionally distinct estates and corporate groupings, the Chinese 
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imperial order was fractal in its organization.478 That is, instead of being distinguished 
by particularistic corporate claims, an empire-wide gentry elite was rather united in its 
commitments to securing the physical safety and material welfare of the peasantry, as 
well as supervising their moral instruction.479 Consequently, the power-legitimating 
norms that sustained the Sinosphere were far simpler than those undergirding 
Christendom. At the apex of the Sinosphere, a sacerdotal conception of kingship 
legitimized the emperor’s suzerainty as the Son of Heaven over the East Asian 
ecumene.480 Meanwhile, social relations were pervaded by a paternalistic Confucian 
world-view, which stabilized and perpetuated an intensely hierarchical order by 
emphasizing the centrality of asymmetric and familial bonds of benevolence and 
obedience between superiors and inferiors at all levels of social organization, from the 
individual household upwards.   
 At the institutional level, the Sinosphere was ordered around a suzerain state 
system centred yoked under the sacred authority of the Son of Heaven. Under the Pax 
Sinica, China was held to be the singular centre of civilization, and the emperor the 
supreme temporal and spiritual authority within the East Asian ecumene.  In keeping 
with Confucian ideology, Chinese tributary states – including Korea, Annam 
(Vietnam) and Japan – stood in an explicit relationship of subordination to the 
emperor.481 In stark opposition to the Westphalian state system that was to succeed it, 
relations between polities were conceived in moral rather than legal terms, with the 
same Confucian rhetoric of paternalism infusing traditional East Asian diplomacy as it 
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did the emperor’s relations with his subjects within China itself.482 As was the case 
with many traditional composite empires, regional diplomacy within the Sinosphere 
was conducted along the lines of a ‘rim-less wheel’, with all interactions concentrated 
around the Chinese ‘hub.’483  China managed its relations bilaterally with each of its 
tributaries on different terms, while none of its tributaries independently engaged in 
routine diplomatic interaction with one another.484 Critically, however, and in contrast 
to most classical empires, the Chinese emperor did little to interfere with the domestic 
authority of tributary rulers within their own territories.485 While obliged to 
acknowledge the emperor’s suzerainty through participation in ritual acts of obeisance 
(generally centred around the tribute trade discussed below), rulers such as the 
successive kings of the Yi Dynasty in Korea were generally free to govern their people 
without Chinese interference.486 At the same time, however, the high culture of 
China’s chief tributary polities was so heavily Sinicized, and China’s material power 
so preponderant within the region, that direct intervention was largely unnecessary to 
secure Chinese goals within her tributary polities. 
 Within the over-arching umbrella of the suzerain state system, order was 
secured in the Sinosphere through recourse to the same careful admixture of 
authoritative and coercive power resources as that manifest in all of the international 
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orders considered in this study. Given its indebtedness to Confucianism, however, 
what is most striking about the Sinosphere is the self-consciousness with which 
authoritative and coercive power resources were distinguished from one another, as 
well as the conspicuous priority rhetorically accorded to the former in sustaining order 
throughout East Asia. Within Confucianism, a clear distinction was drawn between 
different forms of social power. At one end of the spectrum resided a form of power 
centring around li, a term referring to the traditional customs and rites performed by 
the Son of Heaven to communicate social norms to others, and in so doing maintain 
the order of the cosmos.487 As stated previously, Confucians assigned great 
significance to the moral character of rulers, believing that in their proper conduct they 
could powerfully influence the behaviour of others through the force of example. In 
light of this thinking, traditional East Asian diplomacy was highly ceremonial and 
explicitly public and performative in its forms, with official interactions between 
China and its tributaries being saturated with religious and symbolic significance. 
Thus, for example, the coronation of new rulers in tributary states could be legitimized 
only by an imperial investiture mission, in which the newly appointed ruler would 
kowtow to symbols of imperial authority provided by the emperor’s representatives.488 
This ritual not only legitimized the local ruler in the eyes of the local gentry, but also 
symbolically re-affirmed the relations of benevolence and obedience obtaining 
between the emperor and his vassal rulers. The tribute missions despatched by 
tributary polities to China provided yet another forum for the ritual affirmation of the 
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emperor’s suzerainty, with performance of the kowtow and the provision of gifts by 
the representatives of tribute states investing these trade missions with a profound 
political and spiritual importance.489 
 From a modern vantage point, the ceremonial forms of traditional East Asian 
diplomacy may seem both arcane and hopelessly archaic. But the temptation to 
dismiss them as merely some form of baroque and irrelevant artifice must be resisted, 
for doing so elides the fact that these practices were anchored in deeply held 
intersubjective beliefs about the nature of the social and cosmic order, and reflected 
the central importance contemporaries accorded to the maintenance of ideological 
orthodoxy in sustaining the Sinosphere. Having made this observation, I must add that 
the normative power centred around li was systematically supplemented, both within 
China proper and throughout its penumbra of tributary polities, by reliance on fa. In 
Chinese thinking, fa (regulations) referred to the recourse to the range of material 
rewards and penalties available to the Son of Heaven to induce compliance from those 
impervious to the force of ritually communicated virtue.490 Moreover, while li was 
suffused with sacred significance and formed a major focus of Confucian scholarship, 
the ‘two handles’ of material inducements and exemplary coercion that constituted fa 
received at least as great an emphasis in ancient Chinese political philosophy.491 At an 
international level, fa manifested itself most conspicuously in China’s intermittent 
resort to armed force to maintain order within the Sinosphere.  In some situations, this 
entailed the suppression of anti-systemic criminal elements (the most conspicuous of 
these being Japanese pirates), while in other cases it involved direct Chinese military 
intervention to protect tributary polities from predators originating from beyond the 
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Sinosphere.492 In all instances, however, the emperor’s resort to force was legitimized 
not by reference to a shared legal code, but rather by invoking the sacred charisma of 
the emperor by dint of his position as the Son of Heaven.  
 At the material level, the Sinosphere subsisted on a foundation of concentrated 
coercion and productive capacity qualitatively greater than anything comparable in 
late medieval Christendom.  In fifteenth century Europe, the diffusion of firearms and 
modern artillery had irretrievably corroded Christendom’s feudal base, and had 
subsequently helped to facilitate the transition to a Westphalian state system.493 
Conversely, the Sinosphere’s experience was more consistent with that of most 
societies across greater Eurasia in the early modern period, with the spread of firearms 
and artillery working to strengthen and expand pre-existing imperial formations. In 
China’s case, the ‘general crisis’ of the seventeenth century was resolved with the 
transition from the Ming to the Qing Dynasties, a process that occurred roughly 
contemporaneously with the birth of the Westphalian state system in West-Central 
Europe. From the early seventeenth century, nomadic Manchu pastoralists from the 
Asian Steppe had augmented their existing superiority in cavalry with the introduction 
of firearms and light artillery into their armed forces.494 This adaptation, while not as 
immediately far-reaching as the European military revolution, was nevertheless 
sufficient to enable them to rapidly conquer China, as well as also facilitating the 
subsequent destruction of loyalist Ming rebels in the decades immediately following 
the Dynasty’s collapse.495 The Manchus then employed a combination of mobile 
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cavalry units, artillery, and Han Chinese infantrymen to add vast swathes of territory 
from the south and Southwest to their holdings, in so doing expanding China’s borders 
to their furthest territorial extent by the end of the eighteenth century.496  
 The stability provided by the Manchu gunpowder empire enabled an expansion 
of trade and the continued accumulation of wealth throughout East Asia over the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Just as the consolidation of Christendom under 
the papal-imperial diarchy had permitted a surge in wealth accumulation and 
demographic expansion in eleventh century Europe, so too the protective carapace of 
Qing suzerainty enabled a similar process of growth in early modern East Asia.  
Within China itself, historians estimate that the empire’s population more than 
doubled over the course of the eighteenth century, from 160 million in 1700 to 350 
million in 1800.497 Moreover, this demographic expansion was accompanied, at least 
up to 1750, by sustained increases in both land and labour productivity, which 
provided the population with a standard of living generally superior to that of most 
Western Europeans at mid-century.498 This economic dynamism spurred the growth of 
trading networks throughout East Asia and beyond, with the bulk of intra-regional 
trend directed towards serving the voracious Chinese appetite for both staples as well 
as luxury goods. The growth of trade in turn fed into the increasing monetization of 
East Asian economies, aiding revenue extraction and stimulating the continuing 
centralization of political power throughout the Sinosphere’s constituent polities.499 
Without the quantum leap in productive and destructive capacities bequeathed by the 
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industrial revolution, the Qing empire and its tributaries remained vulnerable to the 
threat of external predation that eventually presented itself in the form of Western 
incursions from the mid-19th century. But such an observation unfairly diminishes the 
achievements of the Qing Dynasty, overlooking the exceptionalism of the Western 
experience after 1750. More fundamentally, however, it threatens to obscure the more 
basic fact that judging by any material measure of aggregated productive and 
destructive capacities, the Sinosphere was by far the most successful and sophisticated 
of all regional international orders in the early modern world down to the late 
eighteenth century.  
Recalling briefly the theoretical framework informing this inquiry, I maintain 
that all social orders are composed of various networks yoked respectively around 
principles of kinship, patronage, contract and bureaucratic command.  It is incumbent 
upon rulers to effectively work through these networks, marshalling and combining 
the normative and material resources that inhere in them, if they are to successfully 
maintain order both domestically and internationally. This observation is borne out by 
a consideration of the constitution of the Sinosphere.  Throughout the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, a major foundation of the Qing Dynasty’s success was the hybrid 
nature of their empire, with the conquering Manchus effectively tapping into and 
exploiting a broad spectrum of social networks to sustain, expand and manage the 
Chinese imperium. Within the sedentary Sinic core of the empire, the Manchus largely 
relied upon the operation of the long-established imperial bureaucracy to maintain 
order.500 A dedicated corps of administrators projected and enforced the emperor’s 
writ at the provincial level, while at the village level an indoctrinated Confucian 
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gentry-scholar elite assumed responsibility for the day-to-day tasks of governance.501 
In the Inner/Central Asian periphery, by contrast, the Manchus chose not to extend 
Confucian bureaucratic structures into recently conquered border territories, preferring 
instead to use their powers of patronage to govern indirectly through a series of local 
intermediaries.502  
Given their status as a conquest dynasty, the Manchus also wisely chose to 
mitigate their dependence on a Han-dominated bureaucracy in the empire’s Sinic core 
by maintaining extensive kinship ties between the imperial court and allied clans 
among the Manchu aristocracy.503 This strategy provided the emperor with an 
independent power base bonded together by real and imagined ties of affect and 
kinship, and enabled successive Qing emperors to concentrate powers in the imperial 
office that far surpassed those of their Ming predecessors.504  Finally, the Qing 
Dynasty perpetuated the Ming system of tribute trade in both Eastern and Central 
Asia. In so doing, it sought both to dictate the terms upon which foreigners interacted 
with the empire, and also to effectively guard against the prospect of alternative and 
potentially threatening power formations cohering within the interstices of developing 
commercial networks. The Dynasty’s efforts to funnel commercial activities 
exclusively through the structures of the tribute system were only partially successful, 
a fact that is unsurprising given their limited capacities to supervise all trade, and 
given also the formidable impetus to regional commercial exchange provided by 
China’s economic efflorescence during the opening century of Qing rule.505  But 
considered in their totality, the Manchus’ efforts to marshal diverse power resources 
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through the various social networks available to them were remarkably successful, 
enabling the empire’s wealth, population and territory to grow continuously during the 
eighteenth century. 
 The final dimension of the Sinosphere that is salient to this investigation is the 
level of violence interdependence manifest within it in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. As the material predominance of China vis-à-vis its tributary polities has 
already been mentioned, this aspect of the Sinosphere’s order-enabling material 
foundation can be dealt with briefly. Simply stated, Qing China represented the most 
powerful and most enduring of the gunpowder empires that had developed from the 
sixteenth century onwards, and it was on the military predominance of the Qing 
Empire that order largely depended in East Asia.  In the North-West, the ancient threat 
of invasion from nomadic pastoralists, which had historically constituted the greatest 
external threat faced by Chinese dynasties, had effectively been neutralized following 
the Manchu conquest of China in 1644.506 Given their nomadic origins, the Manchus 
retained a mastery of mobile cavalry warfare, but supplemented this strength with 
modern artillery, Han bureaucracy and massed infantry to deter and defeat prospective 
challengers from the steppe. Manchu military strategy paid less heed to maritime 
threats from East Asia, a neglect that would ultimately doom the dynasty in the 
nineteenth century. But in the pre-steamship era of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, Europeans lacked the capacity to effectively project power throughout the 
region (much less project power along China’s riverine arteries), and it was possible 
for the Manchus to confine them to limited coastal enclaves.507 At the same time, 
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Japan’s self-imposed policy of isolation under the Tokugawa Shogunate removed 
from contention the one potential regional challenger to Chinese maritime supremacy 
over the East Asian littoral. With the threat of pastoralist invasion from the steppe 
eliminated, and the maritime threat from industrializing European and American 
outsiders yet to emerge, China enjoyed regional military supremacy beyond challenge.  
This military supremacy, combined with the stability provided by the Sinosphere’s 
ideological hegemony and practices of tribute diplomacy, worked to sustain order 
throughout the region without serious challenge down to 1800.  
  The constitutional order of the Sinosphere is schematically presented in 
table form below (Table 6.1). The same caveats that applied to my discussion of 
Christendom’s constitution also obtain here. International orders are constituted by a 
an elaborate amalgam of normative, institutional and material elements that fit 
together imperfectly, and are beset by tensions and inconsistencies that are elided in 
schematic portraits such as the one advanced below. Equally, schematic outlines 
convey a sense of stability – even permanency – that belies the provisional and 
ultimately transient nature of international orders.  These important qualifications 
notwithstanding, the following snapshot of the Sinosphere nevertheless provides a 
useful point of departure for an examination of the dynamics that eventually led to its 
destruction. 
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6.2 The Decay of the Sinosphere 
 
6.2.1 Latent Vulnerabilities 
 
For all of its longevity and its evident strengths, the Sinosphere was nevertheless beset 
with a range of latent vulnerabilities, the destabilizing consequences of which became 
increasingly manifest from the late eighteenth century onwards. The most basic of  
 
Table 6.1 The International Order of the Sinosphere, 1644-1850 
 
Normative Complex Governing Institutional 
Framework 
Order-Enabling Material 
Context 
Identity Constitutive 
Norms 
Achievement of a temporal 
state of harmony (ping) in 
concordance with cosmic 
order 
Ordering Framework 
Suzerain state system 
governed by the Chinese 
emperor as Son of Heaven 
Aggregate Capacities for 
Production and 
Destruction 
Proto-capitalist mode of 
production organized 
within the framework of 
centralized gunpowder 
empire 
Ethical Prescriptive 
Norms 
Confucian Ethics 
Authoritative Institutions 
Ritual enactment of shared 
identities (li) through 
investiture missions and 
tribute trade 
Dominant Mobilizational 
Networks  
Dominance of imperial 
bureaucracy and 
centralized imperial 
patronage networks 
Power Legitimating 
Norms 
Sacerdotal conception of 
emperor and Confucian 
norms of asymmetric 
benevolence and 
obedience 
Coercive Institutions 
Imperial resort to judicial 
sanctions and violence (fa) 
to rectify error and restore 
cosmic order 
Violence 
Interdependence 
High concentration and 
low accumulation of 
coercive means [moderate 
violence interdependence] 
 
these vulnerabilities was the extremely loose nature of the suzerain order over which 
China presided, and the great dependence of this order upon the continuing strength of 
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the Chinese empire. During periods of dynastic ascendancy and consolidation, the 
modest character of China’s authority claims over its tributary states assured local 
rulers a high level of autonomy, thus working to minimize resistance to Chinese 
hegemony. Unlike Christendom, the Sinosphere lacked a transnational bureaucratic 
authority structure that was in any way analogous to the medieval Church. Neither was 
the Sinosphere knitted together by same kinds of thick crosscutting webs of 
aristocratic kinship ties that bound together Christendom’s constituent polities. In the 
absence of an intrusive transnational bureaucracy against which to compete for 
authority, material privileges, or popular allegiances, the Sinosphere’s rulers were 
generally happy to participate in Chinese practices (e.g. the tribute trade, investiture 
missions) that promised to enrich them while also fortifying their internal and external 
legitimacy. Furthermore, the absence of thick crosscutting kinship ties among the 
Sinosphere’s aristocratic elites eliminated an important potential transmission vector 
for localized ideological challenges, thus insulating the Sinosphere from the rapid 
spread of heterodox movements and ideologies of the kind that had eventually 
destroyed Christendom. Finally, China’s unrivalled economic and military 
predominance during periods of dynastic strength radically raised the costs of 
confrontation with the Celestial Empire, thereby effectively deterring would-be 
aggressors and anti-systemic actors from launching challenges against the prevailing 
international order.  
 In times of dynastic weakness and decline, by contrast, East Asia’s Sino-
centrism ensured that domestic instability within China rapidly translated into a 
deterioration of order well beyond the empire’s borders. This strong co-variance 
between dynastic cycles of decline in China and regional instability was evident for 
example in the final decades of the Ming Dynasty in the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries. During this period, the Japanese ruler Toyotomi Hideyoshi 
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launched an attack on Korea that was motivated as much by an aspiration to assert 
equal status with the Ming emperor as it was by a desire for territorial 
aggrandizement.508 While imperial forces managed to repel Japan and further 
strengthen China’s bonds with its Korean tributary in the process, the conflict 
nevertheless heavily drained the imperial treasury, thus hastening the dynasty’s 
eventual decline and fall to Manchu conquerors in 1644.509 Perhaps even more 
fundamentally, however, the convoluted diplomatic manoeuvrings that accompanied 
China’s early efforts to secure Japan’s peaceful withdrawal from Korea revealed the 
fragility of the consensus underpinning the Sinosphere’s diplomatic structure. 
Ambiguity remains as to whether Hideyoshi’s demand to be recognized as an equal of 
the Chinese emperor was reflective of an ignorance of the Sinosphere’s constitutional 
norms, or whether he was alternatively seeking to actively revise these norms through 
the use of force.510  What the protracted negotiations between Chinese, Korean and 
Japanese envoys nonetheless clearly illustrated was the openness of these norms to 
contestation, particularly at times when the Celestial Empire was weak or distracted by 
internal rebellions. Consequently, although it was undeniably important as a 
mechanism for regional order maintenance and the empire’s domestic legitimation, 
China’s tributary system was susceptible to re-interpretations by tributary rulers that 
deviated – sometimes substantially – from the rigid bonds of benevolence and 
obedience favoured by the imperial court.     
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 While serious in its long-term implications, the existence of a gap between 
prescription and practice in the operation of the Sinosphere comes as no surprise, and 
is illustrative of the kinds of imperfections that trouble all international orders. In 
China’s case, however, departures from prescribed norms were particularly 
problematic given the great emphasis accorded to the maintenance of ideological 
orthodoxy as a prop for imperial power. The conflation of the sacred and secular 
realms in imperial ideology provided ruling dynasties with a great source of strength 
during times of peace, with the divinely ordained character of the Chinese political 
order conferring upon it a powerful sense of permanence and divine legitimacy. 
However, in times of dynastic decline, the conjoining of the sacred and secular realms 
conversely encouraged actors to interpret the empire’s political troubles in spiritual 
terms.  Consequently, failures in governance were often popularly conceived as 
signifying that the emperor’s Mandate of Heaven had been withdrawn, and that the 
imperial household must consequently be overthrown.  For this reason alone, China’s 
absolute insistence that foreigners conform to the rites and practices of the tributary 
system is understandable, given that a failure of ‘barbarians’ to observe these rites 
constituted an explicit challenge to the Confucian order, one which threatened the 
emperor’s authority domestically as well as internationally. More generally, the 
religious legitimation of imperial authority ensured that oppositional movements 
within Chinese society also cast their grievances in similarly absolute and 
eschatological terms. Thus, while barbarian invasion from the Asian steppe 
historically constituted the most common external threat to successive Chinese 
dynasties, the threat of millenarian rebellion from within constituted the greatest 
domestic danger to the perpetuation of imperial authority. 
 The fragility of the tributary system during periods of dynastic decline and the 
internal threat of millenarian rebellion together constituted the two great historical 
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sources of structural vulnerability within the Sinosphere.  In the era of the Qing 
Dynasty, however, these vulnerabilities were overlain by a third and more historically 
contingent weakness, namely the widespread hostility of the Han majority towards 
their culturally alien and ethnically distinct Manchu conquerors.  For while the 
Manchus followed the path trod by previous steppe conquerors of China, becoming 
progressively sedentarized and Sinicized following their victory over the Ming 
Dynasty, they nevertheless retained a distinctive corporate identity that marked them 
out as separate from and superior to the Han majority. Although efforts were made to 
cultivate indigenous collaborators, and the Manchus relied heavily on the state 
bureaucracy and the scholar-gentry to maintain order throughout their imperium, 
conquerors and conquered remained divided from one another. In southern China in 
particular, this division manifested itself not merely as diffuse resentment, but 
assumed a self-consciously political form in the emergence of armed secret societies 
dedicated to the overthrow of the Manchus and the restoration of the Ming Dynasty.511 
 Elsewhere within the Manchus’ expanding patrimony, Ming loyalist 
sentiments did not pose such a problem for authorities, but the cultural distance 
between the Manchus and their subjects nevertheless remained a potent source of 
potential friction. Over the course of the eighteenth century, the Qing Empire rapidly 
expanded. This process of territorial expansion necessarily led to the incorporation of 
an enormous range of culturally and religiously diverse communities into the empire, 
necessitating attendant adaptations in Qing techniques of administration and 
legitimation. Whereas the Manchus were content to work through existing governance 
structures in the sedentary Han metropole, in the sparsely populated annexed 
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territories of the north and the west they chose instead to govern through the Lifan 
Yuan (Ministry of Dependencies), in conjunction with reliance on local 
intermediaries.512 Additionally, rather than merely replicating Confucian ideology in 
the outer provinces, the Manchus inserted themselves into local cosmologies wherever 
possible, falling back on an ideology of universal kingship when subjects’ spiritual 
beliefs precluded such a possibility.513 Although Qing imperial techniques of 
administration and legitimation compared favourably in terms of sophistication when 
compared to the contemporaneous activities of their European counterparts elsewhere, 
the mere fact of their occupation nevertheless generated potentially destabilizing 
undercurrents of resentment, even in non-Han areas of the empire.  
 The foregoing survey of the Sinosphere’s latent vulnerabilities is necessary if 
we are to properly comprehend the dynamics of its collapse in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. This is because each of the aforementioned vulnerabilities became 
violently exposed from the 1840s onward, contributing to the Sinosphere’s seemingly 
sudden contraction and collapse over the course of the following few decades. 
Nevertheless, as with Christendom before it, the acute phase of the Sinosphere’s 
legitimation crisis was preceded by chronic processes of decay that were much more 
incremental and long term in their essential character. The Sinosphere collapsed as a 
result of an explosive conjuncture between these internal processes of decay and the 
onset of the Western challenge, thus it is to a consideration of these processes that we 
must now turn. 
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6.2.2 Processes of Internal Decay 
 
 Like Christendom before it, the Sinosphere in many ways became a victim of 
its own success, with the rapid demographic and commercial expansion of the mid-
Qing period seeding the Chinese social landscape with tensions that would eventually 
prove highly inimical to the maintenance of order within the empire. Despite the Qing 
Dynasty’s impressive territorial expansion during the eighteenth century, the 
population of the empire grew so rapidly that the land-population ratio diminished 
continuously over time.514 The introduction of New World crops such as sweet 
potatoes and maize enabled the cultivation of marginal lands, thus forestalling the risk 
of widespread famine.515 But declining per capita acreage of land, combined with 
intermittent poor harvests, ensured that increasing numbers of peasants were forced 
into bankruptcy.516  Thus compelled to leave the land, many drifted towards work in 
non-agrarian sectors, others became vagrants, while others still joined a growing pool 
of itinerant bandits and urban gangs.517 Given that the Manchus (with the exception of 
Manchuria) imposed few effective barriers to internal migration within their empire, 
population pressures in densely populated regions could be partially relieved by 
peasant migration to more sparsely settled territories. However, in the absence of 
revolutionary advances in agricultural productivity, such expedients only temporarily 
alleviated the empire’s accumulating demographic pressures. Worse still, migration 
towards less settled areas inevitably engendered tensions between migrants and 
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established communities, particularly in those cases where this social cleavage was 
compounded by ethnic differences between migrants and the native population.518 
 In addition to demographically induced social tensions, creeping processes of 
institutional decay also beset the Qing Empire by the late eighteenth century. These 
processes were manifest most keenly in the central state’s declining capacity to match 
the paternalistic promise of imperial ideology with effective delivery of government 
services to the majority of the population. The Qing state’s declining capacity was 
explicable at least partially as a legacy of the emperor Kangxi’s decision in 1713 to 
permanently fix his subjects’ tax quotas in perpetuity.519 While the emperor’s edict 
was politically astute at the time of issue, his successsors’ willingness to maintain this 
edict over the following decades contributed to a steady decline in the real value of 
state revenues, thanks to the continuous inflation induced by robust commercial 
expansion over the eighteenth century.520 The decline in real revenues had predictable 
consequences for state capacity. The government gradually withdrew from governance 
functions, such as stockpiling food in state granaries to moderate food prices and thus 
ensure the masses’ food security, which had earlier been central to the dynasty’s 
cultivation of popular legitimacy.521 Corresponding with the decline in state activism, 
the central state also tolerated - and in some cases tacitly encouraged - local office-
holders’ efforts attempts to make good the shortfall in central revenues through the 
arbitrary imposition of additional taxes at the municipal and provincial levels.522 Both 
the atrophying of central government and the spontaneous growth of arbitrary taxation 
at the local and provincial levels nurtured the growth of widespread corruption, a 
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phenomenon that in turn fed back into a vicious cycle of diminishing governmental 
capacity and escalating popular disillusionment. 
 Demographic expansion, accumulating social tensions, and diminishing 
governmental capacity and legitimacy had all featured in prior cycles of dynastic 
decline in Chinese history.  These problems were joined at the eighteenth century’s 
end by the eruption of violent ideological dissent, which took the form of a series of 
rebellions that broke out in China towards the end of the Qianlong emperor’s sixty 
year reign. Of these rebellions, the most protracted and destructive was the millenarian 
White Lotus revolt, which shook parts of northern and central China from 1796-1804.  
The revolt is of interest partially because it reflected a familiar dynamic in Chinese 
history, whereby disillusionment with government became channelled into a violent 
millenarian movement whose leaders urged spiritual and social renewal through the 
overthrow of the ruling dynasty. In addition to its continuities with past periods of 
dynastic decline, however, the White Lotus rebellion is also relevant as a harbinger of 
the Taiping rebellion and the Qing dynasty’s subsequent slow-motion breakdown after 
1850. 
 A hybrid movement, the White Lotus rebellion tapped into the widespread 
anti-Manchu sentiment among the Han majority, while also locating its call to restore 
the deposed Ming Dynasty within the prophetic tradition of the White Lotus religion. 
Subscribing to a Manichean offshoot of Buddhism, adherents of the White Lotus faith 
venerated the Eternal Mother, the universal progenitor from whom all humans had 
originated, and from whom they had become progressively estranged upon their entry 
into the temporal world.523  Like many millennial sects, White Lotus practitioners 
interpreted contemporary social strife as constituting a symptom of humanity’s 
                                                 
523On the cosmology of the White Lotus movement, see Susan Naquin. Millenarian Rebellion in China: 
The Eight Trigrams Uprising of 1813. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976, pp. 9-12. 
 263
estrangement from the divine. Similarly, they also emphasized familiar millennial 
themes concerning the transient nature of the temporal world and the imminent 
approach of the apocalypse. The looming collapse of the Qing Dynasty would be 
accompanied by devastation on a truly cosmic scale, with the Eternal Mother visiting 
horrifying punishments on the non-believers. Thus it was prophesied: ‘for an entire 
day and night, a black wind will rise up and blow, killing countless people, leaving 
mountains of white bones and oceans of blood.’524 Predictably, a somewhat happier 
fate awaited believers in the Eternal Mother.  For them, salvation would be provided 
through the intercession of the Maitreya, the Buddha of the Future who would spare 
them from annihilation and secure their reunion and reconciliation with the Eternal 
Mother.525  
 The foregoing comments provide an admittedly brisk overview of the White 
Lotus vision, and one that moreover implies a potentially misleading homogeneity in 
the diverse beliefs that drove various heterodox sects to participate in the rebellion. In 
reality, period specialists have been at pains to highlight the heterogeneity of the 
dispersed devotional congregations that took part in the revolt, both in terms of their 
organizational form and ideological content.526  Indeed, some have even gone so far as 
to argue that the very designation of ‘White Lotus’ should be rejected, given that the 
rebels themselves abjured this label, and given also imperial bureaucrats’ habit of 
applying the label indiscriminately to all sectarian groups who opposed the ruling 
dynasty.527  The millenarian character of rebel grievances and goals notwithstanding, it 
is also worth emphasizing that the immediate impetus for the rebellion was eminently 
pedestrian in nature, arising from popular hostility towards tax exactions in a 
                                                 
524Quoted in Ibid., p. 12. 
525
Ibid., p. 10. 
526On this point, see generally Barend ter Haar. The White Lotus Teaching in Chinese Religious History. 
Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1992. 
527See for example Ibid., pp. 289-290. 
 264
mountainous frontier region that was already notorious for its weak administration.528 
These important qualifications aside, the White Lotus rebellion is nevertheless 
relevant to this inquiry for three reasons. At the most prosaic level, the rebellion 
reflected the depth of popular hostility towards the ruling dynasty, and the frailty of 
governing institutions in the face of sustained guerrilla warfare. Despite the 
fragmented and largely uncoordinated nature of sectarian resistance, it took the 
beleaguered imperial forces the better part of a decade to defeat the rebellion. The 
costs of suppression were also immense, draining the imperial treasury of the 
equivalent of five years’ revenue, and in so doing eliminating the budget surplus built 
up under the Qianlong emperor’s long reign.529 
 Besides its immediate material costs, the rebellion also inflicted severe 
reputational damage on the Qing Dynasty, with the rebels’ protracted resistance 
shattering the myth of Manchu military invincibility and thus giving courage to the 
empire’s multiplying internal and external enemies.530 In a pattern that would be 
repeated on a radically larger scale fifty years later, the White Lotus resistance 
inspired rebellions in other parts of the country, in so doing further compounding the 
empire’s internal woes.531 More revealingly still, the rebellion was demonstrative of a 
larger characteristic of the late imperial era, namely the proliferation of clandestine or 
semi-clandestine social networks that evaded governmental control, and that could 
potentially be harnessed for subversive or even revolutionary purposes. Despite the 
empire’s best efforts, ‘White Lotus’ devotional congregations persisted in northern 
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and central China in the decades following the crushing of their eponymous rebellion, 
their sectarian tradition of rebellion informing subsequent anti-government 
insurgencies down into the twentieth century.532 In Taiwan and the south-eastern 
provinces of Fujian and Guangdong, meanwhile, the late eighteenth century also saw 
the growth of ‘secret societies’, including the so-called Triads. While presenting 
mainly as a criminal rather than an explicitly political threat to the Qing Dynasty, the 
Triads nevertheless subscribed to a conservative Ming restorationist ideology, and 
were involved in fomenting and organizing a rebellion in Taiwan as early as 1787.533 
In the far south-western edges of the empire, finally, the Muslim province of East 
Turkestan also presented challenges for the Qings.  Having only recently been 
conquered by the Chinese, the province remained connected to the neighbouring 
Central Asian khanate of Kokand through overlapping ties of faith, kinship and trade. 
Now exiled in Kokand, Turkestan’s former rulers retained great influence in the 
province on account of their leadership of a Sufi brotherhood that straddled the fuzzy 
border between the two territories. This brotherhood and the saintly families attached 
to it would eventually provide the primary mobilizational vehicles through which 
successive jihads would be launched against the Qings in Turkestan during the 
nineteenth century.534  
 In additional to its material and reputational costs, the White Lotus rebellion 
was thus also symptomatic of the growth throughout the empire of clandestine and 
semi-clandestine social networks during a period of rising social and political disorder. 
                                                 
532While White Lotus repertoires of rebellion, including the practice of magical rites of invulnerability, 
informed subsequent rebellions in North China in particular in the twentieth century (specifically the 
Boxer rebels and the Red Spears), Elizabeth Perry has argued convincingly against earlier suppositions 
claiming a direct ideological or organizational ancestry between White Lotus practitioners and later 
rebel movements. See generally Elizabeth J. Perry. Rebels and Revolutionaries in North China, 1845-
1945. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1980.  
533Ownby. Brotherhoods and Secret Societies in Early and Mid-Qing China, p. 5. 
534On this point, see Joseph Fletcher. "Ch'ing Inner Asia." In The Cambridge History of China, Volume 
10 - Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911, Part I, edited by Denis Twitchett and John King Fairbank, 35-106. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976. 
 266
From the Sufi brotherhoods and saintly families of Turkestan, through the scattered 
White Lotus congregations in northern and Central China and the Triads of the 
southern Maritime Provinces, the ruling dynasty’s declining capacity and legitimacy 
was mirrored in the spread of secretive and potentially subversive networks 
throughout the empire’s length and breadth. Given the immense size of the Manchu 
imperium and the limited state capacities for surveillance in a pre-industrial era, it 
would have been unreasonable to have expected the central state to have continuously 
monitored (let alone effectively controlled or even dismantled) all or indeed even most 
of these groups. Nevertheless, the government’s immediate response to the White 
Lotus rebellion in particular served to further dilute its already degraded monopoly on 
force within the empire, thus further weakening the dynasty’s grip on power. 
In the rebellion’s early stages, the poorly equipped and ill-disciplined imperial 
forces proved unable to effectively deal with the rebels’ hit and run tactics, and were 
continually frustrated by the rebels’ ability to either withdraw to their mountainous 
redoubts or else melt back into the local civilian population following their attacks.535 
Unable to effectively engage with the enemy, the government adopted a range of 
tactics that would become thoroughly familiar to subsequent generations of counter-
insurgency practitioners.  Central to the government’s strategy was a policy of 
‘strengthening the walls and clearing the countryside.’536 This policy entailed the 
comprehensive registration, concentration, and sequestration of civilians within 
strategic hamlets, with a view towards insulating them from the insurgents’ influence 
while simultaneously starving the insurgents of popular material and moral support. 
Given the strong links between the rebels and the local population, the t’uan-lien 
system (literally: ‘grouping and drilling’) was designed as much for purposes of 
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facilitating internal social monitoring and control as it was for defending against 
external threats.537 However, lest the system be mistaken for a successful assertion of 
the state’s bureaucratic powers over the populace, it must be added that an essential 
part of the t’uan-lien system was the establishment of popular militia, to be financed 
and led by the local gentry. Consequently, while the t’uan-lien system was conceived 
as an adjunct of state power and clothed in the protective camouflage of bureaucratic 
language, in effect it represented a form of nobility-led private military 
mobilization.538 
Whereas previously the elite Manchu cavalry and the state armed forces had 
been the primary loci of military power within the empire, the t’uan-lien system 
inaugurated a process of military devolution that would be radically magnified during 
the rebellions of the mid-nineteenth century. Personalistic ties and cash payments 
substituted for bureaucratic command as the integrative glue holding the local militias 
together, with the emergence of these militias signifying a partial reversal of the 
rationalization and centralization of organized violence that had occurred during the 
Qing Dynasty’s first century.539  In hindsight, the establishment of a system of local 
militia to combat the White Lotus rebels may have been unavoidable, given the 
weakness of imperial forces and given also the limited effectiveness of the 
mercenaries who were also hired (at ruinous expense) to crush the insurgency.540 But 
for all of their ostensible commitments to the maintenance of Confucian orthodoxy, 
the advent of the militias also represented a destabilizing diffusion of military power 
along two vertical axes – from the central state to the localities, and from the 
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conquering Manchus to the conquered Hans. More worryingly still for the ruling 
dynasty, the militia system could not simply be rolled up following the defeat of the 
rebellion. Instead, given the state’s persistent fiscal weakness and the unabating 
accumulation of social pressures accruing from continued population growth, the 
dynasty was forced to accept the t’uan-lien system as a vital component of the 
empire’s internal security apparatus. In this way, the White Lotus rebellion indirectly 
catalysed the dispersal of armed force within the empire, further fracturing the 
institutional bases of Manchu hegemony and thus white-anting the imperial core of the 
Sino-centric world order. 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
 
To briefly recap, the Sinosphere in the late eighteenth century was subject to 
three major structural vulnerabilities. Firstly, the order’s extreme reliance on China’s 
material and ideological power reserves rendered it highly susceptible to breakdown 
during periods of dynastic decline. The power vacuum engendered by downturns in 
the dynastic cycle in turn invited regional challengers such as Japan to reinterpret 
China’s tributary diplomacy in ways that contradicted the rigidly hierarchical 
cosmology underpinning the Sinosphere. Secondly, given that the Celestial Empire 
acknowledged no distinction between the domestic and international realms, and given 
also that imperial Confucianism explicitly conflated the sacred and temporal spheres, 
external challenges to the tributary system ran the risk of further corroding popular 
belief that the emperor retained the Mandate of Heaven.  In such circumstances, the 
ruling house remained vulnerable to the threat of internal sectarian rebellion, as 
popular dissatisfaction with an ailing dynasty found expression in calls to depose the 
emperor in favour of a new ruler capable of regaining Heaven’s Mandate and thereby 
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restoring cosmic and temporal order. Lastly, this internal threat became even more 
acute in those periods of Chinese history when the empire was ruled by foreign (i.e. 
non-Han) dynasties, and when xenophobic sentiment could thus combine with popular 
discontent and sectarian religious zeal to fuel rebellion against the Son of Heaven. 
 As the senile Qianlong emperor finally expired in 1798, the Qing Dynasty was 
showing unmistakeable signs of accelerating decline. In a technologically stagnant 
environment with limited scope for further increases in agricultural productivity, 
continuous demographic and commercial expansion was increasingly running up 
against ineluctable physical and ecological constraints. Simply stated, the empire was 
running out of the arable land needed to sustain its ever-expanding peasant population. 
While China was fortunate at this moment to be spared Malthusian correctives of the 
magnitude that had swept Christendom in the mid-fourteenth century, the absence of 
empire-wide famines or plagues ensured steadily declining per capita acreage, 
increasing peasant indebtedness and bankruptcy, and increasing popular recourse to 
adaptive strategies (e.g. banditry or internal migration) that further fuelled social and 
political instability. Like Christendom before it, China was also experiencing 
widespread institutional decay, manifest in the form of declining central state revenues 
and activism, together with a concomitant growth in the powers of arbitrary and 
corrupt local officials.  
Faced with both growing social tensions and declining governmental 
effectiveness and capacity, sections of the population became increasingly receptive to 
sectarian calls to overthrow the Qing dynasty. Whereas lay pietist movements within 
pre-Reformation Christendom had generally shied away from calls to overthrow the 
temporal authorities, in China sectarian rebels refracted the holistic cosmology of the 
ruling dynasty in their own conjoined impulses towards political and spiritual 
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renewal.541 The dynasty’s responses to the resulting sectarian rebellions in turn 
accelerated the diffusion of military power towards local Han gentry-officials, 
cultivating the growth of orthodox private militias to counter heterodox clandestine 
networks such as the White Lotus rebels. Imperial policies thus both reflected and 
reinforced an emerging dynamic of private military mobilization, yoked respectively 
around the poles of heterodox clandestine networks and officially sanctioned and 
ideologically orthodox gentry-led militias. In this way, late Qing policies partially 
reversed the centralization and bureaucratic rationalization of violence that had 
accompanied China’s absorption of the first ‘military revolution’ in the mid 
seventeenth century. 
 By the end of the Qianlong emperor’s reign, definite cracks were beginning to 
appear in the imperial edifice. However, while it is tempting to retrospectively discern 
the seeds of the Sinosphere’s collapse in the convulsions of the late eighteenth 
century, such an interpretation can only be advanced with caution and with appropriate 
qualifications. Undeniably, centrifugal forces were at work within the empire by 
century’s end, but it is worth noting that large-scale public disorder had yet to 
penetrate the empire’s densely populated economic heartland around the middle and 
lower Yangtze regions during this period. Fin de siecle conflagrations like the White 
Lotus rebellion and the Miao revolt undoubtedly posed serious threats to imperial rule.  
But these threats tended to remain localized, and tended also to crystallize in remote 
and recently settled frontier areas, such as the mountainous tri-border area between 
Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Hubei that formed the geographic epicentre of the White Lotus 
rebellion. Although the demographic and institutional drivers of dynastic decline were 
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prevalent throughout the empire, it was on the fringes and remote badlands of the Qing 
imperium rather than within the Han metropole that organized hostility towards the 
dynasty first manifested itself. Despite the great costs and debilitating institutional 
legacies spawned by imperial attempts to suppress these rebellions, the empire’s 
economic heartland remained secure at this time, enabling the imperial household to 
retain a misplaced optimism in the dynasty’s prospective longevity.  
 At the systemic level also, the international order of the Sinosphere appeared to 
remain superficially intact at the turn of the century. The cultural scaffolding of 
Confucian orthodoxy remained firmly in place throughout East Asia at this time, and 
while the empire was rotting from the inside, this had yet to be reflected in the growth 
of opportunistic predation by either pirates or rival states at the international level. 
Moreover, while private military mobilization was incrementally raising violence 
interdependence within the empire, analogous processes had yet to manifest 
themselves throughout the East Asian ecumene. Despite the Qing Dynasty’s internal 
decline, the Celestial Empire over which it presided remained the economic hub, 
military giant, and political apex of the region.  For the moment at least, China’s 
primacy remained beyond challenge, and its diplomatic practices of tribute trade and 
investiture continued to function effectively. In the absence of systemic ideological 
challenges or destabilizing changes in the Sinosphere’s material base, a centuries-old 
international order continued to prevail, even as the system’s contemporary custodians 
began to falter in their management of their own internal challenges. 
 Two vignettes, drawn from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, 
illustrate the Sinosphere’s resilience and its vulnerability at century’s end.  The first 
concerns China’s successful management of a localized succession conflict within her 
southern tributary of Annam (Vietnam). Between the period 1788-1790, the Qing 
emperor effectively used a combination of military intervention and his powers of 
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investiture to manage and ultimately resolve a conflict between the incumbent king of 
Vietnam and a pretender to the throne.542 Throughout the conflict, Qing policy 
oscillated between the two contenders. Initially, China provided refuge to the fleeing 
incumbent and sent an expeditionary force to help restore him to the throne.543 Later, 
this policy was reversed, with the emperor deciding that the incumbent had indeed lost 
the Mandate of Heaven, and that it was necessary to use his powers of investiture to 
legitimize the pretender’s succession to the throne.544  What is important about this 
anecdote is less the outcome of the conflict itself, and more the fact that all parties to 
the dispute openly acknowledged China’s suzerainty and powers of investiture and 
intervention as legitimate.545 What is more, in the aftermath of the dispute, Vietnam’s 
tributary missions to China dramatically increased, with the ceremonial and diplomatic 
bonds between suzerain and vassal actually intensifying rather than diminishing over 
subsequent decades, even as the Qing Dynasty grew weaker rather than stronger over 
time.546 
 The second vignette concerns the Chinese emperor’s rejection of a foreign 
visitor’s entreaties to establish trading relations with the Celestial Empire in 1817.  
The stranger had travelled from a distant land, and from a remote part of the world 
well beyond the Sinosphere that had recently been embroiled in war and revolution. 
Consequently, while he brought goods from his homeland in apparent observance of 
the requirements of tributary diplomacy, he remained unfamiliar with the rituals 
expected of a visiting vassal, and stubbornly refused to perform the kowtow at the 
imperial court. In light of this failure to observe the appropriate norms of the 
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Sinosphere, the emperor unsurprisingly refused either to meet with the visitor, or to 
grant him the trading privileges afforded to more loyal vassals. The emperor’s 
subsequent reprimand to the visitor’s distant sovereign, communicated by imperial 
edict and indicative of the supreme confidence worthy of the Son of Heaven, is worth 
quoting directly: ‘You live at such a great distance from the Middle Kingdom that 
these Embassies must cause you considerable inconvenience.  Your envoys, moreover, 
are wholly ignorant of Chinese ceremonial procedure, and the bickering which follows 
their arrival is highly displeasing to my ear.  My dynasty attaches no value to products 
from abroad; your nation’s cunningly wrought and strange wares do not appeal to me 
in the least, nor do they interest me.  For the future, O King, if you will keep your 
subjects in order and strengthen your national defences, I shall hold you in high 
esteem, notwithstanding your remoteness.  Henceforth, pray do not trouble to dispatch 
missions all this distance; they are merely a waste of time and have their journey for 
nothing. If you loyally accept our sovereignty and show dutiful submission, there is 
really no need for these yearly appearances at our Court to prove that you are indeed 
our vassal. We issue this mandate to the end that you may perpetually comply 
therewith.’547 In the face of this intransigence, Lord Amherst and the other 
representatives of the British East India Company had no choice but to withdraw. The 
next time the British sought trading privileges from the Celestial Empire, they would 
prove less easy to rebuff.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
HEAVENLY KINGDOM, IMPERIAL NEMESIS – THE TAIPING 
REBELLION AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE SINOSPHERE 
 
‘Both in Heaven and on earth is the Heavenly Kingdom of the Divine Father.  Do not 
imagine that it refers solely to the Heavenly Kingdom in Heaven. Thus the Great Elder 
Brother formerly issued an edict foretelling the coming of the Heavenly Kingdom 
soon, meaning that the Heavenly Kingdom would come into being on earth.  Today 
the Heavenly Father and the Heavenly Elder Brother descend into the world to 
establish the Heavenly Kingdom…’548 
 
Introduction 
 
As it entered the nineteenth century, the Sinosphere superficially presented as a robust 
international order.  While the Qing Dynasty was showing signs of deterioration, 
China remained East Asia’s undisputed hegemon. Internally, the imperial household 
had succeeded in suppressing various internal rebellions by 1813, while internationally 
the British East India Company’s entreaties to secure greater trading privileges with 
China had also been easily rebuffed. In spite of accelerating institutional decay and 
mounting popular disaffection with the ruling dynasty, the Manchus retained sufficient 
reserves of authoritative and coercive power to suppress or repel their diverse rebel 
and ‘barbarian’ antagonists, while also securing broad international adherence to the 
prevailing norms and practices of the East Asian suzerain state system. Critically, in 
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the century’s opening decades, the challenges of internal rebellion and foreign 
harassment could also be managed as distinct and separate threats, having no real 
bearing on one another.  Unfortunately, the discrete character of China’s various 
internal and external challenges would not endure. Instead, in the middle decades of 
the nineteenth century, the empire’s resources were stretched almost to breaking point 
as sectarian rebellion and external predation catastrophically converged.  From a 
population of approximately 410 million in 1850, China’s population is estimated to 
have fallen to approximately 350 million by the time the last of the mid-century 
rebellions was finally suppressed in 1873.549 Beyond the enormous physical and 
human toll inflicted by these conflicts, their chief institutional legacy was to further 
accelerate the cascading downwards of military and fiscal power to regional 
strongmen, fatally compromising the dynasty’s subsequent ‘self-strengthening’ 
program of defensive modernization.550 More broadly still, the confluence of 
millenarian rebellion and Western encroachment terminally destabilized the normative 
foundations of the Sinosphere, contributing to its subsequent obliteration and 
absorption into an international society of sovereign states.         
 This chapter continues the narrative of systemic decay, decline and dissolution 
begun in chapter six, and focuses predominantly on the concatenation of mid-
nineteenth century crises that effectively gutted the imperial core of the Sinosphere. 
Section one sketches the broad nature of the Western threat to the Sinosphere, 
denoting the conjunction of normative and material transformations that enabled 
Western powers to forcibly open China to increased foreign trade from the Opium 
War (1839-1842) onwards. Sections two, three and four respectively focus on the 
origins, evolution and subsequent suppression of the Taiping rebellion, the most 
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protracted, damaging and ideologically subversive of the revolts that shook the Qing 
Dynasty in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. Section five discusses the 
systemic consequences of China’s mid-century crisis, detailing the delegitimation, 
corrosion and breakdown of China’s system of tributary diplomacy from the 1860s 
onwards. The discussion concludes with a brief consideration of religious rebellions in 
China and Korea (its erstwhile tributary) at century’s end. Paradoxically, these 
religious rebellions arose in resistance to the encroaching Western-dominated system 
of states, but also served as the unintended midwives of nationalism in both countries, 
thereby indirectly aiding the state system’s long-term consolidation in the East Asian 
region.   
 
7.1 Barbarians at the Gates – Opium, Gunboats and the Cross in the Opening 
Phase of Western Encroachment into the Sinosphere 
 
7.1.1 The Advent of Gunboat Diplomacy and the Growth of Violence Interdependence 
in East Asia 
 
In the late eighteenth century, a series of interlocking transformations began to unfurl 
in the Atlantic state system. These transformations, encompassing revolutionary 
changes in modes of political legitimation, wealth accumulation, and state 
administration, would within a century propel the Western world to a historically 
unprecedented position of global dominance. The popular sovereignty revolution, the 
industrial revolution, and the nineteenth century revolution in state power together 
bequeathed a radically new type of state-society complex in the form of the modern 
nation-state. From the 1850s onward, the emerging nation-states of North-Western 
Europe proved capable of concentrating and mobilizing authoritative and coercive 
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power resources to a degree unmatched either by the Absolutist monarchies that 
preceded them, or by the decaying agrarian empires with which they were by then 
grappling for control of Eurasia. This quantum leap in social power eventually opened 
up a huge asymmetry of power between Western and non-Western powers, enabling 
the forcible incorporation of the world into a single international system by 1900. The 
nature of these interlocking revolutions and their global geopolitical consequences will 
be elaborated in greater detail in later chapters. For now it is sufficient to note that the 
revolutionary changes that would drive the West’s global ascendancy were still in 
their early stages in the first half of the nineteenth century. Consequently, while 
Europeans were capable of militarily defeating the Chinese by the 1840s, neither the 
true extent of their growing supremacy nor the revolutionary implications of this new 
power imbalance were fully apparent at the time, either to the Europeans or to the 
Chinese. 
 In the East Asian theatre, the British East India Company’s introduction of iron 
steam-ships provided the metaphorical forceps the British needed to pry China open to 
foreign trade.  As I have noted in chapter six, China was suffering from both 
institutional decay and growing ideological opposition to Manchu rule (manifesting 
itself in the form of peasant sectarian rebellions) towards the end of the Qianlong 
emperor’s reign. Additionally, processes of domestic military and fiscal 
decentralization were already underway. Unlike Latin Christendom at a similar stage 
of decay, however, systemic increases in violence interdependence throughout East 
Asia were limited up to 1800, owing in no small part to the lack of continuing military 
innovations emanating from the Sinosphere’s Chinese core. In the early decades of the 
nineteenth century, however, this situation began to change with the accelerating 
intrusion of Western commercial pressures along China’s south-eastern maritime 
provinces. Westerners had maintained a continuous commercial presence in the region 
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that dated back to the sixteenth century.551 However, their demands for increased 
access to Chinese markets had previously been moderated, both by their lack of 
desired commodities (excepting precious metals) with which to trade in exchange for 
Chinese goods, and also by their inability to compel Chinese acquiescence to greater 
trading privileges through force of arms. China was at this stage both too 
economically self-sufficient to be tempted and too militarily strong to be coerced into 
granting increased trading privileges to the ‘red-haired barbarians.’ 
 In the years leading up to the Opium War, however, neither of the above 
conditions continued to obtain.  Within Britain itself, the growing prosperity begotten 
by the industrial revolution led to an increase in demand for precious commodities 
from China, most particularly Chinese tea. Given China’s lack of interest in British 
textiles or manufactures, Chinese tea could only be paid for with scarce precious 
metals such as gold and silver. For the British, this unhappy situation began to 
improve after 1820, as growing Chinese demand for opium provided them with a 
tradeable bulk commodity that could profitably be exchanged for Chinese tea, thereby 
staunching the eastern flow of Britain’s bullion reserves.552 From this point onwards, a 
triangular trade flourished between India, China, and Britain – opium was cultivated 
on the East India Company’s (EIC’s) Indian plantations, to then be exchanged for 
Chinese tea, which was then exported onwards to Britain.553  Britain’s gains from the 
opium trade were substantial. Not only did the trade promise to resolve Britain’s 
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perennial trade deficit with China, but opium also yielded one seventh of the total 
revenue of British India in the nineteenth century, in effect serving as a crucial fiscal 
strut propping up the consolidation and subsequent expansion of the sub-continental 
core of Britain’s overseas empire.554 For the Chinese, by contrast, the opium trade 
exacerbated social disorder in the Maritime Provinces, as well as further stimulating 
the growth of criminal and potentially subversive elements such as the Triads and 
other Han Chinese secret societies. Chinese officials also correctly blamed the opium 
trade on China’s rising outflows of silver. Thanks to China’s bi-metallic currency 
system, in which peasants’ land taxes were paid in copper but assessed and transmitted 
to the central government in silver, the rising relative value of silver to copper resulted 
in an increase in peasants’ real tax burden without yielding any compensatory increase 
in the central state’s income.555 In the minds of Chinese officialdom, the opium trade 
was thus linked via its mediation through the imperial fiscal system to growing 
popular distress and disaffection with the government, a perception that contributed 
along with the trade’s more obvious evils to the government’s decision to ban the 
trade and consumption of opium in 1836.556    
 In light of the great commercial and political importance of the opium trade to 
Britain’s expanding empire, the Chinese opium ban was always likely to introduce 
further friction into an already fraught Sino-British relationship. Given Britain’s 
longstanding ambitions to circumvent China’s extensive restrictions on trade, and 
given also China’s countervailing determination to minimize foreign contacts through 
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a strict enforcement of those very same restrictions, the subsequent slide towards war 
was perhaps inevitable. However, while both sides were from the outset confident of 
victory, neither the British nor the Chinese could possibly have anticipated the 
revolutionary repercussions that would flow from China’s eventual defeat in 1842. 
The course of the Opium War itself has been explored in numerous studies, its precise 
details need not detain us here.557 What is relevant to this inquiry is a brief 
consideration of the exact causes of China’s defeat, which lay primarily in Western 
technological innovations that broke the military deadlock that had formerly confined 
the Western trading presence to the coastal enclave of Canton.  
From the first military revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
the countries of Western Europe had acquired an unrivalled advantage in naval 
warfare through their development of broadside-firing battleships. However, while this 
growing naval supremacy enabled Western Europeans to gradually establish control 
over strategic sea-lanes, up until the nineteenth century their colonial presence in the 
Old World was largely restricted to networks of fortified coastal enclaves dispersed 
across the Afro-Eurasian littoral.558 European naval power was not matched by 
European land power sufficient to overawe robust imperial mega-states such as China. 
Given Europeans’ historic inability to project military power into the Eurasian interior, 
the Chinese could for a long time regard them as a manageable irritant on a par with 
Japanese pirates, rather than perceiving them as a serious strategic threat.  
 This longstanding military deadlock collapsed with the British East India 
Company’s introduction of compartmentalized iron steamships into Chinese littoral 
waters in 1840. Whereas deep-draught sailing ships were restricted to coastal 
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harassment of Chinese forces, shallow-draught steamships such as the Nemesis were 
capable of navigating China’s complex network of estuaries and shallow channels, and 
were also capable of snaking up its riverine arteries deep into the Chinese interior.559 
This capability, together with the Nemesis’ complement of mobile cannons, enabled 
her to destroy Canton’s defending junks and forts at will in the opening stages of the 
conflict.560 More fundamentally, the newly acquired ability to traverse China’s internal 
river systems enabled the British to score the decisive victory of the conflict. In June 
1842, the British fleet entered the Yangtze River, destined for the Manchu garrison 
town of Chinkiang, a city lying at the intersection of the Yangtze and the Grand 
Canal.561 Given that the Grand Canal was the principal north-south trade route along 
which rice was transported from the southern rice-bowl provinces to the capital of 
Peking, the seizure of Chinkiang effectively cut the Chinese empire in half, thus 
compelling the Chinese to sue for peace in July.562 
 The introduction of the gunboat into European colonial warfare increased 
violence interdependence within East Asia in a manner that fundamentally altered the 
Sinosphere’s underlying material foundations. Prior to the First Opium War, a gigantic 
agrarian gunpowder empire had dominated the East Asian security environment, its 
rulers’ focus fixed principally on deterring land-based threats emanating from the 
nomadic northern steppe. After the First Opium War, however, the Sinosphere’s 
strategic centre of gravity began to shift decisively away from the northern steppe, and 
towards the Western Pacific. Following the forced opening of China to foreign trade in 
1842, the gunboat featured conspicuously in subsequent Western campaigns to secure 
commercial and political dominance in the region. The arrival of Commodore Perry’s 
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ships in Japan in 1853, the Second Opium War (1856-1860), the Second and Third 
Anglo-Burmese Wars (1852-1853 and 1885), and the French conquests of Tonkin 
(1873-1874) and Annam (1883) each testified to the novel power projection capacities 
rapidly accruing to the Western maritime powers as a result of industrialization.563 
From mid century onwards, the Western powers’ abilities to project power globally 
would be further enhanced due to technological innovations (e.g. the telegraph), 
improved knowledge systems (e.g. improved coastal mapping techniques), and 
organizational adaptations (e.g. the Royal Navy’s development of a trans-continental 
network of coaling stations).564 These revolutionary changes guaranteed that the 
strategic initiative thus irretrievably slipped away from China after the First Opium 
War.  More crucially still, they delivered regional preponderance towards a precocious 
host of ‘barbarian’ maritime powers, whose origins from beyond the Sinosphere left 
them unfamiliar with and contemptuous of the region’s diplomatic norms and rituals. 
Beyond the immediate material dislocation induced by the West’s maritime 
ascendancy, it would be this attitude of dismissive disregard for the Sinosphere’s 
constitutional norms that would eventually prove most subversive to the maintenance 
of the established East Asian international order. 
 
7.1.2 Civilizations Clashing, Cosmologies Colliding - The Ideological Impact of 
China’s Defeat in the First Opium War 
 
 Despite its far-reaching impact, the Treaty of Nanjing, which formally resolved 
the First Opium War in August 1842, contained continuities with past diplomatic 
practice for both the British and the Chinese negotiators. In negotiating an end to the 
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conflict, China agreed to the opening up of foreign trade in five treaty ports, and 
additionally ceded to Britain the barren island of Hong Kong in perpetuity.565 The key 
treaty provisions governing the new arrangements included: (1) extra-territoriality 
(foreign consular jurisdiction over foreign nationals); (2) an indemnity; (3) a moderate 
tariff and direct foreign contact with Chinese customs collectors; (4) most-favoured-
nation treatment; and (5) freedom of trade with all comers.566 For the British, the 
powers of extra-territorial jurisdiction extracted from the Chinese paralleled similar 
concessions previously granted to Westerners in both the Ottoman Empire and also in 
the Muslim states of North Africa.567 The British regarded extra-territorial application 
of British law as essential in non-Western states, both to grant traders the commercial 
certainty provided under British contract and property law, and also to protect 
Westerners from the alleged arbitrariness and cruelty of indigenous criminal legal 
codes.568 Other concessions, ranging from the standardization of China’s tariff regime 
through to the application of most-favoured-nation provisions, admittedly reflected 
Britain’s material interests as the world’s leading trading nation and sole industrial 
power.  At the same time, however, these concessions also reflected a deeper 
conviction in the ameliorative influence of free trade, conceived not merely as an 
engine of prosperity and peace, but also as a contributor to the moral elevation of 
nations as well.569  
 Equally, for the Chinese, the concessions contained in the Treaty of Nanjing 
were perceived as far from revolutionary. On the contrary, these concessions for the 
most part echoed earlier arrangements made with other ‘barbarians’ aggressively 
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seeking access to Chinese markets, as demonstrated for example in the concessions 
granted to the Central Asian khanate of Kokand at the conclusion of hostilities along 
China’s East Turkestan border in 1835.570 From a Western (or more specifically, 
Westphalian) perspective, the granting of extra-territorial jurisdiction to foreigners 
marked a serious dilution of a host state’s domestic sovereignty, potentially signifying 
its de facto subordination to the imperatives of contracting states. Chinese officials by 
contrast deemed it preferable for foreigners to govern and police themselves within 
clearly demarcated enclaves, having previously applied a similar regime to resident 
Arab traders as far back as the thirteenth century.571 In the same vein, the most-
favoured-nation provision was interpreted not as a capitulation to Western demands, 
but rather as a gesture of imperial benevolence and munificence fully in keeping with 
well-established practices of ‘barbarian management.’572 As the traditional cultural 
and economic centre of civilization within the region, the Chinese had historically 
acquired a great deal of experience in pacifying and subduing less developed 
neighbouring polities through the granting of selective trading concessions. Such 
concessions had in the past reliably mollified foreigners, who had been generally 
content to reciprocate by conforming to the mandatory rituals of obeisance expected 
by the Chinese emperor in exchange for his generosity.573 In light of this past 
experience, the imperial court’s failure to properly apprehend the full import of the 
West’s initial encroachments – while lamentable - is nevertheless understandable. 
 Unfortunately for the imperial household, while the Chinese took the Treaty of 
Nanjing to represent a definitive settlement of the Western barbarian question, the 
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Westerners conversely regarded the Treaty as a baseline for continuing negotiations, a 
legal point d’appui which could subsequently be used to leverage more generous 
trading concessions from the Chinese.574 Underlying this mutual misperception was a 
far more radical dissonance in the respective world-views informing Western and 
Chinese conceptions of international order. Recapitulating briefly, the Sinosphere was 
hierarchical in its conception, moral in its essential character, and deliberately flexible 
and ambiguous with respect to its key mechanisms of operation. It was hierarchical, 
inasmuch as the Son of Heaven presided over the cosmic and social order, and was 
thus placed in a position of explicit superiority and authority in relation to other 
polities. It was moral, in that the emperor was bound to vassal states through 
asymmetric bonds of benevolence and obedience that were conceived in explicitly 
moral and familial terms.  And it was deliberately flexible and ambiguous, in that the 
tribute trade system allowed the emperor to buy off barbarians when China was weak, 
and control or limit their access to Chinese markets when China was strong, at all 
times overlaying the barbarians’ commercial activities with rituals of obeisance that 
symbolically affirmed a Sino-centric cosmic and political order.575   
 Conversely, Western conceptions of international order were egalitarian in 
their conception, legal in their essential character, and conceived in such a way as to 
limit ambiguity and codify contracting parties’ relationships as precisely as 
possible.576 Conceptually, Western international law from the late eighteenth century 
onwards increasingly emphasized notions of sovereign equality, explicitly 
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contradicting the hierarchical assumptions upon which international order was based 
in East Asia.577 In place of the paternal moralism characteristic of East Asian 
diplomacy, Westerners conceived international relationships as being mediated 
through a depersonalized, formal, rationalized corpus of international law.578 Finally, 
rather than abiding by the flexibility and ambiguity that marked the Sinosphere’s 
system of tributary trade, Westerners demanded that contracting parties’ rights be 
explicitly codified in treaty form.579 To the extent that scope existed for a revision of 
parties’ rights and responsibilities under the Western conception of international order, 
it could be secured only through a renegotiation of said treaties, which was in turn 
frequently driven by the stronger party’s insistence and the weaker party’s 
acquiescence.     
 From a Chinese perspective, the Western conception of international order was 
therefore inherently subversive and even blasphemous, denying as it did the 
hierarchical essence of diplomatic practice in the Sinosphere, and also calling into 
question the emperor’s status as the Son of Heaven. Moreover, while the tribute trade 
system could accommodate periodic declines in Chinese military power vis-à-vis 
culturally backward barbarians, it could only do so in circumstances where foreigners 
were still willing to at least publicly acquiesce to the symbolic re-affirmation of the 
broad cosmology underpinning imperial authority. In the face of Western 
intransigence, by contrast, traditional Chinese mechanisms of accommodation and 
appeasement were rendered ineffective. Making matters worse still, the Western 
emphasis on sovereign equality soon proved highly selective in its application to non-
European polities. Both the Enlightenment and the French and American revolutions 
had worked to destabilize the Absolutist nexus between cosmos and polis, and had 
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consequently contributed to the growth of a more secularized and egalitarian 
international legal system within the West in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. Paradoxically, however, from 1800 onwards, the West’s collective 
ascendancy over Asia and Africa was increasingly reflected in the formulation of a 
‘standard of civilization’ that explicitly posited the superiority of Christian over non-
Christian nations, and provided legal justification for the subordination of ‘barbaric’ 
and ‘savage’ nations to Western hegemony.580 Over the course of the nineteenth 
century, religion would eventually be supplemented and then ultimately surpassed by 
race as the primary lens through which civilizational difference was conceptualized in 
the West. The examples of Japan and Siam also demonstrate that not all polities in the 
Sinosphere were destined for foreign subjugation, and that the ‘standard of 
civilization’ could be enabling as well as constraining for those polities that 
successfully undertook rapid modernization in the face of the Western threat.  
Nevertheless, the basic reality remains that the First Opium War marked the intrusion 
of a new conception of international order into the Sinosphere, one that recoded the 
classic distinction between civilized and barbarian states, and thereby radically 
inverted the political and cosmic hierarchy upon which international order in East Asia 
had hitherto been based.  
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7.2 The Western Encroachment, Evangelical Christianity, and the Birth of the 
Taiping Heavenly Kingdom Movement 
 
7.2.1. The Taiping Rebellion – The Enabling Context 
 
Defeat in war has served as a catalyst for domestic upheaval in many instances 
throughout history, and China in the years following the First Opium War proved to be 
no exception to this generalization. Given the foreign character of the Manchu 
government, the emperor’s capitulation to Western demands at Nanjing inevitably 
exacerbated Han resentments towards the ruling dynasty, further nurturing Ming 
restorationist sentiment among China’s heterodox criminal and sectarian networks.  
The Manchus’ defeat in the Opium War, coupled with continuing governmental decay 
and rising criminality and social unrest in China’s coastal provinces, also added to the 
widespread perception that the dynasty had lost the Mandate of Heaven, and was set 
on a course of irreversible decline.581  Both anti-Manchu sentiment and the belief that 
the government had lost its Heavenly Mandate constituted iterations of familiar 
themes in Chinese history, which had reliably recurred during previous cycles of 
dynastic decline. But in the wake of the Opium War, the government’s loss of prestige 
was compounded by the intrusion of a set of beliefs that fundamentally challenged the 
cosmology sustaining the Sinosphere as an international order. The official dimension 
of this challenge, in the form of the ‘standard of civilization’ underpinning the system 
of unequal treaties, has already been discussed. However, the encroachment of 
Western diplomatic norms was accompanied also by a more diffuse and unofficial 
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challenge to the Sinosphere’s integrity, in the growth of Christian missionary activity 
following the Opium War.  
 While the Treaty of Nanjing contained no explicit provisions guaranteeing 
Western missionaries rights to proselytize throughout China, the treaty provisions 
relating to extra-territoriality nevertheless indirectly boosted the missionary effort.582 
This is because these provisions afforded missionaries the necessary legal protection 
to proselytize within a country in which Christianity had been officially proscribed 
since 1724 as a heterodox and potentially subversive foreign doctrine.583 Despite the 
missionaries’ best efforts, the bulk of the Chinese population would for a range of 
reasons eventually prove impervious to the Christian message. Nevertheless, Chinese 
officialdom’s longstanding hostility towards Christianity would soon be vindicated, 
for the missionary movement introduced to southern China a set of ideas that radically 
challenged Confucian orthodoxy. These ideas will only be mentioned here in passing, 
for it was only once they were adapted and indigenized by Chinese converts that they 
truly acquired their revolutionary character. Stated briefly, whereas Confucianism 
projected an unreservedly hierarchical and familial conception of social order, 
Christianity conversely emphasized the equality of all humans under the Heavenly 
Father, and provided only qualified and ambiguous justification for political and 
economic inequalities in the earthly world.584 Similarly, whereas imperial state 
ideology conflated the temporal and spiritual realms, Christianity expressly 
emphasized their distinct character, advancing a transcendent rather than an immanent 
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conception of the divine.585  Finally, whereas Confucian orthodoxy openly deified the 
emperor as the Son of Heaven, Christianity reserved divine status for the Holy Trinity, 
and condemned all attempts to deify earthly rulers as idolatry.586 
 
7.2.2 Hong Xiuquan and the Origins of the Taiping Ideology 
 
The subversive nature of Christianity’s key tenets antagonized both Chinese 
state officials and the gentry elite, who stoked popular xenophobia and anti-Christian 
superstitions in a largely successful effort to staunch the religion’s spread among the 
peasantry.587 Nonetheless, given both the fervour of the foreign missionaries and their 
immunity from official prosecution, the conversion of some Chinese was unavoidable. 
One of these converts was Hong Xiuquan, a failed candidate for the imperial 
bureaucracy who would go on to become the chief prophet and supreme leader of the 
Taiping Heavenly Kingdom movement.  Hong’s first indirect exposure to Christianity 
came in 1836, when he came into possession of a pamphlet written by another Chinese 
convert entitled Good Works to Admonish the Age.588  A confusing synthesis of Bible 
extracts interspersed with the author’s own commentary on contemporary Chinese 
society, Good Works provided Hong with an at best distorted and idiosyncratic 
introduction to Christian theology, and was in any case quickly filed away and ignored 
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by the recipient after a cursory perusal.589 Following his third failure to secure entry 
into the imperial bureaucracy the following year, Hong became delirious and suffered 
a mental breakdown. During this time, he experienced a series of visions, including 
one in which his internal organs were removed by demons and replaced with new 
ones, another in which he was introduced to a golden-bearded man who was identified 
as his father, and yet another in which Hong fought demons alongside a heavenly elder 
brother.590 Upon Hong’s fourth failure to pass the imperial exams in 1843, he revisited 
the long-neglected Good Works pamphlet, after which he reinterpreted his earlier 
visions as a divine revelation calling on him to overthrow the Manchus and establish 
the Christian God’s Heavenly Kingdom on earth. In 1847, Hong further clarified his 
vision through a brief period of religious instruction under an American Protestant 
missionary based in Canton. By this stage, however, the essential elements of the 
Taiping ideology, a hybrid combination of Protestant evangelical Christianity and 
Chinese folk millenarianism, had already been consolidated. In abbreviated form, its 
key features are presented below. 
 Both Taiping adherents and their Confucian detractors identified the Taiping 
movement as being essentially Christian in its overall character. This characterization 
was far from unwarranted, given that Protestant Christian texts and motifs formed the 
foundation and original source material for much of Hong Xiuquan’s vision.  In 
keeping with mainstream Christian teaching, Hong preached that there was only one 
God, a Heavenly Father who had sent his son Jesus Christ into the world to redeem the 
sins of mankind. Hong’s God was also the God of the Ten Commandments, the self-
sufficient moral and legal code to which God’s followers were to adhere if they 
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wished to enter into paradise.591  The rite of baptism, strict observation of the Sabbath, 
the rejection of Confucian hierarchy in favour of an emphasis on humans’ equality 
before God, and an uncompromising repudiation of idolatry were all characteristics of 
the Taiping faith that tied it back to its Protestant missionary origins.592 Importantly, 
however, the Taiping faith also placed disproportionate emphasis on the more 
Manichean and apocalyptic themes of evangelical Protestantism. Thus, the Sinologist 
Eugene Boardman writes that the ‘[the] gentler features of the Christian faith seem to 
have been entirely absent…’ from the Taiping faith.593 This is perhaps unsurprising 
given that Good Words, Hong’s original introduction to Christianity, began with the 
story of Adam and Eve’s fall from grace and concluded with graphic descriptions of 
the Last Judgment, according little if any attention to Christ’s Sermon on the 
Mount.594 However, it is also demonstrative of the fact that the Taiping revelation took 
shape in an environment in which expectations of dynastic decline were already rife 
among the Han majority, and in which millenarian visions of apocalypse and 
redemption formed an indelible part of China’s spiritual landscape. 
 For all of its Christian influences, the Taiping faith was emphatically hybrid in 
its construction, constituting an indigenization of Christianity that appeared both 
subversive to orthodox Confucian Chinese and heretical to mainstream Western 
Christians. By far the most straightforwardly subversive element of Hong’s revelation 
was his condemnation of the imperial neo-Confucian ideology as idolatrous in its 
elevation of the emperor to divine status.595 Like many Han Chinese, Hong harboured 
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an abiding antipathy for the Manchus. However, his absorption of the Christian 
conception of an anthropomorphized Heavenly Father provided Hong with a powerful 
new rationale for challenging the very foundation of the imperial office itself. In 
openly opposing the deification of the Chinese emperor, Hong conformed to the tenets 
of mainstream Christianity, although his calls to overthrow the reigning dynasty 
departed from the public message of the Protestant missionary movement. However, 
in religiously justifying his revolutionary political program to his followers, Hong 
radically departed from mainstream Christianity. In an unconscious reflection of the 
Confucian orthodoxy that he so resolutely opposed, Hong fundamentally 
misinterpreted the Christian notion of the Heavenly Kingdom. Whereas Christianity 
stressed the distinctiveness of the City of Man and the City of God, Hong echoed the 
holistic conflation of the spiritual with the temporal that was characteristic of 
Confucian orthodoxy, conceiving the Heavenly Kingdom as being both earthly and 
social as well as ethereal and spiritual in nature.596  In accounting for contemporary 
China’s perceived moral and political decline, Hong argued that the Chinese had 
abandoned their ancient worship of a single and all-powerful God, and that emperors 
from the Qin Dynasty onwards had perpetuated China’s continuing estrangement from 
God by claiming the title of Son of Heaven.597 As the second son of the Heavenly 
Father and the younger brother of Jesus Christ, it was Hong’s divine mission to 
overthrow the Manchu dynasty in an apocalyptic war between the children of light and 
the children of darkness, after which he would then establish God’s Heavenly 
Kingdom on earth.598 While he abjured claims to personal divinity in keeping with 
Christian orthodoxy, Hong thus located himself within the Heavenly family. More 
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fundamentally, he appropriated the most eschatological themes of Christianity and 
situated them within traditional Chinese narratives of dynastic decline, creating a 
hybrid faith that enjoined fanatical, total armed opposition not merely to the Manchu 
dynasty, but to the entire Confucian social order itself.599 
 
7.2.3 The Society of God Worshippers and the Social Origins of the Taiping Rebellion 
 
Hong was first exposed to Christianity while visiting Guangdong’s capital of 
Canton. This is unsurprising, given that Canton was at the time the focal point for 
Western trade with China, and was thus the primary conduit for enabling Sino-
Western religious and cultural exchange. Nevertheless, it was in Guangdong’s 
hinterland, in the mountainous backwaters of the neighbouring province of Guangxi, 
where the Taiping religion first found popular purchase. Given the more general 
failure of Christianity to win Chinese converts, a consideration of the specific 
constellation of social conditions that facilitated the growth of the Taiping movement 
in Guangxi is essential to an understanding of the course and dynamics of the 
subsequent rebellion. 
 In many respects, the social problems afflicting Guangxi in the aftermath of the 
First Opium War were far from exceptional, but rather reflected the more general 
malaise then afflicting the empire. Like many other provinces, Guangxi was 
experiencing growing social unrest and criminality as a result of a range of generic 
structural pressures, including over-population, growing peasant landlessness and 
vagrancy, an increasingly regressive taxation system, and a corrupt and moribund 
                                                 
599Franz Michael. The Taiping Rebellion, History and Documents - Volume I: History. University of 
Washington Press: Seattle, 1966, p. 4. Michael goes so far as to characterize the Taiping movement as 
totalitarian in its aspirations to completely remake Chinese society, a point to which I will return in 
greater detail below.  
 295
local bureaucracy.600 In the face of rising banditry and an increase in conflict over 
dwindling land resources, the region had also witnessed the growth of local gentry-led 
defence units and militias, even as the more desperate or opportunistic of the peasantry 
simultaneously threw their lot in with the ubiquitous Triads and other self-help secret 
societies.601 Further aggravating an already tense security situation, Britain’s victory in 
the Opium War and subsequent piracy-clearing operations around the Pearl River 
Delta displaced many pirates upriver, funnelling them up the West River and into 
Guangxi.602 Being separated from other parts of China by natural mountainous 
borders, the provinces of Guangdong and Guangxi together constituted a single 
economic unit.603 But while Guangdong provided the portal through which Western 
religious doctrines flowed into China, it was in Guangxi’s tense and conflict-laden 
social milieu that Hong found his adherents, and was able to construct his holy army. 
 Within Guangxi, the Taiping faith first gained popularity among the Hakkas 
(literally ‘guests’), an ethnic minority that the government had encouraged to migrate 
into Guangxi in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to relieve population 
pressures in neighbouring Guangdong.604 While they were culturally Sinicized, the 
Hakkas nevertheless retained a distinctive ethnic identity. Not only did they preserve 
their own dialect, but the Hakkas also preserved their own customs as well. Hakka 
women were not forced to bind their feet, but rather worked in the fields.605 As they 
did not bind their feet, other Chinese men found Hakka women unattractive, thereby 
ensuring a continuing intermarriage among the Hakkas that preserved their 
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distinctiveness from the surrounding population.606 While Hakkas in Guangxi were 
held in higher regard than local indigenous tribal peoples such as the Miao, the more 
established and more Sinicized Punti Chinese settlers did nevertheless resent their 
presence. As recent arrivals to Guangxi, the Hakka subsisted either as tenants under 
the yoke of ethnically different landlords, or alternatively eked out an existence as 
homesteaders on the region’s more marginal lands.607 Moreover, whereas more 
established Punti settlers cohered around localized lineage structures and frequently 
clustered in single-surname villages, the Hakkas’ ability to mobilize in defence of their 
interests was weakened by their more fragmented kinship and settlement patterns.608 
As population pressures increased, feuding between the Hakka and other ethnic groups 
also escalated. This further worsened the Hakkas’ collective condition, leaving them 
susceptible to the message of salvation Hong Xiuquan’s earliest followers brought to 
Guangxi from 1844 onwards.  
 Guangxi at the dawn of the Taiping movement was a volatile, over-populated, 
and weakly governed frontier region, where a kaleidoscope of different ethnic groups 
uneasily co-existed, and where non-state violence – in the form of lineage feuds, 
ethnic conflict, and organized criminal activity – was endemic. As a culturally 
assimilated but socially disorganized ethnic grouping, the Hakkas were particularly 
vulnerable to predation. Lacking the social cohesion and ready access to lineage 
wealth of the more established Punti settlers, the Hakkas found it difficult to mobilize 
in defence of their interests.609 At the same time, being at once culturally Sinicized but 
collectively distinct by virtue of their dialect and customs, the Hakkas lacked the 
symbolic vocabulary through which ethnic grievances could be conceptualized, let 
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alone openly articulated.610 In accounting for the Hakkas’ enthusiastic reception of the 
Taiping faith, it is therefore worth noting that the new religion provided the Hakkas 
with both a symbolic vocabulary with which to conceptualize their shared grievances, 
as well as a shared organizational vehicle (in the form of the God Worshipping 
Society) through which collective action was now possible.611 The fact that both Hong 
Xiuquan and his earliest disciples were themselves Hakkas also helps to account for 
the Hakka minority’s special receptivity to the Taiping message, as does the fact that 
many Hakkas were already landless (having been driven by their homes by ceaseless 
feuding) and therefore available to join the vast peasant host that would become the 
Taiping Heavenly Army. 
 In explaining the rise of the Taiping movement, Philip Kuhn explicitly 
emphasizes the parallels between the social reality of ethnic conflict in Guangxi and 
the Manichean world-view and redemptive promise of the Taiping religion, writing: 
‘The fact was the polarization of society between hostile ethnic groups. The metaphor 
was a starkly metaphysical description of a world polarized between the saved and the 
damned.’612 While this observation pithily captures the fit between the Hakkas’ 
vulnerable position within Chinese society and the apocalyptic appeal of the Taiping 
faith, it is worth reiterating the multiple causes underlying the movement’s genesis, 
ranging from the broader structural dynamics of dynastic decline through to the 
distinctive combination of lawlessness, ethnic heterogeneity, and openness to foreign 
cultural and religious influences that characterized the Guangxi and Guangdong 
regions. It is also worth stressing that while the Hakkas formed the bulk of the 
movement’s early membership, at no time did they exclusively dominate it, and at no 
time did the Taiping leadership ever conceptualize it as a specifically Hakka 
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movement.613  Indeed, it was precisely the ideological universalism of the Taiping 
faith and its accompanying imperial ambitions that distinguished it from the 
contemporaneous local tribal and sectarian rebellions that also shook the empire in the 
third quarter of the nineteenth century. Other rebels sought merely to protect 
communal interests, or at best to revise the terms of their relationship with the Son of 
Heaven. The Taipings sought nothing less than to bring heaven to earth. 
  
7.3 Thy Kingdom Come – The Rise and Demise of the Heavenly Kingdom of 
Great Peace 
 
7.3.1 From Iconoclasm to Revolution – The Taipings’ Long March from Thistle 
Mountain to Nanjing 
 
 Despite the intensity of its religious hostility towards the Confucian social 
order, the Taiping movement’s mutation from a local sectarian grouping to an empire-
shaking revolutionary army was a highly contingent affair, being driven as much by 
chance and by the personalities of the movement’s original leaders as by the structural 
drivers of revolt already outlined. While Hong Xiuquan’s religious vision was 
obviously central to the movement’s initial success, his role in the organization and 
recruitment of members to the Society of God Worshippers was fairly minimal. With 
Hong based predominantly in Guangdong in the early stages of the movement 
perfecting the Taiping ideology, it was left to his indefatigable close friend and 
convert Feng Yun-Shan to recruit followers and begin building the new church in the 
inaccessible area of Thistle Mountain in Guangxi.  By the time Hong arrived in 
Guangxi in August 1847, the Society of God Worshippers had grown rapidly in 
                                                 
613Michael, The Taiping Rebellion, p. 40. 
 299
numbers, with the church headquarters at Thistle Mountain being linked to a multi-
village network of local congregations in neighbouring districts.614 The combination of 
economic hardship and escalating communal tensions between the Hakkas and the 
Punti had considerably swelled the God Worshippers’ ranks. Moreover, while 
conflicts over land and inter-clan feuding continued to punctuate the Hakkas’ 
relationship with their neighbours, this already tense environment was further 
aggravated by the God Worshippers’ violent iconoclasm, which increasingly 
manifested itself in their destruction of idols erected by Guangxi’s various 
communities in veneration of local gods.615  The iconoclastic zeal with which the God 
Worshippers attempted to destroy the ‘demons’ worshipped by their neighbours not 
only brought them into greater conflict with surrounding communities, but also both 
prefigured and made much more likely their inevitable confrontation with the forces of 
the imperial government.616 
 By the time the God Worshippers resolved to openly revolt against the 
government in July 1850, the movement’s leadership had already become dangerously 
fragmented. Although Hong Xiuquan retained his spiritual pre-eminence in the 
movement as Christ’s younger brother and the bearer of the divine mission, he relied 
on Feng Yun-Shan as his chief organizer and administrator.  Moreover, while the 
relationship between Hong and Feng remained close, the absence of both men from 
Thistle Mountain during a crucial period in the lead-up to the revolt had enabled other 
leadership contenders to emerge. Of these, the most ambitious was an illiterate 
charcoal-burner named Yang Hsui-ch’ing, who along with his chief lieutenant Hsiao-
Ch’ao-kuei claimed independent spiritual authority as the respective spokesmen of 
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Jehovah and Christ.617 Both men periodically entered into trances where they 
purported to speak directly in the voice of the Heavenly Father or the Elder Brother, 
and the pretensions of both towards having claims to independent access to the divine 
eventually fatally divided and weakened the Taiping movement.618 In the immediate 
term, however, their ecstatic style of worship drew in more recruits to the Society of 
God Worshippers, while Yang’s outstanding military skills contributed greatly to the 
Taiping army’s initial triumphs over government forces.619 
 It was during the Taiping army’s two-and-a-half year sweep from the Guangxi 
hinterland to the ancient imperial capital of Nanjing that the key ideological and 
institutional characteristics of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom were first elaborated. In 
July 1850, the God Worshipping congregations of Guangxi were assembled at the 
town of Chin-t’ien. Having abandoned their homes and pooled all of their saleable 
goods in a common treasury, the God Worshippers were formed into a ‘united military 
camp’, which was soon merged with an eclectic assemblage of other groups – ranging 
from indigenous Miao tribesmen and break-away pirate and Triad groups – that had 
also decided to throw their lot in with the rebels.620 From July 1850 down to Hong’s 
initial proclamation of the Taiping Kingdom of Heavenly Peace on January 11, 1851, 
the Taiping leaders concentrated on forging their vast host into a disciplined and 
fanatically indoctrinated armed force. As God’s children, the rebels addressed each 
other as brother or sister.621 This egalitarianism that extended towards the pooling of 
all wealth into a single treasury, in recognition of the fact that all wealth was God’s 
property, and was to be marshalled and distributed by God’s anointed prophets in 
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pursuit of the Taipings’ mission of redemption.622 Throughout the Taiping ranks, a 
rigorously puritanical moral regime was enforced. The consumption of alcohol, 
opium, and tobacco was prohibited upon pain of death. Men and women were 
segregated into single-sex military units, and a rule of absolute chastity was enforced 
even among married couples, again upon pain of death by beheading.623 
 The discipline and raw fanaticism of the Taiping soldiers served them well 
against the poorly paid and generally incompetent Qing imperial forces. In their 
campaigns from Guangxi and through the middle Yangtze region to Nanjing, the 
Taiping commanders utilized the advantages of speed and the great size of their 
peasant host to overwhelm imperial forces. Cities where the rebels faced concerted 
resistance were often bypassed for the sake of maintaining strategic momentum, 
although others rapidly surrendered or capitulated after putting up only token 
resistance.624 Throughout the Taipings’ campaigns, the rebels actively sought to 
proselytize among the local population and mobilize additional holy warriors for the 
fight against the Manchus. In soliciting popular support, the Taipings attempted to tap 
into Han xenophobic sentiment, denouncing the ruling dynasty as ‘Tartar dogs’ that 
must be punished for their oppression and humiliation of the Chinese people.625 
Crucially, however, this political appeal was never allowed to subordinate the 
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Taipings’ religious message. Consistently, the Taipings identified the Manchus and 
their supporters as demons, who had defied God’s laws by blasphemously sacralizing 
the imperial office and the imperial person.626 For the Taipings, the struggle to topple 
the Manchus was merely an earthly manifestation of a larger cosmic struggle between 
the forces of God and the forces of Satan. Consequently, inhabitants of towns that the 
Taipings had resolved to conquer, and that put up a determined resistance, were 
themselves identified as ‘demons’, and summarily massacred en masse following the 
Taiping victories.627 These acts of annihilatory piety during the initial Taiping 
campaigns, which faithfully reflected the Taipings’ apocalyptic belief system, 
provided a foretaste of the combination of puritanism and terror that would mark 
Taiping rule following the Heavenly Kingdom’s establishment in Nanjing on 19 
March 1853.   
 
7.3.2 The New Jerusalem – The Nature and Characteristics of the Taiping Heavenly 
Kingdom 
 
With the conquest of Nanjing, the seat of imperial government during Ming 
times, the Taipings confirmed their imperial pretensions and in so doing solidified 
their reputation as the pre-eminent threat confronting the Qing Dynasty. Upon taking 
Nanjing, the Taipings promptly renamed it the Heavenly Capital. This was a deliberate 
allusion to the New Jerusalem, and one that telegraphed the Taipings’ apocalyptic aim 
of establishing the Heavenly Kingdom on earth in the form of a theocratic universal 
monarchy.628 From Nanjing, the Taipings ruled the greater part of the middle and 
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lower Yangtze regions, dominating China’s major riverine artery and with it, the most 
urbanized, populous and economically productive regions of the empire.629 Given their 
inveterate ideological hostility towards the Confucian gentry, the Taipings inevitably 
failed to secure the gentry’s support for implementing their revolutionary agenda in 
the countryside, and were only slightly more successful in implementing their divine 
mandate within the Heavenly Capital. The effort of trying to sustain two massive 
offensives against imperial forces further drained Taiping resources, distracting them 
from the task of properly institutionalizing Hong’s vision within Taiping territories. 
These qualifications aside, a brief description of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom is 
necessary in order to establish the depths of its estrangement both from the declining 
imperial order of the Sinosphere, and from the encroaching Western-dominated 
society of sovereign states. 
In terms of its political constitution, the Heavenly Kingdom represented a 
strange combination of continuities and discontinuities with the Chinese imperial 
tradition. Whereas Neo-Confucianism anchored imperial legitimacy within the 
concept of the Mandate of Heaven, the Taipings conversely invoked the authority of a 
Biblical God to legitimize their establishment of God’s Heavenly Kingdom on earth. 
This alternative legitimizing ideology reflected a transcendent conception of the 
divine, which appeared to differ fundamentally from the impersonal and immanent 
conception of the divine that informed the imperial tradition.630 However, while Hong 
Xiuquan and his most powerful lieutenants repudiated the Chinese emperor’s title of 
Son of Heaven and abjured any direct claims towards divinity themselves, they did 
nevertheless also cultivate a sacred aura of legitimacy around themselves in their 
proclaimed status as the mouth-pieces through which God conveyed His commands to 
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humanity.631 While the Taiping rebels did not deify their political leaders, they did 
sanctify them in asserting their status as the conduits linking the sacred and temporal 
worlds, and thus did echo core elements of the established imperial ideology. This 
parallel is unsurprising, given that Hong had effectively indigenized Christian themes 
of apocalypse and redemption by situating them within Chinese political narratives of 
dynastic decline and renewal. Also unsurprising is the reproduction of the rituals and 
forms of court life in the Heavenly Capital, which were designed to further cultivate 
the perception that the Taiping pretenders did in fact constitute the legitimate locus of 
imperial authority, both within China and beyond. 
   Despite the Taipings’ absolute enmity for the Qing Dynasty and its 
‘idolatrous’ legitimating ideology, the Heavenly Kingdom thus betrayed trace 
elements of China’s imperial tradition, both in its sanctification of political authority, 
and in its aspirations to substitute one form of universal monarchy for another. 
Conversely, the Taipings’ revolutionary program radically and comprehensively 
repudiated almost every aspect of the existing social order. Its precociously 
sophisticated bureaucracy notwithstanding, the Chinese mode of state-society relations 
generally comported with the model of ideological universalism and institutional 
localism characteristic of most pre-industrial empires. Being at once inculcated with 
Confucian values and yet embedded within village-level social networks, the scholar-
gentry served as the bulwark of imperial authority throughout the empire, acting in 
their capacity as local administrators and civic leaders as the indispensable lynchpin 
linking the universal with the local worlds.632 Conversely, and in keeping with their 
millenarian aspirations, the Taipings sought to revolutionise the existing model of 
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state-society models by dispensing with the imperial Confucian system of 
ideologically integrated indirect rule, and replacing it with a pyramidal organizational 
structure that vertically integrated the Heavenly Kingdom from top to bottom. Under 
the Taiping schema, the population was to be organized into base groups (‘platoons’) 
of twenty-five families each, with each family obliged to provide one man or woman 
for service in the Heavenly Army, and the base groups to be collectively supervised by 
a ‘sergeant’, who would simultaneously serve as their military, civic, and spiritual 
leader.633 All land was to be expropriated from landlords and allotted in varying 
portions to each man, woman, and child, while all agrarian surplus was to be 
accumulated in local ‘Heavenly Storehouses.’634 While the twenty-five families would 
function as the basic unit of social organization, they would be hierarchically 
integrated into 156-family units (‘armies’), each led by a general, which would each 
be integrated in turn within the broader pyramidal structure of the Heavenly 
Kingdom.635 
 While the Taiping vision was implemented only imperfectly outside of the 
Nanjing region, the magnitude of Taiping aspirations to transform society has led at 
least one scholar to characterise the movement as being totalitarian in the scope of its 
ambitions.636 Within the Heavenly Kingdom, the distinction between civil and military 
authority was completely collapsed, with Chinese society to be re-cast as a mobilized 
army of believers dedicated to the fight against the Manchu ‘demons.’637 Additionally, 
whereas Confucian norms legitimized inequalities between landlords and tenants, the 
Biblical egalitarianism of the Taipings produced the 1854 Agrarian Reform Law, 
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which promised to overturn existing property relationships in the countryside in favour 
of instituting a form of theocratic proto-communism.638 The Taipings’ ruthless 
enforcement of religious homogeneity also departed profoundly from the status quo. 
Although Neo-Confucianism had sustained the ancien regime as its official ideology, 
the Qing Dynasty had nevertheless respected China’s religious diversity, and had 
charged the scholar-gentry with responsibility for supervising and supporting locals in 
their worship of the plethora of local deities that populated the Chinese pantheon.639 
The Taipings by contrast rejected any possibility of co-existence with other religious 
traditions, and instead enforced the systematic destruction of local shrines and 
temples, and violently suppressed all non-Taiping religious practices throughout their 
territories.  Finally, even the patriarchal family, the very foundation of the Confucian 
model of social order, did not escape revision. Although they might appear 
progressive to the contemporary observer, reforms such as the banning of foot-binding 
and concubinage and the establishment of places for women in the Taiping 
bureaucracy were deeply subversive at the time, undermining the gender norms and 
conceptions of the family then dominant within Chinese society.  Similarly, the re-
organization of villages into twenty-five family platoons occurred without heed for 
pre-existing patterns of lineage settlement. Both the segregation of villages by gender 
and the enforcement of norms of absolute chastity also had predictably catastrophic 
consequences for the population wherever they were enforced.      
 From their precociously totalitarian attempts to re-engineer state-society and 
civil-military relations, through to their policies on property, religion and the family, 
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the Taipings envisaged a total purification and transformation of the spiritual and 
social worlds. However, in their conception of China’s relations with other countries, 
the Taipings remained stubbornly orthodox, adhering to the Sino-centrism 
characteristic of the late imperial Sinosphere. Despite their ideological antagonism 
towards the Manchu court, the Taipings shared with their adversaries an outlook that 
conceived of China as the singular centre of civilization. Thus, while the Taipings 
were forced by their faith to concede that God had sent his first Son to the barbarian 
state of Judea to redeem humanity, the Taipings nevertheless affirmed their Sino-
centrism in positing Hong Xiuquan as God’s second son, and also in their conception 
of China as the seat of God’s prophesied Heavenly Kingdom. In keeping with this 
outlook, Hong regarded Western Christians with a mixture of benevolence and 
condescension. Visiting foreign delegates to the Taiping court were consequently 
warmly greeted as fellow Christians, but were nevertheless also expected to render due 
deference and obedience to Hong Xiuquan in his capacities as both God’s Chinese 
son, and also as the ruler of His Heavenly Kingdom.640  This promise to perpetuate the 
hierarchical international order of the Sinosphere represented a thread of continuity 
linking China’s rebels and rulers at the peak of the rebellion. Unfortunately for both 
sides, the very intensity with which they prosecuted their struggle against one another 
helped to accelerate that order’s impending demise.   
 
                                                 
640This attitude of benevolent condescension is conveyed in the tone of the following Taiping missive to 
visiting British dignitaries to the Taiping court in Nanjing in on April 28, 1853: ‘Whereas God the 
Heavenly Father has sent our Sovereign down to earth, as the true Sovereign of all the nations of the 
world, all people in the world who wish to appear at his Court must yield obedience to the rules of 
ceremony. They must prepare representations, stating who and what they are and from when they come, 
after previous presentation of which only can audience be accorded them. Obey these commands.’ 
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7.4 The Defeat of the Taiping Rebellion and the Collapse of the Heavenly 
Kingdom 
 
 Following their meteoric ascendancy in the middle and lower Yangtze regions 
in the early 1850s and their attempted institutionalization of the Heavenly Kingdom in 
Nanjing, the Taipings experienced a protracted and bloody decline into oblivion from 
the period 1856-1864. At the most prosaic level, this defeat was occasioned by basic 
military blunders committed after the Taipings’ capture of Nanjing in 1853. The 
decision to divide Taiping forces into two forces, charged respectively with the tasks 
of securing the Taipings’ western flank and advancing north to seize the imperial 
capital of Peking, fatally dispersed the Taipings’ military strength.641 In the absence of 
sufficient troops to sustain either of these major offensives, the Taiping onslaught 
faltered. This loss of strategic momentum in turn gave both government and loyalist 
gentry forces the time needed to regroup, enabling them to progressively roll back 
Taiping forces and eventually encircle and destroy the movement in Nanjing in 1864.     
 Beyond the specific military blunders mentioned above, however, three more 
fundamental reasons deriving from the nature of the movement itself decisively 
contributed to its defeat. From the outset, the Taiping movement had been 
characterised by both an ecstatic form of worship, and also by an extensive reliance on 
a charismatic mode of leadership in which rebel leaders’ political authority flowed 
directly from their claims to have unmediated access to the divine. Initially, Hong 
Xiuquan’s self-proclaimed status as God’s Chinese son provided the Taipings with a 
powerful rallying point, with Hong serving as the earthly embodiment of God’s will, 
and the agency through which both China and the world would finally be redeemed. 
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However, with the early fragmentation of the Society of God Worshippers in the lead-
up to the rebellion, other armed prophets had surfaced, also claiming to speak in the 
voice of either Jehovah or Jesus Christ. Consequently, by the time the Heavenly 
Kingdom was established at Nanjing in 1853, Hong was merely the Taipings’ primus 
inter pares, functioning as the largely titular ‘sovereign’ of a regime in which real 
political and military power lay with four wangs (kings).642  Each of these wangs 
retained their own armed retinues in the capital, and at least two also regularly entered 
into trances where they issued commands allegedly flowing directly from the 
Heavenly Father or from Jesus Christ.643  Thus, while the protean, charismatic 
components of the Taiping vision provided an immensely powerful catalyst for 
rebellion, these very same features also prevented the establishment of a coherent 
government apparatus once the Taipings seized power in Nanjing. In Weberian terms, 
the very nature of the movement prevented a transition from a charismatic to a legal-
rational mode of domination. With Hong unable to monopolize spiritual authority in 
the Heavenly Kingdom, the stage was set for a brief but bloody confrontation between 
opposing court factions in 1856. The resulting fratricidal slaughter of an estimated 
20,000 rebels in the imperial capital killed off the most dangerous pretenders and 
momentarily strengthened Hong’s position, but it ultimately failed to yield the more 
coherent and stable leadership structure the movement required if it was to achieve 
victory over the Manchus.644  
 In addition to its debilitating dependence on charismatic modes of domination, 
the extreme doctrinal exclusivity of the Taiping movement also greatly contributed to 
its eventual downfall. This was primarily because the Taipings’ insistent dogmatism 
prevented them from effectively cultivating and maintaining alliances with other 
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groups seeking to overthrow the Qing Dynasty. Thus, while some Triad groupings 
momentarily gravitated towards the Taipings in the early stages of the rebellion, the 
Taipings’ rigid insistence that prospective allies convert to Taiping Christianity and 
submit to its rigid puritanical code quickly scotched any possibility of collaboration 
between the two forces.645  More generally, the Taiping cause was damaged by their 
unwillingness to ideologically accommodate anti-Manchu elements by stressing proto-
nationalist rather than primarily religious themes in their propaganda. The Taipings’ 
fragmented leadership structure notwithstanding, rebel leaders remained surprisingly 
uniform in their ideological inflexibility and lack of pragmatism when it came to 
appealing to prospective allies. Taiping dogmatism effectively served as a self-
imposed firewall, which prevented the rebels from effectively coordinating their 
strategy with the multitude of concurrent anti-Manchu revolts roiling other provinces 
during the period of the Taiping rebellion.  
This self-defeating dogmatism also manifested itself in the Taipings’ strained 
dealings with Westerners. Although initially intrigued by the Taipings on account of 
their supposedly sincere commitment to Christianity, Western visitors to the Heavenly 
Court were quickly alienated by the heretical components of Taiping ideology, and 
were even more aggrieved by Hong Xiuquan’s claims towards universal spiritual and 
political dominion.646 The Western countries’ early commitment to a strict policy of 
neutrality with respect to the Manchu-Taiping struggle was further weakened as it 
became more and more evident that the Taipings were unable to constitute a 
functioning government in the territories under their control.647  Despite the initial 
hopes of individuals on both sides, the possibility of a Taiping-foreigner alliance was 
foreclosed by the Taipings’ failures to meet the legitimacy standards of either Western 
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missionaries or Western diplomats. Despite a last ditch effort by one of the few 
pragmatic advisors at the Taiping court to modernize Taiping practices of governance, 
the Heavenly Kingdom remained estranged from the West for the duration of its 
existence, with Western mercenaries eventually playing a small but significant role in 
securing the Taipings’ eventual defeat.648 
 In addition to their early military blunders, their inability to move beyond 
charismatic modes of domination, and the self-imposed limits to alliance building 
imposed by their doctrinal exclusivity, the Taipings’ revolutionary character also 
ensured the failure of their movement. Simply stated, the totalistic nature of Taiping 
aspirations to redeem Chinese society earned them powerful enemies, who finally 
proved capable of mobilizing against the rebellion once it became clear that the 
imperial forces themselves could not effectively crush the rebels. In their earnest 
desire to cleanse both themselves and the world of evil, the Taiping rebels declared 
war against the entire Confucian social order. The extreme institutional frailty and 
unpopularity of the Manchu regime provided the movement with both its enabling pre-
conditions, while also providing the necessary window of opportunity in which they 
could attempt to realise their apocalyptic vision. However, while the central 
government was faltering, elements of the Confucian scholar-gentry regrouped to 
establish the new military formations that would ultimately crush the rebellion. Given 
the chasm between Confucianism and Taiping Christianity, it was impossible for the 
Taipings to tap into the energy and skills of China’s traditional governing class, and 
thus also impossible for them to effectively establish their rule beyond the fortified 
cities over which they held sway. Equally, with the social order upon which their 
privileges were based being threatened with extinction, the predominantly Han 
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Chinese gentry had little hesitance in setting aside their anti-Manchu sentiments and 
marshalling their power to resist the Taiping onslaught.649  
 On July 19, 1864, the Heavenly Capital fell to besieging imperial forces. In his 
reports to the imperial court, the loyalist general Zeng Guo-fan succinctly captured the 
appropriately apocalyptic end of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom: ‘On the 17th and the 
18th, Tseng Liang-tso …and others searched through the city for any rebels they could 
find, and in three days killed over 100,000 men. The Ch’in-huai creek was filled with 
bodies.  Half of the false wangs, chief generals, heavenly generals, and other heads of 
battle were killed in battle, and the other half either drowned themselves in the dykes 
and ditches or else burned themselves.  The whole of them numbered about 3,000 
men. The fire in the city raged for three days and nights…Not one of the 100,000 
rebels in Nanking surrendered themselves when the city was taken, but in many cases 
gathered together and burned themselves and passed away without repentance.  Such a 
formidable band of rebels has rarely been seen from ancient times to the present.’650 
 While Taiping remnants would fight on for another two years, both the 
Heavenly Kingdom and the fanatical faith that had sustained it were effectively 
destroyed with the fall of Nanjing. But while the Taiping faith would never revive, the 
indirect systemic consequences of the rebellion, for both China and for East Asia more 
generally, would be of enduring and profound significance. 
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7.5 Armageddon’s Wake – The Systemic Consequences of the Taiping Rebellion 
and its Suppression 
 
 The Taiping rebellion constituted the bloodiest of a wave of rebellions that 
convulsed China in the third quarter of the nineteenth century, and one of the most 
immediately devastating consequences of its outbreak was the stimulus it provided to 
other rebellious elements throughout the Qing Empire. At the time of the Taiping 
rebellion, secret-society activities increased in the Pearl River delta, the Yangtze delta, 
and the North China plain.651 The Nien rebellion (1850-1868) in northern China, the 
southwest Muslim rebellion in Yunnan (1855-1873), the north-west Muslim rebellion 
in Shensi and Kansu (1862-1878) and the Miao rebellion in Kweichow and Hunan 
(1855-1873) each roughly coincided with the Taiping rebellion, and the collective 
burden of suppressing these revolts placed massive strains on the imperial 
government.652 Moreover, while for reasons already outlined the Taipings cooperated 
only sporadically with other rebel groups, the Taiping rebellion indirectly stimulated 
other revolts against the Manchus in a variety of ways. On the one hand, the Taipings’ 
rapid early successes against the Manchu armies reinforced an impression of dynastic 
weakness, which had already been steadily rising following the dynasty’s defeat in the 
First Opium War. Much like the White Lotus rebels in the late eighteenth century, the 
Taipings’ military successes encouraged negative assessments of government 
capabilities and legitimacy that in turn stimulated further violent challenges to central 
rule. 
 In addition to the inspiration the Taipings provided to others disaffected with 
Manchu misrule, the fiscal and military strains imposed by the rebellion further 
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contributed to the lateral spread of civil unrest throughout China’s provinces. As the 
most populous and economically developed regions of the Qing Empire, the lower and 
middle Yangtze regions had provided the imperial treasury with a large proportion of 
its total revenues. With the loss of these territories to the rebellion, and the reduction 
also in land taxes recoverable from the areas of South China affected by the 
insurgency, the central government resorted to a range of extraordinary measures in its 
financing of the war effort.653 By far the simplest of these measures was an increase in 
the land tax in other provinces within the empire. While probably unavoidable in view 
of the empire’s straitened circumstances, this move further compounded popular 
economic distress in these provinces, and thus stoked additional resentment towards 
the ruling dynasty. 654 Similarly, desperate short-term expedients such as the 
debasement of the currency also momentarily alleviated the government’s war-
financing difficulties, only to further increase inflationary measures and thus 
exacerbate the popular discontent fuelling the empire’s crisis of authority.655 The 
military imperative of redeploying imperial forces garrisoned in supposedly peaceful 
provinces to fight the Taiping rebels also amplified governmental vulnerabilities 
throughout the empire, providing further temptations for the disaffected to revolt in 
these provinces while the government’s back was turned. Faced with declining 
prestige, an incipient fiscal crisis, and an overstretched and poorly resourced military, 
the dynasty became locked in a vicious cycle of declining governmental capacity and 
legitimacy and spiralling domestic unrest. Moreover, while the empire’s fortunes 
improved following the crushing of the Taiping rebellion, the damage inflicted by the 
mid-century revolts – estimated to have cost a total of up to sixty million lives in the 
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period 1850-1875 – was of nevertheless of such a vast scale as to gravely and 
permanently weaken the empire’s material foundations.       
 Beyond the immediate devastation caused or inspired by the Taiping rebellion, 
the mid-century crisis triggered deeper and more enduring changes to the structure of 
Qing rule. Specifically, the mid-century rebellions inaugurated a shift of military, 
fiscal and political power away from the central government, and towards provincial 
governors and governors-general. The Taipings’ triumphant breakout from Guangxi 
and conquest of the middle and lower Yangtze regions sharply exposed the 
inadequacies of the Eight Banners and the Army of the Green Standard, and provided 
a further fillip to the growth of the semi-private orthodox militias that had initially 
developed in response to the White Lotus threat at the turn of the century.656 This 
trend became most pronounced in Hunan, where the first of the provincial new model 
armies was constructed under the leadership of the loyalist general Zeng Guo-fan. 
Since its establishment, the imperial Green Standard army had been organized in such 
as way as to explicitly discourage the development of personal bonds of loyalty 
between higher and lower officers, for fear that such bonds might weaken the 
government’s control over the military.657  Faced with the challenge of forging a 
viable army out of a diverse ensemble of different mercenaries, militias and other 
irregular units, Zeng abandoned this tradition. Instead, he chose to capitalize on bonds 
of kinship and patronage and self-consciously build upon pre-existing lineage and 
native-place relationships in order to ensure the army’s coherence and combat 
effectiveness.658 In the financing of the new regional armies, Zeng and his allies 
proved equally innovative, introducing an ad valorum tax (likin, literally a thousandth) 
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on goods in stock or in transit, and also upon certain goods such as tea in their place of 
manufacture.659  
While Zeng’s Hunan army was disbanded following the suppression of the 
Taiping rebellion, ongoing rebellions such as the Nien revolt necessitated the 
continued use of regional new model armies to suppress insurgents, and the Manchu 
government was unsuccessful in recovering its monopoly on military force following 
the conclusion of hostilities.660 The mid-century rebellions thus sharpened and 
qualitatively accelerated changes in the distribution of power within China that had 
been manifest from the rebellions of the turn of the century. The dispersal of power, 
both from centre to provinces and from Manchus to Han, perilously weakened the 
Qing Dynasty’s grip on power, as well as amplifying the centrifugal tendencies that 
would culminate in China’s descent into warlordism and anarchy in the early twentieth 
century.661 The innovations introduced in suppressing the rebellions also paved the 
way for the emergence of military service in the new regional armies as a vehicle of 
social mobility, partially supplanting participation in the centrally controlled civil 
service as the preferred path-way to social advancement for ambitious sons of the 
lower gentry.662 Compounding this trend, the emphasis placed on kinship and 
patronage in the new model armies, while useful in ensuring unit coherence and 
combat effectiveness, nevertheless also portended a partial unravelling of the 
government’s caging of organized violence within the confines of the imperial 
bureaucracy.     
 With the their grip on power being so tenuous within the borders of their own 
empire, it was unsurprising that the Qing Dynasty proved incapable of maintaining the 
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international order of the Sinosphere when it was exposed to sustained external attack. 
The conjunction of internal and external threats, succinctly captured in the Chinese 
phrase ‘internal disorder and external calamity’, was a familiar enough motif in 
Chinese history during downturns in the dynastic cycle.663 However, in the mid-
nineteenth century, both the magnitude and character of the threat constellation facing 
the Qing Dynasty was qualitatively different to anything that had come previously. For 
just as the Taipings’ early victories encouraged revolts in other provinces within the 
empire, so too did they encourage renewed external predation by China’s foreign 
adversaries. But whereas previous external challengers in East Asian history had 
merely sought to reposition themselves favourably within the existing hierarchy of the 
Sinosphere, the Western powers sought overturn the system entirely. Frustrated by 
China’s unwillingness to enforce the treaty provisions that concluded the First Opium 
War, and taking advantage of the court’s preoccupation with crushing the Taiping 
rebels, an Anglo-French expeditionary force wrested further commercial and 
diplomatic concessions from the beleaguered emperor after sporadic fighting over the 
period 1858-1860. In addition to forcing China open to Western merchants and 
evangelists, the Second Opium War was fought with the explicit objective of forcing 
China to join the modern state system.664 For the Westerners, the establishment of 
permanent diplomatic envoys in the imperial capital was essential, if for no other 
reason than to ensure that the provisions of the unequal treaties signed with the 
emperor were fully observed. For the Chinese, the implied equality with barbarians 
that ambassadorial diplomacy embodied constituted not only an assault on the 
emperor’s prestige, but more fundamentally contradicted the entire panoply of norms 
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and institutions upon which the order of the Sinosphere was based. Weakened by the 
ravages of the Taipings, unable to match the naval firepower of the industrializing 
West, and suffering the indignity of foreign occupation in the imperial capital, the 
Qing Dynasty was nevertheless compelled to capitulate on October 24, 1860.    
 
7.6 Restoration and Retreat – Religion, the Sinosphere, and Systemic Collapse in 
an Age of Nation-States 
 
 The Taiping rebels failed completely in their goal of establishing God’s 
Kingdom on earth. But in subjecting the tottering Qing Dynasty to a revolutionary 
assault at a time when it was already facing foreign encroachment, the Taipings did 
succeed in gravely weakening the Chinese Empire. This process in turn portended the 
hollowing out and eventual collapse of the Sinosphere. Paradoxically, many of the 
initiatives that the Qing Dynasty undertook for the purposes of self-preservation 
contributed to the Sinosphere’s dissolution, even as they worked to sustain the empire 
itself. Following its capitulation to Western demands, the Chinese government 
established the Zongli Yamen, a proto-typical foreign office that facilitated China’s 
entry into a Western-dominated sovereign state system.665 At the same time, the 
Manchus actively solicited Western foreign military assistance to suppress the Taiping 
rebels, and sought also to reconstitute government finances on the basis of revenues 
derived from the Maritime Customs Office, an institution that was designed, operated 
and maintained by Westerners.666  The resulting Anglo-Qing condominium, which 
encompassed diplomatic, military, and fiscal initiatives mentioned above, enabled the 
dynasty to survive the mid-century crisis, and gave it the breathing space necessary to 
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undertake an ambitious if ultimately inadequate ‘self-strengthening’ program of 
defensive modernization.667 But in so starkly exposing the Manchus’ dependence on 
barbarians for support, the initiatives underpinning the Qing Restoration also inverted 
the entire civilizational hierarchy on which the Sinosphere was predicated.  In so 
doing, they exposed the Sinosphere’s increasingly archaic status in an age in which the 
Western imports of nationalism and industrialized warfare were inexorably in the 
ascendancy. 
 Despite a momentary revival of imperial fortunes within China proper 
following the suppression of the mid-century rebellions, the late nineteenth century 
witnessed a further acceleration of centrifugal processes in East Asia. The most 
conspicuous of these was the continuing growth of violence interdependence in the 
region, a trend that was already pronounced in the 1870s, but which had intensified 
dangerously by century’s end.  The 1870s witnessed challenges to China’s territorial 
integrity in both the north-west and the south-east, with Russian and Japanese 
incursions in Xinjiang and Taiwan respectively threatening the ruling dynasty’s 
tenuous hold over its most far-flung possessions.668  In both instances, Qing officials 
demonstrated admirable diplomatic dexterity in peacefully fending off these 
advances.669 Similarly, China’s intensified efforts to establish direct rule over these 
frontier regions –  thus satisfying the requirements of effective occupation then 
operative under Western international law – also illustrated the dynasty’s willingness 
to adapt to the expanding global state system when China’s territorial integrity was 
under threat.670  
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 Nevertheless, this strategy of defensive adaptation to the requirements of 
Western international law sat uneasily with China’s simultaneous attempt to maintain 
a system of tributary diplomacy with traditional tributaries such as Annam and Korea.  
On the one hand, China sought to participate on equal terms in a rapidly globalizing 
sovereign state system, in which the hierarchical cosmologies of multi-ethnic empires 
were increasingly being sidelined in favour of ideals of popular eudemonism and 
national sovereignty. On the other hand, however, China sought to preserve its status 
as the suzerain of an explicitly hierarchical regional international order, which relied 
for its operation on actors’ common subscription to precisely the kind of inegalitarian 
cosmology now being edged out by an encroaching sovereign state system. 
Throughout the 1880s, this tension between two modes of international order became 
increasingly unsustainable, and by the decade’s end, both Annam and Korea had been 
forcibly detached from the tributary system, thus effectively abolishing the last 
tributary ties holding the old Sinosphere together.671 
 By the close of the nineteenth century, the international order of the Sinosphere 
had been effectively dismantled. Additionally, by this time, the dynasty’s inadequacies 
had become so pronounced and the level of regional geopolitical rivalry so intense that 
even the core objective of preserving China’s territorial integrity against foreign 
aggressors was no longer attainable. China’s humiliating defeat in the Sino-Japanese 
war of 1894-1895 brutally exposed the weakness of the Qing Dynasty, stimulating a 
‘scramble for concessions’ by colonial powers anxious to shore up their strategic and 
commercial interests in the region.672  Moreover, while the official territorial partition 
of China was averted (with the exception of Japan’s seizure of Taiwan), the century 
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ended with huge swathes of Chinese territory under foreign occupation.673  With East 
Asia’s traditional hegemon effectively reduced to a semi-colonial status and the world 
on the cusp of a massive naval arms race, the region became a focal point for 
accelerating Great Power rivalry, setting the stage for the series of wars that wracked 
the Western Pacific in the twentieth century. Meanwhile, within China itself, the 
Manchus’ ability to resuscitate imperial power was stymied by a combination of 
crushing war indemnities and a pervasive loss of popular legitimacy occasioned by 
defeat in the Sino-Japanese war and the post-war imposition of foreign occupation.674  
Just as defeat in war, foreign predation, and festering anti-Manchu sentiment had 
provided fertile ground for rebellion in the wake of the Opium Wars, so too did this 
concurrence of ‘internal disorder and external calamity’ recur at the turn of the 
century. 
 In the wake of the Sino-Japanese war, China was shaken by successive waves 
of rebellion that culminated in the Qing Dynasty’s final dissolution in 1912. The most 
infamous expression of popular discontent during this period, the Boxer Rising, bore 
many resemblances to previous anti-Manchu sectarian rebellions. Like previous 
risings, the Boxer movement arose in a region (Shandong province in northern China) 
plagued by poor governance, over-population, and increasing resource scarcity, in this 
case amplified by a series of natural disasters that befell northern China in the late 
1890s.675 Similarly, and again much like its historical predecessors, the Boxer 
movement cohered around a loose secret society network, rumoured to have itself 
evolved out of the Eight Trigrams Sect that had plagued Manchu authorities almost a 
century earlier.676 The Boxers claimed to possess certain magical powers, including 
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invulnerability to swords and guns, and also initially subscribed to a millenarian and 
anti-Manchu restorationist agenda. Unlike their historical predecessors, however, the 
Boxers enjoyed a degree of tolerance and eventually even overt sponsorship from the 
local authorities.677  In time, they were even weaned of their anti-Manchu sentiments 
to ally with the imperial court in an ultimately futile attempt to expel the foreigners 
and exterminate their local (and predominantly Christian) collaborators.678  Most 
critically of all, alongside more familiar sectarian themes of restoration and 
millenarianism, the Boxers’ vehement xenophobia also incorporated more novel 
themes of anti-colonialism and proto-nationalism. In this respect at least, the Boxers 
can most usefully be compared not to previous sectarian rebellions throughout Chinese 
history, but rather to other roughly contemporaneous religious qua nationalist 
rebellions in Korea, the Philippines and elsewhere.679 These movements sought 
unsuccessfully to resist the growing encroachment of a Western-dominated global 
state system. But in evoking themes of national solidarity, mediated though they were 
through indigenous spiritual frameworks, these various ‘revolts against the West’ also 
paradoxically signified the concurrent spread of nationalist sentiments throughout the 
world. An audacious reading of the Boxers and their counterparts elsewhere in East 
Asia would thus cast them as the mid-wives of nationalism throughout the former 
Sinosphere, and as heralds of the consolidation of a modern system of sovereign 
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rebellions in the South-Western United States and German-governed Tanganyika respectively, although 
these last two movements cannot truly be regarded as being nationalistic in their underlying character 
and Esherick does not impute nationalistic sentiments to these last two movements. See Esherick, The 
Origins of the Boxer Uprising, pp. 316-317. 
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nation-states. A less bold but perhaps more sustainable interpretation would instead 
accent their transitional and essentially janus-faced character, one face turned 
backwards towards the receding world of the Celestial Empire and the Taiping 
Heavenly Kingdom, the other turned forwards towards the coming nationalist world of 
Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, and Mao Tse-Tung.   
 From their conquest of China in 1644, the Manchu conquerors had struggled 
against the hostility of the Han majority and recurrent tendencies towards 
provincialism and rebellion to carve out the richest and most successful of the Old 
World gunpowder empires. Simultaneously, the Manchus had inherited and 
maintained an elaborate suzerain international order that had provided unrivalled 
stability and prosperity to the peoples of East Asia down to the mid-nineteenth 
century. This order had been predicated on a cosmology that elevated the emperor to 
the status of Son of Heaven. It had also been sustained by a deeply ritualistic style of 
tributary diplomacy that sought to re-affirm the emperor’s supreme authority, while 
minimizing the Chinese people’s exposure to potentially subversive outside 
influences. For the Qing Dynasty, the imposition of strict controls over contacts 
between Chinese and the outside world was a vital pre-requisite for the maintenance of 
order, domestically as well as internationally. Conversely, for Western merchants and 
missionaries, who coveted the prospect of greater access to Asian markets and souls, 
the tributary diplomacy of the Sinosphere stood as an arcane and intolerable barrier 
impeding the spread of commerce, Christianity, and civilization. Where one party 
regarded the Sinosphere as a form of insulation protecting the centre of civilization 
from the subversive influences of the barbarians, the other regarded it as the most 
egregious outgrowth of Oriental barbarism and despotism, its very existence an affront 
to Western ‘standards of civilization.’      
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 With hindsight, it is evident that Manchu fears concerning the subversive 
consequences of increased contacts with the outside world were well-founded, for East 
Asia’s integration with the global state system and China’s internal disintegration were 
ultimately intimately connected with one another.  This paradoxical combination of 
integrative and disintegrative dynamics was no more evident than through a 
consideration of the origins of the revolutionary coalition that finally destroyed the 
Chinese empire. Sun Yat-sen’s Revolutionary Alliance, which provided the 
intellectual leadership of the 1911 revolution, consisted primarily of a diaspora 
network of overseas Chinese students who had chosen to study abroad to acquire the 
skills necessary to overthrow the Manchus and inaugurate a nationalist revolution in 
China.680 Himself a Christian who had spent much of his youth in Honolulu, Sun-Yat-
sen worked tirelessly from the 1890s onwards to mobilize financial and political 
support for a nationalist revolution among the burgeoning diaspora communities of 
overseas Chinese that had emerged throughout East Asia in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century.681  From Honolulu to Singapore to Tokyo, Sun Yat-sen steadily 
cultivated an overseas support base for the revolution, even as continuing emigration 
from China laid the structural foundations for a new East Asian economic order built 
around intersecting and transnationally dispersed Chinese family business networks.682 
Meanwhile, within China itself, the decentralization of military and fiscal power to the 
provinces that had begun with the Taiping rebellion continued to intensify, the 
dynasty’s efforts at military modernization accelerating rather than ameliorating this 
                                                 
680On the role of the Revolutionary Alliance in helping to catalyse the revolution of 1911, see Michael 
Gaster. "The Republican Revolutionary Movement." In The Cambridge History of China, Volume 11 - 
Late Ch'ing 1800-1911, Part Ii, edited by Denis Twitchett and John King Fairbank, 463-534. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980. See specifically pp. 484-506. 
681Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, pp. 455-458. See also Takeshi Hameshita. "The Intra-Regional 
System in East Asia in Modern Times." In Network Power - Japan and Asia, edited by Peter 
Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi, 113-35. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997. See specifically 
pp. 132-135. 
682Hameshita, ‘The Intra-Regional System in East Asia’, pp. 134-135. 
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process.683 With the revolutionaries’ successful infiltration of the New Army, these 
two dynamics –  a diaspora nationalist mobilization borne of global economic 
integration, and provincial militarization symptomatic of internal disintegration – were 
finally conjoined in the revolution of 1911.  
 With the abdication of the last Chinese emperor on February 12 1912, two 
hundred and sixty eight years of Manchu rule finally ended. 684 Over the course of the 
preceding century, both the empire and the international order that it sustained had 
experienced a crisis of legitimacy encompassing institutional decay, foreign invasion, 
millenarian rebellion, and nationalist revolution. Like Latin Christendom before it, the 
Sinosphere faltered as a result of a fatal conjuncture of institutional decay, ideological 
shocks, and system-wide increases in violence interdependence. By the onset of their 
respective crises, both the papal-imperial diarchy and the Qing dynasty had been 
seriously weathered by processes of internal corrosion that seriously diminished their 
ability to manage conflict within and between political communities. Similarly, in both 
instances, the authoritative institutions of canon law and tributary diplomacy failed as 
their ideological and material foundations fell away. In Christendom, however, 
nemesis came from within, the Reformation shattering Europe’s religious unity and 
inspiring an Absolutist counter-reaction that eventually yielded a European sovereign 
state system. In the Sinosphere, by contrast, the suzerain state system faltered under 
the combined impact of external assaults and internal rebellion. The Taiping rebellion, 
the Boxer rising and the secular nationalist revolution of 1911each represented 
different responses to the encroaching Western-dominated state system, their leaders 
appropriating diverse ideas from the foreigners even as they each sought to restore 
China’s traditional pre-eminence over the barbarians. The rebels’ intentions 
                                                 
683On the emergence of elements of the New Army as revolutionary actors, see Gaster, ‘The Republican 
Revolutionary Movement’, pp. 507-512. 
684Cambridge History, Volume 11 part 2, p. 523.  
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notwithstanding, each borrowing tended to reinforce the intertwining trends of 
regional integration and domestic disintegration. This trend would persist after 1911, 
with China forced to endure four more decades of warlordism, revolution and foreign 
invasion before central government was effectively re-established on the mainland. 
However, with the abdication of the last Son of Heaven, the greatest of the early 
modern gunpowder empires had passed, its demise fittingly heralding the onset of a 
century marked by the end of empire and the globalization of the Westphalian state 
system.    
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE ORIGINS, CONSTITUTION, AND DECAY OF THE 
GLOBAL STATE SYSTEM 
 
Introduction 
 
On Christmas day, 1991, the Soviet Union was formally dissolved, marking in its 
demise the apparent triumph of the nation-state as the world’s dominant form of 
political community. Over the course of the twentieth century, the political 
organization of the world was transformed as four successive waves of imperial 
disintegration facilitated the universalization of the nation-state as the world’s 
accepted model of legitimate statehood.685  Superficially, the universalization of the 
nation-state appeared to represent the culmination of European international society’s  
centuries long expansion, with the legitimacy concepts and fundamental institutions 
first forged in the Atlantic state system at last acquiring global reach. In its final years, 
the Soviet Union’s imperial constitution, command economy, and authoritarian 
political superstructure had appeared to condemn it as a geopolitical dinosaur, with its 
demise seeming epitomize the inexorable ascendancy of national self-determination, 
market capitalism, and republican sovereignty as the constitutional principles of a 
global international society.686    
                                                 
685These successive episodes of imperial disintegration were as follows: (1) the dissolution of the 
Manchu Chinese, German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman empires either immediately before 
or following WWI; (2) the defeat of the Nazi, Japanese and fascist Italian empires in World War II; (3) 
the dismantling of European colonial empires from 1945-1975; and (4) the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union in 1991. 
686The classic statement of this optimistic post-Cold War perspective remains Francis Fukuyama. The 
End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press, 1992. 
 
 328
 The liberal triumphalism that attended the Soviet Union’s collapse was already 
a fading memory by the turn of the millennium, but with the attacks of 9/11 and the 
ensuing war on terrorism, the global state system’s underlying frailty was 
spectacularly exposed.  Al Qaeda’s assaults on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon 
struck respectively at two iconic symbols of global capitalism and bureaucratically 
administered state military power. Additionally, they also represented a violent 
repudiation not only of American hegemony, but also of the deeper constitutional 
principles underpinning global international society. The post-Westphalian re-
conceptualization of religion as referring to an abstract body of beliefs rather than to 
an embodied community of believers; the post-revolutionary transition from sacred to 
popular legitimations of state sovereignty; even the post-imperial universalization of 
the nation-state as the world’s modal form of political community – each of these 
aspects of world order constituted the ultimate targets of the global jihadist 
insurgency.   
 The following two chapters are devoted to an examination of the jihadist 
challenge to world order, as well as to the larger processes of systemic decay that 
initially brought it into being, and that will likely persist after its eventual defeat. The 
discussion proceeds in seven sections.  In chapter eight, I begin by tracing the global 
state system’s origins, before then describing its constitutional principles and 
fundamental institutions. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the processes of 
systemic decay out of which the jihadist challenge has emerged. Having outlined the 
state system’s origins, constitution, operation and decay in chapter eight, I proceed to 
a more focused analysis of the character and likely consequences of the global jihadist 
insurgency in chapter nine. Section four outlines jihadism’s philosophical 
underpinnings, stressing its uncompromising incompatibility with the constitutional 
principles of the global state system. Section five articulates the intersection of 
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national, regional, and global forces within which the jihadist insurgency germinated 
in the 1970s-1990s. In section six, I situate the post 9/11 global confrontation between 
the jihadists and the United States within my broader narrative of systemic decay. I 
conclude with an analysis of the strategic mis-steps of the United States and its allies 
in their struggle against jihadism, arguing that these mis-steps are attributable to the 
international community’s inability to comprehend jihadism within the context of the 
broader constellation of challenges now threatening the state system’s long term 
viability.   
 
8.1 The Origins of the Global State System 
 
8.1.1 The Nineteenth Century Origins of the Global State System 
 
 The global state system’s origins can be traced to the unfolding of four 
overlapping macro-processes originating in Europe’s long nineteenth century (1789-
1914). These processes were the advent of the popular sovereignty revolution, the 
emergence of industrial capitalism, the revolution in state power (henceforth referred 
to as the administrative revolution), and the rise of the ‘new’ imperialism.  The first 
three of these processes established the ideal, material and institutional conditions 
needed to facilitate the birth of a global state system, while the last process advanced 
this outcome by forcibly integrating the world’s polities into a single geopolitical 
space for the first time.  
From the American Revolution through to the Congress of Vienna, the Atlantic 
state system had been shaken by a seismic shift in prevailing conceptions of political 
legitimacy that would eventually exert globally transformative effects. The sovereign 
state system that had evolved following Europe’s Wars of Religion had cohered 
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around a value complex derived from a highly inegalitarian social milieu, in which 
monarchy, aristocracy and church together formed the primary organizational foci 
around which collective life revolved.687  Monarchical power was legitimized in 
explicitly paternalistic terms, with the power of the sovereign ruler conceived as an 
earthly replication and complement to the divine authority of an almighty God.688  
Irrespective of the post-Reformation re-conceptualization of religion from body of 
believers to body of beliefs, monarchical power remained wraithed in a sacred aura 
throughout the Absolutist era, with the king’s powers said to derive directly from his 
status as one of ‘God’s lieutenants’ charged with governing his subjects in accordance 
with divine law.689 Consistent with its conception of society as a divinely ordained and 
hierarchically structured order, Absolutist theory was necessarily authoritarian in its 
emphasis on the nature of law as sovereign command, one that warranted subjects’ 
unconditional obedience with the edicts of the king.690 In an environment dominated 
by subsistence agriculture and in which the atomising effects of market relations had 
yet to properly percolate beyond Europe’s cities, the patronal outlook of the landed 
aristocracy provided a further structural reinforcement to the rigidly hierarchical 
constitutional values upon which the ancien regime was sustained.691      
 The ideas that fuelled the popular sovereignty revolution challenged every core 
element of the Absolutist order.692  Whereas divine right Absolutism emphasized a 
top-down theory of sovereignty, with the monarchy’s powers to rule said to have been 
                                                 
687On this point, see generally Burns, “The Idea of Absolutism.” 
688
Ibid. 
689Keohane, Philosophy and the State in France, pp. 70-71. 
690On the Absolutist conception of sovereignty as legislative command, see Reus-Smit, The Moral 
Purpose of the State, pp. 97-99. 
691On the distinctive moral culture of patronal social systems, and their distinctiveness from those 
characterized by centralized bureaucracies and effectively operating market economies, see Gellner, 
‘Patrons and Clients’, p. 4. 
692See generally Bukovansky, Legitimacy and Power Politics; Jacques Godechot. France and the 
Atlantic Revolution of the Eighteenth Century 1770-1799. New York: The Free Press, 1965;and Hall; 
National Collective Identity, especially chapters six and seven.   
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conferred by God, the revolutionaries stressed a bottom-up theory of sovereignty that 
legitimized state power by reference to its presumed concordance with the will of the 
governed.693 Demos replaced cosmos as the fountainhead of political legitimacy, with 
the old order’s emphasis on the divine and transcendent sources of state power being 
challenged by a republican insistence upon mundane and immanent sources of 
authority, specifically those of human reason and the popular will. In republican lights, 
reason was to replace revelation as the foundation of political order, with consent 
replacing command as the basic constitutional principle underwriting legislative 
authority.694 
 Despite its initially successful suppression in Europe, the popular sovereignty 
revolution nevertheless bequeathed emphases on self-determination, popular 
eudemonism, and human emancipation that would prove irrepressible in the long 
term.695 Aiding the diffusion of the popular sovereignty revolution was the second 
great macro-process of the nineteenth century, the emergence of industrial capitalism. 
With the coming of the industrial revolution, the societies of Western Europe and 
North America witnessed a quantum leap in their productive and destructive capacities 
on a scale unprecedented in human history. The invention of the railroad, the steam 
engine and the steam-ship knitted societies together in ever denser and broader 
networks of commercial exchange, while innovations such as the steam-driven mill 
and the invention of the bureaucratically organized modern factory created 
qualitatively more intensive concentrations of mechanical and human productive 
                                                 
693R. R. Palmer. The Age of the Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America, 
1760-1800, Volume 1. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959, p. 114. 
694
Ibid. 
695On the initially successful suppression of republicanism in Europe, followed by Europe’s increasing 
polarization along democratic and authoritarian lines from the 1830s onwards, see Alan Cassels. 
Ideology and International Relations in the Modern World, The New International History Series. 
London New York: Routledge, 1996, chapter three. 
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power than had previously existed.696 These innovations dramatically raised the 
wealth-generating capacities of host societies, while also permitting a parallel increase 
in the scale and spatial reach of forces of destruction.697 The revolutionary increase in 
productivity affected by industrialization progressively freed up ever larger reserves of 
men for potential mobilization into states’ armed forces, while advances in 
transportation and communication (spearheaded respectively by the railroad and the 
telegraph) permitted states to concentrate and project armed force more rapidly and 
over greater distances than ever before.698   
More importantly even than these technological and organizational 
innovations, however, industrialization progressively transformed the social 
composition of Western societies by drawing an ever larger percentage of the 
population into anonymous relations of market exchange. In so doing, it promoted 
either the dissolution of existing networks of patronage and kinship, or more 
commonly their subordination and re-articulation within the parameters of a market 
economy and a rational-bureaucratic state apparatus.699  With the spread of industrial 
capitalism, organized violence was largely expelled from the social relations of 
production and concentrated instead within the policing and military institutions of the 
state, in so doing promoting a formal separation of the political/public and 
economic/private spheres.700  Simultaneously, the accelerated urbanization spurred by 
industrialization hastened a homogenization of cultures within states, a process that 
was further entrenched towards the end of the nineteenth century through the 
introduction of compulsory state-sponsored education and the advent of mass media 
                                                 
696On this process, see for example Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence, pp. 137-147. 
697
Ibid., pp. 222-227. 
698
Ibid. See also Hirst, War and Power in the 21st Century, p. 28. 
699On this point, see for example Christopher Dandeker. Surveillance, Power and Modernity - 
Bureaucracy and Discipline from 1700 to the Present Day. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990, p. 100. 
700Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence, p. 191. 
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such as mass circulation newspapers.701  Despite their halting and gradual spread, the 
technological, organizational, and social changes accompanying industrialization 
progressively consolidated the imaginative grip of the nation upon the popular 
consciousness, thereby further nurturing the ascendancy of ideologies identified with 
the popular sovereignty revolution. 
 The popular sovereignty and industrial revolutions that swept nineteenth 
century Western Europe and North America have both been justly recognized by 
generations of social scientists for their transformative effects. Less frequently 
acknowledged has been the equally revolutionary increase in state capacity that 
defined the epoch. Throughout the long nineteenth century, Europe’s polities 
experienced a revolution in their mode of administration that both complemented and 
reinforced synchronous transformations in their terms of legitimation and capacities 
for organized production and destruction. Just as the Absolutist state had constituted 
an advance over the Renaissance monarchies that had preceded it, so too the emerging 
nation-states of the nineteenth century embodied a qualitative improvement in 
administrative capacity over their Absolutist predecessors.702  For all of their 
superficial modernity, Absolutist states had lacked direct infrastructural power over 
the bulk of their population, with monarchs relying on a system of indirect rule 
through local aristocratic intermediaries to maintain peace and order throughout their 
territories.703 Far from constituting uniformly administered and centrally governed 
domains, Absolutist states had remained pockmarked by private seigneurial 
jurisdictions, their pretensions towards rational administration pervasively 
                                                 
701See generally Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, pp. 35-39. 
702Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence, p. 173. 
703See for example Henshall, The Myth of Absolutism.  
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compromised by institutionalized concessions to church, aristocracy, and local 
custom.704 
 By contrast, the nation-state realised levels of political centralization and 
administrative reach of which even the most ambitious of Absolutist monarchs could 
only have dreamed. The mechanization of means of transportation and later the 
development of electronic media such as the telegraph enabled states to more deeply 
penetrate societies than had previously been possible, facilitating the collection and 
storage of a greatly expanded corpus of information about governed populations.705  
Relatedly, the development of statistics and the birth of the social sciences permitted 
society to be rendered far more legible to rulers than before, inspiring a concomitant 
expansion in government ambitions to engage in wholesale projects of social 
engineering for the benefit of the governed.706 The unfolding shift from Absolutist to 
republican modes of sovereignty provided a powerful ideological justification for this 
expansion of state activities to promote popular welfare, while the greatly enhanced 
pools of taxable wealth made available by the industrial revolution provided states 
with the material wherewithal to do so.  In this way, the popular sovereignty and 
industrial revolutions combined with the less conspicuous administrative revolution to 
bequeath formidable new state-society complexes, with the combination of democratic 
legitimation, industrial wealth, and expanded administrative surveillance and control 
endowing the state with historically unmatched capacities for internal resource 
mobilization and external power projection.707     
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Ibid. 
705Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence, p. 173. 
706On this point, see generally James C. Scott. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve 
the Human Condition Have Failed, Yale Agrarian Studies. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1998. 
707On this process, see Amir Weiner. "Introduction: Landscaping the Human Garden." In Landscaping 
the Human Garden - Twentieth Century Population Management in a Comparative Framework, edited 
by Amir Weiner, 1-18. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003. See specifically pp. 2-3. 
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 The combined impact of the popular sovereignty, industrial, and administrative 
revolutions was to markedly increase the power of states over their own societies, 
while simultaneously opening up a radically expanded asymmetry of power between 
the West and the non-European world.708  This power asymmetry culminated in the 
final macro-process considered here, specifically the ‘new imperialism’ that integrated 
the world into a single geopolitical space in the last three decades of the nineteenth 
century. The final surge of European imperialism completed longstanding processes of 
Western imperial expansion. These processes dated from the fifteenth century at least, 
and had received a major fillip in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with 
Europe’s first military revolution and the ensuing consolidation of European naval 
supremacy vis-à-vis non-European societies.709 Critically, the predominantly naval 
character of European military supremacy had placed serious upper limits on Western 
empire-building projects in Eurasia and Africa prior to the mid-late nineteenth 
century. While European innovations in ship-building and fortification had permitted 
the establishment of a string of fortified coastal trading settlements in Southern and 
Eastern Asia prior to this point, European capacities to project power into the Eurasian 
interior had previously been limited, and had been further curtailed by the robust land-
based military power of indigenous gunpowder empires.710  Similarly, in Africa, the 
armed resistance of local potentates had combined with natural epidemiological 
barriers to inhibit European imperial expansion into the interior.711  
                                                 
708Dandeker, Surveillance, Power and Modernity, p. 89; and Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence, p. 
226. 
709McNeill, The Global Condition, pp. 113-116. 
710Black, ‘War and International Relations’, p. 130. 
711On this point, Thompson contrasts the experience of the European conquerors in the New World, 
where local susceptibilities to disease facilitated European colonial expansion, with European 
experiences in Afro-Eurasia, where European susceptibilities to disease tended to inhibit rather than 
assist projects o imperialism. See Thompson, ‘The Military Superiority Thesis’, p. 151. 
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 By the last third of the nineteenth century, however, the technological, 
organizational and scientific bounties of the industrial and administrative revolutions 
had corroded the last remaining barriers to European expansion.  With the diffusion of 
the railroad and the steam-train, Europeans were at last able to effect the political, 
economic, and military penetration of the Eurasian and African heartlands.712 The 
roughly synchronous invention of the telegraph and the development of a trans-
continental network of submarine telegraph cables permitted the rapid conveyance of 
market transactions and bureaucratic commands across the globe, thereby further 
facilitating European imperial expansion, while the administrative revolution within 
Europe found its global echo in the construction of more intrusive state apparatuses 
throughout Europe’s maritime empires.713  Meanwhile, in the African interior, even 
the previously immutable epidemiological barriers to European conquest were 
ultimately overcome (or at least reduced to manageable levels) through advances in 
Western medicine.714   
The specific dynamics by which different non-European polities succumbed to 
Western colonial penetration varied, with the steady decomposition of the Ottoman 
and Qing empires contrasting with the fairly rapid absorption of large numbers of 
African polities following the European carve-up of the continent at the Congress of 
Berlin.  Additionally, in some isolated instances (e.g. Siam, Afghanistan), non-
European rulers were able to take advantage of European imperial rivalries to evade 
the indignity of colonial subjugation entirely.  But neither the varying dynamics of 
Western expansion in Eurasia and Africa nor the anomalous instances in which 
polities escaped the grasp of empire detracted from a larger reality, namely that by the 
                                                 
712Black, ‘War and International Relations’, p. 131. 
713On the growing importance of the telegraph in knitting the world together into a single geopolitical 
space during this period, see generally Daniel R. Headrick. The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications 
and International Politics, 1851-1945. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. 
714On this point, see for example McNeill, Plagues and Peoples, p. 284. 
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century’s end, the peoples of the world had for the first time in history  been integrated 
into a single global international system.  
 
8.1.2 The Thirty Years’ Crisis, the Decline of the West and the Genesis of the Global 
Sovereign State System 
 
 From a global vantage point, the dominant motif of the nineteenth century had 
been the West’s meteoric ascendancy over other civilizational centres, with the 
century witnessing the envelopment of non-European polities throughout Eurasia and 
Africa by a Western-dominated global international system. The collective dominance 
the West enjoyed over other civilizational centres at this time was anomalous when 
situated within the broader history of East-West relations. Additionally, the 
subordination of non-Europeans within the framework of empire sat uneasily with the 
supposed universality of the ideals of the popular sovereignty revolution.  As the 
twentieth century progressed, this structural contradiction between empire and popular 
sovereignty would be sharply exposed, eventually resolving itself through the 
establishment of a global sovereign state system. But the structural contradiction 
between imperialism and popular sovereignty was by itself insufficient to produce this 
change. Rather, just as a global international system had first emerged as a by-product 
of the imperialism enabled by Europe’s inter-locking popular sovereignty, industrial, 
and administrative revolutions, so too the transition to a global sovereign state system 
emerged only after a radical contraction in the power of the Western European 
metropole.  Ironically, this contraction in power was in turn driven by a series of 
overlapping crises centring round the very same macro-processes that had sustained 
Europe’s ascendancy to world hegemony in the first instance. 
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 The shift from divine to popular legitimations of political authority; the 
exponential increase in humankind’s productive powers wrought by industrialization; 
the equally prodigious growth in the state’s powers of administration, policing and 
surveillance – each of these trends had appeared in 1900 to hold out the prospect of 
dramatically improving the moral and material condition of humanity. Nevertheless, 
each of these macro-processes contained nightmarish potentialities, which were all 
realised in the first half of the twentieth century. Turning firstly to the ideological 
dimension of the crisis, the period 1914-1945 saw both the obliteration of the last 
vestiges of the ancien regime in Europe, as well as the onset of a global contest 
between regimes incarnating different variants of the popular sovereignty revolution. 
From the perspective of an investigation into the origins of a global sovereign state 
system, the pivotal year of the Great War was 1917.  In this year, the Tsarist autocracy 
collapsed, the United States entered the war, and a systemic ideological polarization 
crystallized between the alternative universalisms of Wilsonian liberal 
internationalism and Soviet Bolshevism.715 Both Wilsonian liberalism and Bolshevism 
claimed to embody the animating ideals of the popular sovereignty revolution, 
specifically those of individual and collective self-determination, popular 
eudemonism, and the promotion of human emancipation.716 Equally, both claimed 
universal validity, with their respective advocates seeking to re-make the entire world 
in accordance with the tenets of their ideology. Most fundamentally for present 
purposes, both ideologies were explicitly anti-colonial in character. In the war’s 
aftermath, the United States retained its Pacific colonial possessions, while the 
Bolsheviks were unsparing in their resort to arms to bring the bulk of the Romanov 
patrimony into their new Soviet empire. These departures from principle in their own 
                                                 
715On this point, see Geoffrey Barraclough. An Introduction to Contemporary History. London: C.A. 
Watts & Co. Ltd, 1964, pp. 113-114. 
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Ibid., pp. 114-115. 
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spheres of influence notwithstanding, both polities remained deeply opposed to 
European colonialism, on the basis of both ideological conviction and hard-headed 
calculations of strategic self-interest.717 
 By 1918, an internal schism between liberal and socialist iterations of the 
popular sovereignty revolution that had simmered in Europe from 1848 onwards had 
been projected onto a global plane. Furthermore, with the establishment of the League 
of Nations, the ideal of national self-determination had been institutionalized as a 
constitutional principle of the international system, further undercutting the legitimacy 
of the colonial empires. In the war’s immediate aftermath, the chief state sponsors of 
liberal and Bolshevik internationalism both turned inwards, partially limiting the 
subversive impact of their ideologies in the short term.718 But this momentary reprieve 
for the colonial empires was offset by the immense material damage inflicted upon the 
European heartland by the advent of industrialized total warfare. Both the American 
Civil War and the Russo-Japanese war had provided early glimpses of the vastly 
destructive nature of industrial warfare.  Additionally, both conflicts had also 
demonstrated the unpredictable and hugely dislocative social and political 
consequences for belligerents that could flow from the prolonged mass mobilization of 
citizens required to prosecute total war. But the battlefield destruction and socio-
political dislocation of these precursor wars paled in comparison to the material 
devastation and social disruption experienced in Europe during and immediately after 
World War I.719 
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 Surpassing in importance even the unprecedented human and material cost of 
World War I, the advent of industrial warfare produced three developments that 
further hastened the transition to a global sovereign state system. Firstly, the conflict 
destroyed the fragile international trading and financial order that had evolved in the 
belle époque of globalisation.720  Having entered the conflict as the world’s largest 
creditor nation, Britain emerged as one of the world’s largest debtors.721 A punitive 
reparations regime meanwhile retarded Germany’s political and economic 
rehabilitation, while the United States refused to assume responsibility as the world’s 
new lender of last resort, thus paving the way for continuing global economic 
instability and the revival of Great Power conflict in the 1930s.722  Secondly, the 
intense pressures of mass mobilization associated with prosecuting prolonged war in 
the industrial age imposed formidable centrifugal strains on multi-ethnic empires. For 
the Ottoman, Habsburg, and Romanov empires, these pressures proved fatal, leading 
to the dissolution of these conglomerations and their eventual succession (in two out 
of three instances) by a fissiparous arc of unstable newly independent states.723 Even 
for the French and British empires, which momentarily grew rather than contracted in 
the post-war period, the extensive wartime mobilization of colonial resources exerted 
centrifugal effects by nurturing the political self-consciousness of peripheral elites. 
Finally, the wartime dislocation of extensive core-periphery financial links hot-housed 
processes of peripheral economic development throughout the non-European world.  
In so doing, the war eroded the virtual monopoly on industrial capitalism the Western 
                                                 
720On the collapse of the old laissez-faire global economic order and states’ failed attempts to 
reconstitute components of it in the post-war period, see for example Karl Polanyi. The Great 
Transformation. Boston: Beacon Press, 1957, chapter two. 
721Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, p. 363. 
722On Britain’s inability to underwrite a functioning global financial order after World War I and the 
United States’ unwillingness to perform this role, see generally Charles Poor Kindleberger. The World 
in Depression, 1929-1939. Rev. ed, History of the World Economy in the Twentieth Century. 
Harmondsworth, Middlesex ; Ringwood, Vic: Penguin, 1987. 
723See generally Aviel Roshwald. Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, Russia 
and the Middle East, 1914-1923. London ; New York: Routledge, 2001. 
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world had enjoyed prior to this point, while also simultaneously nurturing the growth 
of politically active new constituencies in the colonies (e.g. organized labour) that 
proved generally hostile to colonial rule.724 
 With the advent of industrial total warfare and the emergence of a global 
ideological polarization between exponents of different variants of the popular 
sovereignty revolution, the normative and material bases of Europe’s collective world 
hegemony were severely undermined. These trends merely accelerated with the 
revival of global Great Power conflict in the 1930s, only to be joined by a third 
destabilizing development, this one stemming from the nineteenth century revolution 
in state power.  Prior to 1914, liberals and socialists alike had celebrated the discovery 
of the masses as the ultimate source of the state’s authority, as well as hailing also the 
dramatic expansion in the state’s infrastructural capacities for directly intervening into 
social life to promote popular welfare. Despite the progressive potentialities posed by 
these developments, however, the growth of what Zygmunt Bauman has labelled the 
‘gardening state’ also portended darker possibilities, which were made horribly 
manifest from the 1930s onwards with the harnessing of state power to totalitarian 
projects of social transformation.725  Writing on the mentality informing these projects, 
Amir Weiner notes that both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union shared a dualistic 
perception of the masses. Their ideological differences notwithstanding, both regimes 
perceived the masses as at once the ultimate source of the state’s legitimacy, as well as 
also being a raw material to be sculpted by the state into a more orderly and more 
perfect society.726 In both states, the latter task was to be accomplished through the 
systematic cataloguing, mapping and categorization of the population, followed by the 
                                                 
724On this point with specific reference to the Dutch East Indies, see Takashi Shiraishi. An Age in 
Motion - Popular Radicalism in Java, 1912-1926. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990, p. 90. 
725Zygmunt Bauman. "Modernity and the Holocaust." In Genocide: An Anthropological Reader, edited 
by Alexander Hilton Laban, 110-33. Oxford: Blackwell, 2002, p. 110. 
726Weiner, ‘Introduction: Landscaping the Human Garden’, p. 2.  
 342
filtering and elimination of toxic elements (either racial or class enemies) through the 
state’s ruthless application of prophylactic violence.727 
 The Soviet Gulag, the Nazi Holocaust and Imperial Japanese atrocities in East 
Asia together revealed the terrifying magnitude of the crimes that unbridled 
totalitarian ‘gardening states’ were capable of perpetrating. In so doing, these regimes 
inadvertently catalysed developments that further hastened the global state system’s 
emergence. For while Soviet atrocities went unrecognized and unpunished after World 
War II, the crimes of the Axis powers furthered delegitimized empire as a means of 
organizing relations between different political communities. The revulsion evoked by 
the Holocaust in particular also further discredited ‘scientific’ racism, a construct that 
had previously played a critical role in intellectually and morally justifying the ‘new’ 
imperialism to Western audiences.728 Whereas international law had previously 
recognized a hierarchical trichotomy of civilized, barbarous, and savage nations, Axis 
war crimes illuminated the moral bankruptcy of the racist assumptions upon which 
these categories relied. Both the creation of the new international offence of ‘crimes 
against humanity’ and the passage of a Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
reflected a transition towards a more cosmopolitan international legal culture, one that 
explicitly attributed to individuals a raft of inalienable rights that accrued to them by 
dint of their status as human beings, without regard to their ethnic or racial 
background.729 The largely hortatory status of the UDHR notwithstanding, this growth 
                                                 
727
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of cosmopolitan legal norms effected a moral flattening of international society in the 
longer term, corroding the normative foundations of the European empires and thus 
speeding the evolution towards a global sovereign state system. 
 In 1914, the European powers had stood at the apex of a global international 
system that was dominated by the institution of empire, having been catapaulted to 
this privileged position courtesy of the inter-locking popular sovereignty, industrial, 
and administrative revolutions that had begun to transform their societies during the 
nineteenth century. Between 1914 and 1945, Europe’s position changed 
fundamentally, as first the continent and then the world were engulfed by a thirty 
years’ crisis in which the devastating potentialities of these inter-locking revolutions 
were fully realised. By the end of the crisis, the popular sovereignty revolution had 
reverberated well beyond its Atlantic epicentre, its internal schisms refracted onto a 
global stage in the form of a systemic conflict between liberal and Bolshevik 
internationalism. The industrial revolution had spawned an equally revolutionary 
transformation in the intensity and destructiveness of warfare, with the desolation and 
socio-political dislocation unleashed by industrial total warfare accelerating processes 
of imperial dissolution throughout Eurasia. Finally, the horrific excesses of 
pathological ‘gardening states’ made possible by the administrative revolution were 
prompting a seismic shift in the international legal landscape, with the hierarchical 
‘standard of civilization’ increasingly giving way to a cosmopolitan international legal 
culture oriented to the universal promotion and protection of human rights. 
 By 1975, a mere three decades again after the conclusion of the thirty years’ 
crisis, the European maritime empires had been largely dismantled, and the sovereign 
state universalized as the world’s modal form of political unit.  Over the course of a 
single lifetime, the global international system had been transformed.  In 1900, an 
explicitly hierarchical international order reserved the privileges and protections of 
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sovereign recognition for ‘civilized’ nations, while the disenfranchised majority 
remained tied to the metropolitan powers in varying degrees of subordination. 
Conversely, by 1975, the institution of the sovereign state had been universalized, with 
the obligation to grant self-determination to colonial peoples having by then become 
entrenched in international law as an indefeasible moral imperative. Thirty years 
forward once again, and the abolition of colonialism remains a cause for celebration, 
but the passage of time has revealed fragilities in the global sovereign state system that 
were unacknowledged in its infancy. But before these weaknesses may be considered, 
a more extensive review of the global state system’s constitution is first required.  
 
8.2 The Constitution and Operation of the Global Sovereign State System 
 
8.2.1 The Normative Complex of the Global Sovereign State System 
 
 Any analysis of the constitution of the contemporary international order must 
begin with an acknowledgement of three essential characteristics that differentiate it 
from both Christendom and the Sinosphere. Firstly, unlike either Christendom or the 
Sinosphere, which only ever prevailed within culturally or geographically discrete 
domains, the contemporary international order is literally global in its reach. Secondly, 
as a consequence of its global reach, the global state system is defined not by any 
underlying cultural unity, but rather by the homogeneity of its institutional forms, of 
which the rational-bureaucratic sovereign state is the most basic element. Finally, 
unlike its historical predecessors, the global state system lacks any overt cosmological 
foundations. On the one hand, this de-coupling of constitutional principles from any 
cosmological foundations has been both essential and unavoidable, given the 
irrepressible cultural and religious diversity of the polities making up the global state 
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system. On the other hand, the secular foundations of the contemporary world order 
are suffused with understandings of religion that strongly derive from Western 
Europe’s very distinctive post-Reformation and post-revolutionary experiences. 
Consequently, the present world order remains acutely vulnerable to challenge by 
those agitating for an alternative formulation of the relationship between the sacred 
and the mundane worlds. 
 Its cultural diversity notwithstanding, the global state system is oriented around 
a constellation of identity-constitutive values that together condition conceptions of 
the ultimate purposes of collective association. In place of the medieval Christian 
concern for preparing for eternal salvation, or the Confucian preoccupation with the 
maintenance of cosmic harmony, the contemporary world order is distinguished by its 
elevation of the explicitly profane concerns of enhancing the happiness, autonomy, 
and freedom of individuals and nations as forming the collective raisons d’etre of 
government.730 While concerns for promoting popular eudemonism were never 
entirely absent from traditional evaluations of governmental legitimacy, it has only 
been with the globalization of the popular sovereignty revolution that this goal has 
been elevated as forming the over-riding purpose of government. 
 In addition to its emphasis on promoting popular eudemonism, the global state 
system is also informed by an abiding commitment to advancing the cause of 
individual and collective self-determination. In contrast to the explicitly hierarchical 
and inegalitarian orders of Latin Christendom and the Sinosphere, the global state 
system’s constitutional principles are insistently egalitarian in character.731 This 
                                                 
730On this point, I am again greatly indebted to Christian Reus-Smit’s conception of both the moral 
purpose of the modern state and its impact on the design of the fundamental institutions of international 
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emphasis on the enhancement of individual and collective capacities for self-
governance is rooted in both the Enlightenment principles informing the popular 
sovereignty revolution of the 19th century, as well as the anti-racist and anti-imperialist 
norms that took hold globally in the post-World War II movement towards 
decolonization.732  At the most basic level, the emphasis accorded to self-
determination flows as a logical corollary to the Enlightenment’s insistence upon the 
reliability of human reason over divine revelation as a guide for the conduct of 
temporal affairs. In severing the sacred cord that had previously connected the polis 
with the cosmos, Enlightenment thinkers delegitimated religious justifications for the 
institutionalized political and economic inequalities of the ancien regime.733 
Complementing this negative indictment of Old Regime values, many thinkers further 
advanced the claim that the human capacity for reasoning endowed citizens with both 
the mental ability and the moral right to determine their own destiny.734 In the 
twentieth century, the moral flattening of international society that had begun with this 
revolution was completed with the discrediting of pseudo-scientific racist justifications 
for colonialism, and the ensuing development of global norms mandating rights of 
self-determination for all colonial peoples.  
 To the extent that one can isolate identity-constitutive norms within a milieu as 
culturally diverse as the global state system, these norms pertain to a near-universal 
consensus upon the centrality of popular eudemonism and of individual and collective 
self-determination as the legitimating imperatives of modern government.  This 
emphasis on the promotion of temporal happiness and the maximization of human 
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capacities for individual and collective self-determination is reflected also in the state 
system’s ethical-prescriptive norms, which are self-consciously cosmopolitan in 
character and are institutionalized in the form of a rights-based moral regime that 
purports to be universal in its application. Recapitulating earlier comments, the 
ethical-prescriptive norms of the global state system were forged largely in response to 
the atrocities perpetrated by the Axis powers during World War II.  The Axis powers 
had subscribed to caste-based ethical systems that assigned special moral significance 
to ethnic and racial differences, with the world conceived as a hierarchy of ‘superior’ 
and ‘inferior’ races locked in ceaseless existential struggle.735  By contrast, the ethical-
prescriptive norms that took hold in the post-war period are encoded within a rights-
based framework in which individuals are assigned a core set of rights owed to them 
by dint of their status as human beings. The enactment of a Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights; the establishment of ‘crimes against humanity’ as an offence under 
international criminal law; the more recent establishment of an International Criminal 
Court claiming universal jurisdiction – each of these developments reflect the 
institutionalization of ethical-prescriptive norms anchored in a cosmopolitan liberal 
outlook.  
Once again, the contrast between these norms and those of historical 
international orders is instructive. Where the ethical-prescriptive norms of Latin 
Christendom and the Sinosphere were thickly embedded within distinctive cultural 
traditions, derived their validity from their alleged concordance with divine laws, and 
were inflected with patronal and inegalitarian values, the norms of the global state 
system are officially disembedded from a particular cultural tradition, are secular and 
ecumenical in character, and are suffused with the egalitarian values characteristic of 
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 348
rights-based moral cultures. The state system’s egalitarian principles are further 
reflected in its power-legitimating norms. The global state system is emphatically 
egalitarian in its maintenance of a regime of international legal equality between its 
constituent members. International law retains its obligatory character in the global 
state system, but in keeping the significance accorded to norms of individual and 
collective self-determination, states’ obligations to obey are held to derive ultimately 
from the presumed grounding of international law in the consent of the contracting 
states.736  Similarly, both citizens’ obligations to observe domestic laws and 
governments’ prerogatives to rule free from external interference are legitimized 
through reference to the perceived concordance between the laws of the state and the 
consent of the governed.737 Admittedly, the egalitarian principles of the state system 
sit awkwardly with the institutional concessions (most notably the assignment of veto 
powers to the P5 members of the UN Security Council) granted to Great Powers to 
ensure their interest in maintaining the present international order. But these pragmatic 
accommodations are exceptions to the rule, and contrast dramatically with the 
pervasively hierarchical power-legitimating norms that sustained both Christendom 
and the Sinosphere.  
 
8.2.2 The Governing Institutional Framework of the Global Sovereign State System.   
 
 As with all orders, the global state system subsists on a combination of 
authoritative and coercive practices which are themselves channelled through a core 
set of fundamental institutions. Consistent with the egalitarian values that sustain it, 
the key loci of authoritative power within the contemporary world order are formally 
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equal, territorially bounded, and domestically supreme sovereign states. Unlike either 
Christendom’s composite monarchies or the Sinosphere’s tributary kingdoms, 
contemporary sovereign states are not situated within hierarchically ordered and 
formally recognized transnational authority structures – to repeat Waltz’s dictum, in 
the present order, ‘None [are] entitled to command; none [are] required to obey’.738 
With the spread of the popular sovereignty revolution, the post-war international 
system witnessed a paradoxical dynamic wherein authoritative power became at once 
dispersed between polities while simultaneously being concentrated within them.  On 
the one hand, decolonization entailed the dismantling of empires and the consequent 
cascading of the right to rule down to the level of the individual polity.739 On the other 
hand, the globalization of the popular sovereignty revolution provided a powerful 
rationale for the intensified concentration and centralization of authoritative and 
coercive power within polities by activist governments claiming to rule in the name of 
the people. The end result has been both a formal levelling of authority structures 
within international society, as well as a sharpening of the conceptual divide between 
an international realm governed by the logic of anarchy, and a domestic realm 
governed by the logic of hierarchy.  
 Lacking the divine justifications for hierarchy evident in either Christendom or 
the Sinosphere, the global state system nevertheless possesses a range of authoritative 
institutions devoted to the cultivation of cooperation and the containment of enmity 
between member states.  Naturally, these institutions bear the imprint of the egalitarian 
principles they are intended to sustain, and are generally designed with a view towards 
complementing and augmenting rather than undermining state sovereignty. Of these 
authoritative institutions, the most conspicuous is the United Nations, a permanent 
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universal conference of states designed to promote international peace and security 
while also advancing the purposes and ideals of the popular sovereignty revolution. 
The intimate association between the ideals of the popular sovereignty revolution and 
the institutional design of the UN is evident for example in both the importance it 
accords to public deliberation between member states and its institutionalization of the 
‘one country, one vote’ principle. In contrast to either Christendom or the Sinosphere, 
where authoritative institutions were accorded legitimacy on account of their 
presumed concordance with cosmic and transcendent sources of authority, 
authoritative institutions such as the UN derive their legitimacy instead from their 
perceived concordance with mundane and immanent sources of authority, specifically 
the collective will of the member states.740 Similarly, whereas authoritative power was 
exercised in Latin Christendom through the Church’s interpretation and enforcement 
of divinely inspired canon law, and in the Sinosphere through the emperor’s ritual 
enactment of rites believed to maintain temporal and spiritual harmony, in the global 
state system authoritative power is instead exercised through the systematic forging 
and mobilization of consensus between juridically equal sovereign communities.741 
 The central importance accorded to consensus within the UN is consistent with 
the legitimacy principles informing the more fundamental institutions within which 
the UN is embedded. Following Christian Reus-Smit, I nominate multilateralism and 
contractual international law as the primary institutions through which authoritative 
power is mobilized and channelled internationally within the contemporary world 
order.742  Furthermore, I endorse Reus-Smit’s related claim that these fundamental 
institutions are sustained by a conception of law as reciprocal accord, and that they 
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gradually took shape as a systemic outgrowth of the rise of republican government 
within sovereign states from the nineteenth century.743 Nevertheless, while the 
legitimacy principles of the popular sovereignty revolution provide the primary 
normative basis of authoritative power within the global state system, they are not the 
sole basis upon which authoritative power relies. Rather, the global state system is also 
infused with the values of a rationalized world culture originating from the 
Enlightenment and the subsequent nineteenth century administrative revolution.744 
While multilateralism and contractual international law form the fundamental 
cooperative institutions of the state system, international cooperation is practically 
realised through the operation of specialized rational-bureaucratic agencies such as the 
World Trade Organization and the Bretton Woods institutions. The authority of these 
institutions in turn derives from the perception that their policies are guided by the 
expert knowledge of technocratic elites, and that the rational application of this 
knowledge will produce desired outcomes for the international community. The dual 
origins of the state system’s authoritative institutions, in both the popular sovereignty 
and the administrative revolutions of the nineteenth century, have introduced a tension 
between democratic and technocratic legitimacy principles, one that in practice 
complicates but does not decisively stymie collective efforts to maintain order 
internationally.745    
 Notwithstanding the internal tensions between the democratic and technocratic 
bases of international institutions, the exercise of authoritative power through these 
institutions remains vital for maintaining world order. Nevertheless, the maintenance 
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of order in the global state system is equally dependent upon recourse to authorized 
practices of organized violence. This dependence is most evident in the system-wide 
expectation that sovereign states will exercise monopolies on organized violence 
within their respective territories. In the contemporary state system, the maintenance 
of a monopoly on organized violence has been elevated as forming a crucial, even 
constitutive characteristic of the nation-state. The considerations informing this 
expectation have been both normative and functional in character. Normatively, the 
spread of republican government from the nineteenth century bequeathed new 
expectations that the state owed an obligation to protect the citizen qua sovereign from 
physical attack.746 As the long nineteenth century progressed, this imperative was 
increasingly realised through the dramatic growth of the state’s policing and 
surveillance capacities, the advent of mass conscript citizen armies, and the 
progressive delegitimation and elimination of non-state practices of violence such as 
privateering and mercenarism.747 Functionally, the trend towards coercive monopoly 
has been reinforced by states’ commitment to collectively suppressing activities (e.g. 
piracy and terrorism) deemed inimical to the common interests of the international 
community.748   
 Sovereign states, purporting to possess a monopoly on the legitimate use of 
violence within their territories, constitute the foundations upon which the 
maintenance of international order ultimately depends.  For all of the undoubted 
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importance of authoritative institutions such as the UN, the efficacy of these 
institutions presupposes the comprehensive disarmament and pacification of governed 
populations by sovereign states. In a world lacking any central and supreme locus of 
recognized authority, the maintenance of order depends upon rulers’ capacity to 
centralize, concentrate and cage coercive power within state institutions to a degree 
that has no parallels in the pre-industrial age.749 Paradoxically, however, World War II 
and subsequent conflicts have repeatedly demonstrated that the concentrated violence 
of the modern nation-state also provides rulers with formidable capacities to 
destabilize international order.  Consequently, local monopolies on force have been 
supplemented since 1945 by the maintenance of a collective capacity for marshalling 
force for the purpose of maintaining world order. In establishing the United Nations 
Security Council and empowering it to sanction the use of violence for the purposes of 
maintaining international peace and security, the UN’s founding states recognized the 
necessity of supplementing the authoritative power of international institutions with 
the coercive power of the strongest sovereign states. Thus, while the institution of war 
remains a vital instrument for enforcing international order, the scope for its legitimate 
exercise has been limited to include only acts of self-defence, with responsibility for 
enforcing norms against aggression residing collectively with the UNSC.  This 
prohibition on war except for defensive purposes contrasts radically with 
Christendom’s acceptance of the intertwined relationship between feuding and 
litigation as acceptable means of conflict resolution, and reflects distinctively modern 
aspirations to completely replace war with law as the preferred mechanism of order 
maintenance internationally.  Equally, in delegating responsibility for order 
enforcement to a community of states acting under the Security Council’s imprimatur, 
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the constitution of the contemporary international order acknowledges the high 
fragmentation of coercive and authoritative power characteristic of sovereign state 
systems, thereby distinguishing it from the Sinosphere’s exclusive reliance on imperial 
power as a bulwark against aggression.  
 
8.2.3 The Order-Enabling Material Context of the Global State System 
 
 One of the most striking characteristics of the contemporary world order is the 
sheer magnitude of the ambitions underwriting its constitution. In both Christendom 
and the Sinosphere, the religious foundations of international order nurtured an 
acceptance of the limited, fragile, and imperfect character of collective attempts to 
replicate cosmic order in the temporal world. By contrast, the contemporary order is 
explicitly secular in its foundations, with the United Nations’ commitment to the 
eradication of war, poverty and tyranny reflecting a deep confidence dating from the 
Enlightenment in the malleability of both human nature and social reality. More 
important perhaps than even the different philosophical underpinnings of historic 
versus contemporary international orders, the grand ambitions informing the present 
order may also be explained by reference to the unique imperatives imposed by the 
material context out of which it emerged.  
 Unlike its historical predecessors, the global state system emerged in an age in 
which humanity’s capacities for production and destruction were being transformed by 
the industrial revolution. With the onset of the ‘new imperialism’ and the nineteenth 
century innovations of the telegraph, the railroad and the steamship, the world became 
enmeshed within global networks of production and exchange of unprecedented reach 
and density, a trend that merely intensified in the second half of the twentieth century 
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with further innovations in transportation and communication.750 Whereas 
Christendom and the Sinosphere were grounded in relatively static material 
environments dominated by subsistence agriculture, the global state system has 
conversely emerged in a milieu which technological constraints on self-sustaining and 
continuous economic growth have largely been transcended. Similarly, whereas 
Christendom’s poverty and the Sinosphere’s pre-industrial character placed a definite 
ceiling on the scale of actors’ destructive capacities, the advent of industrial and later 
nuclear warfare has removed all limits to the physical destruction rulers are 
collectively capable of unleashing.     
 The global state system can also be distinguished from its forebears in the 
different combination of kinship, patronage, bureaucratic and commercial 
mobilizational networks woven into its composition. As I have illustrated in previous 
chapters, in both Christendom and the Sinosphere, aristocratic kinship and patronage 
networks formed the basis of vital conduits for the mobilization of social power. 
Conversely, while kinship and patronage retain some importance as bases of 
mobilization in the contemporary world order, their relative significance has been 
surpassed by rationally organized state bureaucracies and formally depoliticized 
world-straddling networks of commercial exchange. With the universalization of a 
reflexively monitored state system, the rational-bureaucratic state has become 
generalized as the dominant institutional form through which authoritative and 
coercive power is channelled.751 In many post-colonial states especially, state 
bureaucracies have been imbricated over powerful kinship and patronage networks, 
with the resulting polities coming to resemble at best partial approximations of the 
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ideal-typical Weberian state.752 Similarly, while global economic integration has 
accelerated rapidly in recent decades, this integration has been uneven in its 
geographical distribution, and the subsumption of social relations within the 
framework of market capitalism remains far from complete.  These caveats aside, the 
dominance of state and market over less abstract and more personalistic kinship and 
patronage networks is undeniable, and is particularly pronounced when juxtaposed 
against the experience of my historical cases.  
 Of all the contrasts between the contemporary world order and its historical 
predecessors, however, the most salient relates to the state system’s level of violence 
interdependence. The global state system emerged out of the crucible of industrial 
total warfare, and took shape during the Cold War under the shadow of nuclear 
annihilation. Unlike its predecessors, the contemporary order emerged in a context 
characterized by both an exceptionally high concentration and an exceptionally high 
accumulation of armed force.753 In Christendom, violence had been a pervasive 
phenomenon but it was neither particularly intensive nor extensive in its reach, at least 
prior to the introduction of gunpowder and commercial mercenarism into European 
warfare in the fourteenth century.  Moreover, in the Sinosphere, the Chinese empire 
was for the most part militarily unassailable prior to the nineteenth century, but its pre-
industrial army and aversion to naval expansion limited the scale and reach of inter-
polity violence within the Sinosphere.754 
 The global state system by contrast developed in an environment of pervasive 
and extensive high-level violence.  The quantum leap in the destructiveness of warfare 
                                                 
752On this point, see for example Francis Fukuyama. "The Imperative of State-Building." Journal of 
Democracy 15, no. 2 (2004), p. 27. See also more generally William Reno. Warlord Politics and 
African States. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998; and Crawford Young. The African Colonial 
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753As indicated previously, the distinction between the accumulation and concentration of the means of 
violence within social systems is drawn from Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, pp. 19-20. 
754See above, chapter six. 
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initiated by the industrial and nuclear revolutions has already been discussed, but bears 
repetition because it was partially the memory of industrial total warfare and the fear 
of nuclear Armageddon that spurred the establishment of the state system’s ordering 
institutions in the first instance. Nevertheless, it is equally important to recognize that 
the state system also emerged consequent to two basic asymmetries obtaining 
respectively between core and periphery, and between rulers and ruled. In the 
nineteenth century, the industrial revolution opened up a vast asymmetry in war-
making capacities between Europe and indigenous polities in Asia and Africa, 
permitting the incorporation of the world into a single geopolitical space.755 In the 
twentieth century, the global process of geopolitical competition and consolidation 
continued, with the emergence of two anti-colonial superpowers beyond Western 
Europe permitting the dismantling of empires and the globalization of the sovereign 
state system.756 This process of geopolitical consolidation has accelerated in the post 
Cold War period with the shift towards a unipolar system, a structural development 
that has profound implications for the state system’s future which will be discussed in 
greater detail below. 
 In addition to the asymmetry between core and periphery engendered by the 
industrialization of warfare, the global state system has also been predicated on the 
opening up of a vast imbalance in coercive power between states and the societies 
over which they govern. Again recapitulating earlier comments, the contemporary 
international order is predicated on the worldwide establishment of localized state 
monopolies over the legitimate use of force within their territories. In the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, the industrialization of warfare and the revolution in state 
power dramatically assisted the consolidation of the Weberian norm throughout the 
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Powers, pp. 189-193. 
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Atlantic state system. Following the liquidation of the European empires, Western 
states sought to replicate this process in the developing world by providing post-
colonial governments with the training and materiel necessary to construct modern 
military forces.757 In many instances, this process of transference was successful. 
However, the state’s monopoly on violence has nevertheless remained tenuous 
throughout many post-colonial societies. Moreover, with the accelerated diffusion of 
disruptive and destructive capacities to non-state actors facilitated by globalization, 
this essential asymmetry between state and society is being frayed further, thereby 
threatening the state system’s material underpinnings. 
 
8.3 The Decay of the Global State System 
 
 In comparison to its historical predecessors, the global state system (see table 
8.1 below) emerged with startling rapidity, with barely a century separating the dawn 
of the ‘new imperialism’ from the collapse of the last of the European maritime 
empires.   So rapid has been the state system’s emergence and so universal is its reach 
that it is easy to retrospectively assume the inevitability of its rise. The sovereign 
state’s global spread has also been so identified with the onward march of modernity 
that its indefinite survival seems assured.  However, as the following discussion 
demonstrates, a closer inspection of the state system’s numerous underlying 
vulnerabilities sharply qualifies such optimism.   
 
 
 
                                                 
757On this process, see generally Alexander Wendt, and Michael Barnett. "Dependent State Formation 
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 359
Table 8.1 The Global State System, 1945-Present 
 
Normative Complex Governing Institutional 
Framework 
Order-Enabling Material 
Context 
Identity-Constitutive 
Norms 
Popular eudemonism, 
human emancipation, and 
augmentation of collective 
and individual capacities 
for self-determination 
Ordering Framework 
Sovereign state system 
collectively governed by 
permanent universal 
concert of formally equal 
states 
Aggregate Capacities for 
Production and 
Destruction 
Global market capitalist 
system ordered within 
framework of states 
possessing industrial (and in 
some cases nuclear) 
capacities for violence  
Ethical-Prescriptive 
Norms 
Cosmopolitan ethical 
framework 
institutionalized within 
global human rights 
regime 
Authoritative Institutions 
Multilateralism and 
contractual international 
law, and issue-specific 
multilateral regimes 
claiming technocratic 
authority (e.g. WTO) 
 
Mobilizational Networks 
Dominance of state and 
inter-governmental 
bureaucracies and formally 
depoliticized global 
commercial networks 
Power-Legitimating 
Norms 
National self-
determination and 
international regime of 
sovereign equality 
Coercive Institutions 
Maintenance of state 
monopolies on organized 
violence and collective 
maintenance of order 
through force authorized 
by UNSC 
Violence Interdependence 
High concentration and 
accumulation of coercive 
means (unipolar distribution 
of Clausewitzian war-making 
capacities and diffusion of 
destructive and disruptive 
capacities to non-state actors) 
[high violence 
interdependence] 
 
8.3.1 Systemic Vulnerabilities – The Imperfect Extension of the Sovereign State 
System 
 
 The greatest single weakness of the global state system lies in the institutional 
weakness and low popular legitimacy of many post-colonial states.  Shielded from the 
threat of extinction by a negative sovereignty regime that grants them sovereign 
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recognition regardless of their institutional failings, many post-colonial states bear 
only surface similarities with the modern nation-states they are supposed to resemble. 
What a brief examination of these polities reveals is a constellation of weaknesses that 
have consistently undermined the state’s ability to provide basic political goods to its 
citizenry. It is partially out of this gap between commitments and capabilities, and the 
ensuing erosion of the state’s popular legitimacy, that the global state system’s current 
vulnerability to subversion has developed. 
 In seeking to account for the weakness of many post-colonial states, Kalevi 
Holsti has observed that ‘colonial rule was one in which the relation between state and 
society was characterized by downward links of domination, but not by upward links 
of representation.’758 This observation captures the essential truth that post-colonial 
states began their lives as artificially imposed authoritarian structures established and 
maintained to advance the interests of the metropolitan powers. As an external 
imposition, the colonial state sunk only shallow roots into host societies in most 
instances, a legacy that has persisted in the form of the weak state-society linkages that 
continue to plague many post-colonial polities in Africa and the Greater Middle 
East.759  In nineteenth century Europe, the growth in the state’s infrastructural power 
that was facilitated by the administrative revolution finally enabled rulers to establish 
direct rule over subject societies, even as the growth of constitutional government 
increasingly limited their recourse to despotic power as a means of maintaining 
order.760  Conversely, in colonial societies, the relative balance between infrastructural 
and despotic power was reversed. The infrastructural power of the central government 
                                                 
758Kalevi J. Holsti. The State, War, and the State of War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996, p. 100. 
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Ibid. On this point with specific reference to Saudi Arabia, see Bertrand Badie, and Claudia Royal. 
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760On this point, see generally Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, chapter six (‘States and 
Citizens’).  
 361
remained limited, and order was maintained through a combination of coercion and 
co-optation, with colonial governments extending their patronage networks to 
incorporate favoured portions of the traditional elite into colonial structures of rule.761  
 In defiance of the hopes of many who supported decolonization, this 
estrangement between state and society has persisted in many polities after 
independence. Just as early modern European rulers resorted to the large-scale sale of 
offices to raise revenue and assert a modicum of control over a restive nobility, so too 
has patronage played a vital role as a mechanism of political integration in the 
developing world, albeit one that has exerted a similarly deleterious impact on the 
post-colonial state’s cultivation of infrastructural power.762 The establishment of one-
party governments and the widespread adoption of dirigiste strategies of economic 
development provided many post-colonial rulers with opportunities to incorporate 
large sections of the population into government-dominated patronage networks.763 
Nevertheless, such strategies have done nothing to develop the state’s autonomous 
infrastructural power, instead merely reinforcing the colonial legacy of sustaining 
dualistic state structures characterized by an anaemic Weberian bureaucracy operating 
alongside – and frequently in competition with – extensive informal patronage 
networks.764 
 In addition to the aforementioned weaknesses, many post-colonial polities 
have been further weakened by extensive misalignments between national borders and 
underlying popular loyalties.  On this point, Martin Shaw’s characterization of post-
colonial states as quasi-imperial entities is apposite, given the arbitrariness of states’ 
boundaries and the extensive cultural fragmentation prevalent within their 
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territories.765 While baptised in the name of national liberation, post-colonial polities 
have frequently been states in search of nations, with authoritarian central 
governments forced to continuously fight rearguard actions against domestic 
insurgencies.766  With post-colonial states largely immune to the threat of territorial 
dismemberment by neighbouring polities, state security institutions have typically 
been preoccupied with suppressing internal threats, employing coercion extensively 
and often ineffectively to promote economic development and compel popular 
adherence to official nationalism.767 
 To the inherent frailty and popular illegitimacy many post-colonial polities 
must be added two additional vulnerabilities that further weakened the state system in 
recent decades.  The first of these has been the strain between the state system’s 
egalitarian values and the persistence of hierarchical linkages bonding post-colonial 
client states to Northern patrons. In view of the fragility of many post-colonial states 
and their susceptibility to subversion, their dependence upon Northern security 
assistance is unsurprising.  Nevertheless, precisely because of the socially 
disembedded character of many post-colonial states, their very dependence on 
Northern security assistance has frequently served to fuel popular perceptions of the 
state’s indistinguishability from its ‘neo-colonialist’ benefactors. The resulting decline 
in the state’s popular legitimacy has then necessitated further recourse to repression, at 
once increasing the state’s dependence on foreign security assistance while further 
estranging it from the populace. To cite but one example, the Pahlavi monarchy’s 
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dependence on US support severely compromised its capacity to garner popular 
support throughout the duration of the Shah’s reign. That the Pahlavi restoration had 
been engineered by a CIA-orchestrated coup against the democratically elected 
Mossadeq government merely further reinforced popular perceptions of the regime’s 
lack of autonomy from foreign interests, setting the stage for the splenetically anti-
Western revolution that eventually swept the Shah from office in 1979.768 
 From 1776 onwards, the legitimacy of governments has increasingly been 
evaluated with reference to their degree of presumed concordance with the will of the 
people and their independence from foreign influence. With decolonization, this 
emphasis on the virtues of indigenous rule and the necessity of securing the nation’s 
independence from foreign actors diffused throughout the world.769 But the swiftness 
of decolonization and the frailty of many post-colonial states yielded a situation in 
which socially disembedded authoritarian regimes remained tied to metropolitan 
powers through their dependence on security assistance.  This tendency for bonds of 
dependence to persist and even expand following decolonization was reinforced by the 
predominantly commodity-based export profile of many developing economies and 
the resulting rise of rentier state regimes. Thus, for example, the Gulf monarchies’ 
reliance on the sale of oil on international markets for the great bulk of their revenue 
permitted them with a high level of insulation from popular demands, while 
simultaneously tethering them ever more closely to their Northern patrons.770  The rise 
of rentier state regimes such as these, immune from popular pressures but yet 
integrated into a global economic and security environment through informal ties of 
hierarchy and dependence, has served to further undercut many post-colonial states’ 
                                                 
768On this point, see Karen Armstrong. The Battle for God - Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity, 
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popular legitimacy.771 The existence of these ‘marionette’ states has also highlighted a 
glaring systemic discrepancy between a formal international regime of sovereign legal 
equality and an underlying reality of enduring relations of informal hierarchy.772 
Analogous instances of ‘organized hypocrisy’ have of course existed in previous 
international orders.773 But in an era in which international order has been explicitly 
organized around values such as self-determination, this disjuncture between 
principles and practice has proved particularly damaging to the state system’s 
legitimacy.  
 Finally, the global state system has been vulnerable to challenge on account of 
the unacknowledged cultural particularity of its normative foundations. Superficially, 
the state system’s promotion of popular eudemonism and self-determination, its 
cosmopolitan ethical framework, and its emphasis on the sufficiency of reason over 
revelation as a guide for state action present as being eminently ecumenical.  
However, on closer inspection, the global state system’s normative complex bears the 
deep imprint of the historical experiences of the Western world. Specifically, the 
revolutionary unmooring of political authority from sacred referents from the late 
eighteenth century built upon a series of developments in West-Central Europe that 
dated back to the Reformation. The revolutionaries’ de-coupling of the polis from the 
cosmos was made possible only by a prior ontological shift in the Western conception 
of religion, from a designation referring to an embodied community of believers 
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towards one referring to an abstract body of doctrines and beliefs.774 With the post-
Reformation separation of beliefs and doctrines from practices and communities, the 
political unity of the temporal state could then substitute for the shattered religious 
unity of the Church as the primary mechanism of social integration.775  Despite the 
enduring confessional intolerance of many European polities after the Westphalia, this 
‘privatization’ of religion was crucial in enabling the revolutionaries to subsequently 
articulate an entirely secularized vision of the state, conceived as an institutionalized 
expression of the General Will and entirely shorn of divine legitimations.  
 From decolonization onwards, the sovereign state, cast as the embodiment of 
the General Will and venerated as the chief vehicle for advancing human 
emancipation, has been the central institution sustaining world order. Despite its 
universality, however, its constitution has implicitly reflected the historical 
experiences of West-Central Europe in negotiating a working relationship between the 
sacred and profane worlds. Popular beliefs in post-colonial polities concerning the 
appropriate relationship between religion and politics have frequently departed from 
the norms encoded into the Westphalian state system.776  This disjuncture has 
introduced an additional element of friction into the state system’s operation. In the 
Atlantic state system, the secularization of public life evolved endogenously and over 
centuries, with the traumas of Reformation and revolution eventually yielding a 
resolution in the form of the secular nation-state. Conversely, in post-colonial states in 
the decades after independence, secularization was often experienced as a traumatic 
state-directed assault, with authoritarian elites aggressively suborning religious actors 
and institutions to their programs of political and economic modernization.777 The 
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contempt demonstrated towards religion by these governments, together with their 
perceived worldliness, incompetence, and corruption, served to further estrange states 
from societies, while simultaneously stimulating the growth of oppositional discourses 
cast in a religious idiom.778 Within sections of the Islamic world in particular, these 
oppositional discourses have increasingly attached not merely to local states, but also 
to the state system itself. 
  
8.3.2 Evolving Strains in the Global State System – The Emergence of Ideological 
Dissent 
 
 On August 29, 1966, immediately following dawn prayers, the Egyptian 
government hanged Islamist ideologue Sayyid Qutb.779  From 1953, Qutb had been a 
member of the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization that had lobbied for a greater 
role for Islam in Egyptian public life since its establishment in 1928. While initially 
peaceful in its activities, the Brotherhood’s maintenance of a vast network of health, 
educational and welfare services for its members had long highlighted the inadequacy 
of government programs, evoking the suspicion of successive regimes.780  The 
Brotherhood’s huge popular base and its prominence within Egyptian civil society had 
further stoked government perceptions of the Brotherhood as constituting a subversive 
‘state within a state’.781 With the establishment of a terrorist unit by a faction of the 
Brotherhood in 1943 and its subsequent assassination of the Egyptian Prime Minister 
in 1948, the government was finally given the pretext to engage in a campaign of 
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savage repression against the organization.782 Following the 1952 Free Officers’ 
putsch and a brief period of rapprochement between the Brotherhood and the new 
order, the Brotherhood’s confrontation with the state resumed, with a failed 
assassination attempt on Nasser catalysing a renewed wave of repression that 
culminated with Qutb’s arrest, imprisonment and eventual martyrdom in 1966.783 
 The clash between the Brotherhood and Nasser and Qutb’s martyrdom were 
both emblematic of a larger tension between religion and the state within the Islamic 
world that carried ominous long-term portents for international order.  As early as the 
1920s, the state system’s privileging of the nation-state over the transnational 
community of believers had prompted a countervailing mobilization of the faithful in 
defence of the umma.  From 1919-1924, the Khilifat movement in British India had 
lobbied unsuccessfully for the post-war preservation of the Ottoman Empire’s borders 
and the perpetuation of the office of caliphate as a symbol of global Islamic 
solidarity.784  Meanwhile, modernizing leaders’ attempts to confine Islam to the 
private sphere in countries such as Turkey and Iran generated fierce and at times 
violent popular opposition, prefiguring a contest for the soul of the nation that would 
play out in many Muslim-majority states after decolonization.785 The clash between 
the Brotherhood and Nasser; the long-running Darul Islam rebellion against the 
Sukarno regime in Indonesia; the protracted contest for legitimacy between Iran’s 
Ayatollahs and the Shah – each of these struggles constituted local expressions of a 
larger battle over the compatibility of Islam with modernity. In the immediate post-
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war period, this battle was largely won by secular, authoritarian and often brutal post-
colonial governments.  
 Beneath the Cold War clash between liberalism and socialism, the international 
system was also rent within the Islamic world by a subterranean clash between 
modernizing secular dictatorships and their religiously motivated opponents. It was in 
this larger context, and while languishing in one of Nasser’s concentration camps, that 
Qutb formulated the ideological basis for what would eventually evolve into the 
contemporary jihadist challenge to the global state system.  Qutb’s critique began with 
the intuition that the corruption, poverty and injustice prevalent under the Nasser 
regime were merely the symptoms of a broader spiritual malaise infecting the modern 
world. This malaise was attributable to humanity’s hubristic delusion that reason could 
ever replace revelation as the ultimate guarantor of human welfare.786  Having lived 
and studied in the United States for almost two years in the 1940s, Qutb was left with 
the conviction that the West was incurably estranged from God, its people having 
abandoned spiritual devotion in preference for a hedonistic abandonment to base 
sensuous and materialistic desires.787  Following the Pakistani Islamist Mawlana 
Mawdudi, Qutb characterised the modern world as subsisting in a condition of 
jahiliyya, referring to the time of ignorance in which the tribes of Arabia had lived 
prior to the coming of the Prophet.788 While the Enlightenment had conferred upon 
Europeans technological advantages that had facilitated the conquest of the Islamic 
world, Westerners remained preoccupied with the mundane to the exclusion of the 
transcendental, their culture crippled by a decadent emphasis upon purely utilitarian 
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and pragmatic reasoning.789 Seen through this prism, Nasser’s secularism and his 
modernizing agenda appeared to embody a wholesale importation of the spiritual 
disease that had engulfed the West, a disease that also lead to Islam’s destruction if it 
wasn’t resisted.790 
 From the outset, Qutb’s ideology (henceforth referred to as Qutbism) was thus 
informed by an abiding hostility to Western secular modernity and an existential fear 
for Islam’s future, which he saw as being threatened in Egypt by a combination of 
Western neo-colonialism and the depredations of the secular Nasser dictatorship. 
While Qutbism originated as a repudiation of Nasserism, it was embedded within a 
broader critique of modernity, and its core claims were from the beginning profoundly 
incompatible with the constitutional values of the modern state system. For Qutb, the 
very notion of popular sovereignty was seen as blasphemous, for true sovereignty 
could reside only with God.791 Equally, while the faculty of reason enabled humans to 
apprehend and apply divine law as embodied in the sharia, the very existence of this 
divine legal code rendered it logically unnecessary to grant legislative sovereignty to 
any human agency, be it either a single ruler or the broader populace.792  In place of 
the modern emphasis on the promotion of collective and individual autonomy, Qutb 
stressed instead that true liberation was possible only through unquestioning 
submission to the will of God.793  Moreover, where liberals and socialists prioritized 
the promotion of popular welfare – particularly material welfare – in the temporal 
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world as the primary purpose of government, Qutb instead subordinated materialistic 
considerations to the promotion of the umma’s spiritual well-being.794         
 Qutb’s diagnosis of the problems afflicting the modern world thus constituted a 
repudiation the moral purposes underpinning the global state system. Qutbism’s 
incompatibility with the global state system was further evident in Qutb’s 
emphatically internationalist orientation. Where Nasser’s entire career was devoted to 
the aggrandizement of the Arab nation, Qutb and his followers regarded nationalism as 
a form of modern idolatry introduced by the West to divide and weaken the umma.795  
Certainly, within the Arab world, the artificiality and arbitrariness of the borders 
imposed by the Mandate powers had been a genuine source of popular resentment, as 
evident in the broad support elicited for the ill-fated merger of Egypt and Syria into 
the United Arab Republic between 1958 and 1961. However, whereas even the most 
ardent Arab nationalists proposed only the unification of the Arab nation, Qutb 
harkened back to the early history of Islam, during which time the entire Islamic 
community had been united under the temporal and spiritual leadership of the 
caliph.796  In embracing the vision of a (re)unified umma, Qutb rejected the 
institutionalized territorial particularism characteristic of all sovereign state systems.  
This rejection flowed as a logical corollary of Qutb’s denunciation of notions of 
popular sovereignty and modern nationalism, and served to further distinguish his 
world-view from the values and underpinning the post-war world order. 
 In the latter stages of his career, Qutb sought not merely to present a theoretical 
critique of modernity, but also to provide a concrete plan of action designed to enable 
the umma to escape the horrors of the jahiliyya.  Drawing inspiration from 
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Mohammed’s early proselytisation of Islam in the teeth of opposition from the 
merchants of Mecca, Qutb proposed a staged strategy for overthrowing apostate 
regimes and thus restoring God’s sovereignty on earth. Qutb argued that Muslims 
must begin the spiritual regeneration of their society by first voluntarily dissociating 
themselves from the jahili mainstream and its corrupting influences.797 This 
dissociation from the mainstream would enable true Muslims to fortify themselves 
spiritually, and provide them with an opportunity to purge themselves of the residues 
and habits of life in jahili society. Having undertaken this process of purification, Qutb 
then enjoined his adherents to establish a genuine Islamic community (jamaah) 
outside of mainstream society, in which Muslims would cultivate a collective life 
governed by God’s laws, and would also prepare both spiritually and militarily for a 
final confrontation with God’s enemies.798 This process of preparation and 
consolidation would eventually culminate with the waging of a victorious jihad 
against apostate regimes and infidels, leading to the reconciliation of God and man 
and the re-establishment of God’s rule on earth.799          
 From its inception, Qutbism thus constituted a holistic negation of the global 
state system’s normative complex. In place of state system’s emphasis on the 
promotion of popular eudemonism and self-determination, Qutb proposed that 
humanity’s purpose was to submit to the will of God and to live in harmony with His 
divine commands. Where the state system crystallized around a rights-based regime of 
cosmopolitan ethics, Qutb found the Koran entirely self-sufficient as a guide for moral 
action.  In place of power-legitimating norms authorizing acceptance of state power on 
account of its presumed concordance with the popular will, Qutbism insisted upon the 
supremacy and inviolability of divine sovereignty, arguing that the only legitimate 
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polities were those that implemented God’s law as revealed in the Koran.  Such a 
stance carried weighty implications for the global state system’s fundamental 
institutions. If divine command was to replace popular consent as the basis for all 
authoritative institutions, then both the United Nations and the fundamental 
institutions of multilateralism and contractual international law would need to be torn 
down and replaced by a universal caliphate built upon the foundations of sharia 
law.800 Similarly, through Qutbist lights, the only legitimate violence was that which 
was undertaken in God’s name, thus the modern state’s monopoly on violence could 
only be legitimate when it was subordinated to God’s law. In the meantime, Qutbism 
expressly authorized and indeed mandated individual believers to employ unlimited 
violence to overturn the existing order. 
 The birth of Qutbism signified the emergence of an uncompromising 
ideological challenge to the contemporary world order. As with Christendom and the 
Sinosphere before it, what made this challenge so potentially threatening was its 
genesis in an environment already marked by extensive institutional decay. In the 
Middle East, North Africa and in Pakistan, this decay was already apparent in the 
1960s, and expressed itself in the corruption and economic under-performance of 
incumbent regimes. To cite but one example, in Nasser’s Egypt, the attempt to 
transform the country into an Arab socialist utopia was faltering even prior to the Six 
Day war, in spite of the massive amounts of Soviet foreign aid being poured in to 
assist this enterprise.801  Throughout the Islamic world, the adoption of dirigiste 
development strategies fuelled the rapid growth of inefficient state bureaucracies, 
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while the sponsorship of state-run heavy industries absorbed scarce capital without 
yielding commensurate benefits for the population.802 
 The gulf between the promises of independence and the reality of 
governments’ underperformance had already weakened popular support for many 
Islamic states by the mid-1960s. However, in the years following Qutb’s martyrdom, a 
series of cataclysms broke upon the Islamic world that further sapped the legitimacy of 
incumbent regimes. The most critical of these was the catastrophe of the Six Day War. 
The suddenness, comprehensiveness, and speed of the Israeli victory both discredited 
Pan-Arabism while also calling into question the basic competence of the Arab 
world’s rulers.  Far from annihilating the ‘Zionist entity’, the Arab armies had been 
comprehensively routed, with Egypt, Syria and Jordan sustaining severe territorial 
losses by the war’s end. Of these losses, by far the most traumatic was the Israeli 
conquest of East Jerusalem.  The establishment of Jewish sovereignty over Islam’s 
third holiest city scandalized the Islamic world, with many able to comprehend this 
catastrophe only as a form of divine retribution inflicted upon the umma as a 
punishment for Muslims’ refusal to live in accordance with the requirements of 
Islam.803 Through this reading, which merely increased in popularity following 
subsequent failures to reclaim Jerusalem by either force or diplomacy, redemption 
could come only when Muslims abandoned the idolatry of modern nationalism and 
established an Islamic state.804 
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803On this point, see generally Kepel, Jihad – The Trail of Political Islam, pp. 60-65. 
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 Pakistan’s 1971 defeat and partition following war with India exerted a 
similarly debilitating effect upon the Pakistani government’s legitimacy. Unlike its 
secular Middle Eastern counterparts, the Pakistani state had always relied on religious 
legitimation, having been explicitly established to provide an independent homeland 
for the sub-continent’s Muslim inhabitants. In the war’s aftermath, President Yahya 
Khan was forced to resign and was succeeded by Ali Bhutto, who initially pursued a 
socialist reform program.805 However, even within its newly truncated borders, Islam 
continued to stand as the only force capable of binding together Pakistan’s polyglot 
tribal and ethnic groups. If anything, the disaster of 1971 had served to further 
highlight this truth by demonstrating Pakistan’s nature as a fragile, arbitrary entity that 
remained at continuous risk of dismemberment by neighbouring states. Whereas 
Bhutto’s reign began with an emphasis on socialist reforms, the partition of Pakistan 
thus convinced many that Pakistan needed to become more and not less Islamic if it 
was to reclaim God’s favour and retain its territorial integrity as a defensible homeland 
for South Asian Muslims.806 
 
8.3.3 Transformations in the Global State System’s Material Foundations 
 
 By the early 1970s, a significant sub-section of the global state system was 
thus bedevilled by the interweaving processes of religiously inspired ideological 
dissent and growing institutional decay. As in my historical cases, these forces were 
soon compounded by a series of developments that worked to destabilize the state 
system’s material foundations.  The first of these developments emerged following the 
oil crisis precipitated by OPEC’s temporary embargo on oil exports to Israel’s allies in 
                                                 
805Kepel, Jihad – The Trail of Political Islam, p. 100. 
806
Ibid. 
 375
the developed world.  The overnight quadrupling of oil prices following OPEC’s 
embargo produced a massive financial windfall for the oil-rich conservative 
monarchies of the Persian Gulf.  Following the first oil shock, the region’s strategic 
and economic centre of gravity thus shifted away from the radical Arab republics and 
towards monarchies such as Saudi Arabia. The Gulf States had long emphasized the 
primacy of tribal and religious themes over nationalism in their legitimating strategies, 
and had historically regarded Pan-Arabism and socialism with profound unease.807 
With the enormous influx of wealth following the first oil shock, Saudi Arabia in 
particular sought to seize the strategic initiative by subsidizing efforts to proselytize its 
own creed of Wahhabi Islam throughout the Muslim world.808 
 Saudi efforts from the 1970s to secure the international ascendancy of 
conservative Islam over radical populism were not unprecedented, with the monarchy 
having established the World Muslim League as an ideological foil to Nasserism as far 
back as 1962.809  However, following the oil crisis, a range of forces converged to knit 
together the material foundations of a revived transnational Islamic imaginary. Within 
the sparsely populated Gulf States, the great surge in wealth engendered by the oil 
boom fuelled dramatically expanded these states’ demand for foreign labour. The 
resulting increase in short-term migration to the Persian Gulf accelerated processes of 
regional integration, with states such as Egypt, Jordan and even Syria becoming 
increasingly dependent on financial remittances from citizens temporarily domiciled in 
the Gulf States.810 For Muslim migrant labourers, who constituted the majority of the 
Gulf States’ guest workers in the 1970s, temporary residence in the Land of the Two 
Holy Places and increased exposure to Wahabbi Islam both served to raise their 
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awareness of the Islamic dimension of their identity.811 When these labourers returned 
home they consequently became conduits for the transmission of a heightened sense of 
Islamic self-awareness back to their home societies.812  Finally, the exponential growth 
in migrant remittances within the Islamic world provided a major fillip to the 
expansion of an under-regulated and largely informal hawala system of international 
financial transactions.813  The growth of this hawala system, which complemented the 
equally prodigious rise of a formal international Islamic banking system, provided a 
further layer of connective tissue integrating the umma within a far denser web of 
transnational linkages than had previously existed.814 
 While initially precipitated in response to a renewed outbreak of Arab-Israeli 
hostilities, the OPEC crisis and its aftermath had repercussions that reverberated well 
beyond the Middle East. From the 1970s onwards, the combination of Saudi 
proselytisation, increased transnational migration throughout the umma, and the 
development of international Islamic banking structures provided a firm foundation 
for the growth of global Islamic solidarity. Certainly, the immediate import of these 
developments should not be overstated, for only a small percentage of the world’s 
population were directly touched by the growth of Muslim diaspora networks, while 
Saudi efforts to spread Wahhabism also produced extremely mixed results. This 
caveat aside, the growth of this transnational Islamic imaginary from the 1970s was 
undeniable, and was all the more significant for crystallizing in an environment in 
which official nationalism’s purchase on popular loyalties within many Muslim-
majority countries remained modest.  If the immediate political impact of radical 
Islamist thinking remained limited in the years following the oil crisis, the 
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constellation of forces the crisis had set in motion greatly facilitated the emergence of 
a transnational constituency for the Islamists’ message.  
 Overlapping with and reinforcing the growth of a transnational Islamic 
imaginary, the late 1960s and early 1970s witnessed innovations in international 
transportation and communication that steadily corroded the global state system’s 
order-enabling material context.  These innovations, ranging from the rise of mass 
commercial civil aviation through to the continuing diffusion of television and the 
advent of compact audiocassette tapes, produced superficially similar effects of 
accelerated global time-space compression as had the advent of the telegraph, the 
steamship and the steam train a century earlier.815  However, whereas the late 
nineteenth century innovations in communications and technology had worked to 
assist the European empires’ military and economic penetration of Asia and Africa, 
the strategic consequences of comparable innovations in the late twentieth century 
were notably different. Specifically, these innovations dramatically enhanced the 
relative destructive and disruptive capacities of non-state actors, enabling them to 
launch sustained strategic terrorist campaigns against hostile states on a global stage. 
While the state system had been buffeted by waves of international terrorism prior to 
the late 1960s, terrorism had hitherto been employed largely as a supplementary tactic 
within the context of conventional guerrilla wars. From the late 1960s, by contrast, 
international terrorism emerged as a preferred strategy by violent nationalist and 
revolutionary groups seeking to break the will of conventionally stronger opponents 
by perpetrating spectacular acts of violence against ‘soft’ targets both domestically 
and internationally.816 
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 While a host of locally specific factors contributed to the eruption of 
nationalist and ‘new left’ revolutionary terrorist campaigns in the 1960s and 1970s, 
these drivers are of less concern to this study than the larger material changes that 
made the rise of international terrorism possible.  With the growth of mass commercial 
civil aviation, anti-systemic actors began to enjoy levels of trans-continental mobility 
that were unknown to militants even one generation previously, while passenger 
airliners equally served as irresistible and easily accessible targets for hijacking by 
transnationally nimble militant networks.817 The continued spread of television 
meanwhile provided violent non-state actors with a global platform through which to 
articulate and publicize their grievances, a potentiality that was most notoriously and 
effectively exploited by the Black September organization at the Munich Olympics in 
1972.818  As the events of 1979 were to demonstrate, even the invention of a product 
as seemingly benign as the audiocassette could have significant strategic consequences 
for the relative balance of power between state and non-state actors, with Khomeini’s 
ability to inspire the Iranian people from exile deriving heavily from the ease with 
which thousands of his taped lectures were smuggled into the country and then 
broadcast to a mass audience.819 
 Once again, the transformative effects of the above changes should not be 
overstated. Notwithstanding the alarm evoked in Western capitals by the rise of 
international terrorism, non-state actors’ increased recourse to terrorism only rarely 
yielded tangible political gains, and strong states rapidly crafted a host of domestic 
and international law enforcement measures to contain the threat of terrorism.820  
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Moreover, while the broader Islamic revival was further fuelled by the increased time-
space compression produced by innovations in transportation and communication, 
these innovations had yet to be effectively exploited by violent jihadists internationally 
in the 1970s.  These observations aside, the larger significance of the growth of 
international terrorism during this period was that it signalled a crumbling of the 
material foundations upon which the global state system was based. Previously, mass-
based guerrilla movements had typically posed the most serious threat to the state’s 
maintenance of a monopoly on violence.  Such movements were generally difficult to 
sustain, required the painstaking cultivation and mobilization of popular support, and 
prevailed rarely against better-armed state opponents equipped with modern military 
forces.821 Moreover, even victorious insurgencies generally did not threaten systemic 
norms governing the state’s monopoly on violence, seeking rather to re-institute this 
monopoly domestically under their own terms.  By contrast, the growth of 
international terrorism signalled a larger shift towards the enhanced diffusion of 
destructive capacities to small, internationally mobile groups with only tenuous direct 
connections to a mass support base. In the 1970s, the emergence of such entities – 
deterritorialized, unconstrained by the challenges of mobilizing a mass support base, 
and capable of readily accessing dual-use technologies to perpetrate sustained trans-
continental ‘hit and run’ attacks against the interests of target polities – was in its 
earliest stages.  But this trend was already evident, and would merely accelerate with 
further advances in communication and innovation technologies as the century 
progressed. 
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 The enhanced diffusion of disruptive and destructive capacities to non-state 
actors evident from the 1970s onwards signalled a creeping corrosion of the basic 
asymmetry in coercive power between state and non-state actors upon which the state 
system relied.  Paradoxically, this process dovetailed with the continuing global 
concentration of Clausewitzian war-making capacities in the hands of the two super-
powers, as well as the increased involvement of both within the Islamic world. By the 
1970s, the USSR was rapidly approaching strategic parity with the United States, with 
the pressures of a stagnant economy and a massive military expenditure burden having 
been partially alleviated by a post-oil shock boost in Soviet hard currency reserves.822 
With the super-powers locked in a nuclear and conventional stalemate in the European 
theatre, and both having experienced growing ideological dissent among their 
respective client states from 1968 onwards, the prospect of an enduring détente was 
appealing to both sides.823 The ABM treaty, SALT, and the Helsinki accords were 
each symptomatic of this move towards strategic stabilization in the European 
theatre.824  However, far from anticipating a more general abatement in rivalry, this 
stabilization merely prefigured a lateral displacement of tensions from the strong states 
of the developed core to the far more fragile polities of the developing world. 
 The lateral displacement of superpower rivalries from core to periphery 
expressed itself in the Islamic world firstly through greater superpower involvement in 
the Middle East. With Britain’s 1968 declaration of its intention to liquidate all 
military commitments east of Suez, a power vacuum opened up in the Persian Gulf 
that the super-powers quickly filled through increased reliance on their respective 
regional allies. Throughout the decade and beyond, the USSR provided generous 
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sponsorship to the communist government that had forcibly established itself in South 
Yemen in 1970, while also attempting with limited success to parlay its massive arms 
sales to Iraq into more enduring strategic influence over the Ba’athist regime.825 Still 
nursing its wounds from Vietnam, the United States abjured any direct military 
involvement in the Gulf, preferring to delegate responsibility for maintaining regional 
stability primarily to the Shah of Iran.826 More importantly, the oil shock and its 
aftermath portended a renegotiation of the United States’ relationship with the House 
of Saud. This renegotiation included large-scale recycling of petro-dollars into 
investments in the United States, as well as the establishment of both a Joint 
Commission on Economic Cooperation and a Joint Security Cooperation Commission 
between the two countries. 827 This intensified economic and security cooperation 
would prefigure a steadily expanding US military involvement in the Persian Gulf 
from the 1980s that would in turn play a vital catalytic role in the development of the 
global jihadist insurgency.828 Finally, the Yom Kippur war alerted both superpowers to 
the risk of inadvertent escalation posed by a war between their client states, a risk that 
the US sought to defuse through its sponsorship of the Camp David Accords and its 
subsequent displacement of the USSR as the chief patron of the Arab world’s most 
populous state.  
 The growth of superpower encroachment on the Middle East was partially a 
by-product of the power vacuum created by Britain’s withdrawal from the Persian 
Gulf, and partially also a result of the super-powers’ heightened appreciation of the 
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region’s strategic significance in the wake of the oil shocks. However, this 
encroachment was also an expression of a more general lateral displacement of 
superpower tensions to the developing world that was driven by both the rough 
strategic parity between the superpowers, and also by the massive disparity between 
the superpowers’ military power and that of every other state in the world.829  
Elsewhere in the Islamic ecumene, superpower tensions took an even more 
destabilizing turn in Central Asia as the decade drew to a close. The deposition of the 
Afghan monarchy by a communist regime in April 1978 had proved profoundly 
alarming to Pakistan, which as America’s chief ally in the region feared the 
encroachment of Soviet influence on its borders as well as the possible revival of 
irredentist Afghan claims on Pakistani territory by the new government.830 The 
establishment of an atheistic communist regime in a historically Islamic land could 
also only be an unbearable affront to the recently established regime of the devout 
general Zia al-Huq.831 Consequently, in the eighteen months separating the communist 
coup from the Soviet invasion, both Pakistan and the Soviet Union began to provide 
material support to their respective allies in Afghanistan.832 In so doing, they 
anticipated the militarization of Afghan society and the ensuing disintegration of state 
power that would indefinitely plague the country thereafter, and that would eventually 
have globally destabilizing consequences. 
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8.4 Conclusion 
 
 In Afghanistan immediately prior to the Soviet invasion, one can see a 
microcosm of the forces that were buffeting the global state system towards the end of 
the twentieth century. The global state system had taken form only one generation 
previously, having arisen from the ashes of the European empires, and been given life 
by the globalization of the popular sovereignty revolution.  In the euphoria 
accompanying decolonization, it was assumed that the rapid modernization of newly 
independent states would assure the consolidation of a global order dedicated to the 
advancement of the eminently secular goals of popular eudemonism and individual 
and collective self-determination.  Conversely, by the late 1970s, these ideals had been 
tarnished by the under-performance of the corrupt regimes that had taken hold after 
independence in many post-colonial states. 
 To the existing weaknesses of the state system owing to post-colonial state 
weakness, a series of further debilitating developments brought the state system’s 
fragility into sharper relief in the Greater Middle East and South Asia from the late 
1960s. In the emergence of radical Islamist thought, the state system witnessed the 
development of a direct attack on its philosophical foundations. Coalescing in the 
context of the immediate struggle between secular authoritarian regimes and 
religiously inspired opponents, this challenge gained increasing popular resonance 
with the onset of localized legitimacy crises and the onward decay of state capacities 
in the Islamic world after the defeats of 1967 and 1971. To this ideological challenge 
and the onward march of institutional decay, the material transformations from the late 
1970s further undercut the state system’s foundations, by providing a more robust 
basis for the development of a transnational Islamic imaginary, diffusing increased 
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destructive capacities to non-state actors, and concentrating Clausewitzian war-making 
capacities so heavily as to displace great power rivalry to the parts of the system 
possessing the least conflict-carrying capacity.  
On the eve of the Afghan invasion, all of these destabilizing forces were 
gaining momentum globally, and all were converging on Afghanistan. And as the first 
T-72 tanks rolled over Afghanistan’s borders on Christmas Eve 1979, the stage was 
set for a confrontation that would long outlast the Soviet occupation, and that would 
eventually culminate in a challenge not merely to the superpowers, but to the global 
state system itself.       
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CHAPTER NINE – THE JIHADIST CHALLENGE TO THE 
GLOBAL STATE SYSTEM 
 
Introduction 
 
 On November 20, 1979, a new century was dawning on the Islamic calendar. 
Throughout the umma, the century’s impending approach was greeted with excitement 
and apprehension, with a series of events appearing to foretell an imminent Islamic 
resurgence. In February of that year, the Ayatollah Khomeini had triumphantly 
returned from exile to Iran, while on April 1, the Islamic Republic of Iran was 
officially proclaimed. The toppling of America’s most powerful client in the region 
signalled a seismic strategic shift in the Middle East, with the emergence of an Islamic 
republic forcing both the radical republics and the conservative monarchies onto the 
defensive. With the Iranian seizure of the American embassy on November 4, it even 
appeared briefly as if Iran was willing to challenge not merely the legitimacy of 
incumbent Middle Eastern regimes, but also the validity of the most basic diplomatic 
rules of international society itself. As it was, the hostage crisis would eventually be 
resolved and Iran, like revolutionary states before it, would gradually be socialized 
into accepting the established conventions of modern diplomacy. This observation 
aside, the Iranian revolution nevertheless constituted the first of three pivotal 
developments in 1979 that foreshadowed the contemporary jihadist challenge to 
international society.  
 The second of these developments was the seizure on November 20 of Islam’s 
holiest place, the Grand Mosque of Mecca, by approximately two hundred Islamic 
militants led by the tribal leader Juhayman al Oteibi.833  Despite the strict prohibition 
                                                 
833The following vignette is taken from Wright, The Looming Tower, pp. 101-109. 
 386
on the shedding of blood in Mecca, Juhayman justified his actions by arguing that the 
Al Saud monarchy had forfeited its custodianship of the Holy Places on account of its 
corruption, extravagance and Westernizing policies. After an initial attempt by the 
Saudi Arabian National Guard to recapture the Mosque failed, the monarchy was 
forced to rely on French Special Forces to reclaim the mosque, in so doing threatening 
the taboo prohibiting infidels from setting foot in Mecca.834 While foreign 
involvement in reclaiming the Grand Mosque was kept secret for fear of scandalizing 
the umma, the Ayatollah Khomeini had meanwhile widely broadcast claims that the 
United States was somehow behind the seizure. This suggestion in turn sparked a 
wave of public outrage throughout the Islamic world, leading to the swift destruction 
of American embassies in Islamabad and Tripoli by angry mobs.835  
 As 1979 drew to a close, the perception of a resurgent Islam being besieged by 
infidels received a further boost with the year’s third pivotal development, the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan.  Even under the narrowest definition of jihad, the Soviet 
invasion constituted an infidel attack on a Muslim land that demanded a robust 
response from all pious Muslims. Given the centrality of religion to the legitimating 
strategies of rulers in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, these countries spearheaded efforts to 
provide aid and military support to the Afghan mujahadeen.836  Even more critically, 
the plight of Afghanistan evoked an enormous popular response in Muslim-majority 
countries, with thousands of volunteers from across the umma electing to fight 
alongside their Afghan brethren.837 As it transpired, the Islamic Internationale’s 
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military contribution to the Soviet Union’s eventual defeat would prove negligible.838  
But the broader significance of this conflict would be inestimable, providing as it did 
the forum for a convergence of radicals who would subsequently form the foundation 
of a global jihadist challenge to international society. 
 In chapter eight, I sketched in broad terms the centrifugal processes that had 
beset the state system within a generation of decolonization.  These processes 
provided the enabling context for the development of the global jihadist insurgency 
that is analysed in this chapter. While this chapter focuses on the evolution of global 
jihadism, my larger purpose is to anchor the discussion within an examination of the 
larger processes of decay that both facilitated global jihadism’s emergence, and that 
will endure even following its likely defeat.  My discussion proceeds in three sections. 
Section one focuses on the period 1979-1990, and is dedicated to an analysis of the 
emergence of the Islamic Internationale and the resulting genesis of Al Qaeda in the 
context of the Afghan jihad. Section two, dating from the commencement of 
Operation Desert Shield and concluding with the attacks of 9/11, charts the 
globalization of Al Qaeda’s objectives, its ascendancy as the vanguard organization of 
the global jihadist movement, and the course of its escalating war against the 
contemporary international order. Section three, dating from the September 11 attacks 
to the present, analyses the responses of both the United States and the international 
community to the jihadist challenge, and examines the impact of these responses upon 
the evolution of the jihadist insurgency.  I conclude that the international community 
has met with jihadist threat with greater vigour than was evident in rulers’ responses to 
ideological challenges in either of my two historical cases, and that Al Qaeda’s 
operational capacity has been gravely damaged. Conversely, however, the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq have sharpened the ideological contest between global jihadism 
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and an increasingly assertive transformational liberalism sponsored by the United 
States, while simultaneously catalysing jihadism’s mutation into a deterritorialized 
anti-systemic social movement. This development, in conjunction with the 
international community’s lackadaisical efforts to address problems of state failure in 
the developing world, is symptomatic of weaknesses in the global state system that 
will persist in the long term. 
 
9.1 The Afghan Jihad and the Foundations of the Global Jihadist Insurgency 
 
9.1.1 The Multi-Dimensional Nature of the Afghan Conflict, 1979-1989 
 
 Befitting its nature as the incubator of a global anti-systemic movement, the 
war in Afghanistan was not reducible to one conflict vector, but was rather driven by a 
cluster of nested national, regional, and global conflicts. At the national level, the war 
constituted a clash between an isolated, brutally authoritarian Marxist-Leninist regime 
and a loose coalition of tribal and religious groupings committed to forcibly resisting 
the government’s revolutionary program. Like many post-colonial polities, the Afghan 
state was only weakly embedded within Afghan society prior to 1978. Under the Old 
Regime, the Afghan state was a classic rentier polity, with the government deriving an 
extremely large proportion of its income from foreign sources (primarily foreign aid 
but also sales of natural gas to the USSR), while conversely receiving only a limited 
proportion of its revenues from direct taxation of the population.839 The institutional 
ligatures of taxation, government service provision, and political participation linking 
state to society remained under-developed, and life for the rural majority remained 
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strongly governed by the influence of tribal structures, religious brotherhoods and 
local strongmen (khans).840  Following the April Revolution in 1978 and the ascension 
of a communist government, the relationship between centre and periphery 
deteriorated as the government resorted to decree and terror to impose a social 
revolution from above. The reforms imposed by the ruling People’s Democratic Party 
of Afghanistan (PDPA) were extensive, ranging from the forcible expropriation of 
lands previously owned by tribal elders and Islamic scholars, through the introduction 
of female literacy campaigns, the abolition of dowries for brides, and the proscription 
of Islamic lending practices.841 The PDPA additionally legislated for freedom of 
marriage, while mandating a secular Marxist education for all Afghans.842  While 
many of these reforms appeared to be progressive on paper, the ineptitude and 
brutality with which they were implemented evoked widespread popular hostility, and 
had inspired widespread Islamist rebellions against the central government well prior 
to the Soviet intervention.843 
 At the national level, the Afghan conflict was thus driven by a centre-periphery 
conflict between a modernizing government with totalitarian ambitions and a resistant 
rural hinterland. The mismatch between the PDPA’s revolutionary ambitions and the 
limited capacities of the state apparatus they had inherited severely curtailed their 
prospects for success from the outset. Conversely, however, the revolutionaries’ 
access to a neighbouring superpower patron fortified their resolve to crush all 
resistance, establishing a militarized template for state-society relations that was 
further entrenched following the Soviet military intervention.844 This clash between 
Afghan state and society represented in acute form a collision between state socialism 
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and Islamist resistance that had already manifested itself in other Muslim-majority 
societies. However, what distinguished the Afghan conflict was its rapid 
internationalization from 1979 onwards.    
The internationalization of the Afghan conflict was catalysed by the Soviet 
invasion, but it was also driven by the defensive adaptations of countries such as Saudi 
Arabia and Pakistan to the global Islamic revival. The growth of political Islam and 
the windfall financial gains flowing from the first oil shock had provided Saudi Arabia 
with both the means and the motivation to finance the spread of conservative Islam 
throughout the Muslim world. In Pakistan, this Saudi largesse had strengthened the 
relative position of the Jamaat-i-Islami, a mass Islamist organization committed to 
transforming Pakistan into an Islamic state.845  Following the military coup in 1977, 
General Zia al Huq had sought to legitimize the new junta and cultivate a grass-roots 
popular base by aligning himself with the goals of the Jamaat, going so far as to 
declare his intention to create a ‘genuine Islamic order’ in Pakistan on October 21, 
1979.846 This shift towards a more Islamist order in Pakistan, coupled with Saudi 
Arabia’s renewed efforts to fortify its Islamic credentials in the wake of the Iranian 
revolution and the siege at the Great Mosque, informed both governments’ decisions 
to provide comprehensive assistance to the mujahadeen. Both the Saudi monarchy and 
the Pakistani military junta were autocracies that legitimized their rule explicitly 
through reference to Islam.847 Both regimes had warily observed the surge in popular 
interest in political Islam spurred by the Iranian revolution. Unsurprisingly, both 
consequently played leading roles in sponsoring the mujahadeen, finding in their 
involvement in the Afghan jihad an expedient means of reaffirming their Islamic 
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credentials and thereby harnessing the Islamic revival for the purposes of regime 
preservation.848 
 Overlaying the civil conflict between a totalitarian Afghan state and an 
indigenous Islamist opposition, the Afghan jihad was thus also entwined within a 
larger intramural struggle within the Islamic world as authoritarian states sought to 
come to terms with the larger Islamic revival. For self-consciously Islamic polities 
such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, sustained sponsorship of the Afghan mujahadeen 
and international volunteers promised to advance their geopolitical goals while also 
deflecting any potential Islamist challenges to regime legitimacy.849 For officially 
secular polities such as Egypt, Algeria and Indonesia, by contrast, Islamist challenges 
to regime legitimacy seemed to be best handled through recourse to a combination of 
domestic repression and the exile of Islamist opponents, many of whom eventually 
gravitated to the Afghan jihad.850  In either case, regime preservation strategies in 
Muslim-majority countries fuelled the Afghan jihad’s internationalization in the 
1980s, strengthening the Afghan resistance in the short term while also sowing the 
seeds of the future global jihadist insurgency. 
 The final conflict vector framing the Afghan conflict was of course the global 
struggle for supremacy between the United States and the USSR. The war in 
Afghanistan constituted one of the bloodiest expressions of the lateral displacement of 
superpower rivalry from core to periphery that had developed from the 1970s. In the 
Soviet Union’s case, the achievement of rough strategic parity with the United States 
in the 1970s had inspired a more activist policy in the developing world.851 This 
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tendency had been further encouraged by American strategic retrenchment after 
Vietnam, past Soviet disillusionment at the fickle loyalties of formally non-aligned 
post-colonial dictatorships, and the breakout of successful Marxist-Leninist 
revolutions across a range of developing states in the 1970s, including in 
Afghanistan.852 The USSR’s intervention in Afghanistan thus formed part of a larger 
grand strategy for advancing Soviet interests through the promotion and support of 
Marxist dictatorships in the Third World, and was also motivated by the ungrounded 
fear that the mercurial PDPA dictatorship might be on the cusp of switching its 
strategic alignment from the USSR to the United States.853 Conversely, American 
policy towards Afghanistan was driven by a desire to sap the Soviet Union’s strategic 
energies by entrapping it in a protracted war against the mujahadeen.854  America’s 
subsequent adoption of the Reagan Doctrine, whereby the White House committed to 
‘rolling back’ communism by sponsoring anti-communist guerrillas throughout the 
developing world, provided the rationale for the dramatic and continuous expansion of 
American support for the mujahadeen throughout the 1980s.855 
 As a nested series of conflicts, the war in Afghanistan thus represented a 
microcosm of the key centrifugal processes manifest in the global state system during 
the 1980s. The clash between the PDPA regime and the Afghan resistance exemplified 
in the most militarized fashion the familiar post-colonial collision between 
modernizing secular autocracies and resistant native populations. The rapid emergence 
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of an Islamist resistance to the PDPA, and the subsequent infusion of men, money and 
materiel from throughout the umma to assist the mujahadeen, were both demonstrative 
also of the conflict’s embededness within a larger transnational Islamist revival, the 
most extreme expressions of which explicitly challenged the state system’s normative 
foundations. Finally, the lateral displacement of superpower rivalries from core to 
periphery manifest in Afghanistan signified larger shifts in the state system’s material 
underpinnings. With the superpowers stalemated in the core owing to their 
unprecedented accumulation of conventional and nuclear war-making capacities, the 
displacement of conflict to the most fragile polities further diluted many states’ 
already tenuous control over violence within their borders. 
 The familiar constellation of institutional decay, ideological polarization, and 
increases in violence interdependence evident in late medieval Christendom and the 
late imperial Sinosphere manifested itself also in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Far from 
merely passively reflecting larger processes of systemic breakdown, however, the 
Afghan jihad also played a formative role in accelerating these processes and 
providing a permissive environment for a movement that would in due course 
violently challenge international society. In this respect, the Afghan jihad was not 
merely a mirror but a matrix, its product Al Qaeda and the global jihadist movement.  
 
9.1.2 The Afghan Jihad and the Gestation of the Global Jihadist Insurgency 
 
Over the course of the Afghan jihad, thousands of volunteers from across the 
Muslim world travelled to Afghanistan to assist their co-religionists.856  Many of these 
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volunteers stayed only briefly in the region, large numbers were involved in relief 
work and support duties rather than front-line combat, and only a few hundred 
volunteers were ever fighting at any one time, rendering negligible their direct military 
contribution to the mujahadeens’ victory over the Soviet Union.857 These caveats 
aside, the convergence of volunteers from across the umma produced a raft of 
unintended consequences that would eventually reverberate well beyond Afghanistan. 
Specifically, the bonds forged between international volunteers during the conflict and 
the ideological cross-pollination that resulted from their interaction facilitated the 
formation of the social networks and doctrinal innovations that would eventually 
coalesce into the global jihadist challenge to the contemporary world order. 
 While the Afghan jihad eventually yielded a constellation of formidable non-
state anti-systemic networks, it is necessary to briefly revisit the role played by state 
actors in inadvertently bringing these networks into being in the first instance. 
Throughout the 1970s, rulers in Muslim-majority countries had confronted a rising 
tide of Islamic activism, one that occasionally manifested itself in anti-government 
violence. The events of 1979 emboldened Islamists throughout the Muslim world to 
intensify their subversive activities in the hope of toppling incumbent apostate 
regimes.858 This upsurge in Islamist activism evoked varied responses from 
governments. In Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, governments’ already strong dependence 
on religion in their legitimating frameworks saw them adopt a strategy of co-optation, 
with both states providing massive support to the Afghan mujahadeen while 
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simultaneously encouraging domestic radicals to also participate in the conflict.859  
Conversely, in secular dictatorships such as Egypt, Indonesia, and Algeria, 
governments favoured strategies of brutal repression in the face of Islamist 
dissidence.860  In each of these countries, Islamist violence was met with 
overwhelming force. In some cases, defeated Islamists were forced into exile as a 
result of heightened repression, while in other cases, governments actively banished 
dissidents or otherwise encouraged them to leave for Afghanistan in the hope that they 
would not return.861  
 The rough synchronicity of rebellion and repression within various Muslim 
countries after the annus mirabilis of 1979 thus played a pivotal role in funnelling 
Islamist dissidents towards the Afghan theatre. Ayman al Zawahiri’s departure from 
Egypt following a brief period of imprisonment for his role in the 1981 assassination 
of Sadat; the forced exfiltration of Algerian Islamists following their 1982 decision to 
engage in armed struggle against the FLN government; the 1985 exile of future 
Jemaah Islamiyah  leaders Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakr Bashir from Indonesia in 
the face of renewed repression by the New Order government – each of these episodes 
constituted local expressions of a broader pattern. Whether adopting strategies of co-
optation or repression, governments in Muslim-majority countries effectively 
externalized their domestic legitimacy strains during the 1980s, projecting the 
intramural struggle within the umma between incumbent governments and Islamist 
dissidents onto a global stage. 
 Government responses to the ideological convulsions of the late 1970s and 
early 1980s constituted a strong ‘push’ factor on Islamist dissidents, wrenching them 
from their various local contexts and propelling them towards convergence in 
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Afghanistan. Nevertheless, this ‘push’ factor was powerfully supplemented by the 
‘pull’ factor of genuine sympathy for the Afghan people felt throughout the Muslim 
world. While the financial assistance provided by states such as Saudi Arabia to the 
Afghan jihad has received the greatest emphasis in narratives of Al Qaeda’s 
emergence, in reality state sponsorship constituted as little as 25% of the total money 
provided to the mujahadeen and their international brethren.862 Volunteers who 
travelled to Afghanistan were frequently subsidized by massive amounts of money 
raised and donated by private donors, charitable organizations, and mosques.863 
Islamic civil society’s great generosity in responding to the war in Afghanistan is a 
testament to the emergence of a transnational Islamic imaginary in the preceding two 
decades. It is also a reminder that the Afghan jihad was not merely a cause celebre for 
the radical Islamist fringe in the 1980s, but rather engaged the sympathies of a broad 
cross section of society throughout Muslim-majority countries. The intense 
commitment the international volunteers demonstrated to the Afghan cause was 
obviously exceptional. But it was merely the most conspicuous manifestation of the 
newfound resonance that appeals to transnational religious loyalties and causes were 
capable of evoking throughout the umma by the 1980s.  
 Both government strategies of regime preservation and the intense activism of 
non-state actors in Islamic civil society facilitated the flow of volunteers to 
Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation. Consequently, the anti-Soviet jihad 
attracted a diverse ensemble of actors, many of whom were not committed Islamist 
radicals prior to their arrival in Afghanistan. Certainly, confirmed Islamists such as 
Ayman al-Zawahiri already subscribed to Qutbism prior to their departure from their 
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home countries, and saw in their participation in the jihad a unique opportunity to 
cultivate the skills, contacts and experience necessary to one day resume their struggle 
against home governments on better terms.864 Others, particularly those that only 
stayed briefly or confined themselves to humanitarian and relief efforts in Afghanistan 
and the refugee camps in Pakistan, did not undergo a process of ideological 
radicalization over the course of the conflict. Still others, including Osama bin Laden, 
were driven to Afghanistan in response to devout religious convictions and became 
progressively more radicalized in their contacts with established Islamists.865 What 
was critical about the Afghan jihad was that it provided the social environment in 
which these diverse groups could interact with one another. This interaction in turn 
spawned a host of perceptual, social, organizational and ideological mutations that 
formed necessary antecedents to the emergence of the global jihadist movement. 
 At a perceptual level, the Afghan jihad brought militants together from dozens 
of countries, nurturing a heightened awareness of their common struggles against 
secular governments. Despite their varied local circumstances, militants found 
common cause in Qutbism’s core propositions.  Militants were united in both their 
hostility towards Westernizing jahili tendencies in their home societies, and also in 
their privileging of divine sovereignty (al hakimiya) over human sovereignty as the 
governing principle of a properly constituted polity.866  The goal of establishing 
theocratic societies governed by sharia law formed a further point of commonality 
among the militants.867 In being exposed to like-minded actors suffering similar 
experiences of repression at home, the émigré militants experienced a significant 
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perceptual shift whereby the global dimension of their individual struggles became 
more boldly illuminated. This perceptual shift was further reinforced by the intense 
social bonds and camaraderie forged among the Islamists as a result of their shared 
experiences in training camps and on the battlefield. By the end of the Soviet 
intervention, the jihadists remained predominantly focused on resuming their separate 
struggles back home, and the imperative of confronting America – much less 
contemporary international society itself – had yet to crystallize as a shared goal.868 
But the broadening of jihadist horizons and the social connections forged as a result of 
the Afghan jihad had now made this development possible. 
 In the short term, the Afghan jihad also yielded organizational and ideological 
innovations that would also be of long-term global import. At the organizational level, 
activists such as bin Laden and his mentor Abdullah Azzam worked diligently to 
provide a robust organizational framework for coordinating and managing the 
emerging transnational cadre of Islamic militants. As early as 1984, Azzam 
established the Maktab al-Khadamat (MAK, or Services Bureau), an organization 
based in Peshawar, Pakistan, in which thousands of volunteers were received, trained, 
housed and supervised prior to deployment in Afghanistan.869 The organizers of MAK, 
which received generous funding from the Saudi government and also from bin Laden, 
were eventually able to establish a network of recruiting offices throughout the Middle 
East and beyond to channel volunteers to Afghanistan.870 Complementing this effort, 
bin Laden established the Al-Faruq military college, a specialized training camp 
designed to equip volunteers with rigorous military training with a view towards 
turning out senior officers capable of fighting on behalf of Muslims in Afghanistan 
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and a range of other theatres.871 Although the relationship between these efforts and 
the subsequent emergence of Al Qaeda was far from one of linear evolution, they 
nevertheless established an important precedent for future non-state efforts to organize 
and coordinate transnational networks of Islamic militants. 
 The enhanced interaction between militants in the context of the Afghan jihad 
also critically accelerated processes of ideological radicalization and cross-pollination. 
Fawaz Gerges notes that one of the most significant by-products of the conflict was 
the synthesis it affected between the militant Qutbist ideology of Egyptian Islamists 
and the puritanical Salafi-Wahhabism of the Arabian Peninsula.872 The Salafi-
Wahabbist strain of Islam that had prevailed in the Arabian Peninsula from the 
eighteenth century was traditionally an introverted faith, whose adherents advocated a 
return to the more pure form of Islam said to have been practiced by the Prophet and 
his early companions (salaf). This strain of Islam, which bin Laden subscribed to and 
which had sustained the Saudi monarchy from its establishment, was traditionally 
isolationist in its international orientation and politically quietist in character.873  
However, in the context of the Afghan jihad and thanks to innovators such as Azzam, 
the evangelical puritanism and scriptural literalism of the Salafis was fused with the 
revolutionary agenda and programmatic anti-Westernism of the Qutbists.874 Once 
again, the import of this development was not immediately apparent, but it 
nevertheless signified an assimilation of bin Laden into the Qutbist mainstream, and 
also a further radicalization of the thinking of those who would subsequently form Al 
Qaeda’s nucleus. 
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 The emergence of an international cohort of volunteers, ideologically 
committed and prepared to take up arms in defence of a transnational cause, was far 
from unprecedented in the history of the state system. In the Spanish Civil War, for 
example, approximately 32,000 volunteers drawn from over fifty countries had 
enlisted in the International Brigades in defence of socialism and the Spanish 
republic.875 Additionally, like the International Brigades, which had been largely 
recruited with the assistance of the Soviet Union via the offices of the Comintern, the 
volunteers for the Afghan jihad enjoyed massive subsidies and assistance from states 
such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.876 Unlike the International Brigades, however, the 
jihadist volunteers demonstrated precocious capacities for autonomous self-
organization and independent ideological innovation at a transnational level.877 These 
capacities were to a large degree the consequence of advances in communications and 
transportation technologies that made the tasks of transnational mobilization far easier 
for non-state actors in the 1980s than they had been in the 1930s. The greater relative 
autonomy of these jihadist groups from state sponsors, and the near-absence of a 
central state authority in Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal also assured the 
volunteer networks a greater longevity than their historical predecessors. Most 
importantly, however, whereas the International Brigades lost their struggle with 
Franco and spontaneously dissolved when the war ended, the jihadists had appeared to 
emerge victorious from their confrontation with the Soviet Union. However marginal 
the volunteers’ objective military contribution to the victory may have been, the 
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jihadists perceived the hand of providence in the Soviets’ defeat.878 Thus emboldened, 
a constellation of jihadist networks emerged from the Afghan jihad ideologically 
radicalized, transnationally organized, and thoroughly energized by their defeat of a 
kufr (infidel) superpower.  The global jihadists’ challenge against the state system had 
yet to be launched, but following the first ‘victory’ in Afghanistan, likelihood of such 
a challenge eventually emerging was dramatically raised.         
   
9.2 The Consolidation and Globalization of the Jihadist Challenge to 
International Society, 1990-2001 
 
9.2.1 The ‘End of History’ and the Revenge of God 
 
 As the 20th century entered its final decade, a series of momentous changes 
rapidly transformed the global political landscape. First and foremost of these changes 
was the end of the Cold War. The Cold War’s end signified the peaceful termination 
of an internal schism within the popular sovereignty revolution that traced its 
European origins as far back as 1848, and that had assumed global significance 
following the Bolshevik revolution and the rise of Wilsonian liberal internationalism 
in 1917.  With socialism discredited and the Soviet Union defunct, liberals looked 
forward to an era marked by the universalization of democracy and market capitalism 
and the strengthening of international institutions to advance the values of a liberal 
world order. Critically, even after the first flush of victory faded, the sentiment that 
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democracy and market capitalism could and should be extended to developing and 
post-socialist polities heavily conditioned the strategic outlooks of Northern states. For 
Western Europeans, their prior successes in rehabilitating post-authoritarian polities 
such as Spain, Greece and Portugal informed post-Cold War efforts to stabilize the 
EU’s eastern and southern flanks through a combination of market liberalization, 
democracy promotion, and the incorporation of target polities into multilateral 
institutions.879 Such policies were supported by the United States, but were tempered 
even prior to Bush the Younger’s presidency by a more qualified endorsement of 
multilateralism and a greater readiness to employ diplomatic and even military 
coercion in the service of liberal ends.880 
 These differences in means notwithstanding, the strategic ends of liberal states 
were remarkably similar during the immediate post-Cold War period. Polities on both 
sides of the Atlantic identified the spread of capitalism and democracy and the 
strengthening of international institutions as beneficial developments that would 
promote international peace and security.  This ideological consensus among Northern 
states was complemented by the Soviet Union’s collapse and the advent of a unipolar 
international system. While the end of the Cold War had resolved a long-standing 
ideological schism, the advent of unipolarity marked an equally significant shift in the 
state system’s material foundations. From its genesis in the second half of the 
seventeenth century, the European sovereign state system had relied upon the 
operation of a balance of power between the Great Powers as a mechanism for 
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moderating states’ ambitions and maintaining international order.881  As the centuries 
progressed, the reliability of this ordering mechanism had been progressively corroded 
through the steady concentration of Clausewitzian war-making capacities among an 
ever shrinking number of powers. From the classic European pentarchy of the 19th 
century, the state system had arguably evolved towards a tri-polar power configuration 
by the inter-war period, before stabilizing around a bi-polar distribution of power 
throughout the course of the Cold War.882  With the Soviet Union’s collapse and the 
advent of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), the United States assumed a 
position of predominance unprecedented in the history of the Westphalian state 
system.883   
 Both the advent of unipolarity and the end of ideological rivalry in the 
developed world marked profound departures from the norm when situated within the 
context of the Westphalian state system’s long-term evolution. However, while these 
transformations held out the prospect of strengthening world order, in the immediate 
post-Cold War period this promise was partially offset by the accelerating decay of 
state structures across swathes of the post-socialist and post-colonial worlds. The 
chaos and instability characteristic of post-imperial transitions predictably manifested 
itself following the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, as violent political 
entrepreneurs scrambled to eliminate rivals and consolidate their position following 
the collapse of these quasi-imperial polities.884 In Africa as well, the complete 
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disintegration of state authority in polities such as Sierra Leone, Zaire, and Somalia 
offset the strategic dividends accompanying the end of superpower-fuelled proxy wars 
and the abolition of apartheid in South Africa.885 Even in instances where the complete 
collapse of state structures was averted, many post-colonial polities suffered violent 
legitimacy crises in the 1990s. The crises that engulfed formerly stable authoritarian 
states such as Algeria and Indonesia during this period further underscored both the 
frailty of state authority in many post-colonial polities, as well as highlighting the 
potential for localized legitimacy crises to exert regionally and even globally 
destabilizing effects in an era of intensified global interconnectedness.  
 The ascendancy of liberal internationalism, the advent of American 
unipolarity, and the prevalence of widespread state failure provided the enabling 
context for the fourth major development of the post-Cold War period, namely the 
enhanced projection of Western military power and political influence into the 
developing world.  Admittedly, many weak post-colonial states had always struggled 
in practice to assert their autonomy from the strategic and economic imperatives of 
powerful Northern patrons.  However, from the early 1990s onwards, longstanding de 
facto deviations from the norm of non-interference were reinforced by an increasing 
willingness on the part of Northern states to qualify the de jure validity of this norm, at 
least as it applied to weak states.  Over the decade’s course, Northern states explicitly 
invoked humanitarian considerations to justify their violation of norms of non-
intervention in northern and southern Iraq, Bosnia, and Kosovo.886  Elsewhere, (e.g. 
Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo), the total collapse of state structures 
enabled them to side step the question of non-intervention, permitting a tentative and 
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in most cases inadequate deployment of military force in the service of humanitarian 
objectives.887  At a more diffuse level still, the indebtedness and geopolitical 
marginality of many post-colonial states following the end of the Cold War left them 
acutely vulnerable to Western pressures to adopt liberal economic and political 
reforms, further compromising the autonomy of incumbent regimes. 
 With liberalism ascendant following the end of the Cold War, Northern states 
became newly receptive to the idea that international peace and security could best be 
advanced by promoting the spread of democracy and liberal capitalism and by 
strengthening international institutions.  The collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
concomitant abeyance of Great Power rivalry meanwhile provided the United States 
with the geopolitical space necessary to advance such a program. Finally, the advent 
of internationally destabilizing crises of state authority in many post-socialist and post-
colonial states provided a strategic rationale for revising established norms of non-
intervention to accommodate the projection of Western military power in the service 
of liberal ends. The resulting circumscription of weak states’ sovereignty in the 1990s 
was ad hoc, sporadic, and inconsistent in its application, with both the legality and the 
efficacy of interventionist initiatives becoming the subjects of considerable 
contestation.888  However, with advances in communications and information 
technologies continually compressing the strategic distance between North and South, 
the caging of weak states’ sovereignty within liberal norms was nevertheless regarded 
by many as a necessary development, and one that would promote rather than subvert 
                                                 
887On Operation Restore Hope, see generally Walter Clarke, and Jeffrey Herbst. "Somalia and the 
Future of Humanitarian Intervention." Foreign Affairs 75, no. 2 (1996): 70-85. On Operation Artemis, 
the EU’s intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo, see Stale Ulriksen, Catriona Gourlay, and 
Catriona Mace. "Operation Artemis: The Shape of Things to Come?" International Peacekeeping 11, 
no. 3 (2004): 508-25. 
888See generally Robert O. Keohane, and J. L. Holzgrefe. Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal 
and Political Dilemmas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
 
 406
the purposes of popular eudemonism and self-determination to which the global state 
system was dedicated.   
 For many Western observers, the foregoing developments appeared to signal a 
prospective consolidation of a liberal world order. The end of the Cold War and the 
advent of US unipolarity provided the opportunity to promote such a consolidation, 
while the emerging threats posed by failing states in the periphery appeared to render 
such an effort a strategic necessity.  Unsurprisingly, for the jihadists returning from 
Afghanistan, the post-Cold War environment presented a radically different set of 
threats and opportunities.  Whereas many Westerners saw the prospective emergence 
of a ‘new world order’ as signalling a break with the traumas of the twentieth century, 
for Islamists, the resulting projection of Western military power into Muslim-majority 
countries marked an alarming escalation of processes of colonial subjugation that had 
been manifest in the 19th century, and that had steadily worsened from the abolition of 
the caliphate in 1924. This dissonance separating Western from Islamist viewpoints 
was most sharply apparent in their discordant interpretations of Operations Desert 
Shield and Desert Storm, the UN-authorized missions marshalled in response to 
Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990.  For a Western-dominated 
international community, the operations represented a rare success for the UN’s 
system of collective security.  A multinational coalition, acting under the imprimatur 
of the Security Council, had repulsed an unequivocal act of aggression perpetrated by 
one member state against another. The UN’s successful response to Iraqi aggression 
contrasted dramatically with its paralysis for much of the Cold War, suggesting 
renewed scope for strengthening collective security institutions in the post-Cold War 
era. 
 However, what served as a cause for celebration in Western capitals served 
equally as a cause for despair and humiliation amongst many Islamists. For the 
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Islamists, the fact that the Saudi monarchy had solicited the assistance of infidel forces 
to defend the Land of the Two Holy Places spoke volumes about the monarchy’s 
spiritual bankruptcy, as well as demonstrating its scandalous dependence on foreign 
patrons to sustain itself.889  Additionally, the indefinite presence of kufr forces in Saudi 
Arabia in the wake of Desert Storm blatantly contradicted Mohammed’s injunction 
forbidding the practice of religions other than Islam on the Arabian Peninsula, thus 
further estranging Islamists from the Saudi monarchy.890  For bin Laden especially and 
for jihadists more generally, the infidel occupation of the Arabian Peninsula served as 
a lightning rod for opposition to the Saudi monarchy and its Western patrons.891 More 
broadly, for the jihadists returning from Afghanistan, the occupation of the Holy 
Lands represented merely the most egregious instance of a larger infidel encroachment 
upon the lands of the umma over the course of the 1990s. Again, the contrast between 
Western and jihadist perspectives is instructive. For Westerners, multilateral 
interventions in northern Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, and later East Timor and Kosovo were 
perceived as being primarily humanitarian in nature. But for the jihadists, these 
operations were conflated with ostensibly unrelated conflicts such as the Chechen 
wars and the long-running separatist insurgency in Mindanao as constituting a 
sustained military assault against the Abode of Islam (Darul Islam).892    
 The jihadist narrative of an umma assailed on all sides by infidels signified the 
most extreme manifestation of a continuing ideological polarization in the global state 
system between an ascendant liberal internationalism and a simmering Islamist 
counter-movement. Nevertheless, this transnational jihadist narrative resonated only 
amongst a minority of the most radical Islamists in the 1990s.  Certainly, both the first 
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attack on the World Trade Centre and other abortive attempts to launch mass casualty 
attacks against Western interests in the early to mid 1990s (e.g. Oplan Bojinka) were 
illustrative of the capacity of this narrative to spur transnational jihadist networks to 
action.893 Similarly, the participation of foreign jihadists in conflicts in Somalia and 
Bosnia demonstrated the continuing resonance of calls to defend the umma against 
kufr incursions among a small minority following their apparent ‘victory’ over the 
Soviets in Afghanistan.894 However, for the majority of jihadists, the changed 
geopolitical circumstances of the post-Cold War period appeared to present 
opportunities to advance the Islamist cause far closer to home.  Given the brittle 
character of many autocratic regimes in Muslim-majority states, and given also the 
military experience jihadists had acquired in Afghanistan, the prospects of striking 
crushing blows against incumbent apostate rulers appeared to be promising. 
 Consequently, in the early to mid 1990s, several Muslim-majority states were 
engulfed in yet another cycle of Islamist rebellion and government repression. Once 
again, Islamist hopes were to be frustrated, with governments brutally suppressing 
renewed jihadist campaigns in Egypt, Algeria and elsewhere.895  The renewed failure 
of jihadists to defeat the ‘near’ enemy of local apostate regimes would prove pivotal in 
the subsequent decision of some jihadists to turn their attention to the ‘far’ enemy of 
the United States and its allies, prefiguring the global jihadist assault on the state 
system from the mid-1990s. However, even a cursory consideration of the jihadists’ 
failed campaigns against incumbent governments during this period reveals several 
critical differences that distinguished them from prior waves of jihadist violence. 
Ideologically, jihadists embraced interpretations of jihad that permitted a radically 
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more permissive attitude towards the targeting of non-combatants than had existed 
previously. From Qutb onwards, the practice of takfir (declaring another Muslim an 
apostate) had been common among Islamists seeking to justify acts of violence 
targeted directly at nominally Muslim rulers.  Over the course of the Algerian civil 
war, however, the jihadist Armed Islamic Group (GIA) progressively extended the 
judgement of takfir to encompass everyone who refused to side with the GIA in its 
struggle against the secular government.896 The resulting indiscriminate massacres of 
civilian populations drew harsh criticisms from within the Islamist movement, 
including from Al Qaeda itself, and the GIA’s resulting estrangement from Algerian 
society contributed heavily to its defeat in 1997.897 But by then, the theological 
precedent for relaxing scriptural norms against the killing of civilians had been well 
established, and it would continue to inform jihadist thought and action thereafter. 
 Jihadist campaigns in Algeria and Egypt during this time were also marked by 
an increased targeting of the political and economic bonds linking incumbent regimes 
with external sources of support. This partial internationalization of the struggle 
against the ‘near enemy’ was manifest in Egypt in jihadist massacres of foreign 
tourists in the mid 1990s, a tactic that was explicitly designed to cripple Egypt’s 
tourist industry, undermine Egypt’s fragile economy and thus starve the Mubarak 
regime of desperately needed revenue.898 In Algeria, the internationalization of the 
local jihad entailed a sustained terrorist campaign undertaken within France itself from 
1994-1995.899 The object of this campaign was to compel the French government to 
withdraw its support for the beleaguered Algerian government, thus weakening it and 
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in so doing enhancing the jihadists’ prospects of seizing power.900 Ultimately, neither 
of these tactics were successful. The French government resisted the jihadists’ 
attempts at compellence, while the Egyptian tourist massacres sparked a popular 
backlash from those hit by the massacres’ economic fall-out, contributing heavily to 
local jihadists’ subsequent declaration of a unilateral ceasefire in 1997.901  Despite 
their failure, these attempts to internationalize local jihads were significant, inasmuch 
as they anticipated the subsequent moves by a minority of jihadists to much more 
systematically target the ‘far enemy’ through a global campaign of asymmetric 
warfare. 
 Finally, the local jihads of the early to mid 1990s also witnessed jihadists’ 
increased resort to weak state havens, as well as their growing recourse to ad hoc 
transnational alliances with other jihadist groups in order to prosecute their struggles 
against home state governments.  The activities of Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Islamic Jihad 
during this time are particularly revealing on this point. In 1990, the newly established 
Islamic fundamentalist regime in Sudan had explicitly sought out and invited jihadist 
groups to re-locate from Afghanistan to Sudan.902 This initiative provided Islamic 
Jihad with a proximate territorial platform from which to launch attacks against 
Egyptian interests throughout the region.903 The most notorious of these attacks, an 
assassination attack on President Mubarak in Addis Ababa in 1995, reflected Islamic 
Jihad’s growing willingness to prosecute its war against the Egyptian government at 
an international level.904 The 1995 bombing of the Egyptian embassy in Pakistan 
further underscored this shift in strategy, but was equally revealing for Islamic Jihad’s 
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reliance upon locally recruited proxies to execute this attack.905 The combination of 
the availability of weak state havens and ad hoc alliances with other jihadist groups 
had provided Islamic Jihad with a global reach by the mid 1990s, while the failure of 
terrorism and guerrilla warfare to advance jihadist goals within Egypt itself made the 
shift towards a global strategy for destabilizing the Mubarak regime seem increasingly 
essential.906 In this respect, Islamic Jihad’s experience prefigured the incipient 
globalization off jihadist violence off the back of weak states and transnationally 
connected militant groups that would find its apotheosis in the Al Qaeda network. 
 By the mid 1990s, the global jihadist movement was clearly faltering. The 
atrocities perpetrated by extremists in Algeria and Egypt had radically estranged them 
from local populations, precipitating a splintering of local jihadist movements and the 
defeat of the Islamist project in both instances.907  Jihadist efforts in theatres such as 
Somalia, Bosnia and Chechnya had also yielded largely disappointing results for the 
jihadist cause.908 The renunciation of jihad by many local jihadist groups signalled the 
prevailing mood of disillusionment and disunity among many jihadists by the middle 
of the decade.909 However, while this sentiment was widespread, it was by no means 
universal. The more permissive attitude towards attacks on non-combatants; the shift 
towards a more internationalized struggle against local apostate regimes; the 
exploitation of weak states and loose alliances between militant networks to forge 
jihadist entities of global reach - each of these legacies of the 1990s jihads would 
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profoundly influence the evolution of the jihadist movement’s radical transnational 
fringe. And each would be evident in the rise of Al Qaeda and the subsequent outbreak 
of the global jihadist insurgency. 
 
9.2.2 Declarations of War – The Rise of Al Qaeda and the Onset of the Global Jihadist 
Insurgency, 1996-2001   
 
‘The situation cannot be rectified, as the shadow cannot be straightened when 
its source, the rod, is not straight either, unless the root of the problem is 
tackled.  Hence it is essential to hit the main enemy who divided the umma into 
small and little countries and pushed it for decades into a state of 
confusion…’910 
 
 On 23d August 1996, speaking from a mujahadeen base in Tora Bora, 
Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden officially declared war against the ‘Zionist-Crusader 
alliance’ in the name of the umma.911  While bin Laden at the time constituted merely 
one representative of the transnational fringe of the jihadist movement, the declaration 
was nevertheless significant for several reasons. At the most basic level, bin Laden’s 
declaration marked a transition from his prior role as a financier of Islamist terrorism 
towards more active involvement as a coordinator and instigator of Islamist attacks 
throughout the Middle East and beyond. Relatedly, bin Laden’s declaration also 
constituted an audacious move to elevate his status within the ranks of the 
transnational jihadists, representing nothing less than a claim to leadership of a 
vanguard force dedicated to the umma’s defence.  More fundamentally, the bin Laden 
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declaration also marked a dramatic mutation of jihadist organization, strategies and 
objectives. Where previously jihadists had concentrated their efforts on direct action 
against incumbent Middle Eastern regimes, bin Laden urged jihadists to prioritize 
targeting the United States and its allies, identifying them as the malignant force that 
directed and underwrote local apostate tyrants, and that consequently represented the 
ultimate fountainhead of Muslims’ present misfortunes.912 With bin Laden’s 
declarations of war against the ‘Zionist-Crusader alliance’ in 1996 and again in 1998, 
the jihad became global, and the systemic confrontation between the jihadist 
insurgency and the global state system truly began. 
 Any adequate comprehension of the globalization of the jihadist insurgency 
must begin with a recognition that the global jihad was borne out of a pervasive sense 
of failure within the Islamist movement. By the mid 1990s, the jihadists’ persistent 
inability to topple incumbent apostate regimes had become starkly apparent. Despite 
their lack of popular legitimacy, the robust repressive capacities of incumbent regimes 
in the Muslim world had proved sufficient to the task of suppressing jihadists’ efforts 
to seize control of the state through the use of armed force.913  Guerrilla warfare, urban 
terrorism, economic sabotage, and even attempts to infiltrate the state’s armed forces 
with a view towards launching coups d’etat against kufr rulers had all failed to 
accomplish the jihadists’ objectives.914  Equally, the non-violent and gradualist efforts 
of other Islamists to Islamicize society from the bottom-up had also been generally 
unsuccessful.915 By the mid-1990s, it was obvious that the state was too strong and 
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civil society too cowed, atomized, and anaemic in most Muslim-majority societies for 
either of these strategies to be effective, leaving the Islamists at a strategic impasse.   
 At the same time that the failure of existing Islamist strategies was becoming 
apparent, Islamists were also confronted by a continued worsening of the very perils 
that they had sought to combat. Foremost of these perils was the inexorable extension 
of kufr influence into Islamic countries. This trend had already manifested itself during 
the Cold War, most conspicuously in the Soviets’ invasion of Afghanistan, but more 
subtly and enduringly in the United States’ alliance with Israel and its steadily 
increasing military presence in the Persian Gulf. Both the United States’ enhanced 
strategic cooperation with Israel and its growing military presence in the Persian Gulf 
in the 1980s were animated by a desire to curb the threat of possible Soviet military 
expansion in the Middle East.916 Equally, the United States’ growing involvement in 
the Persian Gulf was also driven by the perceived need to fill the security vacuum left 
by the British liquidation of military commitments east of Suez after 1968, and by a 
growing appreciation of the necessity of securing developed states’ reliable access to 
the region’s energy reserves.917 In the 1980s, the United States had extended its 
regional power projection abilities through improvements to existing air bases and 
enhanced pre-positioning of war materiel in the Persian Gulf.918 However, from 1990 
onwards, America’s regional presence expanded dramatically, with Operations Desert 
Shield and Desert Storm leaving thousands of American troops stationed indefinitely 
in the Saudi kingdom.919 It was specifically this ‘provocation’ that formed the focal 
grievance for bin Laden, but it was also symptomatic of the larger process of global 
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geopolitical consolidation evident during the post-Cold War era of American 
unipolarity. 
 The presence of infidel troops in the Holy Land provided the primary catalyst 
for the emergence of the global jihadist insurgency, but it constituted only the most 
grievous instance of the umma’s perceived subjugation by kufr forces. This 
subjugation was evident also in the military campaigns being waged against Muslims 
in theatres as diverse as Chechnya, Bosnia, Somalia, Tajikistan, and the southern 
Philippines.920  At a more insidious level, however, continuing advances in 
communications technologies were progressively increasing Muslims’ exposure to 
outside cultural influences, further fuelling Islamists’ anxieties for the umma’s 
future.921 The spread of satellite television in particular not only provided a conduit for 
the transmission of Western cultural ‘pollutants’, but also increased the visibility of 
violence perpetrated against Muslims in places such as Bosnia and Chechnya, serving 
in both instances to reinforce the sense of siege gripping the Islamists.922  For 
Islamists, the combination of American unipolarity and globalization posed an 
existential threat to the umma’s very survival. That incumbent rulers were not 
repelling the kufr threat, despite the ease with which they had defeated the jihadists, 
seemed to lend further support to the jihadists’ characterization of them as apostates 
who were actively complicit in the infidels’ plans to destroy Islam.923  
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 Faced with a strategic impasse at home, and gripped by fears of impending 
catastrophe evoked by the combined influence of unipolarity, globalization, and 
localized failures of governance, a tiny, radicalized transnational fraction of the 
Islamist movement underwent profound mutations that yielded the phenomenon of 
global jihadism. While Al Qaeda assumed unofficial leadership of the global jihadist 
movement for only a brief period of time, a consideration of its ideology, objectives, 
organization, strategy and operations yields important insights concerning both the 
nature of global jihadism as well as the distinctive milieu out of which it emerged.  
Ideologically, bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri married the political program of Qutb with 
the moral puritanism of Salafism, before situating this synthesis within a global 
framework of grievances.924 The result was an anti-systemic ideology that 
comprehensively repudiates the identity-constitutive, ethical-prescriptive, and power-
legitimating norms that jointly constitute the normative complex of the contemporary 
international order. 
 At the identity-constitutive level, global jihadism rejects entirely the 
proposition that the purpose of world order should be to promote popular eudemonism 
and the advancement of individual and collective self-determination.  For the jihadists, 
following Qutb, the Enlightenment’s unmooring of the polis from the cosmos 
constitutes the root cause of the modern jahiliyya afflicting contemporary society.925   
In elevating reason over revelation and the satisfaction of humankind’s material wants 
over its spiritual needs, the kufr world order is seen to institutionalize humankind’s 
estrangement from God.926  In jihadist lights, true sovereignty (al hakimiya) can reside 
only with God, the creator of the universe.927 The divinely inspired sharia provides an 
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entirely self-sufficient legal code for human societies, thus the assignment of 
legislative sovereignty to any human agency both denies God’s authority, while also 
empowering earthly rulers to establish a tyranny over their fellow men.928  For 
contemporary jihadists, as for rulers in Latin Christendom and the Sinosphere, the 
spiritual and political realms are thus intimately connected, with submission to the 
divine imperatives of the former guaranteeing the realization of a modicum of order in 
the latter.  This integrationist conception of the relationship between the sacred and the 
mundane conflicts radically with the privatization of the religious sphere implicit in 
the Westphalian state system, and accounts to a considerable degree for the jihadists’ 
implacable hostility towards the contemporary international order. 
 In addition to opposing the state system’s purposes, jihadism also rejects its 
ethical-prescriptive norms. While bin Laden in both of his major fatwas against the 
West protests the large-scale violations of Muslims’ human rights allegedly 
perpetrated by the global kufr, these references to the cosmopolitan ethics of the 
contemporary order sit uneasily within the context of Al Qaeda’s broader moral 
outlook.929  For the jihadists, God’s will as revealed in the Koran constitutes the sole 
legitimate guide for moral action. The jihadists’ idiosyncratic privileging of the sword 
verses of the Koran also leads them to posit an unbridgeable moral divide between 
believers and non-believers.930 In place of the moral universalism of the global human 
rights regime, the jihadists attribute exclusive moral worth to the umma, casting it as a 
community of faith locked in ceaseless existential struggle with the forces of 
infidelity, unbelief, and idolatry.931 In keeping with this outlook, the laws of war are 
                                                 
928Goldberg, ‘Smashing Idols and the State’, pp. 16-18. 
929OBL – Declarations of War, Al Qaeda Reader 
930On the idiosyncratic character of the jihadists’ interpretation of Islam, which expressly contravenes 
orthodox Islamic jurisprudence, see Khaled Abou El Fadl. "The Orphans of Modernity and the Clash of 
Civilizations." Global Dialogue 4, no. 2 (2002), p. 13. 
931
Ibid., p. 10. 
 418
seen to have no authority, being superseded by de-contextualized Koranic injunctions 
marshalled by the jihadists to legitimize unlimited war against a dehumanized and 
undifferentiated kufr adversary.932   
 Finally, in relation to the state system’s power-legitimating norms, the 
jihadists’ rejection of popular sovereignty extends to a repudiation of the entire 
institutional architecture of the state system, including both the United Nations and its 
member states.933  Once again following Qutbism, the artificial splintering of the 
umma into a mosaic of territorially delimited and mutually exclusive sovereign states 
is interpreted as a mutilation of the embodied community of believers inflicted by 
infidel forces to divide and weaken Muslims.934  For the jihadists, the idolatry 
embodied in the modern nation-state must be rejected in favour of a transnational 
caliphate encompassing all believers.935 In contrast to traditional Islamic 
jurisprudence, which abhors the prospect of strife (fitna) and counsels against 
rebellion, jihadist ideology recognizes only the authority of God and his chosen 
caliph.936   In the absence of a caliph to marshal Islam’s forces in defence of the 
umma, jihadists insist that it is the individual and perpetual duty of all Muslims to 
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wage war against the infidel.937 In arrogating to themselves the responsibility for 
taking up arms in defence of an imagined transnational umma, the jihadists thus reject 
the Weberian norm mandating the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence.938 In so 
doing, they thereby undercut the most basic and essential power-legitimating norm 
undergirding the contemporary world order. 
 Al Qaeda’s ideology remained faithful to the core elements of Qutbism, while 
simultaneously fashioning an interpretation of it that was more sensitive to the new 
threats and opportunities jihadists confronted in a more global age. Thus Qutb’s 
dichotomy between jahiliyya and al-hakimiya, his critique of the soulless materialism 
of Western modernity, and his insistence on the necessity of jihad against apostate 
rulers were all retained, but were augmented by an awareness that the ‘near enemy’ 
would remain impervious to annihilation while it retained the support of the ‘far 
enemy.’939 While Qutbism had always been virulently anti-Western, bin Laden made 
the fight against the ‘Zionist-Crusader alliance’ jihadists’ first priority, and sought to 
channel Islamists’ activities towards jihad against a Western-dominated international 
system underwritten by American hegemony.940 For bin Laden and his followers, the 
apostasy afflicting Muslim-majority societies and the umma’s military encirclement 
and ongoing penetration were both attributable to the pernicious influence of America 
and its allies.941 As a logical corollary of their integrationist conception of the 
relationship between the sacred and the mundane, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri naturally 
saw the Muslim world’s spiritual and geopolitical afflictions as being inextricably 
entwined.  This sentiment was most pithily captured in bin Laden’s post September 11 
characterization of America as the Hubal of the Age, referring to the stone idol that 
                                                 
937Al Qaeda reader 
938On this point, see Mendelsohn, ‘Sovereignty Under Attack’, p. 67. 
939Gerges, The Far Enemy, pp. 144-145  
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Ibid. 
941Doran, ‘Somebody Else’s Civil War’, p. 27. 
 420
had once stood in the Kaaba prior to Mohammed’s revelation.942  As Michael Scott 
Doran has noted, this symbolism carried a dual resonance for Muslims. In portraying 
America as the modern Hubal, bin Laden both cast America as the font of all idolatry, 
while simultaneously identifying its military presence in the Holy Land as an 
unpardonable desecration of Islam’s holiest site.943  The opposition of Hubal and 
Kaaba as respective metonyms for kufr world order and beleaguered umma 
economically communicated the jihadists’ central anxiety concerning the ongoing 
encroachment of the profane upon the sacred worlds, an encroachment personified 
most starkly in the American military presence in the Gulf. At the same time, the 
statement also conveys the jihadists’ Manichean world view, as well illuminating their 
strategic reorientation from an emphasis on local rebellion towards a global 
insurgency against the global state system. 
 Al Qaeda’s ideological innovations were very much the product of perceived 
strategic necessities flowing from the failure of local jihads and the waxing of the kufr 
threat. However, in their organization and grand strategy, Al Qaeda also demonstrated 
a precocious capacity to exploit emerging mobilizational opportunities made possible 
by changes in the state system’s material foundations. Writing on the dynamics of 
emergent power agglomerations in relation to ideological, economic, military and 
political sources of social power, Michael Mann has observed: ‘When an independent 
source of power emerges, it is promiscuous in relation to ‘factors’, gathering them 
from all crannies of social life, giving them only a distinctive organizational 
configuration.’944 This observation relates particularly well to Al Qaeda, which was 
able from the mid 1990s to draw from global flows of people, capital, ideas and 
materiel to energize a unique form of globalised insurgency more analogous to a 
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transnational social movement than to a traditional guerrilla organization. Indeed, 
while Al Qaeda during the period 1996-2001 undoubtedly possessed the rudiments of 
a central hierarchy, the broader jihadist movement it purported to lead can best be 
conceptualized as an interstitial social phenomenon, sustained by a combination of 
transnational flows, localized governance gaps in weak and failing states, and social 
ties of varying strength between diverse militant groups.945    
 The enhanced interconnectedness of societies bequeathed by globalisation 
conferred new opportunities upon a range of non-state actors in the 1990s, including 
the global jihadist movement. Advances in communications technologies empowered 
activists such as bin Laden to communicate rapidly and easily with a global 
audience.946 Relatedly, the information technology revolution also enabled him to 
more effectively coordinate the actions of territorially dispersed networks of 
operatives, permitting him to orchestrate the series of trans-continental terrorist attacks 
on Western interests that culminated in 9/11.947  Improvements in communication and 
transportation technologies meanwhile increased the transnational mobility of men, 
money and materiel, while the patchy and uneven nature of global governance regimes 
in the areas of finance, migration, and arms control facilitated the harnessing of each 
of these resources to the jihadist cause. To cite two illustrative examples, from 1996 
Al Qaeda benefited from substantial flows of money and volunteers from Saudi 
Arabia to its training camps in Afghanistan. These flows were enabled by a Saudi 
regime that did not supervise the international financial transactions of its citizens, and 
that continued in the 1990s to encourage a culture of private military participation in 
                                                 
945On this point, see generally David J. Kilcullen. "Countering Global Insurgency." The Journal of 
Strategic Studies 28, no. 4 (2005): 597-617. 
946On this point, see for example Audrey Beth Cronin. "Cyber-Mobilization: The New Levee En 
Masse." Parameters XXXVI, no. 2 (2006), pp. 81-83. 
947On Al Qaeda’s use of both low-tech traditional means of communication (e.g. face-to-face meetings) 
in addition to high-tech communications techniques to coordinate the 9/11 attacks, see Kevin O'Brien. 
"Information Age, Terrorism and Warfare." Small Wars and Insurgencies 14, no. 1 (2003), p. 199. 
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foreign conflicts that dated from the original Afghan jihad.948  Similarly, the planning 
and organization of the 9/11 attacks was facilitated by Malaysia’s pre-September 11 
policy of enabling Muslims from throughout the umma to visit and transit through 
Malaysia without the need for an immigration visa.949 
 The combination of enhanced international inter-connectedness and an uneven 
state supervision of global flows provided a conducive operating environment for 
transnational jihadists in the 1990s. Equally, the gaps in governance capacity evident 
in weak and failing states further assisted the insurgency’s evolution. As was the case 
for the more locally oriented jihadists that had preceded them, transnational jihadists 
indirectly benefited from governments’ inability to provide their citizens with basic 
political goods, such as protection from physical violence or the provision of even an 
elementary level of material welfare.950  The resulting popular disaffection against 
incumbent regimes broadened the jihadists’ potential recruitment base, although this 
must be qualified by a recognition that Al Qaeda’s ‘hard core’ leadership derived from 
the educated middle and upper classes of Egypt and Saudi Arabia rather than being 
drawn from the huddled masses.951  More importantly than their utility as a 
recruitment base, however, under-policed polities provided valuable staging grounds 
from which to launch attacks against Western interests, as demonstrated for example 
                                                 
948On the culture of private military participation that flourished in Saudi Arabia among the country’s 
Islamists in the 1990s, see Thomas Hegghammer. "Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization in Saudi 
Arabia." Middle East Policy XIII, no. 4 (2006), p. 48. 
949On this point, see Brek Batley. "The Complexities of Dealing with Radical Islam in Southeast Asia - 
a Case Study of Jemaah Islamiyah." In Strategic and Defence Studies Paper. Canberra: Australian 
National University, 2003, p. 57. The author notes that this policy has subsequently been discontinued 
following 9/11.  
950On this point, see generally Robert Rotberg. "Failed States in a World of Terror." Foreign Affairs 81, 
no. 4 (2002): 127-40. Although for a more sceptical interpretation of the relationship between state 
failure and terrorism, see Stewart Patrick. "Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction?" The 
Washington Quarterly 29, no. 2 (2006), pp. 34-36. 
951Sageman notes that what he dubs the ‘Central Staff’ of Al Qaeda were drawn from particularly 
privileged and educated backgrounds, and cohered together as a network through their shared 
participation in the original Afghan jihad in the 1980s. See Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 
p. 171. 
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in Al Qaeda’s activities in Somalia undertaken in preparation for the 1998 embassy 
bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.952  Most critically of all, however, internationally 
ostracized failing states such as Sudan and later Afghanistan presented as useful 
potential partners for Al Qaeda, offering the jihadists’ extended sanctuary in exchange 
for economic and in some cases even military assistance.  In the case of Afghanistan 
in particular, bin Laden was able to cement an enduring alliance with an initially 
diffident Taliban regime by providing it with a much-needed cadre of trained militants 
(the 055 Brigade) to assist in prosecuting the regime’s ongoing war against the 
Northern Alliance.953  
 Transnational flows and failing states provided jihadists with operational 
mobility and a vital ecological niche in the global state system, but the jihadist 
movement was also sustained by the existence of dense webs of social ties linking 
various militant groups to one another.  In the case of Al Qaeda, bin Laden was able to 
effectively constitute an Al Qaeda ‘High Command’ by building upon the existing 
web of social connections forged during the Afghan jihad between various alumni of 
Azzam’s Services Bureau.954 Given the relatively small number of militants clustered 
around bin Laden, however, the Al Qaeda leadership assiduously cultivated more 
diffuse ties with like-minded jihadist organizations in other theatres to extend the 
network’s global reach. Networks such as the Salafist Group for Call and Combat 
(GSPC) in the Maghreb and Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia subscribed to similar 
if slightly more parochial agendas to Al Qaeda, but were often only tenuously 
connected (if connected at all) to bin Laden through the prior involvement of some of 
                                                 
952On the role played by Somalia-based Al Qaeda operatives in the 1998 embassy bombings, and in 
their suspected role in attacking a hotel and El Al plane in Kenya in 2002, see John Prendergast and 
Colin Thomas-Jensen. "Blowing the Horn." Foreign Affairs 86, no. 2 (2007), p. 65. 
953On this point, see Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, pp. 58-60.  
954Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, p. 71. 
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their members in the Afghan jihad.955  Bin Laden therefore sought to plug in to the 
strengths and capacities of these groups by providing them with money, know-how, 
and access to training opportunities in his camps in Afghanistan.956 So successful was 
this strategy in building bin Laden’s profile and prestige among jihadists that 
independent militants eventually began to solicit bin Laden’s assistance in the 
preparation of terrorist attacks against Western targets.957  
 The caution some commentators have expressed in employing the designation 
‘Al Qaeda’ to describe bin Laden’s network in the period 1996-2001 is justifiable 
given the protean nature of his organization, and given also the varying strength of its 
relationships with the other important jihadist networks also operative at this time. 
Certainly, while bin Laden emerged as the most notorious jihadist during this period, 
his pretensions towards leadership of the global jihadist movement were never 
universally accepted by other jihadists.958 Nevertheless, the fact that no central brain 
was coordinating the global jihad in its entirety should not detract from the ingenuity 
or import of bin Laden’s adaptations to evolving changes in the state system’s material 
foundations.  In exploiting new communications technologies and the enhanced 
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958On this point, see Gerges, The Far Enemy, pp. 158-159. 
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international mobility characteristic of globalization for purposes of transnational 
military mobilization, bin Laden was far from unique.959 Still less was his exploitation 
of weak and failing states for illicit purposes all that distinctive, although one struggles 
to find contemporary parallels to the extraordinary alliance he was able to contrive 
between his organization and the Taliban regime. Even bin Laden’s synthesis of older 
‘Afghan alumni’ contacts with newer connections to regional networks and 
autonomous cells was not absolutely exceptional. What distinguished bin Laden was 
his capacity to simultaneously exploit intensified global inter-connectedness, endemic 
state failure, and existing and developing social ties between jihadist groups and 
individuals to craft a subversive entity of unprecedented reach and sophistication. 
 While the global jihadist threat that emerged in the period 1996-2001 cannot 
be reduced to Al Qaeda and its allies, a consideration of Al Qaeda’s operations is 
nevertheless useful for illustrating the new methods of asymmetric warfare that were 
being pioneered by jihadists during this time.  The jihadists’ grand strategy was deeply 
flawed but nevertheless relatively straightforward. Having failed to defeat apostate 
regimes through local struggle, the jihadists embarked on a global campaign designed 
to compel the United States to terminate its sponsorship of client states in the Muslim 
world.960 With their umbilical cord to their kufr sponsors severed, the jihadists 
anticipated that the regimes would then be vulnerable to the threat of popular 
revolutions led by the jihadist vanguard.961 Once state power was seized in multiple 
polities, the ground would then be clear for the establishment of a caliphate stretching 
throughout the Greater Middle East. A spiritually purified and politically unified 
umma, empowered by the Gulf States’ massive financial wealth and also by the 
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Muslim world’s control over much of the world’s energy reserves, would then restore 
Muslims to the privileged position of power they had enjoyed for the first millennium 
following the Prophet’s revelation.962   
 While bin Laden’s grand strategic vision remained constant, the multiple 
techniques Al Qaeda pursued in realizing this vision varied. In exploring this 
variation, it is interesting to note that Al Qaeda’s military operations reflected an 
assimilation and synthesis of multiple military traditions, each adapted to the changed 
circumstances of a rapidly globalizing world order.  From 1996 onwards, Al Qaeda 
pursued a sustained campaign of ‘hit and run’ operations targeted at American 
interests overseas. This campaign, including attacks on US military facilities in Saudi 
Arabia in 1996, the 1998 African embassy bombings, the attempted bombing of USS 
The Sullivans January 2000 and the successful attack on the USS Cole in October 
2000, was explicitly designed to steadily ratchet up the costs of America’s continuing 
military presence within the Middle East until such time that America resolved to 
leave the region.963 With it emphasis on speed, surprise, mobility, ambush, and then 
rapid withdrawal once enemy forces had been successfully engaged, the strategy 
comported with classic guerrilla warfare techniques as articulated by Mao Tse-
Tung.964 At the same time, however, the strategy also resembled the far older 
techniques of tribal raiding on the Arabian Peninsula with which bin Laden was 
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familiar from his reading of early Islamic history.965  In the time of the Prophet, 
warfare between the nomadic Arabic tribes was not focused upon seizing and holding 
territory, but rather revolved around a series of raids, skirmishes, and ambushes 
undertaken by horsemen warriors against enemy caravans.966 This style of warfare 
subsequently persisted down to the seventeenth century wherever nomadic pastoralists 
co-existed with sedentary agricultural societies, with horse-borne warriors using the 
advantages of speed, mobility and surprise to harass and at times even conquer far 
wealthier and more populous societies.967  For Bin Laden, the greater transnational 
mobility afforded by globalisation presented analogous opportunities to launch 
lightning raids against American interests on a global stage.  Equally, just as the 
horsemen of earlier ages were able to withdraw to the safety of over-the-horizon 
sanctuaries after a successful raid, so too Al Qaeda enjoyed in Afghanistan a territorial 
platform deep within Central Asia that lay largely beyond the reach of American 
retaliation, at least prior to 9/11.968 
 Bin Laden’s strategy of global raiding arguably reached its apogee with the 
lightning strike on the American citadel perpetrated on September 11.  But 9/11 
moved beyond earlier ‘hit and run’ attacks in both its shift in geographic focus (from 
American interests overseas to the homeland itself), and also in the unprecedented 
                                                 
965On this parallel, see for example Denis McAuley. "The Ideology of Osama Bin Laden: Nation, Tribe, 
and World Economy." Journal of Political Ideologies 10, no. 3 (2005), pp. 277-279. McAuley notes 
that the parallels with Arabia’s tribal past are explicitly evoked in bin Laden’s rhetoric, as for example 
in bin Laden’s characterization of 9/11 as ‘yawm New York’ or ‘the day of New York.’ McAuley notes 
that this is the same formulation that would have been used to describe a raid in the time of 
Muhammad. See Ibid.,p. 277.     
966On this point, and for a useful parallel between tribal modes of warfare and that now being 
undertaken by the global jihadist movement, see generally David Ronfeldt. "Al Qaeda and Its Affiliates: 
A Global Tribe Waging Segmental Warfare?" First Monday 10, no. 3 (2005). [Cited 5 November 
2007]. Available at: http://www.uic.edu/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1214/1134  
967McNeill, The Global Condition, p. 116.  
968For a more extensive development of the analogy between the contemporary global jihadists and the 
nomadic steppe warriors of the past, see Malise Ruthven. "The Eleventh of September and the Sudanese 
Mahdiya in the Context of Ibn Khaldun's Theory of Islamic History." International Affairs 78, no. 2 
(2002), pp. 347-350. 
 428
scale of death and destruction it wrought. The 9/11 attacks were not the jihadists’ first 
attempt to strike the American homeland, nor were they the first attempt to inflict 
mass casualties on America and its allies. The first World Trade Centre attack in 1993 
and the foiled Oplan Bojinka and Millennium Plot attacks all speak to the 
longstanding nature of jihadists’ desires to perpetrate large-scale attacks against the 
‘Zionist-Crusader’ alliance.969  That the jihadists’ are possessed by an urge towards 
indiscriminate purgative violence directed against religious outsiders is consistent with 
my analyses of the sentiments animating the Reformation militants and the Taiping 
rebels that preceded them. However, this parallel should not detract from the 
instrumental objectives of the 9/11 attacks, which were to puncture America’s 
perceived aura of invincibility, to inspire the Muslim masses to revolutionary action, 
and to provoke America into a militarized over-reaction that then would draw it into 
open conflict with the Islamic world.970 Once again, this strategy reiterated upon 
historical precedents, while adapting them to exploit the enhanced destructive and 
disruptive capabilities conferred on non-state actors by globalization.  
Specifically, the strategy constituted a modern adaptation of the ‘propaganda 
by the deed’ tactics first employed by anarchist terrorists one century earlier. In the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, anarchists had perpetrated a range of 
high profile attacks against heads of state and civilian targets in America, Europe, and 
Tsarist Russia.971  The widespread diffusion of technologies such as repeating rifles 
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and dynamite during this time empowered non-state actors with the capacity to launch 
such attacks, while the advent of mass circulation newspapers ensured that their 
psychological effects would reverberate throughout targeted societies.972  Similarly, in 
the lead-up to 9/11, jihadists repeatedly attempted to exploit the emergence of global 
mediascapes and the accelerated diffusion of dual-use technologies to engage in 
‘propaganda by the deed’ at a global level.  Bin Laden’s establishment of a WMD 
acquisition unit in Al Qaeda as far back as the early 1990s reveals the longevity and 
intensity of the jihadists’ commitment to developing a capacity to inflict mass casualty 
attacks against those deemed Islam’s enemies.973  However, what the 9/11 attacks also 
demonstrated was that the direct acquisition of a WMD capacity was not necessary to 
achieve Al Qaeda’s goals. Instead, by the early 21st century, continuing modernization 
was itself conferring upon non-state actors the ability to creatively exploit civilian 
technologies to perpetrate mass atrocities guaranteed to instantaneously reach a global 
audience. 
 By the eve of the millennium, an ideology that had originated as a localized 
challenge to secular dictatorships in the Greater Middle East had morphed into a 
virulently anti-systemic worldview.  The end of the Cold War, the waxing of 
American military involvement in the Middle East, and the halting consolidation of a 
liberal world order under conditions of globalization meanwhile drew the proponents 
of this ideology into ever-sharper confrontation with a state system underwritten by 
                                                                                                                                            
notes that the years 1892 to 1901 became known as the Decade of Regicide, during which more heads 
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American hegemony. At the same time, improvements in communication and 
transportation technologies, the continuing diffusion of destructive and disruptive 
capacities to non-state actors, the opening up of territorial sanctuaries in failed states, 
and the existence of established and emerging links between diverse jihadist groups 
enabled the consolidation of an oppositional movement explicitly dedicated to the 
state system’s destruction.  
 In Reformation Europe, the unholy trinity of ideological polarization, 
institutional decay, and increases in violence interdependence had eventually yielded 
the ‘hard shell’ of the sovereign state, and with it a reflexively monitored sovereign 
state system. By the turn of the 21st century, globalization had compressed the 
strategic distance between North and South, as well as rendering the hard shell of the 
sovereign state increasingly permeable.  Simultaneously, a combination of post-
colonial state failure and accelerating technological innovation were working steadily 
to corrode the state monopoly on organized violence that had been so painstakingly 
constructed in the centuries after Westphalia. In this increasingly fluid context, Bin 
Laden and others like him tapped into transnational flows, exploited global and local 
gaps in governance, and leveraged off the various social ties linking the jihadist 
diaspora to marshal an armed challenge to the prevailing world order. Jihadist 
ideology explicitly challenged the constitutional principles of the global state system. 
Jihadist actions meanwhile undermined the state’s monopoly on warfare and 
threatened the Hobbesian protection bargain linking popular obedience to publicly 
provided collective security. In the years preceding the millennium, jihadism thus 
challenged both the authoritative and the coercive foundations of the liberal world 
order.  While the threat had crystallized due to a convergence of long-ranging 
ideological, institutional, and material developments in the world polity, by the dawn 
of the new millennium the threat to the state system was immediate. But in the dying 
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days of the twentieth century, the international community failed to appreciate the 
threat’s urgency, and its response to jihadism was uncoordinated, localized, sporadic, 
and desultory.  Then came 9/11.  
 
9.3 Global Jihadism versus the Liberal World Order, 2001-Present 
 
9.3.1 The Day After – International Society Responds to 9/11   
 
‘Nous Sommes Tous Américains’974 
 
 For the preceding quarter of a century, Islamist rebellions had roiled large 
sections of the Muslim world, and had intermittently struck painful blows against 
Western interests overseas. Nevertheless, it was only with the attacks of September 11 
that the proximity and immediacy of the jihadist threat became universally apparent. 
Al Qaeda’s spectacular assault on the global superpower indelibly established the 
fragility of the state’s monopoly on violence to a global audience. In many developing 
countries, including Afghanistan, the state’s tenuous control over the means of 
violence had long been manifest. But it was only after 9/11 that Northern rulers and 
citizens grasped the global strategic consequences of this longstanding reality. 
Similarly, September 11 also shattered the insular Western conviction that the Cold 
War’s end had somehow signalled the termination of international ideological 
rivalries. With the destruction of the Twin Towers, the illusory ‘Fukuyaman moment’ 
of post-Cold War ideological unipolarity ended, and the battle was joined between the 
custodians of international order and the soldiers of the global jihad.   
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 Even in their death throes, neither Christendom nor the Sinosphere ever 
experienced an event that so vividly signalled their underlying frailty as did the 9/11 
attacks for the liberal world order. Equally, however, neither of these orders 
demonstrated the same capacity for defensive adaptation as was evident in the state 
system in the days and months following September 11.  Beyond the broad outpouring 
of international sympathy for the United States in the attacks’ immediate aftermath, 
the 9/11 assault activated a diverse range of more tangible responses to the jihadist 
threat that can be surveyed only briefly here. At the global level, a raft of initiatives 
was rapidly implemented to constrict the permissive operational environment that Al 
Qaeda had previously exploited in preparing the September 11 attacks.975 Under 
American leadership, a suite of policies were introduced or expanded under the 
auspices of the United Nations to restrict Al Qaeda’s access to personnel, money, and 
materiel. Thus, for example, an established UN convention to suppress terrorist 
financing rapidly received the necessary ratifications to enter into force in the months 
following September 11.976  With the convening of the 1540 Committee, the UN 
Security Council additionally founded an institution explicitly charged with the task of 
preventing non-state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.977  The 
founding of the UN Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) and later the Counter 
Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) also signified the UN’s new-
found willingness to create dedicated assets charged specifically with the task of 
defending the global state system from the threat of jihadist terrorism.978 
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 The initiatives listed above constitute only a small sampling of the policies 
introduced under UN authority to combat global jihadism after 9/11. In addition to 
these policies, the international community also responded with enhanced moves to 
delegitimate terrorism and state sponsorship of terrorism. With characteristic 
bluntness, President Bush famously declared after the attacks that states were either 
with America or against it in the struggle against global terrorism.979 While this 
sentiment evoked consternation among many observers at the time, what the ensuing 
controversy obscured was a larger post 9/11 systemic strengthening of norms against 
terrorism.980  In place of the permissive negative sovereignty regime that had prevailed 
in the immediate post-colonial period, by the 1990s a more demanding conception of 
‘sovereignty as responsibility’ was acquiring increasing purchase, a trend that was 
further strengthened after September 11981   In keeping with this emerging emphasis 
on sovereignty as responsibility, on September 28, 2001 the United States and its 
allies successfully sponsored UN Security Council Resolution 1373 under the 
                                                 
979President Bush’s statement, which was directed primarily at states suspected to be harbouring 
terrorists, but which in its exact formulation seemed far broader in its potential application, was as 
follows: ‘Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are 
with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbour or support terrorism will 
be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.’ See George W. Bush. Address to a Joint Session 
of Congress and the American People, September 20, 2001 [cited 6 November 2007]. Available from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.  
980Although it is nevertheless worth noting that while the international community has responded 
robustly to the specific threat posed by global jihadist terrorism, the establishment of an internationally 
agreed definition of terrorism as a threat to international peace and security more generally remains 
elusive, despite occasional signs of progress such as at the World Summit meeting in 2005. See Rosand, 
‘The UN-Led Multilateral Institutional Response to Jihadist Terrorism’, p. 407. 
981On the prevalence of a negative sovereignty regime in the immediate post-colonial period, see Robert 
H. Jackson. Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 40-47. The concept of sovereignty as responsibility as it 
developed in the 1990s related primarily to the emerging practice of humanitarian intervention, with the 
principle of the ‘responsibility to protect’ receiving broad endorsement by the international community 
at the World Summit in 2005. See Alex J. Bellamy. "Whither the Responsibility to Protect? 
Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World Summit." International Affairs 20, no. 2 (2006): 143-69. 
However, from 9/11 onwards, the notion of sovereignty as responsibility has been increasingly 
extended to the areas of counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation. On the application of the principle 
of sovereignty as responsibility to the area of counter-proliferation in the post 9/11 era, see generally 
Jofi Joseph. "The Exercise of National Sovereignty - the Bush Administration's Approach to Combating 
Weapons of Mass Destruction." The Nonproliferation Review 12, no. 2 (2005): 373-87. 
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authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 982 This resolution imposed a host of 
uniform obligations on all 191 member states to prevent or suppress terrorist activities 
within their borders. These responsibilities included obligations to suppress terrorist 
financing, obligations to deny safe haven to terrorist organizations, obligations to 
implement rigorous border controls to constrict the transnational movement of 
terrorists, and obligations to refrain from providing either active or passive support to 
terrorist organizations.983 In establishing explicit obligations on the part of member 
states to suppress jihadist terrorism, the Security Council reaffirmed systemic norms 
pertaining to the maintenance of the state’s monopoly on legitimate violence, while 
simultaneously aligning the prerogatives of sovereign power more closely with the 
imperative of defending the state system against jihadist subversion.   
 Despite the international community’s increased willingness to confront 
jihadism following September 11, many weak states lacked the institutional capacities 
necessary to practically pursue effective counter-terrorism policies in the short term. 
Consequently, the United Nations, the European Union, and the G8 each launched 
state-strengthening initiatives explicitly designed to empower states with the resources 
necessary to meet their counter-terrorism obligations as legitimate members of 
international society.984  In the areas of border control and the suppression of terrorist 
finances in particular, Northern states and specialist NGOs cooperated intensively with 
weaker states to transfer the institutional capacities necessary to assure these states’ 
compliance with emerging counter-terrorist norms.985  Equally, the looming danger of 
                                                 
982United Nations Security Council, SC Res. 1373 (2001), S/RES/1373, New York, 28 September 2001.  
983For further details on the obligations imposed on member states by UNSC resolution 1373, see 
generally Eric Rosand. "Security Council Resolution 1373, the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the 
Fight against Terrorism." The American Journal of International Law 97, no. 2 (2003): 333-41. 
984
Ibid., pp. 335-337.  
985On international cooperation to enhance states’ capacities in the area of border control, see 
Mendelsohn, Jihadism, International Society, and Interstate Cooperation, pp. 171-177. On international 
capacity-building initiatives to assist states in the suppression of terrorist financing, see generally Ibid., 
chapter six.  
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WMD terrorist attacks spurred a renewed commitment to securing nuclear-related 
technologies, particularly within the states of the former Soviet Union. The United 
States’ Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTRP) constituted merely the most 
conspicuous and most expensive of a raft of programs designed to secure former 
Soviet stockpiles, and transfer to the former Soviet states a long-term capacity to 
prevent the diffusion of WMD-related technologies and expertise to terrorist groups.986 
 Finally, the United States acted swiftly and decisively in October 2001 to drive 
Al Qaeda from its territorial sanctuary in Afghanistan. In destroying Al Qaeda’s 
network of training camps in Afghanistan and deposing the allied Taliban regime, the 
United States dealt bin Laden’s organization a heavy blow. Deprived of its territorial 
sanctuary and also of the infrastructure that had previously been such a powerful 
drawcard for other militant groups, Al Qaeda’s capacity to plan major attacks was 
significantly degraded, as was its ability to attract the allegiance of others within the 
jihadist diaspora through the provision of in-theatre training and financial 
assistance.987  Intelligence acquired as a result of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 
also assisted in both the subsequent assassination or capture of leading Al Qaeda 
cadres, as well as the thwarting of at least one major follow-up jihadist attack in 
Singapore in December 2001.988  The decimation of both the Taliban and regional 
jihadist allies such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) further weakened 
the global jihadist movement, while the inauguration of a new Afghan government and 
                                                 
986On both the continuing difficulties in effectively implementing the CTRP, as well as efforts to extend 
the program beyond the states of the Former Soviet Union, see Richard G. Lugar. "Redefining the 
Threat." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 61, no. 5 (2005): 20-21. On international efforts more 
generally to prevent the spread of WMD to non-state actors in the wake of 9/11, see Mendelsohn, 
Jihadism, International Society, and International Cooperation, chapter seven. 
987Michael Kenney. "From Pablo to Osama: Counter-Terrorism Lessons from the War on Drugs." 
Survival 45, no. 3 (2003), p. 195. Kenney does nevertheless qualify this observation by suggesting that 
while Operation Enduring Freedom certainly weakened Al Qaeda’s offensive capabilities, its defensive 
strengths – in terms of covertness, elusiveness, and adaptability – may have been strengthened by the 
dispersal of Al Qaeda operatives away from their Afghan redoubts.  
988On this point, see Ron Suskind. The One Percent Doctrine: Deep inside America's Pursuit of Its 
Enemies since 9/11. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006, p. 57.  
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the country’s subsequent diplomatic rehabilitation held out the prospect of long-term 
regional stabilization.989 
 It can be argued on the basis of the above analysis that what 9/11’s aftermath 
demonstrated was not the state system’s fragility, but rather its exceptional resilience. 
The constriction of jihadists’ access to personnel, money, and materiel, the 
delegitimation of terrorists and their state sponsors, the establishment of state-
strengthening programs to help weak states meet their international counter-terrorism 
obligations, and Al Qaeda’s defeat and expulsion from Afghanistan all present as 
manifestations of the state system’s robust capacity to respond to anti-systemic threats.  
Despite the Bush administration’s penchant for unilateralism, the cooperation between 
the United Nations and the United States in prosecuting the war on terror in 9/11’s 
immediate aftermath was far more extensive than is commonly acknowledged, 
suggesting also a continued complementarity between the respective pinnacles of 
authoritative and coercive power in the global state system.  If anything, the months 
following 9/11 indicated the frailty of global jihadism rather than the state system. Al 
Qaeda’s swifter than expected defeat in Afghanistan lent plausibility to interpretations 
that 9/11 was a colossal strategic error by Bin Laden, more analogous for the defeated 
jihadists to the Battle of the Bulge than to the victorious anti-Soviet jihad. Far from re-
energizing a flagging global Islamist movement, 9/11 instead opened up bitter internal 
divisions within jihadist ranks, leaving bin Laden isolated and his organization 
damaged and disoriented.990  With peaceful Islamists and locally oriented jihadists 
being swept up in the indiscriminate wave of repression unleashed in many states after 
                                                 
989On this point, see Svante E. Cornell. "The Narcotics Threat in Greater Central Asia: From Crime-
Terror Nexus to State Infiltration?" China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 4, no. 1 (2006), p. 58. See also 
Evgeny Troitskiy. "U.S. Policy in Central Asia and Regional Security." Global Society 21, no. 3 (2007), 
p. 425. 
990See generally Gerges, The Far Enemy, chapter five (‘Aftermath: The War Within’).  
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9/11, bin Laden’s ambitions to lead the umma in revolt against the kufr world order 
appeared fated to fail.  
 
9.3.2 Snatching Defeat from the Jaws of Victory?  The Iraq War, the Rejuvenation of 
Global Jihadism, and the Prolongation of the ‘Long War.’ 
 
 In early 2002, as the spring sun dissolved the snows of the Hindu Kush, the 
jihadist challenge to the global state system appeared to be in inexorable retreat. Five 
years later, the Afghan spring saw renewed offensives by a resurgent Taliban against 
NATO and Afghan troops in southern Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Al Qaeda worked to 
feverishly to re-establish its terrorist infrastructure in neighbouring Waziristan, while 
the United States remained locked in a losing battle with foreign jihadists and local 
insurgents in the heart of the Arab world.991 Worst of all, while Al Qaeda’s operational 
capabilities remained severely degraded after six years’ of continuous warfare against 
the state system, the Iraq war helped catalyse jihadism’s evolution into a globally 
distributed anti-systemic social movement that will likely endure into the indefinite 
future.992  
 How did this happen? Many factors account for this reversal, but two deserve 
particular attention.  In Afghanistan, the United States failed to consolidate its victory 
over the Taliban by refusing to commit the resources necessary to reconstitute a viable 
central state. Having initially sidelined NATO in favour of an ad hoc ‘coalition of the 
willing’ during Operation Enduring Freedom, the Bush Administration subsequently 
                                                 
991On Al Qaeda’s post 9/11 resurgence, see generally Bruce Riedel. "Al Qaeda Strikes Back." Foreign 
Affairs 86, no. 3 (2007): 24-40. 
992On the emergence of the Iraq war as a cause celebre for the jihadist movement, and on the growing 
geographical spread of the jihadist threat, see Declassified Key Judgements of the National Intelligence 
Estimate: "Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States", April 2006 [cited 
November 6 2007]. Available from 
http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/Declassified_NIE_Key_Judgments.pdf.  
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handballed the task of reconstructing Afghanistan to the United Nations and to the 
NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in order to free its forces 
for the pending war in Iraq.993 Consequently, while Al Qaeda and other jihadist 
networks were momentarily evicted from Afghanistan, the anarchic local security 
environment that enabled Al Qaeda’s relocation to the region in the first instance 
continues to persist. Six years after its liberation, Afghanistan remains plagued by 
massive unemployment, endemic corruption and pervasive governmental weakness.994  
Cursed with limited opportunities to participate in the non-drug market economy, 
many farmers have resumed their involvement in opium production and distribution, 
fuelling a resurgence of organized crime and warlordism throughout the country.995  
Meanwhile, the Taliban is now safely headquartered in Quetta and is steadily 
reconstituting its forces in the Pashtun tribal belt straddling Pakistan and 
Afghanistan.996  More alarmingly still, the Taliban continues to receive substantial 
sponsorship from patrons in the Persian Gulf and also elements of the Pakistani 
security services, endowing it with the wherewithal to continuously harass and 
destabilize the fledgling Afghan government.997   
 Just as America’s post-Cold War abandonment of Afghanistan permitted the 
rise of the Taliban, so too the Bush Administration’s aversion to nation-building has 
left Afghanistan and indeed the broader Central Asian region vulnerable to a jihadist 
revival. Conversely, where the Administration’s sins in Central Asia are largely those 
of omission, the invasion of Iraq was an unforced error of commission that has done 
more than any other policy to revive global jihadism’s fortunes. In the 1980s, the 
Afghan jihad emerged as a cause celebre throughout the Muslim world, with the 
                                                 
993Barnett R. Rubin. "Saving Afghanistan." Foreign Affairs 86, no. 1 (2007), p. 65. 
994
Ibid., pp. 67-69.  
995
Ibid., pp. 68-69.  
996
Ibid., pp. 70-71. 
997
Ibid., p. 70. 
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convergence of volunteers to Afghanistan catalysing the genesis of global jihadism. 
Similarly, the Iraq war has evoked similar passions throughout the umma. More 
specifically, it has spurred the emergence of a new generation of transnational jihadists 
who are committed to expelling kufr influence in the Middle East, and then 
subsequently establishing a stem-polity for the Caliphate on the ruins of the Iraqi 
state.998  The jihadist narrative of a beleaguered umma besieged by infidel forces has 
also received an enormous fillip, with fundamentalists exploiting shared narratives of 
past subjugation to draw parallels between the American invasion of the Iraq and the 
Mongol destruction of the Abbasid caliphate over seven centuries earlier.999 The 
continued spread of the internet has meanwhile facilitated the rapid dissemination of 
this message to a global audience, aiding greatly in the recruitment of fresh volunteers 
for the Iraqi jihad from the Middle East, the Western European Muslim diaspora, and 
beyond.1000   
 Having smashed the brittle skeleton of Saddam’s police state, the United 
States’ has thus far failed to re-establish a central government capable of providing for 
the security of the Iraqi people.1001  In effect, the invasion and subsequent botched 
                                                 
998Declassified Key Judgements of the National Intelligence Estimate: "Trends in Global Terrorism: 
Implications for the United States", April 2006 [cited November 6 2007]. Available from 
http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/Declassified_NIE_Key_Judgments.pdf. On jihadist aspirations to 
establish a stem-polity for the Caliphate in Iraq, see English Translation of Ayman Al-Zawahiri's Letter 
to Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi [cited 5 November 2007]. Available from 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/203gpuul.asp?pg=1.  
999On the deep resonance that the Mongols’ 1258 destruction of the Abbasid Caliphate still carries 
within the Islamic world, and the scope for parallels with the American occupation, see Husain 
Haqqani. "The American Mongols." Foreign Policy, no. 136 (2003): 70-71. In his propaganda in 
relation to Iraq, bin Laden has nevertheless relied on his preferred parallels between the Coalition of the 
Willing and the umma’s earlier Western antagonists (both Roman and Crusader). See Osama bin Laden. 
"'To the Muslims of Iraq II'." In The Al Qaeda Reader, edited by Raymond Ibrahim, 251-55. New York: 
Broadway Books, 2007. See specifically pp. 252-254. 
1000On this point, see for example Kilcullen, ‘Counter-Insurgency Redux’, p. 113. See also Cronin, 
‘Cyber-Mobilization – The New Levee En Masse’, p. 83. 
1001The literature on the Bush Administration’s failures in Iraq is now extensive. See for example Rajiv 
Chandrasekaran. Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green Zone. 1st ed. New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 2006; George Packer. The Assassins' Gate: America in Iraq. 1st ed. New York: Farrar Straus 
and Giroux, 2005; and Thomas E. Ricks. Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq. New York: 
Penguin Press, 2006. 
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occupation have established a failed state in the Arab epicentre of the umma, 
reproducing in Iraq a vacuum of effective governmental authority analogous to that 
which has plagued Afghanistan since 1979. As in Afghanistan, the fragility of state 
structures has enabled foreign jihadists to insinuate themselves into local conflicts, 
while also permitting them to use Iraq as a launching pad from which to strike at 
neighbouring states.1002  Despite Al Qaeda’s limited operational capabilities, the 
conflict has raised the network’s prestige in some quarters, as witnessed by the 
growing number of jihadist groups that either explicitly invoke Al Qaeda’s name in 
justifying their atrocities, or that have even moved to explicitly affiliate themselves 
with the organization and its remaining leaders.1003  Finally, the Iraq war has schooled 
a new generation of militants in the ethos and practice of jihad. Indeed, whereas the 
original Afghan jihad exposed foreign jihadists to techniques of rural insurgency that 
were of limited relevance in the context of their local struggles, jihadist returnees from 
Iraq will leave equipped with invaluable urban warfare skills, making them even more 
dangerous as adversaries than were their ‘Afghan alumni’ predecessors.1004  
 Both America’s failure to consolidate victory in Afghanistan and its strategic 
misstep in invading Iraq have given jihadism a new lease of life, and have ensured that 
it will pose a threat to world order for an indefinite time to come. The 
Administration’s mistakes have been attributable to a number of factors, not least of 
                                                 
1002The potential for the jihadists to use Iraq as a launch-pad for destabilizing surrounding countries was 
for example evident in the bombing of the Radisson and two other hotels in Amman, Jordan by 
militants linked to the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in November 2005. See Riedel, ‘Al Qaeda Strikes 
Back’, p 30.  
1003This trend is evident for example in the official merger between Al Qaeda and the Salafist Group for 
Call and Combat (GSPC) in 2006, which produced the new organization Al Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM). Subsequent to this merger, AQIM has recast its strategy and goals in accordance 
with Al Qaeda’s more global agenda, and has additionally adopted many of the signature tactics (e.g. a 
reliance on suicide bombers) of the Al Qaeda organization. Nevertheless, while this merger has 
enhanced Al Qaeda’s prestige and operational reach, it has also yielded internal fissures within AQIM 
that could gravely compromise the organization’s effectiveness over time. See Andrew Black. 
"Recasting Jihad in the Maghreb." Terrorism Monitor, vol. V, i. 20, October 25 2007, 6-8. 
1004On this point, see for example Bruce Hoffman. "The 'Cult of the Insurgent': Its Tactical and Strategic 
Implications." Australian Journal of International Affairs 61, no. 3 (2007), p. 325. 
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which has been a misreading of the post-Cold War world that conflated American 
unipolarity with omnipotence.  Freed from the straitjacket of superpower rivalry and 
empowered by their leadership of an incipient Revolution in Military Affairs, many 
Americans overestimated the capacity of American military might to remake the world 
in the image of liberalism.1005 One of the essential flaws in such reasoning is that it 
overlooked states’ capacity to thwart American designs through various stratagems of 
‘soft balancing’ and passive non-cooperation.1006  Thus, while the absence of a 
genuine peer competitor provided America with much greater latitude than it had 
enjoyed in the Cold War, this increased room for manoeuvre did not translate into a 
liberation of American foreign policy from all constraints. In an international order 
predicated on principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention, the constitutional 
principles of the liberal world order imposed very real and binding practical political 
constraints on the exercise of American military power. Additionally, in an era of 
popular sovereignty, where even autocratic regimes must appear to be at least 
minimally responsive to public sentiment, American military power has proven far 
from infinitely fungible. In the area of counter-terrorism in particular, where intensive 
inter-governmental cooperation remains essential for realizing fundamental policy 
goals, America’s undisputed military supremacy has been of limited value in 
convincing regimes such as that of Musharraf to comply with American requests that 
run against the grain of essential state interests or domestic political imperatives.1007 
 In addition to overestimating the extent to which military pre-eminence could 
be translated into political influence, America’s leadership also misjudged the ease 
with which liberal values and institutions could be successfully and rapidly 
                                                 
1005On this point, see Reus-Smit, American Power and World Order, pp. 50-52. 
1006On ‘soft balancing’ and more passive forms of non-cooperation, see generally Robert A. Pape. "Soft 
Balancing against the United States." International Security 30, no. 1 (2005): 7-45. 
1007On this point, see for example Howard La-Franchi. "America's Pakistan Dilemma." Christian 
Science Monitor, July 23 2007, p. 1. 
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transplanted to countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Certainly, the Bush 
Administration was correct in its assessment that state tyranny in the Muslim world 
constituted a key incubator of jihadist terror. But the deduction that jihadism could 
best be confronted by engaging in projects of long-distance democratization 
overlooked some critical considerations concerning Muslim polities’ developmental 
trajectories and contemporary composition.  Specifically, while the ideology of global 
jihadism represents an extreme and generally unpopular reaction to the past and 
present excesses of secular dictatorships, the disillusionment it expresses towards a 
wholesale secularization of political life has in the last three decades become far from 
uncommon in the Islamic world.1008 Consequently, while popular demands for greater 
political participation remain widespread in Islamic countries, the Bush 
Administration erred in identifying this sentiment with a readiness to embrace 
republicanism in its secular liberal incarnation.1009  More fundamentally, the 
transformational liberalism embodied in the Bush Doctrine either downplayed or 
ignored the degree of institutional decay prevalent in large sections of the Greater 
Middle East. Whereas liberal democracy depends upon the existence of a Weberian 
legal-rational state endowed with a monopoly on violence, decades of institutional 
decay have left many post-colonial polities bereft of functioning state institutions. 
Lamentably, this observation was no truer than in Afghanistan and Iraq, which 
                                                 
1008On this point, see for example Armstrong, The Battle for God, p. 367. Significantly, however, 
Armstrong stresses that this disillusionment with secularism is far from unique to the Islamic world, but 
has manifested itself also in the faith traditions of Judaism and Christianity as well in acute and 
sometimes violent ways.    
1009Tellingly, this dissonance was manifest most conspicuously in post-Saddam Iraq, when the Coalition 
Provisional Authority sought in the teeth of Iraqi opposition to introduce clauses in the Iraqi 
constitution guaranteeing both gender equality and the strict separation of church and state. While from 
a Western standpoint, such intentions seem admirable, the resistance these ideas encountered from large 
swathes of the post-war Iraqi political establishment is perhaps indicative of the Bush Administration’s 
naïveté in assuming that Western liberal values and institutions could be readily implanted in the 
Middle East. See Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City, p 211.  
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through the vagaries of the war on terror became the first test cases for Bush’s variant 
of transformational liberalism.  
 Most critically of all, the Bush Administration’s failures in the war against 
jihadism can be sheeted home to an abject failure to calibrate commitments with 
capabilities. Notwithstanding the Administration’s post 9/11 rhetorical allusions 
concerning the need for a Marshall Plan for the Middle East, its financial commitment 
to democracy promotion in the Islamic world has been paltry.1010 Despite the 
Administration’s proclaimed grand strategy of ‘draining the swamp’ of terrorist 
sentiment by democratizing the region, in practice this objective has been 
systematically sacrificed to the more pedestrian prerogative of maintaining 
longstanding alliances with regional autocracies such as Saudi Arabia.1011 Meanwhile, 
in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the Administration’s goal of effecting the total political 
transformation of these societies has been systematically under-resourced from the 
outset.1012  In both cases, the Defence Department’s goal of transforming the military 
into a transnationally nimble expeditionary force of global reach took absolute 
precedence over the requirements of nation building, dooming US policy to failure in 
both instances.1013 
                                                 
1010On the relative paucity of US assets dedicated to democracy promotion in the Greater Middle East, 
see Christopher Hobson. "A Forward Strategy of Freedom in the Middle East: Us Democracy 
Promotion and the 'War on Terror'." Australian Journal of International Affairs 59, no. 1 (2005), p. 42. 
1011On the contrast between the Administration’s efforts at democracy promotion in Iraq and its 
continued adherence to a longstanding policy of support for the conservative autocratic monarchies of 
the Persian Gulf, see generally Marc J. O'Reilly, and Wesley B. Renfro. "Evolving Empire: America's 
"Emirates" Strategy in the Persian Gulf." International Studies Perspectives 8:2 (2007): 137-51. 
1012On Afghanistan, see Rubin, ‘Saving Afghanistan’, pp. 65-66. On the under-resourcing of the 
invasion of Iraq and the subsequent occupation, see for example David C. Hendrickson, and Robert W. 
Tucker. "Revisions in Need of Revising: What Went Wrong in the Iraq War." Survival 47, no. 2 (2005), 
pp. 12-13.  
1013On the under-resourced character of US nation-building efforts in Iraq relative to earlier efforts in 
Japan, Germany, Bosnia and Kosovo, see James F. Dobbins. "America's Role in Nation-Building: From 
Germany to Iraq." Survival 45, no. 4 (2003-04), pp. 105-108. On the under-resourced character of the 
nation-building effort in Afghanistan relative to earlier missions, see Ibid., p. 99. 
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 In mistaking unipolarity for omnipotence, overstating the political utility of 
military power, underestimating the difficulties of long-distance democratization, and 
failing to calibrate commitments with capabilities, the United States has potentially 
snatched defeat from the jaws of victory in the struggle against global jihadism, or at 
the very least deferred victory for some time.  I would argue that at the root of all of 
the above misperceptions lies a failure to situate the jihadist challenge to the liberal 
world order within its larger systemic context. The global jihadists remain implacable 
enemies of the global state system, and their defeat will require the kind of intensive 
international cooperation that the US and the UN were together capable of marshalling 
in the months immediately following 9/11. However, the jihadist threat cannot be 
confronted in isolation from a conscious engagement with the larger macro-processes 
that initially brought it into being. For at its base, the jihadist phenomenon is merely 
one manifestation of a more protracted multi-dimensional crisis in the state system, the 
roots of which I have sought to excavate in the preceding two chapters.  Thus, while 
global jihadism embodies the most radical religious repudiation of the contemporary 
international order, its origins lie in a much broader revival of popular religious 
consciousness that sits awkwardly with the sovereign state system’s secular 
foundations.  Jihadists’ recourse to asymmetric warfare has likewise been singular in 
its global scale and impact, but is emblematic of larger material processes that will 
continue to compromise the hard shell of the sovereign state long after jihadism’s 
defeat. Finally, the continuing decay of many post-colonial states is a well-established 
feature of the global state system that continues to worsen, corroding the present world 
order’s popular legitimacy and thereby increasing its exposure to anti-systemic threats.   
 In both Christendom and the Sinosphere, the destruction of international orders 
was heralded by the intersection of the unholy trinity of ideological polarization, 
increases in violence interdependence, and pervasive institutional decay. In the past 
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three decades, this constellation of forces has begun to manifest itself once again. 
While the global state system is hardly on the cusp of dissolution, its fragility and its 
susceptibility to future breakdown is consequently greater than is commonly 
acknowledged. If the custodians of the present world order are to successfully preserve 
the global state system’s liberal constitutional values, they must first acknowledge the 
full magnitude of the threat being faced, for only then can a collective response be 
fashioned that adequately responds to the challenge. The likelihood of such a renewal 
occurring, and the steps that must be taken to avert continuing systemic decay and 
eventual disintegration, form part of the subject of the concluding chapter of this 
investigation, to which I now turn.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
‘Politics will, to the end of history, be an area where conscience and power meet, 
where the ethical and coercive factors of human life will interpenetrate and work out 
their tentative and uneasy compromises…’  
– Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society.1014 
 
 
 In 1500 CE, from Paris to Peking, the bulk of the world’s population were 
governed by clerics and emperors.  In Latin Christendom, the dream of re-uniting 
Europe under the imperial sceptre continued to fire the hearts of men such as Charles 
V, while the pope remained unchallenged as Christendom’s supreme spiritual leader. 
Throughout the Muslim world, the umma’s seemingly inexorable centuries-long 
expansion looked set to continue, with the sixteenth century witnessing both the 
waxing of Ottoman power, as well as the emergence of new Muslim empires in the 
form of Safavid Iran and Mughal India.  Finally, in the Far East, a far-flung suzerain 
state system flourished under the Celestial Empire of the Ming Dynasty, with the 
Chinese emperor exercising unchallenged regional hegemony by dint of his status as 
the Son of Heaven.  Across the length and breadth of the Old World, the ethical power 
of transcendental religious visions intertwined uneasily with the coercive power of 
multi-ethnic dynastic empires. Faith and empire thus formed the twin foundations of 
regional international orders in Christendom, the umma, and the Sinosphere, with the 
                                                 
1014 Reinhold Niebuhr. Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics. New York: 
Charles Scribner, 1960, p. 4. 
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political stability afforded by each facilitating the ensuing surge of world-wide 
demographic and commercial expansion that heralded the advent of modernity.   
 In the twenty-first century, emancipation has displaced salvation as the 
animating purpose of collective association, while the nation-state has eclipsed empire 
as the world’s dominant form of political community. In the preceding chapters, I have 
sought to chronicle this transition, concentrating on two configurative crises that 
propelled the state system’s genesis and subsequent expansion, before considering the 
contemporary challenges that now threaten that system’s untroubled perpetuation. My 
purposes in undertaking this inquiry were to investigate the nature of international 
order, to account for the transformation of international orders throughout history, and 
to make a preliminary assessment concerning the long-term durability of the 
contemporary global state system. In this concluding chapter, I will revisit my main 
findings, considering in turn this study’s contributions to our understanding of the 
nature of international order, the dynamics of international systems change, the 
developmental trajectory of world order from 1500 to the present, and the likely future 
of the global state system in the twenty-first century.       
 
The Nature of International Order 
 
 The notion that there exists a clear distinction between the domestic and the 
international spheres, whereby the former is dominated by the pursuit of the good life 
while the latter is dominated by the struggle for survival, has long framed prevailing 
conceptions of international order. Even with the stabilization of the post-war order 
and the resulting recession of the threat of state extinction, international politics has 
continued to be regarded by many as a realm of necessity, in which there exists 
minimal consensus over visions of the good life, and in which the threat of violent 
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death remains a permanent possibility.1015  In the post-Cold War era, this conceptual 
distinction between the international realm of necessity and the domestic realm of 
freedom has grown increasingly untenable. Internationally, the post-Cold war period 
has witnessed the global ascendancy of a liberal transformationalist agenda, in which 
both multilateral institutions and hegemonic power have been harnessed to the task of 
promoting distinctly liberal visions of the good.  This task has been undertaken much 
more aggressively and systematically than was the case during the Cold War. 
Concurrently with this development, post-colonial state failure has left people in 
countries such as Sudan, Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan trapped in a condition of 
pervasive personal insecurity, with the disintegration of central authority plunging 
populations back into a condition in many ways reminiscent of Hobbes’ imagined 
state of nature. These developments alone suggest the limited utility of traditional 
dichotomies that locate the imperatives of emancipation and survival respectively in 
the domestic and international spheres.  
 More generally, however, my inquiry into the nature of international orders re-
affirms constructivist insights regarding the intimate relationship that exists between 
shared conceptions of the good and the design of fundamental institutions.  In Latin 
Christendom, the Sinosphere, and the modern state system, international orders have 
been thoroughly suffused with historically particular conceptions of the good. 
Moreover, in each instance, the maintenance of international order has been highly 
dependent on practices of communicative action, which have themselves been 
mediated via authoritative institutions anchored in shared conceptions of legitimacy. 
Thus in Latin Christendom, it was actors’ shared commitment to the Church’s vision 
of universal salvation that invested canon law with the authority necessary for it to 
effectively mediate conflicts between Christendom’s fractious kings and princes. 
                                                 
1015See for example Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. 
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Similarly, in the Sinosphere, the stability of the East Asian ecumene was heavily 
dependent on the operation of the elaborate rites and forms of ceremonial tributary 
diplomacy, practices which were themselves underwritten by the emperor’s broadly 
acknowledged authority as the Son of Heaven.  Finally, in the modern state system, 
the authority of fundamental institutions such as multilateralism and contractual 
international law is heavily predicated on actors’ shared subscription to fundamentally 
liberal conceptions of the moral purpose of the state.  
 Nevertheless, while my investigation re-affirms the existence of an Aristotelian 
dimension to all international orders, I depart from established constructivist accounts 
in acknowledging the equally significant Augustinian dimension of international 
orders. In opposition to most realists, I concur with constructivists that shared 
conceptions of legitimacy and practices of communicative action are central to the 
constitution and operation of international orders.1016  But these authoritative norms 
and practices – ‘the arts of man’ in Machiavelli’s parlance, are by themselves 
insufficient to maintain international order. On the contrary, I have argued that it is the 
combined operation of authoritative institutions with legitimate practices of coercion – 
the art of man and the art of beasts – that works to cultivate cooperation and contain 
enmity between different political communities.  This argument derives from the 
undeniable reality that violent struggles over power and principle have posed a central 
challenge to the maintenance of international order in every case I have considered. In 
each of my cases, the custodians of international order have sought to contain the 
disruptive consequences flowing from two forms of enmity. The first, that of 
conventional enmity, expresses itself in the form of violent positional struggles for 
power and prestige that occur within the normative framework of the existing order. 
                                                 
1016See for example Buknovansky, Legitimacy and Power Politics; Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty; 
and Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State. 
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The second, that of absolute enmity, finds its expression in violent challenges that 
anti-systemic actors have mounted against the most basic constitutional values of the 
prevailing order. Both the Augustinian as well as the Aristotelian purposes of political 
order – the containment of enmity as well as the pursuit of the good life - have 
informed the constitutional structure and fundamental institutions of international 
orders throughout history.  For this reason, any attempt to understand the 
constitutional structure of international orders by focusing exclusively on the 
operation of authoritative institutions and practices of communicative action is bound 
to remain incomplete. 
 That practices of organized violence have been central to the reproduction of 
international orders will come as no surprise to realists. Indeed, realists have long 
insisted on war’s necessity as an unavoidable mechanism for preserving order within 
sovereign state systems.1017  More generally, the ordering mechanisms realists favour, 
including great power hegemony, deterrence, and the maintenance of a balance of 
power, derive their efficacy at least in part through their association with legitimate 
practices of organized violence. However, this study departs from conventional 
realism on two important matters. Firstly, my investigation demonstrates the 
variability of institutionalized practices of legitimate violence across time and space. 
Secondly, I have also demonstrated that institutionalized practices of legitimate 
coercion are profoundly conditioned by prevailing conceptions regarding the moral 
purpose of collective association. In Latin Christendom, the Sinosphere, and the 
modern sovereign state system, differing conceptions of the good yielded differing 
practices of legitimate violence in addition to different forms of authoritative 
institutions. Far from being diametrically opposed to one another, authoritative and 
                                                 
1017See generally Hans Joachim Morgenthau. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and 
Peace. 5th ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978; and Waltz, Theory of International Politics. 
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coercive institutions modes of social action have both been recruited to the task of 
order preservation throughout history. Moreover, in their varied expressions, both 
forms of social practice have been intimately related to one another, owing to their 
common origins in shared beliefs regarding the ultimate ends of social life. 
 The argument that practices of organized violence are central to the operation 
of international orders will sit uncomfortably with many constructivists, particularly 
those who are ethically committed to the goal of supplanting the logic of force with 
the force of logic as the primary feature of international politics. Nevertheless, I 
maintain that there is significant compatibility between constructivists’ emancipatory 
objectives and the arguments advanced here. In demonstrating the variability of 
practices of legitimate coercion across different international orders, I hope to have 
undermined the realist refrain that human agents are condemned to remain stuck in an 
endless cycle of recurrence and repetition, with brief intervals of peace being 
punctuated by renewed outbreaks of violent disorder. For while violence has remained 
a pervasive feature of international politics throughout history, agents’ conceptions of 
what constitutes legitimate violence and who may wield it have varied markedly in 
different eras.  More fundamentally, agents’ tolerance for violence has fluctuated 
significantly in accordance with the differing visions of the good that have sustained 
different international orders. For example, whereas the Church duly accommodated 
itself to the bellicosity of the European nobility in the legitimacy it extended to the 
institution of the feud, Confucianism restricted legitimate recourse to violence to the 
emperor, and consistently emphasized the superiority of moral example over violence 
as the preferred method of maintaining cosmic and social order. Stated bluntly, some 
visions of the good – and thus some international orders – have been more accepting 
of violence as a feature of everyday social life than have others. In illustrating this 
variability, I hope to have provided a firm empirical basis for refuting realists’ 
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pessimism regarding the possibility of achieving fundamental moral progress from 
more to less violent forms of international order. Equally, in encouraging 
constructivists to acknowledge the indispensability of legitimate violence in sustaining 
international orders, I hope to stimulate greater debate regarding the best means of 
harmonizing the ethical imperative of emancipation with the practical imperative of 
preserving the liberal world order from either external assault or internal corruption.  
 
The Dynamics of International Systems Change 
 
 The research traditions of realism, rationalism, and constructivism, framed 
respectively around the motifs of power, efficiency, and identity, each suggest 
different explanations for the transformation of international orders.1018  For realists, 
for whom the ceaseless struggle for power, prestige and survival remains paramount, 
international systems change is best conceptualized as a residue of Great Power 
conflict. This school of thought regards international orders as being essentially 
expressions of the will and the purposes of the strong, and consequently views their 
transformation as being driven primarily by tectonic shifts in the underlying 
distribution of capabilities between ascending and declining Great Powers.1019   
Conversely, rationalists are more inclined to account for international systems change 
by reference to actors’ search for more efficient institutional solutions to common 
problems. Thus, in rationalist lights, institutional dysfunction and the quest for more 
efficient alternatives are accorded causal primacy as the chief mechanisms driving the 
                                                 
1018On power, efficiency, and identity as the key motifs of the dominant research traditions in 
international relations, see J. J. Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson. Rethinking Security in East 
Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency, Studies in Asian Security. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University 
Press, 2004, pp. 8-9. 
1019See for example Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics. 
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transformation of international orders.1020  Constructivists offer yet a third explanation 
for international systems change, emphasizing the transformative significance of 
revolutionary ideas and new forms of social identity in undermining old orders and 
providing the normative impetus for the construction of new orders.1021 
 The preceding analysis indicates that valuable insights can be drawn from each 
of these traditions.  In each of my cases, processes of order creation and disintegration 
have been heavily conditioned by the rise and fall of empires. In both Christendom 
and the Sinosphere, the Habsburg and Qing imperial households tried but ultimately 
failed to reconstitute international orders along imperial lines, while more recently, the 
struggle against jihadist terrorism has been intimately entwined with the travails of an 
informal American imperium. Similarly, the functional strains that growing violence 
interdependence placed on established ordering mechanisms in Christendom, the 
Sinosphere, and the contemporary global state system appear to vindicate rationalists’ 
emphasis on institutional dysfunction as a mechanism of international systems change. 
Finally, constructivists may take heart from my readings of historical instances of 
international systems change, which re-affirm constructivist understandings regarding 
the critical role played by insurgent ideas and new forms of categorical collective 
identities in precipitating transformative crises of international order. 
 These observations aside, my argument does not completely vindicate any of 
the established research traditions. Instead, my findings suggest that historical events 
as complex and protracted as transformations of international order can only be 
properly understood through recourse to multi-causal forms of explanation. The 
emergence of new forms of violence; processes of systemic institutional decay; the 
polarization of international orders following the irruption of insurgent ideas and 
                                                 
1020See for example Spruyt, The Sovereign State and its Competitors. 
1021See for example Bukovansky, Legitimacy and Power Politics; Hall, National Collective Identity; and 
Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty.  
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forms of collective identity – each of these developments are of equivalent importance 
in accounting for episodes of international systems change. More fundamentally, these 
processes work together in an interactive rather than merely an additive fashion.  
International orders falter not simply because they are overwhelmed by the 
simultaneous accumulation of discrete material, institutional, and ideational challenges 
to their integrity.  Rather, these macro-processes interweave with one another in 
complex ways to collectively produce transformations of international order. The 
fundamental institutions of international orders are always susceptible to challenges to 
their legitimacy, owing to the inevitable discrepancies that exist between the values 
they purport to protect and their limited success in practically realizing these values.  
However, they are most likely to fracture only when their efficiency and legitimacy is 
compromised by simultaneous increases in violence interdependence and the 
emergence of ideological challenges to their animating values.  Equally, it is not 
technologically driven increases in violence interdependence per se so much as the 
qualitatively new forms of violence that they enable that threaten international order. 
These new forms of violence are certainly facilitated by material changes, but they are 
also derivative of both the mobilizational opportunities afforded by institutional 
failure, as well as the behavioural imperatives to violence implied in insurgent 
ideologies and their corresponding forms of social identity. Lastly, my analysis 
confirms that revolutionary ideas and identities acquire their full subversive potential 
only when the fundamental institutions of international orders are already fragile, and 
ideally only when increases in violence interdependence have provided anti-systemic 
actors with the coercive wherewithal necessary to challenge the prevailing order.  
 In addition to demonstrating the multi-causal and conjunctural character of 
international systems change, my argument also highlights the highly contingent and 
largely unintended character of this process. Struggles over power and prestige, 
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disputes and bargaining over questions of institutional design, and more fundamental 
contests over meaning and identity feature heavily in the everyday warp and woof of 
international politics. However, my analysis suggests that a focus on the agency and 
specific intentions of particular actors is likely to be of limited value when considering 
protracted episodes of international systems change. This is because international 
orders are not transformed by either Herculean acts of statesmanship, the cool 
calculations of rational actors seeking optimal solutions to shared problems, or even 
the apocalyptic visions of prophets seeking to inaugurate the new millennium. 
Certainly, all three of these behaviours may manifest themselves during periods of 
systemic flux. But transformations of the scale witnessed in early modern 
Christendom or the late modern Sinosphere are so vast as to preclude their deliberate 
determination by acts of conscious human will. In the case of Latin Christendom, 
Reformation ideas were undoubtedly central in dissolving Christendom’s spiritual 
unity, while an elective affinity also existed between many Protestant propositions and 
the constitution of the early modern state. However, the constitution of the 
Westphalian state system was conditioned even more profoundly by Absolutist 
conceptions of state sovereignty. These ideas owed their genesis to the Wars of 
Religion that the Reformation catalysed, but they did not organically arise out of the 
Reformation challenge itself. Similarly, in nineteenth century East Asia, the Taiping 
vision worked to eviscerate the old order of the Sinosphere, but played absolutely no 
role in constituting the East Asian state system that succeeded it.  The ideology of 
jihadism looks similarly unpromising as the potential inspiration for the emergence of 
a new international order. Nevertheless, given the dominance of a logic of unintended 
consequences in guiding past transformations of international order, the possibility 
that the jihadist challenge may yet catalyse far-reaching revisions in the practice of 
sovereignty cannot be summarily dismissed, a point to which I will return below.  
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The Direction of International Systems Change 
 
The Ends of History and the Historical Trajectory of International Systems Change 
from 1500 to the Present 
 
 In emphasizing the themes of causal complexity and contingency, my account 
of transformations of international order would initially appear to confound 
teleological readings of world history. When considered in isolation, the themes of 
complexity and contingency evident in my historical cases may imply that there is no 
over-riding logic to patterns of international systems change, and thus no useful way 
in which history can guide us in anticipating the long-term prospects of the 
contemporary world order.  Nevertheless, a more holistic consideration of my cases 
does reveal the existence of undeniable common trends and global patterns. These 
trends must be identified and acknowledged before any informed evaluation of the 
possible future of the present international system can be undertaken.  
 The first trend that is evident across my cases is the steady secularization of 
international order from 1500 to the present.  At the start of the sixteenth century, 
political and spiritual authority structures were deeply intertwined across each of the 
regional international orders that dominated the Old World.  In Christendom, the 
Church retained its spiritual leadership of the Respublica Christiana, while the 
emperor’s admittedly tenuous claim to temporal suzerainty derived from his status as 
the Church’s pre-eminent earthly bodyguard. In the Ottoman Empire, the Caliph was 
not forced to contend with a religious establishment as organized or as autonomous as 
the Roman Church. Nevertheless, his legitimacy remained strongly tied to the tasks of 
extending the territorial reach of the Darul Islam, and governing his diverse subject 
peoples in a God-pleasing manner.  In the Sinosphere, the sacred and the temporal 
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spheres were least differentiated, with the East Asian ecumene being regulated by an 
elaborate system of tributary diplomacy, and the Ming Emperor claiming universal 
spiritual and political supremacy over the civilized world as the Son of Heaven.  
 From the Reformation onwards, the relationship between the polis and the 
cosmos has grown increasingly attenuated, firstly in Western Europe and then 
subsequently throughout the world. In Christendom, this process of disenchantment 
began with Luther’s proclamation of his ninety-five theses at Wittenberg, before being 
momentarily reversed with the onset of confessional polarization and the outbreak of 
the ensuing Wars of Religion. The Wars of Religion eventually yielded a reinvention 
of religion (conceived as a body of beliefs rather than a body of believers), a 
weakening of the transnational authority structures of Church and Empire, and a re-
conceptualization of political authority around the innovation of Absolutist 
sovereignty. The modern separation of religion from politics owes its origins to this 
configurative crisis, but was only really completed in Europe after 1789, with the 
delegitimation of divine right Absolutism and the elevation of emancipation over 
salvation as the ultimate end of collective association. 
  In East Asia, the secularization of international order was if anything even 
more traumatic than in Europe. There, the combination of Western encroachment and 
domestic millenarian rebellion fatally undermined the emperor’s credibility and 
authority as the Son of Heaven, with the dissolution of the old order ironically 
hastened by Hong Xiuquan’s quixotic quest to bring heaven to earth following his 
fleeting establishment of a New Jerusalem in Nanjing.  Finally, within the Islamic 
world, the abolition of the office of the Caliphate in 1924 best symbolized the global 
extrusion of religion from international order in the twentieth century. This process 
had begun as a localized challenge to the Church in a fragment of early modern 
Christendom in 1517. It had been refined and fortified in the Atlantic Age of 
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Revolution with the delegitimation of divine right Absolutism and the onset of the 
popular sovereignty revolution. And it was extended and imposed on the polities of 
Africa, Asia and the Middle East in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries through the 
successive processes of imperialism and decolonization.  
 Alongside this global secularization of international order, the last half 
millennium has also been marked by crises of empire, the flattening of international 
hierarchies, and the wholesale delegitimation of systems of foreign rule.  At the dawn 
of modernity, the majority of the Old World’s sedentary populations were governed 
by composite monarchies, ranging in size from the Renaissance kingdoms of Western 
Europe to the sprawling gunpowder empires of Muscovy, China, and the Ottoman 
domain.1022 These polities were characterized by their extreme ethnic diversity, their 
uneasy synthesis of monarchy with patronal forms of indirect rule, and their heavy 
dependence upon religious forms of legitimation to sustain and strengthen rulers’ 
authority. From the sixteenth century onwards, successive crises of international order 
have overlapped with, and have partially been driven by, the break-up these imperial 
formations. Within Christendom itself, this pattern was manifest in the interweaving 
of struggles for religious freedom and political autonomy that punctuated the Wars of 
Religion. Most important for Western Europe’s subsequent evolution was the failure 
of Charles V and his successors to (re)unify Christendom spiritually and politically in 
the wake of the Reformation.  The failure of the Habsburg imperium in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries was driven by a multitude of factors, but local resistance to 
foreign rule in places like Holland and Bohemia, as well as resistance to external 
interference in religious beliefs and practices, was decisive in driving this process.1023 
                                                 
1022On the consolidation of the early modern gunpowder empires, see generally McNeill, The Age of 
Gunpowder Empires. See also McNeill, The Global Condition, p. 116. On the growth of gunpowder 
empires in the Islamic world at this time, see Bayly, Imperial Meridian, chapter one.  
1023See for example Nexon, ‘Religion, European Identity, and Political Contention in Comparative 
Perspective’, pp. 266-270.  
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Even if it is anachronistic to label these and other anti-Habsburg revolts as being 
nationalist in the strictly modern sense, the xenophobic rhetoric, anti-imperial 
sentiments, and demands for local religious and political autonomy characteristic of 
these struggles bore many family resemblances to the more self-consciously 
nationalist rebellions that followed them, and that themselves further accelerated the 
global shift from imperial to sovereign state systems.     
 In nineteenth century East Asia, the transition from the Sinosphere to the 
sovereign state system was also accompanied by crises of empire, entailing a 
conjunction of religious and proto-nationalist anti-systemic violence. From the mid-
nineteenth century onwards, anti-Manchu Han nationalism played a crucial role in 
sapping the Qing Dynasty of its legitimacy, and featured heavily – albeit in a 
millenarian guise – in the Taiping challenge that almost toppled the dynasty in the 
period 1851-1864.  Fin de siecle rebellions, including the Chinese Boxer rebellion, the 
Korean Tonghak rebellion, and the Santa Iglesia movement in the Philippines, served 
to further entrench nationalist sentiments among Asian populations, even as they 
sought with limited success to resist the Japanese and Western imperial 
encroachments that followed in the train of Chinese imperial decline. The final 
collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1912 definitively signalled the end of the imperial 
Sinosphere, and was thus of inestimable significance for the East Asian region. 
However, at the same time, it also marked the beginning of the first of the four waves 
of imperial disintegration that transformed the world polity in the twentieth century. 
The collapse of the Ottoman, Habsburg, Romanov and Hohenzollern realms either 
during or immediately following World War I; the World War II defeat of the Nazi, 
Fascist Italian, and Imperial Japanese totalitarian empires; the post-war liquidation of 
the European maritime empires; and finally, the collapse of the Soviet Union towards 
the century’s end – each of these epic convulsions brought national self-determination 
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to successively greater swathes of humanity.  More generally, the twentieth century 
recess of empire capped a deeper world-historical process, entailing the delegitimation 
of international hierarchy generally, and of practices of foreign rule in particular.1024 
This process had its antecedents centuries earlier, in the failure of the papal-imperial 
diarchy and the subsequent defeat of the abortive Habsburg imperium. But it was only 
properly universalized in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, firstly with the 
collapse of hierarchical non-Western international orders such as the Sinosphere, and 
secondly with the eradication of European colonialism and the globalization of a 
sovereign state system founded on the principle of national self-determination.  
 Finally, the last five centuries have seen a dramatic increase in both the scale 
and scope of violence interdependence internationally, as well as a parallel – if 
admittedly more sporadic and faltering – ‘civilizing process’, whereby violence has 
been progressively monopolized by states and then imperfectly corralled within a 
universal framework of international law. This process began with the consolidation 
of early modern European Renaissance monarchies and Eurasian gunpowder empires 
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  Across the Old World, the introduction of 
gunpowder weaponry generally favoured political consolidation and the strengthening 
of kings over subjects, although in Western Europe, the technological balance both 
between rulers and between rulers and subjects was initially more even than 
elsewhere, yielding a sovereign state system that departed from the Eurasian imperial 
norm.1025 By the mid-seventeenth century, however, the spread of gunpowder 
weaponry had shifted the military balance of power between sedentary agriculturalists 
and nomadic pastoralists decisively in favour of the former for the first time since the 
                                                 
1024See generally Jackson, Quasi-States; and Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty, chapters eight to 
twelve. 
1025McNeill, The Global Condition, p. 118. 
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fall of the Roman and Han Empires.1026 With the perennial threat of nomadic 
blitzkrieg invasions finally contained, empires such as Muscovy and the Qing 
imperium were then able to expand rapidly into the Eurasian hinterland.1027 
Meanwhile, the ‘military revolution’ facilitated a similarly rapid and devastating 
European expansion into the New World, as well as also enabling the construction of 
a series of littoral factories and forts throughout Asia and Africa that would 
subsequently form the launch pads for later European imperial expansion into the Old 
World.1028 
  In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a raft of technological, 
organizational, and ideological changes emanating from the Atlantic world further 
increased global violence interdependence, as well as also catalysing intensified state 
efforts to monopolize violence domestically and constrain its use internationally. The 
combination of the popular sovereignty revolution, European imperialism, and the 
industrialization of warfare destroyed the multi-ethnic gunpowder empires of the Old 
World. The disintegration of the gunpowder empires began with the Opium Wars and 
the Taiping rebellion in the mid-nineteenth century, and concluded with the cataclysm 
of World War I, the establishment of the Mandate System over the rubble of the 
Ottoman Empire, and the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924. The global growth of 
violence interdependence during this time did however coincide with attempts to 
contain and control violence, both through the codification of international laws of 
war, and also through the establishment of a permanent universal congress of 
sovereign states dedicated to the abolition of war.  Following the ‘total wars’ of the 
twentieth century, and under the shadow of nuclear annihilation, this commitment to 
civilizing violence internationally and eventually eradicating it entirely has formed 
                                                 
1026
Ibid., p. 116. 
1027McNeill, The Age of Gunpowder Empires, pp. 27-28. 
1028See generally Parker, The Military Revolution. 
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one of the chief raisons d’etre of the UN system. In the post-Cold War period, one 
can cite both the steady decline in civil and international wars, as well as the UN’s 
increasing activism in both facilitating state-building and responding to new threats 
such as global terrorism and the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, as 
suggestive evidence of the continued maturation and institutionalization of this 
civilizing process at a global level.1029   
 
International Systems Change – The Persistence of Contrary Dynamics 
 
 From 1500 onwards, the world has been wracked by a succession of 
configurative crises, involving outbreaks of religious radicalism, crises of empire, and 
the emergence of new forms of violence that have threatened the functional integrity 
of existing international orders. These crises have historically been resolved, in both 
Western Europe and East Asia, through the secularization of international orders, the 
delegitimation of universal empires in favour of sovereign state systems, and the 
corralling of violence within the institutional parameters of the sovereign state. The 
macro-trends, which become visible through a comparative analysis of episodes of 
configurative systems change, superficially suggest an inevitability in the state 
system’s genesis and its subsequent expansion. Nevertheless, upon closer scrutiny, 
each of these macro-trends can and must be subject to serious qualifications that 
militate against an unreservedly optimistic reading of the state system’s historic 
ascendancy and its long-term prospects. 
                                                 
1029On the steady decline in both civil and international wars during the post-Cold War period, see 
generally Human Security Report 2005 - War and Peace in the 21st Century. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005. 
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 The worldwide growth of politicized forms of religious sentiment, particularly 
the violent form embodied in global jihadism, sits uneasily with the historical trend 
towards the global secularization of international order. For optimists, this so-called 
‘revenge of God’ is often cast as a lamentable but transient detour from the path of 
secular modernity.1030  More pessimistic observers have conversely portrayed this 
development as forming part of a more enduring anti-modern backlash, which is 
symptomatic of the unfulfilled promises of development and democracy in parts of the 
post-colonial world.1031  Neither of these readings is sustainable upon closer 
inspection, however, for both fundamentally overestimate the secularism of modernity 
in their initial assumptions. Certainly, the genesis and expansion of the sovereign state 
system entailed the institutional secularization of international order. However, what 
is often overlooked is the fact that the expansion of a Western-dominated sovereign 
state system throughout the Middle East, Africa and Asia coincided with a 
synchronous consolidation and globalization of the major faith traditions, most 
particularly Christianity and Islam.  Thus, the historic eclipse of non-Western 
international orders such as the Sinosphere corresponded with what historian 
Christopher Bayly has dubbed the coterminous rise of ‘empires of religion’.1032 The 
rise of these so-called empires of religion entailed the following: (a) the growing 
                                                 
1030This optimistic view is not the sole preserve of liberals, as evidenced in Colin Gray’s confident 
prediction regarding the future of Islamic radicalism: ‘Al Qaeda and associated organizations will be a 
perennial menace, but they will be beaten decisively as the Islamic world comes to terms, culturally in 
its own ways, with the modern, even the postmodern, world. That process will take two or three 
decades, at least.’ Gray, ‘How Has War Changed Since the Cold War?’, p. 23. The protracted character 
of the Islamic world’s anticipated transition aside, what is telling is the implied assumption regarding 
the inevitability of this transition.  
1031Evocations of this pessimistic theme can be found in different forms in works such as Samuel P. 
Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1996; and Robert D. Kaplan. The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold 
War. 1st ed. New York: Random House, 2000. In its starkest and arguably most hysterical form, this 
pessimism extends towards a fear that the process of desecularization will be forcibly imposed on the 
West in coming decades by a resurgent Islam. See for example Ye or Bat. Eurabia: The Euro-Arab 
Axis. Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2005. 
1032C. A. Bayly. The Birth of the Modern World 1780-1914: Global Connections and Comparisons. 
Oxford ; Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2004, p. 325. 
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rationalization, codification, and standardization of religious beliefs, accompanied by 
increasing activism in suppressing and disciplining ‘heretical’ popular forms of 
religious devotion; (b) the increased bureaucratization of forms of religious hierarchy; 
(c) the ‘downward’ expansion of religions to impose devotional uniformity and moral 
regulation and surveillance upon a steadily greater proportion of society; and (d) the 
geographic expansion of major faith traditions ‘outwards’ at the expense of local folk 
and animist forms of spirituality.1033 
 What is so significant about this trend is that it suggests a key paradox in the 
state system’s evolution. On the one hand, the state system expanded in the nineteenth 
century at the expense of other non-Western international orders built upon religious 
foundations. In doing so, it imposed an order upon non-European peoples that 
assumed the international separation of religious and political spheres of authority. On 
the other hand, however, this very process of expansion helped to stimulate the 
rationalization and extend the geographic reach of the major world religions, thereby 
fuelling the development of forms of subjectivity that were both religious and in some 
cases also transnational in character.1034 Seen through this lens, the relationship 
between secularization and modernity becomes significantly more complex, and the 
emergence of religiously framed challenges to the contemporary order appears as less 
obviously counter-intuitive than is suggested in conventional ‘revenge of God’ 
accounts.  For while the expansion of the state system led to an institutional separation 
of political from religious authority internationally, it also coincided with the growing 
homogenization of structures of religious belief within different faith traditions, as 
well as a growth in the importance of these global faith traditions in shaping 
individual and collective identities.1035 Global patterns of institutional secularization 
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have thus mapped uneasily onto patterns of popular identification from the moment of 
the state system’s initial expansion, suggesting that contemporary religious challenges 
to its normative constitution are neither as unusual nor as emphatically ‘anti-modern’ 
(and thus, by implication, as transient) as is often assumed. 
 Equally, the historic eclipse of empire and other forms of international 
hierarchy should not be overstated. At first glance, the modern sovereign state system 
presents as a relentless steamroller of modernity, flattening international society firstly 
through the humbling of Church and Empire in early modern Europe, before sweeping 
aside the gunpowder empires of the Old World to create a global system of sovereign 
national states. The litany of defunct empires that expired in the twentieth century 
appears to further reinforce this narrative, as does the profound extent to which anti-
colonial norms against foreign rule have now become entrenched in the modern state 
system.  However, once again, further analysis calls this teleological argument into 
question.  This is so firstly because at a regional level, trace elements of past 
international orders continue to endure. In Europe, for example, the post-war project 
of European integration has seen the partial revival of regional forms of heteronomy, a 
development that replicates the multi-layered pattern of authority relations that has 
governed Europe for most of its history.1036 The European Union’s stalled efforts to 
integrate Turkey into its ranks also demonstrates the continuing salience of religious 
fault-lines in demarcating the outer boundaries of a putatively post-Christian 
Europe.1037 In East Asia and the Persian Gulf, meanwhile, the hierarchical lineaments 
of past orders find partial parallels in the United States’ contemporary maintenance of 
                                                 
1036Ruggie, ‘Territoriality and Beyond’, pp. 171-172. 
1037On this point, see M. Hakan Yavuz. "Islam and Europeanization in Turkish-Muslim Socio-Political 
Movements." In Religion in an Expanding Europe, edited by Timothy Byrnes and Peter Katzenstein, 
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‘empires of bases’ in both regions.1038  More critically still, at a global level the revival 
of practices of international neo-trusteeship suggests the continuing vitality of 
hierarchy as a feature of international politics, even in an officially post-imperial 
age.1039 
 Finally, the post 9/11 era has decisively demonstrated that violence 
interdependence continues to grow in the contemporary state system off the back of 
globalization and technological advances, and that it has done so in a manner which 
has temporarily outpaced the international community’s institutional capacities to fully 
contain its disruptive potential. The spectre of non-state actors acquiring and 
deploying Weapons of Mass Destruction remains a disquietingly plausible possibility, 
and it has already been explicitly invoked by the Bush Administration for the purposes 
of relaxing hitherto sacrosanct norms prohibiting states from engaging in preventative 
war. Equally worrying, however, given its far greater likelihood, is the global 
diffusion of modern techniques of urban warfare of the kind now being refined in 
countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan.  The widespread use of vehicle-borne and 
roadside Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in both of these countries, alongside 
traditional insurgent techniques such as assassinations and guerrilla ambushes, has 
paralysed both local governments and their foreign allies.1040 These techniques are 
eminently capable of being adopted by autonomous cells operating in major cities in 
Europe and North America, particularly as the continuing information and 
communications revolution enables anti-systemic actors to spread both the knowledge 
                                                 
1038With reference to East Asia, see for example generally Chalmers Johnson. Blowback - the Costs and 
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1040 On this point, see for example Hoffman, ‘The Cult of the Insurgent’, p. 325. 
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necessary to undertake such attacks, as well as the propaganda necessary to justify 
them in the minds of potential perpetrators.1041 
 What both the prospective spread of WMD capabilities to non-state actors and 
the potential introduction of urban warfare techniques into Western cities together 
represent – albeit on radically different scales – is an unravelling of the modern state’s 
monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, one which contrasts starkly with past 
historical experience. In both Reformation Europe and nineteenth century East Asia, 
the ordering mechanisms of existing international orders were decisively unsettled by 
increases in violence interdependence, driven respectively by the early modern 
military revolution and by the nascent industrialization of warfare. However, what was 
noteworthy about both of these material ruptures was their long-term centripetal 
effect. In both instances, material changes eventually favoured the increased assertion 
of control over violence by central governments. This centralization of control over 
violence enabled the development of rudimentary international institutions to contain 
its exercise, while the increasing technological scale and scope of violence potential 
rendered this ‘civilizing process’ a practical necessity.  By contrast, the prospective 
spread of WMD and the contemporary growth in non-state practices of asymmetric 
violence both constitute a partial reversal of this process.1042 This observation should 
not be taken to suggest that the international community will be unable to effectively 
adapt to the challenges posed by this growth in violence potential.  But it does 
nevertheless convey the fact that the contemporary growth of non-state capacities for 
violence is far from trivial, and that it will require significant and potentially profound 
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institutional adaptations at the systemic level if the ‘civilization of violence’ is to 
progress and the present international order is to be sustained. 
 
The Future of the Global State System 
 
What, then, are the implications of this investigation for our efforts to 
anticipate the future of world order? At the outset of this inquiry, I identified four 
different types of international change, specifically configurative, constitutional, 
institutional, and positional forms of change. The bulk of my investigation has been 
devoted to understanding historic episodes of configurative international systems 
change, while in the preceding two chapters I have also sought to identify points of 
fragility and potentially transformative trends now evident in the contemporary state 
system. In concluding this inquiry, I wish to briefly sketch out the likely contours of 
international systems change in the coming decades. 
 Although the future of world order remains uncertain, at the very least, we can 
expect that the twenty-first century will see the rise of the Asian giants and the 
corresponding decline of Western hegemony. While the unipolar era may persist for 
some time yet, the great chasm in power and wealth that opened up between East and 
West with the onset of the industrial revolution will narrow dramatically in the coming 
century. Of the four types of international change identified earlier, positional change 
thus seems to be inevitable, barring some as yet unforeseeable calamity such as the 
disintegration of either China or India. The rise of non-Western Great Powers (and 
their possible resurgence, in the case of Russia and Japan) will necessarily entail 
significant shifts in both the international distribution of power and privileges, as well 
as wrenching shifts in the West’s understanding of its place in the world. From the 
Age of Discovery onwards, the peoples of Western Europe and their colonial offspring 
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have been enamoured of themselves as possessing a special claim to world leadership. 
The basis of this belief has been recast on diverse foundations over different epochs, 
with Christianity, racial supremacy, and economic and political modernity 
successively being invoked as both the markers of Western virtue, and also as the 
foundation of Western claims to exercise dominance over the rest of humanity. In the 
twenty-first century, the material asymmetry of power that has sustained this Western 
self-understanding will slip away, as modernity becomes unshackled from its 
dominant associations with the Atlantic world, and the historic pattern of a multi-
centric world economy dominated by the Eastern powers is finally restored.1043  
 The stability of world order in the coming decades will depend in large part on 
the ability of the West – the European powers perhaps even more so than the United 
States – to come to terms with their relative decline, and to manage the ascendancy of 
the emerging Great Powers in a manner that accommodates non-Western aspirations 
for recognition without sacrificing either vital material interests, or the equally 
important principled interest in promoting and extending the global human rights 
agenda. The history of failed attempts to manage the rise of past Great Powers such as 
Germany and Japan is a testament to the inherent difficulties involved in peacefully 
managing power transitions. These challenges will be further compounded in future by 
the renewed scope for geopolitical friction posed by Great Powers’ growing anxieties 
over energy security.1044 They will also be complicated by principled disagreements 
between democratic and authoritarian Great Powers over the relative balance to be 
struck between human rights concerns and the preservation of states’ sovereign 
                                                 
1043On the historical precedent of a multi-centered world economy, see generally Abu-Lughod, Before 
European Hegemony. 
1044On this point, see for example Flynt Leverett, and Jeffrey Bader. "Managing China-U.S. Energy 
Competition in the Middle East." The Washington Quarterly 29, no. 1 (2005): 187-201. 
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prerogatives within the domestic sphere.1045  Finally, ecological security concerns 
(particularly food security and water security concerns driven by climate change) will 
further strain relations both within and between countries, a dynamic that will likely 
impinge negatively on Great Power relations as well.1046  Whether the international 
community will be able to peacefully resolve these tensions is at this point difficult to 
foresee. Nevertheless, it can definitely be stated that this effort will require at a 
minimum the preservation of a state system that is sufficiently stable to support to the 
continuing operation of the global economy, and that is also sufficiently robust as to 
resist subversion by the anti-systemic forces presently agitating for its destruction. 
Significant revisions in both the authoritative and coercive fundamental institutions of 
the global state system will be required if these minimum conditions of order are to be 
met.     
 Historically, the threat posed by nomadic predators operating from ungoverned 
sanctuaries was most commonly dealt with within the framework of empire. From the 
collapse of the Western Roman and Han Empires through to the early modern 
consolidation of gunpowder empires in the Old World, nomadic pastoralists 
continuously preyed upon and occasionally overwhelmed their wealthier sedentary 
neighbours. In managing this threat, sedentary rulers across Eurasia oscillated between 
strategies of trade and tribute on the one hand, and reprisal and conquest on the other, 
their choice of strategy being governed largely by the relative balance of power then 
obtaining between city and steppe.1047 Even with the consolidation of the Eurasian 
gunpowder empires and the parallel growth of the European maritime empires, the 
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problem of frontier instability persisted for empire-builders from the seventeenth 
down to the twentieth century. From Kabul to Khartoum, regional potentates resorted 
to a plethora of coercive and co-optive strategies, seeking to stabilize their porous 
frontiers while securing the wealth-producing core of their patrimonies from external 
assault. Empire-builders took for granted the principled legitimacy of foreign rule over 
subject peoples. At the same time, they also accepted the practical spatial limits of 
imperial rule. In restive frontier regions, where the empire’s reach exceeded its grasp, 
the best that could be hoped for was a fitful stability to be maintained by local clients 
where possible, and enforced through punitive expeditions when necessary.1048 
 Today, the institution of empire is defunct, but many of the governance 
problems that bedevilled past empires have re-emerged in new and more dangerous 
forms. In place of fractious imperial frontiers, the international community is now 
struggling to contain the instability emanating from weak and failing post-colonial 
states. Similarly, transnational predators such as Al Qaeda stand as contemporary 
analogues to the nomadic marauders that threatened sedentary societies in an earlier 
age, with the ‘Manhattan raid’ of 9/11 providing a chilling demonstration of the 
disproportionate damage non-state actors are now capable of inflicting without 
warning on global cities.1049  Should anti-systemic actors succeed in acquiring and 
deploying Weapons of Mass Destruction, the essential imbalance of power that has 
prevailed between state and non-state actors since the seventeenth century would be 
drastically compromised, imperilling the very foundations of world order. For this 
reason alone, it is vital that states collaborate effectively to adapt the fundamental 
institutions of international society to comprehensively confront these challenges. 
                                                 
1048On the spatial limits of governance constraining the power of traditional states, see Giddens, The 
Nation-State and Violence, pp. 51-52. 
1049For further development of this analogy, see again Ruthven, ‘The Eleventh of September and the 
Sudanese Mahdiya’, pp. 347-350. 
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 The international community’s responses to emerging threats will be 
conditioned by two realities that distinguish the contemporary period from earlier 
epochs. Firstly, institutional solutions predicated on some form of indefinite foreign 
rule over weak and failing states are no longer viable. Nationalism was effectively 
globalized in the twentieth century, and popular tolerance for foreign rule remains low 
even in the most volatile of polities.1050 Secondly, imperial strategies of containment, 
which sought to quarantine instability in the periphery, are not likely to be practically 
effective in any case, having been superseded by the surge in global 
interconnectedness facilitated by modern advances in transportation and 
communication.1051 Neither the normative basis of empire nor its underlying spatial 
premises survived the twentieth century. The globalization of the nation-state has 
made a return to formal empire politically impossible, while globalization itself has 
diluted traditional distinctions between core and peripheral zones, rendering traditional 
imperial strategies of order maintenance practically unavailing. Both the governance 
capacity of fragile states will need to be strengthened, and the state system’s collective 
capacity to resist anti-systemic violence reinforced, if international order is to be 
maintained. But both projects will need to be undertaken within the normative 
parameters of a sovereign state system in which anti-colonial norms and ideals of non-
intervention and sovereign equality have become deeply entrenched.  
 Notwithstanding the Taliban’s resurgence in Afghanistan and the continuing 
fiasco in Iraq, the international community has already demonstrated significant 
adaptive capacities in the face of the jihadist challenge. The UN’s establishment of 
                                                 
1050On the discrepancy between the universalization of the nation-state and the persistence of classically 
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both the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate and the 1540 Committee combating 
the spread of WMD to non-state actors stand out as definitive examples of the facility 
with which states have harnessed the authoritative institutions of the UN system to the 
task of upholding states’ collective monopoly over legitimate organized violence.  
These formal initiatives, in conjunction with more ad hoc forms of multilateral 
cooperation such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, are demonstrative of the state 
system’s resilience in the face of threats to its perpetuation. More fundamentally, 
however, they also reflect evolving conceptions of sovereignty as responsibility. 
While the notion of sovereignty as responsibility has been most popularly associated 
with nascent norms surrounding the practice of humanitarian intervention, the UN 
Security Council’s post 9/11 activism in the areas of counter-terrorism and counter-
proliferation has led to the emergence of a raft of new ‘duties to prevent’, which the 
UN’s member states are now universally bound to observe.1052  These developments 
signify the Great Powers’ sanctioning of the partial return of a positive sovereignty 
regime, at least to the extent that all sovereign states are increasingly expected to fulfil 
certain minimum requirements associated with the preservation of international order 
if they are to be fully recognized as members of international society.  
 The institutionalization of duties to prevent activities such as terrorist financing 
and WMD proliferation to non-state actors is a welcome and necessary development, 
as are multilateral efforts to enhance the institutional capacities of weak but willing 
states to fulfil these duties. Nevertheless, the defence of international order in the 
coming decades will be possible only if two related challenges can be effectively 
addressed. Firstly, the international community will need to formulate an agreed 
framework for deploying coercive power against those states that conspicuously refuse 
to uphold their core duties as members of international society. In the post 9/11 period, 
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the United States has repeatedly resorted to violence against states have been 
perceived to have been thwarting its counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation 
objectives. Given the magnitude of the threat posed by both terrorism and WMD 
proliferation, one can reasonably expect this trend to continue in a post-unipolar 
world, as Great Powers invoke these perils to justify the preventative use of force 
against recalcitrant ‘outlaw’ states.1053  If international order is to be preserved, both 
coercive as well as authoritative power will need to be mobilized to defeat anti-
systemic actors and their passive and active state sponsors, but this must be done in a 
way that minimizes the collateral damage thereby inflicted on norms of non-
intervention and freedom from external aggression. What was so destabilizing about 
the Bush Administration’s post 9/11 foreign policy was not its attempt to redraw the 
rules governing the international use of force per se, so much as the unilateral manner 
in which it sought to pursue this enterprise. In a world in which imperial solutions to 
anti-systemic threats are unavailable and American hegemony is both finite and 
constrained by international legitimacy concerns, it is imperative that the international 
community develop criteria and procedures to enable the legitimate use of organized 
violence in future to neutralize imminent threats and to punish those states that are 
willing to provide sanctuary to the would-be subverters of the present state system. 
 In addition to formulating clear international criteria and procedures for 
dealing with states that refuse to abide by the most basic norms of international 
society, the custodians of international order will need to develop more reliable means 
of managing the threats posed by ungoverned spaces, in which there exists no 
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effective state apparatus capable of either monopolizing legitimate violence or 
policing against anti-systemic threats. As noted earlier, the strength of anti-colonial 
norms makes an overtly imperialist solution to the problem of state failure and state 
collapse impossible. Similarly, the international community’s post-Cold War 
experience of short-term international neo-trusteeship in territories such as Eastern 
Slavonia, Kosovo, and East Timor, has demonstrated the limited generalizability of 
neo-trusteeship as a method of systemic stabilization.1054 While UN-led projects of 
neo-trusteeship have been qualified successes in most instances, they have generally 
been undertaken within small territories, and scholars have argued that both political 
and logistical constraints would likely prevent their application to larger territories 
such as Somalia or the Democratic Republic of Congo.1055  Given these normative and 
practical constraints, the Great Powers and regional organizations will need 
collaborate to develop new regimes, both to prioritize targeting of the ungoverned 
spaces that pose the greatest threats to international peace and security, and also to 
marshal the material and institutional resources necessary undertake the reconstructive 
interventions needed to revive failing and collapsed states. 
 In addition to managing the rise of new Great Powers and the decline of 
Western hegemony, world leaders will thus also need to adapt the fundamental 
institutions of the existing international order to more effectively combat transnational 
predators, chastise their active and passive state sponsors, and revive state authority in 
the ungoverned spaces of the global state system. Without the possibility of easily 
reverting back to formal empire, the international community must therefore 
collaborate to strengthen the authority of the sovereign state throughout the world. 
Paradoxically, this project will necessarily entail increased international involvement 
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in state-building. This task is itself likely to be rendered more complicated by the 
possibility of incremental purposive shifts in the nature of international order in the 
coming decades. On the one hand, the ascendancy of authoritarian and semi-
authoritarian Great Powers such as China and Russia will increasingly constrict the 
scope for the United States and its allies to promote the transformational liberal 
agenda that held sway in the immediate post-Cold War era.1056 Equally, while the 
growth of politicized forms of religiosity will likely have regionally uneven effects, it 
is nevertheless likely to open up a noticeable dissonance in values between a secular, 
rich, demographically moribund North, and a pious, predominantly poor, and 
demographically dynamic South.1057 One needn’t subscribe to some form of 
civilizational essentialism to acknowledge the historical particularity of the Western 
experience, and to acknowledge also the challenges to world order posed by the 
existence of multiple forms of modernity. Recognition that the West’s post-
Reformation conception of the sacred/secular divide is but one of many possibilities 
that are compatible with modernity should imply neither the inevitability of cross-
cultural confrontation, nor the necessity of disengaging from efforts to promote liberal 
values internationally out of respect for cultural diversity. On the contrary, the core 
values of popular eudemonism and self-determination that underpin the global state 
system resonate across different traditions, while violent extremism of the type 
personified by jihadism offends the key tenets of all the major faiths. Nevertheless, in 
seeking to promote their own hitherto dominant liberal conception of the state 
system’s core values, the Western democracies should proceed with a spirit of 
humility. More specifically, they must proceed with a willingness to accept the 
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possibility that public piety is not incompatible with popular sovereignty, and that in 
the Islamic world in particular, a degree of rapprochement with peaceful variants of 
political religiosity will be essential if the shared threat of jihadist terrorism is to be 
decisively defeated. 
 Positional changes in the global state system will be inevitable in the coming 
decades. Revisions and adaptations of the state system’s fundamental authoritative and 
coercive institutions are likely, given the necessity of such reforms if anti-systemic 
threats are to be effectively contained. Purposive challenges to the state system’s 
normative values – particularly in their present liberal incarnation – are possible, 
owing to both the rise or revival of authoritarian Great Powers, and the continuing 
global ascendancy of intensely politicized forms of religiosity, especially but not 
exclusively within the Islamic world. In light of these trends, is configurative 
international systems change, on the scale evident in my historic cases, likely to 
manifest itself in the twenty-first century?  I would suggest that configurative 
international systems change remains a remote but nevertheless imaginable possibility, 
believing it more likely that the custodians of international order will ‘muddle 
through’ the challenges of the coming decades than that we will witness the holistic 
transformation of the global state system.  As the post-Cold War period of unipolarity 
wanes, I believe that we will enter an era of ‘contested constitutions’, analogous in 
many respects to the decades immediately following the Congress of Vienna.1058 
Much like the post-Congress period, the world will be multipolar in its essential form, 
but informally underwritten by the dual hegemony of two preponderant powers. In the 
nineteenth century, Britain and Russia underpinned the Concert system for the 
duration of its existence, while in the twenty-first century their places are likely to be 
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taken by the United States and China, each country serving respectively as the 
maritime liberal and continental autocratic anchors of an uneasy but nevertheless 
relatively stable international security order.1059  At a global level, the Great Powers 
will compete with one another for influence in major energy-producing regions, with 
the lands of the former Ottoman Empire and Central Asia serving once again as the 
chief foci of rivalry, just as they did in the nineteenth century.1060  Moreover, as in the 
post-Congress era, the Great Powers are also likely to disagree on the extent to which 
insurgent ideologies (liberalism in the nineteenth century, Islamism today) threaten 
international order, and will disagree too on the scope of states’ legitimate 
prerogatives to intervene to resist Islamist influence in states of vital concern. 
 In yet another parallel with the post-Congress international system, states will 
also collaborate to suppress shared anti-systemic threats. As with the nineteenth 
century struggle to suppress piracy, which was largely undertaken under British 
leadership, the United States is likely for some time yet to take the lead in combating 
transnational terrorism and non-state WMD proliferation, owing to both its acute 
vulnerability to these threats, and also to its unparalleled military command of the 
global commons.1061 However, unlike the post-Congress Concert of Powers, initiatives 
against shared threats will need to be undertaken with at least partial regard to the 
norms of consultation and consensus now institutionalized in the UN’s permanent 
universal congress of states. Equally, Great Power competition – both geopolitical and 
ideological – will be muted in the coming century both by unprecedented global 
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economic interdependence, as well as by the consolidation of anti-imperialist norms 
that prevent the resolution of ‘great games’ through the overt territorial conquest or 
partition of smaller polities. Finally, in the most profound contrast with the nineteenth 
century, the international order of the twenty-first century will genuinely be a world of 
regions. With the global imbalance of power between ‘the West and the rest’ finally 
wound back, different regional orders are likely to cohere under the broader glacis of a 
global state system, with these regional orders reflecting the diverse historical 
experiences of their constituent polities. The traumas of the past five centuries were of 
such magnitude and permanence that modern-day facsimiles of either Latin 
Christendom or the Sinosphere will not re-emerge. Nevertheless, echoes of these old 
orders are likely to resurface, whether in the more formally institutionalized structure 
of a heteronomous European Union, or in the more informal structure of an East Asian 
order economically dominated by Chinese family business networks, and sustained 
politically and diplomatically by a regionally preponderant China.1062    
 The survival of the global state system, albeit one characterised by continuing 
Great Power rivalry, persistent transnational security threats, and intensifying regional 
diversity, is likely. It is not, however, guaranteed. In previous epochs, episodes of 
configurative international systems change have been catalysed by systemic crises of 
the kind described earlier in this inquiry.  My analysis of the global state system 
revealed unnerving parallels with prior systemic crises, to the extent that the present 
world order is bedevilled, much like its predecessors, by widespread institutional 
decay, the emergence of anti-systemic ideologies, and increases in violence 
interdependence. Should the custodians of international order fail to act decisively to 
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address these challenges, it is possible to envisage the continuing decay and 
accelerating disintegration of the state system in the coming century. Such a scenario 
might begin with growing global anxieties over food, water and energy security. These 
anxieties would be driven by increasing demand for these necessities, combined with 
diminishing supply caused by over-consumption and (in the case of food and water) 
local and ecological crises fuelled by anthropogenic climate change. Global warming 
is expected to impact with particular severity upon the already water-scarce societies 
of the Mediterranean littoral, and would feed into increased popular distress and 
disillusionment towards government among the rapidly growing populations of North 
Africa and the Middle East.  Simultaneously, rising demands for fossil fuels would 
draw the United States and emerging non-Western Great Powers into further 
involvement in the Greater Middle East. Great Power competition for resources and 
influence in the area would aggravate the region’s already tense geopolitical situation. 
In conjunction with states’ existing concerns about the spill-over effects of instability 
in Iraq and the continuing Iranian ascendancy, accelerating Great Power competition 
in the region could amplify existing trends towards conventional arms build-ups and 
‘nuclear hedging’ by concerned states.1063 At the same time, increased Great Power 
involvement in the Middle East would also exacerbate the sense of siege and 
existential danger informing jihadist ideology, leading to a likely surge in jihadist 
terror attacks both within the region and beyond. 
 In the face of growing terrorism, heightened Great Power resource 
competition, ecological crises, and the threat of nuclear proliferation throughout the 
Middle East, strong states would be increasingly tempted to abandon conventional 
                                                 
1063On recent conventional arms build-ups in the region, see Dan Glaister. "US Accused of Fuelling 
Arms Race with $20bn Arab Weapons Sale." The Guardian, July 30 2007. On the increased tendency 
towards ‘nuclear hedging’ in the Middle East, as evidenced in the fact that no less than 13 Sunni states 
have declared atomic energy plans within the space of a year in response to the Iranian ascendancy, see 
Dan Murphy. "Middle East Racing to Nuclear Power." Christian Science Monitor, November 1 2007. 
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norms of non-intervention and non-aggression, both for defensive and offensive 
reasons. Within an ever more volatile environment, and against the backdrop of rising 
terror attacks against Great Power interests overseas and at home, states would 
develop ever more permissive defensive justifications for the pre-emptive use of force 
against terrorists and their presumed state sponsors. Equally, the temptation to seize 
hydrocarbon reserves, both to ensure states’ own energy security while also potentially 
denying it to rivals, could contribute to a further corrosion of international norms 
against aggression. This would in turn worsen the security anxieties of small energy-
rich states, further increasing their incentives to acquire unconventional weapons to 
deter potential aggressors. Horizontal proliferation among states – particularly in the 
Middle East -would in turn raise the likelihood of non-state actors acquiring WMD, 
and then deploying it against Western targets. Were this to occur, the global state 
system – at least in its liberal incarnation – would be in danger of unravelling. 
Domestically, formerly liberal states would confront the now existential threat posed 
by terrorism by further winding back civil liberties, adopting an even more permissive 
attitude towards the use of coercive interrogation and torture upon terror suspects, and 
potentially even reviving the World War II precedent of indefinitely interning suspect 
nationalities. Borders would be sealed to insulate the homeland from subsequent 
attacks, in so doing threatening the continued operation of the global economy. With 
the fragile bonds of global economic interdependence severed, strong states might be 
compelled to return to imperialist strategies of wealth accumulation to sustain their 
popular legitimacy at home. This development would further weaken the norms of 
sovereign equality, non-aggression, and non-intervention that have sustained the 
global state system since 1945, thereby threatening a return to a less liberal, less 
peaceful, and less egalitarian age. 
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 While the breakdown of the present international order is alarmingly easy to 
envisage, it is impossible to reliably predict what form of successor order might 
emerge on the other side of the abyss. Conceivably, as occurred following the thirty 
years’ crisis of 1914-1945, the Great Powers might succeed in reconstituting a global 
order of sovereign states, albeit one equipped with mechanisms of collective defence 
more properly attuned to the threats of the twenty-first century. Alternatively, some 
form of global confederacy might emerge, with states voluntarily surrendering a 
portion of their sovereignty to a global authority equipped with the authoritative and 
coercive wherewithal necessary to confront common threats to international peace and 
security more effectively than did its UN predecessor.1064  Yet another possibility is 
that of the reversion to a form of ‘durable disorder’, characterized by a plethora of 
different governance forms interacting with one another in the absence of any formal 
organizing principles or shared values.1065  Finally, in the event of a genuinely 
transformative systemic crisis, technological and ideological possibilities that are as 
yet unimaginable might facilitate the emergence of the world’s first genuinely global 
empire. Regardless of the exact outcome of such a hypothetical crisis, the historic 
experience of both Christendom and the Sinosphere teaches us that transformations of 
international order are singularly traumatic experiences. These cases also warn us of 
the perils of complacency. Both Christendom and the Sinosphere were underpinned by 
religious visions that appeared to contemporaries to guarantee the indefinite 
perpetuation of these orders until it was too late to prevent their dissolution. The 
global state system by contrast lacks the reassuring certainty of any cosmic guarantee, 
                                                 
1064This seems to be the preferred vision of Daniel Deudney, who anticipates the possibility of 
continually rising levels of violence interdependence producing a federal republican world nuclear 
government incorporating ‘negarchical structures of mutual restraint’ among the world’s political 
communities. See Deudney, Bounding Power, pp. 262-264 and p. 276. 
1065On ‘durable disorder’ as a possible future, see Philip Cerny. "Terrorism and the New Security 
Dilemma." Naval War College Review 58, no. 1 (2005), pp. 29-30. 
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relying rather on the collective reason of its members to ensure its preservation. 
Writing this dissertation has given me a strong appreciation of the horrors entailed in 
the transformation of international order. It has also reinforced my conviction that the 
contemporary world order is much more fragile than is commonly acknowledged. 
Nevertheless, it has also re-affirmed my belief that the challenges facing the global 
state system, unlike those that faced its historic predecessors, remain in the last 
instance eminently surmountable. 
 
A Final Word From Augustine 
 
 St. Augustine once argued that the Latin word religio derived from the earlier 
religare, meaning ‘to bind together.’1066  From Augustine’s time down to the 
Reformation, religion served this vital purpose within Christendom, tying otherwise 
disparate and feuding communities together through the higher bond of a common 
faith. Since the sixteenth century, however, religion has receded as the primary basis 
for international order, firstly within Christendom and then subsequently throughout 
the world. This secularization of international order has been partially propelled by 
systemic crises in which self-styled soldiers of God have invoked the divine not for 
the purposes of binding communities together, but rather with a view towards tearing 
international orders apart. Today, men who have invoked God’s name to justify the 
most heinous of atrocities are assailing the global state system. But while today’s 
jihadists have sought to invest their struggle with sacred significance, their ideas and 
actions are instead suggestive of an instrumental, cynical attitude to human life that 
owes more to Machiavelli than it does to Mohammed.  In this respect, they represent 
                                                 
1066On the etymology of religion, see Martin Warner. "Introduction." In Religion and Philosophy, edited 
by Martin Warner, 1-22. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. See specifically p. 1. 
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merely the most recent manifestation of a type of intensely politicized religiosity that 
has recurrently erupted from the Reformation onwards, and that has paradoxically 
been indirectly responsible for the birth and global diffusion of the very state system 
that jihadism now aims to annihilate.  In a multi-confessional world, in which 
authoritative and coercive power are unevenly dispersed among almost two hundred 
sovereign states, it is no longer possible for international society to remain anchored 
within the cosmic certainties of bygone orders. Nevertheless, it is still possible to 
identify those whose ethos violates the tenets of every major faith tradition, and whose 
actions threaten the very order within which freedom becomes possible.  
All international orders are impermanent, and all are imperfect. However, 
while I recognize the many imperfections of the present order, I nevertheless continue 
to believe that it is worth defending. In both Christendom and the Sinosphere, attempts 
to institute God’s reign on earth unleashed human suffering on a massive scale, and 
ultimately destroyed international orders that had endured for centuries on the basis 
that they were believed to have been divinely ordained. For all their destructive fury, 
however, the confessional militants of Europe’s Wars of Religion failed to expunge 
religious diversity from Europe in the Reformation’s wake. Similarly, the militant 
faith of the Taipings went the way of Carthage, their creed being utterly obliterated 
from the Chinese popular consciousness upon their defeat. One can only hope that 
global jihadism will suffer a similar defeat, as the grotesque dissonance between the 
jihadists’ protestations of piety and the profane character of their actions becomes 
universally apparent, spurring the international community to take the actions 
necessary to rejuvenate the current order, and defeat civilization’s common enemies.  
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